Nature and Representation: Qutb al-Din al-Razi on the Onto-Epistemic Status of Mental Exemplars

Abstract

Onto-epistemological status of mental representations can be seen among the most controversial problems of Post-Avicennan philosophy. The problem has its roots on the one hand in Ibn Sina's attempt to get a predicational unity between the layers of being and on the other hands in Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's criticisms of mental existence and universality of mental exemplars. Al-Razi's criticisms led the prominent followers of Ibn Sina to reconsider Avicennan principle of preservation of essences in multi-layered being and his conception of knowledge as an immaterial representation of nature. Against al-Razi's criticism, al-Tusi tried to narrow the ontologicaltextension of essences and redefined universal predication. Qu.b al-Din al-Razi's involvement in the discussion took the narrowing efforts to the next level. In addition to al-.usi's narrowing the ontological extensions of essences through giving them only an epistemological role, Qu.b al-Din alRazi downgraded their epistemological roles as well and counted them just as individual exemplars (mithal) in an individual mind. And in addition to al-Tusi's hesitant rejection of universal natures in external world, he clearly rejects the existence of universal natures in the external world. His first position led him to redefine the notion of correspondence and universality, and his second position led him to propose a non-explanatory interpretation of Ibn Sina's hylomorphic substances. In this paper, I will discuss the continuities and discontinuities of his interpretations in respect to Ibn Sina's strong metaphysical realism and his philosophical project aims to construct the unity of essences in multi-layered being.