The Weakening of Judicial Independence Through the Transition From the Judicialization of Politics to the Politicization of the Judiciary: Turkish Case

Abstract

The rule of the Justice and Development Party has brought about the transition from ‘tutelary democracy’ to ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in Turkey. A new partisan presidentialism model was introduced in 2017. The composition and powers of the Constitutional Court and the High Council Judges and Public Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcilar Yuksek Kurulu) were the centres of the Turkish judicial system. The executive used constitutional amendments and legislation to pack these judicial bodies with judges and prosecutors loyal to the regime. As a result, the judiciary has been politicized. This undermined the separation of powers and judicial independence, and empowered the executive. The existing studies on judicial independence in transitional democracies do not explain recent threats to judicial independence in Turkey. This chapter argues that the main threats to judicial independence in Turkey are the existence of long-standing tutelage democracy, the lack of legal regulation to protect the separation of powers, the presence of populism, and the close relationship between the executive and legislative organs. The aim of this chapter is to examine and evaluate the nature and scope of threats to judicial independence in a transitional democracy. © 2025 selection and editorial matter, Nauman Reayat, Rhona K. M. Smith and Moohyung Cho.