Roy Bhaskar's Critical Realism in the Face of the Structure-Agency Problem in Social Theory

Abstract

This article examines the possibilities and limitations of Roy Bhaskar's critical realism on the problem of structure and agency. Bhaskar's realist perspective on the problem starts from discussions in the philosophy of science and extends to social theory. In this regard, Bhaskar, building upon the layered reality concept in the philosophy of science, attempted to construct a naturalistic social theory, starting with the concept of ontological stratification and continuing with the theory of causal powers, reinforced by discussions of emergentism. Through this conceptual framework, he offered an explanation beyond the reductionist and synthesist approaches around the mentioned debate. On the other hand, the criticisms of Bhaskar's naturalistic perspective, especially by contemporary representatives of the critical realist tradition through cognitive neuroscience, have shown the limitations of Bhaskar's naturalistic view. The article discusses these criticisms and then lays out the grounds for both Bhaskar and his critics. Finally, the similarities between the seemingly conflicting approaches, the sources of these similarities, and the questions they fail to answer are addressed. In addition, it has been argued that the theoretical diversity on the structure-agency problem around these questions is merely an expansion within critical realism itself, and that a paradigmatic solution to the problem could not be produced. For a paradigmatic solution, it is argued that new theoretical considerations based on human nature and human singularity/subjective experience are essential.