Is Ontological Modality Distinct from Logical Modality? Tracing the Dispute on Wujub, Imkan and Imtina' in Kalam from Adud al-Din al-Iji to 'Ali Qushji

Abstract

In his al-Mawaqif fi'ilm al-kalam, 'Adud al-Din al-Iji argues that the concepts of wujub (necessity), imkan (possibility), and imtina' (impossibility) as analyzed in the general ontology (al-umur al-'amma) sections of later books are not the same as the wujub, imkan, and imtina' of modal logic. The subsequent commentary tradition is almost unanimous in its criticism of Iji on this point. Commentators of the Mawaqif such as Sayf al-Din al-Abhari, al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani, and Hasan Celebi; major commentators of the Tajrid tradition; and the author of Sharh al-Maqasid, Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani, all criticize Iji's claim. 'Ali Qushji represents an important culmination of this series of criticism, with his notable synthesis of the critiques of Jurjani and Taftazani. This paper firstly charts the trajectory of these critiques, by presenting and analyzing them in chronological order. Secondly, it makes the case that these critiques, though formally valid, in fact miss the mark, as they fail to recognize the full significance of the distinctions between existence and essence, and between wujub and imkan. More specifically, the later scholars had not expressly renewed the definition of the concept of thubut. Owing in large part to Ibn Sina's distinctions between existence-essence and wajib-mumkin, thubut in the later period radically diverged from the concept of existence, and in fact, the later scholars were using thubut with this newer understanding in mind, despite this not always being made explicit. For this reason, it is more accurate to understand Iji's statement not as a mistaken point or a stating of the obvious; rather it is an expression of his understanding that a new era of metaphysical analysis had commenced, as well as a characterisation of the nature of this era.