



GRADUATE SCHOOL
ISTANBUL MEDENIYET UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**INDONESIA'S DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS
TOWARD THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT
AFTER 7 OCTOBER 2023**

Master's Thesis

Anandam HAYUNDAKA

January, 2025



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THESIS JURY APPROVAL

This master's thesis titled "**INDONESIA'S DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS TOWARD THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT AFTER 7 OCTOBER 2023**" written by Anandam Hayundaka at the Department of International Relations was accepted by our jury.

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STATEMENTS

Writing and Citation Guidelines Statement

I have examined and verified that the structure of this thesis, which was produced under my direction, complies with the guidelines outlined in the writing and referencing standards guide.

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Doç. Dr. Fatma SARIASLAN

Declaration of Originality

I affirm that I am the sole author of this thesis, followed all academic and ethical guidelines, and properly referenced all of my sources.

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Anandam HAYUNDAKA

ÖZET

Endonezya'nın 7 Ekim 2023'ten Sonra Filistin Meselesine Yönelik Diplomatik Çabaları

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Ocak, 2025

Bu tez çalışması, Endonezya'nın ulusal ve İslami kimliğinin dış politikasını nasıl etkilediğini, Filistin-İsrail meselesi özelinde ele almakta ve Endonezya'nın bu meseleye yönelik diplomatik çabalarının nasıl şekillendiğini sosyal inşacılık (konstrüktivizm) kuramı ve Çok Kulvarlı Diplomasi (Multi-Track Diplomacy) kavramsallaştırması bağlamında tartışmaya odaklanmaktadır. Betimleyici niteliksel yöntem, daha kapsamlı bir inceleme sağlamak amacıyla analitik bir yaklaşım olarak tercih edilmiştir.

Çalışma, Endonezya'nın dış politikasının, *Pancasila*'nın değerleri ve ilkeleri ile 1945 Anayasası'ndan kök bulan ulusal kimliği ve Müslümanlar arasındaki dayanışma değerine dayanan İslami kimliği tarafından etkilendiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, Endonezya'nın Filistin'in mücadelesini ve bağımsızlığını destekleme konusundaki uluslararası diplomasi faaliyetlerinin yalnızca devlet düzeyindeki aktörlerini değil, aynı zamanda *Muhemmediye* gibi Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları dahil olmak üzere birçok başka aktörün katılımını da içerdiğine dikkat çekmektedir.

Endonezya'nın siyasi kimliğinin oluşum süreci, bağımsızlık yolundaki çabalarla yakından ilişkilidir. Bu süreçte 17 Ağustos 1945'te bağımsızlığını ilan eden bir ülke olarak Endonezya, içeride çeşitli ideolojik görüşlerin rekabeti ve dışarıdan Hollanda'nın tekrar kontrol kurma girişimi gibi zorluklarla karşılaştı. Bu süreçte de, ülkenin çeşitli dini ve etnik gruplarını birleştirecek bir ideolojiye ihtiyacı vardı; bu da *Pancasila* denilen beş maddeli bir ilkeyle gerçekleştirildi. *Pancasila*, inanca dayalı adalet, insan hakları, ulusal birlik, temsil yoluyla demokrasi ve sosyal adalet ilkelerini kapsayan bir çerçeve sunar. *Pancasila*, Endonezya'nın hem iç politikada çok etnikli ve çok dinli yapısını dikkate alan birleştirici bir ideoloji olarak hem de dış politikada bağımsızlık ve tarafsızlığı ön plana çıkaran bir strateji izlemesini sağlar.

Muhammad Hatta, 1948 yılında "İki Kaya Arasında Kürek Çekmek" başlıklı bir konuşma ile ülkenin "bağımsız ve aktif" dış politika prensibini ortaya koydu. Bu politika, Endonezya'nın herhangi bir uluslararası bloka dahil olmadan, çıkarlarını bağımsız bir şekilde koruma taahhütünü ifade eder. Anti-sömürgecilik, ulusal çıkarları koruma ve pragmatik bir yaklaşım bu politikanın temel taşları arasındadır. Bu dönemde, Endonezya hem çok kutuplu dünya düzeninde denge sağlamaya çalışırken, hem de içeride ulusal birliği güçlendirme çabalarına odaklanmıştır. Bu prensipler, hem iki tarihi hem de modern Endonezya dış politikasının temelini oluşturmuştur. 1947 yılında, Endonezya'nın Orta Doğu'daki diplomatik girişimleri sonucunda Mısır, Lübnan, Suriye, Suudi Arabistan ve Yemen gibi ülkeler Endonezya'nın bağımsızlığını tanıdı. Bu diplomatik başarı, İslam kardeşliği bağları ile desteklendi. Endonezya delegasyonunun İslami dayanışma mesajları, çok sayıda Arap ülkesinden uluslararası destek alınmasında etkili oldu. Ancak, bu İslami dayanışma çalışmaları, *Pancasila*'ya dayanan laik devlet anlayışının önünü kesmemiştir. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

(SBY) döneminde (2004-2014), Endonezya'nın uluslararası arenadaki İslamî kimliği öne çıkardı. SBY, Endonezya'nın modernite, demokrasi ve İslam'ı birleştiren benzersiz bir model sunduğunu vurgulamak istedi. Özellikle 11 Eylül olayları sonrasında artan İslamofobiye'ye karşı, Endonezya, İslam'ın barışçı ve modern bir din olduğunu dünyaya göstermek amacıyla uluslararası platformlarda aktif bir rol oynadı. SBY döneminde, İslam'ın uluslararası imajını düzeltmek için şu stratejiler izlenmiştir: **Barış ve Tolerans Mesajı:** İslam'ı rahmet ve barış dini olarak tanıtmaya çalışmaları. **Diyalog Platformları:** Batı dünyası ve İslam coğrafyası arasında bir köprü olma rolü. **Ulusal Kimlik ve Uluslararası Güçlendirme:** Endonezya'nın demokratik ve çoğulcu yapısını vurgulayan diplomatik kampanyalar. Sonuç olarak, Endonezya'nın İslamî kimliği, uluslararası arenada ülkenin rolünü ve önemini arttıran bir unsur olmuştur. Ancak bu İslamî kimliği, Endonezya'nın devlet ideolojisi olarak *Pancasila*'da meydana gelen değişiklikleri etkilememektedir.

Endonezya'nın Filistin'e verdiği destek, ilk Cumhurbaşkanı Soekarno dönemine kadar uzanmaktadır. Soekarno, bağımsızlık hakkının tüm ulusların doğal hakkı olduğunu vurgulayarak, Filistin'in özgürleşmesi için dayanışma gösterdi. Bu destek, Asya-Afrika Konferansı (1955) gibi platformlarda dile getirildi ve günümüzde de devam etmektedir.

Filistin meselesine yönelik politikaların kaynağı üzerine farklı görüşler mevcuttur. Bazı araştırmacılar bu politikaların İslami dayanışma temelli olduğunu belirtirken, diğerleri ulusal çıkarları ve anayasal değerleri temel aldığını savunmaktadır.

Endonezya'nın Filistin'e desteęi, çeşitli biçimlerde devam etmektedir:

1. **Siyasi Destek:** Endonezya, Filistin'in özgürlüğünü savunma konusunda uluslararası platformlarda aktif bir tutum sergilemektedir. Bu durum, Birleşmiş Milletler gibi uluslararası kurumlarda Filistin yanlısı kararları desteklemekte açık bir şekilde görülmektedir.
2. **Ekonomik ve İnsanî Yardım:** Endonezya, Gazze şeridindeki insani krizi hafifletmek için düzenli olarak yardım kampanyaları düzenlemektedir. Son dönemde toplam 30 milyar rupiah değerinde tıbbî malzeme, gıda ve temel ihtiyaç yardımı Filistin'e ulaştırılmıştır.
3. **Diplomatik Girişimler:** Endonezya, İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı (İİT) gibi örgütlerle eşgüdüm halinde çalışmakta, ülkeler ararası diyalog ve barış çağrıları yapmaktadır.
4. **Kamuoyu ve Sivil Toplum Katılımı:** İslamî organizasyonlar, özellikle *Muhammediye* ve *Nahdatul Ulama*, Filistin yanlısı kamuoyu oluşturmak ve sivil yardım faaliyetleri düzenlemek konusunda aktif rol oynamaktadır.

Endonezya'nın Filistin politikası, hem anayasal değerlerden hem de İslam'ın dayanışma ilkelerinden etkilenecek şekilde şekillenmektedir. Bu strateji, hem ulusal hem de uluslararası çıkarları dengeleme amacı taşımaktadır.

Gazze meselesinin artışıyla Endonezya, barışı teşvik etmek ve insani yardımları sağlamak için aktif diplomasi yürütmüştür. Şu adımlar atılmıştır:

1. **Uluslararası Örgütlerle İşbirliği:** ASEAN-Körfez Ülkeleri Zirvesi ve BM toplantıları gibi platformlarda Filistin'e destek vurgulanmıştır.

2. **İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı ile Eşgüdüm:** İİT toplantılarında Filistin'in haklarını savunma çağrısı yapılmıştır.
3. **Bilateral Diplomasi:** Örneğin, Endonezya ile Yeni Zelanda ve Ürdün arasında Filistin meselesine dair ortak görüşler dile getirilmiştir.
4. **İnsani Yardımlar:** 2024 yılına kadar toplam 30 milyar rupiah değerinde insani yardım yapılmış, gıda, tıbbi malzeme ve temel ihtiyaçlar Gazze'ye ulaştırılmıştır.

Endonezya'nın en etkili İslamî organizasyonlarından *Muhammediye*, Filistin davasını desteklemek için çeşitli girişimlerde bulunmuş, insani yardım kampanyaları düzenlemiş ve çatışmanın sona ermesi için diplomasiye katılım sağlamıştır. *Muhammediye*, yalnızca inanç (akide) alanında değil, aynı zamanda insan ilişkileri (muamelat) alanında da davet (tebliğ) faaliyetleri yürüterek gerçek İslam'ı tanıtmayı amaçlamaktadır. Wasatiyye'ye (orta yol) dayalı, ilerici bir İslami yönelimle ve iyiliği emretme, kötülükten sakındırma (amar ma'ruf nahi munkar) ruhuyla hareket eden *Muhammediye*, eğitim, sağlık ve hayırseverlik faaliyetleri gibi alanlarda davet çalışmalarını geliştirmektedir. *Muhammediye*'nin uluslararasılaşma çabaları, bu kuruluşun davet mücadelesinin bir parçası olarak dünya Müslümanlarına fayda sağlamak ve Filistin'e verdiği desteği sürdürme çabalarında kendini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Filistin-İsrail Meselesi, Endonezya, Kimlik, Çok Kulvarlı Diplomasi, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları

ABSTRACT

Indonesia's Diplomatic Endeavors Toward the Palestine-Israel Conflict after 7 October 2023

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Master's Thesis, Institute of Graduate Education

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January, 2025

This thesis focuses on discussing how national and Islamic identity affects the foreign policy of Indonesia, especially in addressing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and how Indonesia's diplomatic efforts toward the conflict. The constructivist approach and the Multi-Track Diplomacy concept are applied as tools to explain the questions in this thesis research.

The results of this study found that the national identity of Indonesia rooted in the values and principles of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, as well as Islamic identity rooted in the value of solidarity with fellow Muslims, influenced Indonesia's foreign policy to continue to be committed to supporting the struggle and independence of Palestine. In addition, Indonesia's diplomacy in the international world as a form of its commitment to Palestine is not only followed by state actors, but also the involvement of many other actors, one of which is Non-Governmental Organizations such as *Muhammadiyah*.

Keywords: Palestine-Israel Conflict, Indonesia, Identity, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Non-Governmental Organization

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN-GCC	: Association South East-Asian Nation-Gulf Cooperation Council
BAZNAS	: <i>Badan Amil Zakat Nasional</i> /National Zakat Agency
DFLP	: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DOP	: Declaration of Principle
ERC	: Egypt Red-Cross
ESS	: Emergency Special Session
Hamas	: <i>Harakat al Muwaqqawamatul Islamiyah</i>
IDF	: Israel Defence Force
IR	: International Relations
KNIP	: <i>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</i> /Central National Committee of Indonesia
LAZISMU	: <i>Lembaga Amil, Zakat, Infak, Sadaqah Muhammadiyah</i> /Muhammadiyah Zakat, Infaq, Shadaqah Institute
MPR	: <i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> /People's Consultative Assembly
MTD	: Multi-Track Diplomacy
MUI	: <i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> /Ulema Indonesia Council
NAM	: Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	: Non-Government Organisation
NU	: Nahdatul Ulama
OIC	: Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OKP	: <i>Organisasi Kepemudaan</i> /Youth Organisation
PCIM	: <i>Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Muhammadiyah</i> /Muhammadiyah Special Branch Leadership

PFLP	: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMI	: <i>Palang Merah Indonesia</i> /Indonesia Red Cross
PP	: <i>Pimpinan Pusat</i> /Central Leadership
PPP	: Palestine People Party
SBY	: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
UN	: United Nations
UNRWA	: United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
YPI	: <i>Yayasan Pendidikan Islam</i> / Islamic Education Foundation

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INTRODUCTION

World history has been marked by several wars rooted in social, political, and economic challenges. The long-standing conflict between Israel and Palestine makes it a significant one. The complexity of the situation stems from several elements, including the rule of Jerusalem, border disputes, security concerns, Palestinian freedom of movement, water rights, and Israeli settlement (Dowty, 2008). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has its origins in the 19th century (Rizova & Panayotova, 2021). Initially, this conflict was rooted in a dispute over the right to settle in the land of Palestine, which at that time was part of Britain's rule in the form of the Palestine Mandate after the loss of the Ottoman Empire in World War I (Harms & Ferry, 2008).

Lord Rothschild, the nominal president of Britain's Zionist Federation, was promised the creation of the Jewish State in the designated Palestinian territories as their National Home following the conclusion of World War I in the Balfour Declaration, which was published on November 2, 1917, by the British government before Britain assuming control of the mandate (Fakhruddin & Nurjannah, 2019). A concept to create two nations out of the Palestinian land was put out by the League of Nations in 1947. Nonetheless, the Palestinians and other Arab nations disapproved of this partition, believing it to be unjust and incompatible with the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The British Mandate ended in 1948 followed by the proclamation of independence of the state of Israel. That proclamation led to the strong rejection from other Arab Countries and caused an inevitable war also known as the Arab-Israeli War or Israel's "War of Independence." The Arab-Israeli War caused the beginning of a mass exodus of Palestinians

known as *Nakba* (catastrophe). Since then, the Palestinian people have been displaced from their land, leaving millions living as refugees in neighboring countries.

Historically, various diplomatic attempts and negotiations have been made between the two parties, such as the Madrid Conference 1991, the Oslo Accords I 1993, Oslo Accords II 1995, Camp David 2000, and Road Map of Peace 2003 which offered the hope of creating two states living side by side in peace. However, these agreements have not worked well and have failed to resolve the conflict completely. To this day, key issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and Israel's illegal settlements remain major points of contention (Seelbach, 2023). The conflict is more arduous because Israel's military actions led to acts of genocide causing thousands of casualties to Palestinians which have frequently violated human rights, and have drawn international condemnation¹.

A recent event in which the Palestinian liberation forces, Hamas (*Harakat al Muwaqawwamatul Islamiyah*), carried out a military operation against an Israeli military base called Operation al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023 (Aisha, 2023). This operation is a form of Palestinian resistance against Israel that has repeatedly committed aggression at the al-Aqsa Mosque and released Palestinian prisoners. In addition, this operation aims to end the 15-year blockade of Gaza and the status quo in the Palestinian territories

¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW) has accused Israel of committing the crime of extermination and acts of genocide against Palestinian civilians in Gaza by deliberately denying them access to clean water. The HRW report states that Israel's actions, including the destruction of water infrastructure and restrictions on humanitarian aid, have led to thousands of deaths from malnutrition, dehydration, and disease. Although Israel denies these allegations and claims to facilitate the flow of water and humanitarian aid into Gaza, HRW stresses that these policies meet the definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. Human Rights Watch, Israel's Crime of Extermination, Acts of Genocide in Gaza, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/19/israels-crime-extermination-acts-genocide-gaza> accessed on 27 December 2024.

(Düz & Çinkara, 2023). This operation also became a turning point in the Palestinian resistance against Israel where Hamas fighters were able to fight and penetrate the Israeli military defense which is considered one of the strongest (Zatari, 2023).

The military offensive launched by Hamas in this operation paralyzed Israel for 24 hours, allowing Hamas fighters to enter deeper into Israel and attack Israeli military posts, the Beit Hanoon border area, the Zikim military base, and the Gaza military headquarters in Reim (Fetouri, 2023).

To counter these attacks, Israel launched a counter-attack operation called “Operation Swords of Iron” which aimed to eliminate Hamas but turned to genocide. This operation has lasted and resulted in a total assault on Gaza, blocking food, water, and fuel supply lines to Gaza, launching ground attacks, and even Israeli soldiers intentionally attacking hospitals and populated areas in Gaza (Ebrahim, 2023). Israeli army troops continue to launch rockets and bombard the area indiscriminately even against civilians there. The number of casualties suffered by Palestinians in Gaza, especially women and children, as well as the lack of food and drink supplies left due to the blockade carried out by Israel against humanitarian assistance from various countries. However, international views were divided: some countries supported the right of Israel to defend their territory from Hamas’s attack², while others, including many in the Muslim world, condemned the Israeli military's atrocities against Palestinian civilians, one of which is Indonesia (Suratiningsih et al., 2020).

² When major attacks are carried out by Hamas against Israel, countries such as the Britain, United States, France, and Germany express full solidarity to Israel, emphasizing the country's right to defend itself. This support is often accompanied by military and diplomatic assistance. The United States has been a major supporter of Israel in various aspects. In the military aspect, the US provides billions of dollars in military aid every year, including the Israel’s defense system, Iron Dome to protect Israel from rocket attacks. In international forums such as the UN, the US often vetoes UN resolutions that are considered detrimental to Israel.

Indonesia is one of the countries that continues to be active and consistent in fighting for and supporting Palestinian independence, especially since the reign of Ir. Soekarno as the first Indonesia's president. In addition, fighting for the independence of Palestine is a promise from Indonesia in the forum of the First Asian-African Conference in 1955, in Bandung (Prasetya & Srifauzi, 2018). Indonesia's support for Palestine is not only limited to bilateral relations but more than that, Indonesia-Palestine relations are based on historical ties (Prawira et al., 2021).

When Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, Palestine – under the British mandate – was the first nation to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Indonesia. Through the radio in Berlin, the mufti of Palestine, Shaykh Muhammad Amin al-Husaini, broadcasted about the independence of Indonesia and congratulated them. He also actively helped the negotiations in the Middle East to provide support and acknowledge the sovereignty and independence of Indonesia (TEMPO, 2023). In the end, Egypt also recognized Indonesia's sovereignty on March 22, 1946 and was followed by other Middle Eastern countries (Satris, 2019).

Until now, Indonesia continues to oppose various forms of oppression, colonialism and violence committed by Israel against Palestine (Sawaki, 2022). In addition, Indonesia also did not give its recognition to the establishment and independence of Israel in Palestine's territory. Indonesia's position is to continue to support the recognition, freedom, and independence of Palestine. Furthermore, on November 15, 1988 when Palestine declared its independence from Algeria, one day later, Indonesia also recognized the independence and established diplomatic relations with Palestine (Aslamiah & Jamaan, 2015). In 1991, the Palestinian embassy was officially established in the capital city of Indonesia, and in 1993, Yasser Arafat, the first president of Palestine, visited Indonesia and met with

Indonesia's second president, Soeharto. Until today, There are no diplomatic ties between Israel and Indonesia (Prasetya & Srifauzi, 2018).

Another example of Indonesia-Palestine relations that shows Indonesia's seriousness in fighting for Palestinian independence is back in 2017, when US President Donald Trump, in his remarks, acknowledged and approved of Israel's decision to relocate its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and the US will shortly relocate its embassy there as well. This event added to the list of prolonged conflicts between Palestine and Israel. In response to this decision, Joko Widodo, Indonesia's president, in a speech at the Presidential Palace in Bogor on December 7, 2017, strongly condemned Trump's action and asked him to reconsider his decision (Saragih, 2018). In his speech, he mentioned:

"I and the people of Indonesia remain consistent with the Palestinian people in fighting for their rights."

This shows Indonesia's position that still stands on the side of Palestine. Furthermore, Indonesia also responded to the current situation in Gaza, Palestine. Through the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, Indonesia spoke in front of the UN Security Council in a High-Level Open Debate, in New York on 24 October 2023, to immediately take concrete action to resolve the Palestine-Israel conflict. On November 11, 2023, President Joko Widodo attended the Extraordinary Meeting of the OIC in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and was attended by leaders from other members, one of which was Türkiye led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. At the meeting, Indonesia and Türkiye worked together to continue cooperation in overcoming the problems in Gaza and supporting Palestine in realizing its independence. President Joko Widodo also expressed his support by making every effort through the United Nations Security Council, International Criminal Court (ICC), and Human Rights Council to continue

to voice justice and humanity toward the Palestinian people (Deputy Cabinet Secretary, 2023). In the same month, on November 29, 2023, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi attended an inter-member meeting of the OIC in New York to deliberate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Indonesia and the OIC representatives in attendance reached a consensus on a number of crucial issues, including the need for the international community to act quickly to secure the aid route to Gaza, complete adherence to international law, and the significance of establishing a lasting ceasefire agreement to put an end to all forms of violence (Kemlu, 2023).

Based on the background above, this research has two research problems, namely how does Indonesian national and Islamic identity influence the foreign policy of Indonesia toward the Palestine-Israel conflict in 2023 and how Indonesia carries out diplomatic efforts? To answer the research question, the researcher uses the Constructivist approach and the Multi-Track Diplomacy concept. Qualitative research methods are used in this study to provide in-depth explanations and descriptions of this topic by collecting data from books, journals, documents, articles, and news on the internet related to the topic of research.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Constructivism

Constructivism is a new theory in International Relations (IR) that emerged in late 1997 as a result of an international conference of IR experts in various countries held in Aarhus-Norsminde, Denmark (Fierke & Jorgensen, 2001). This approach emerged due to the IR scholars's inadequacy to explain the end of the Cold War - which seemed sudden - based on existing theories at that time, especially neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Kurki & Smith, 2010).

The development of constructivism in IR makes the study not only focus on the problem of High-Politics issues but also opens up opportunities to explain Low-Politics phenomena such as gender and ethnicity issues that have been neglected. Norms, the significance of identity in the formation of actions and interests, and the reciprocal interaction between "agents" and "structures" are all highlighted by constructivists as anthropological and sociological perspectives on international politics (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998).

Contrary to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivism is a new approach to the study of international relations that emphasizes the social dimension of IR, the potential for global change, and the importance of non-material factors like norms, culture, identity, and ideas in explaining the actions of IR actors (Bakry, 2017).

Constructivism is also commonly known as social constructivism which emphasizes the importance of the idea factor, how each country 'constructs' social reality in IR and from the results of this construction they will act. Therefore, the creation of the social world by humans (actors) is not given and is something that exists outside of the realm of scientific study and theoretical justifications for its rules. Constructivist views that "international reality" is formed by shared ideas, perceptions and beliefs

that emerge through interactions between countries (Kaya, 2008). Constructivism views the international system as a social structure consisting of norms, values, and practices resulting from interactions between actors. In this case, actors in international relations, such as states, international organizations, or even individuals, are not only influenced by material interests but also by the identities and social norms they internalize. The identities of these actors play an important role in determining their actions (Arı, 2014).

Constructivism sees that states do not only react to international structures but also play a role in shaping these structures through social interaction. In other words, states are active agents that not only adapt to the international system but also shape it through the values, ideas, and norms they embrace. Overall, constructivism helps us understand that international relations are not only determined by "What states have" but also by "How states see themselves and others" (Kaya, 2008).

In constructivist thinking, there are three main points, namely (1) emphasizing the aspects of actors and structures; (2) prioritizing the importance of interaction between international relations actors and structures; (3) the results of social construction influence actor behavior to produce an interest (Abdurofiq, 2016). Each of the points of thought above is built on three propositions, first, structure influences the behavior of international relations actors. This is related to the constructivist assumption that ideas, beliefs, and values have a strong influence as structural characteristics on every action taken by actors both in the social and political fields, which are called collective meanings or intersubjectivity. Thus, the existence of this intersubjectivity influences the formation of structures that have an impact on actor behavior. Second, the actions and interests taken by actors are based on their identities as

expressed by Alexander Wendt "Identity is the basis of interest". Third, the relationship between actors and structures that influence each other to form identities in social and political actions (Linklater et al., 2005).

In addition, the constructivist theory is built on four assumptions according to Joseph Grieco, (1) a form of interest from many actors, is not given, but is formed from the identity of the actors and how others see these actors; (2) culture, normative beliefs, religion, and science, as variables that form the identity; (3) elites in both nations are the most significant actors in influencing a nation's perspective and behavior within the international system; and (4) the role of interaction between elites, form and change identity in order to strengthen ideas and beliefs (Grieco et al., 2015).

1.1.1 Identity and Norms

In international relations, constructivists use identity as a concept to explain "who" or the actor who acts in an international relations phenomenon. By knowing the identity possessed by an actor, one can know the actions taken based on the abilities he has in social and political matters. The concept of identity can be simply interpreted according to Alexander Wendt as self-understanding. To make identity a variable in international relations, it is essential to apprehend the identity of an actor that is carried out collectively, not personally (Abdurofiq, 2016).

Wendt also divides identity into two parts, internal and external. Identity that is formed internally is formed through a series of historical processes that are passed through and the values of the nation that are adopted in it so that the identity is attached to a nation. While identity that is formed externally is formed through the interaction of a country with other countries (Torun, 2009). Thus, the interactions carried out by actors in international relations are not given, but based on the construction of

structures that influence the behavior or actions of the actors collectively (Wendt, 1994).

Norms, on the other hand, are social rules or expectations that are shared among states, creating standards of behavior that are considered correct or appropriate in a particular context. Kaya explains that international norms are formed through interactions and collective agreements between states, which can develop into widely recognized norms. These norms serve as “guidelines” for states to decide on actions that are deemed appropriate or inappropriate, not only for the sake of individual interests, but also to maintain international image and reputation (Kaya, 2008).

Identities and norms have direct implications for a state's foreign policy in several ways, namely 1) Policy Prioritization: Identities and norms assist states in determining foreign policy priorities; 2) Formation of Alliances and Bilateral Relationships: States often seek partners who share similar identities or norms; 3) Policy Change through International Pressure: International norms can influence a state's foreign policy, especially if the state is trying to improve its image or reputation; 4) Influence on Military Decisions and Interventions: decisions for military involvement are also heavily influenced by identity and norms.; 5) Policies in Response to Global Threats: In issues that require international cooperation, such as climate change or terrorism, identity and norms play a role in driving collective policies (Kaya, 2008).

Identity and norms are not just supporting factors but essential elements that shape the national interests and foreign policy of a country. States act not only based on rational calculations of material gain, but also on how they see themselves and what is considered right in the international system. Changes in identity or norms can produce major changes in foreign policy (McGlinchey et al., 2017).

1.1.2 Interest and Identity

The emergence of the interest and identity approach in constructivism began with criticism directed at realists who stated that the interests of a country that influence foreign policy are fixed. Meanwhile, according to the constructivist view, these interests are dynamic and do not just appear out of nowhere, but there is a deep understanding of the identity carried by a country. Thus, identity becomes the main source that influences the interests of a country and from these interests produces an output to design the foreign policy. A state's identity encompasses how it sees itself and how it wants to be seen by other actors. This identity is not fixed but continues to develop through the process of social interaction. Identity also influences how states define their interests. In constructivism, state interests are not considered to be something that has existed from the beginning or universal, but are the result of ongoing social interactions (Ari, 2014).




Figure 1: Process of Making a Decision According to Constructivist Wendt

Constructivism's explanation above makes it clear that the occurrences that take place in International Relations are not predetermined but rather the product of actors' constructions of how they see the global environment. According to the constructivist view, national interests driven by their individual identities are the exact reason why IR players engage in policy-makers. Thus, to analyze a country's foreign policy, it can be understood more deeply through its identity, such as in understanding Indonesia's policy to respond and play a role in the Palestine-Israel conflict.

The 1945 Constitution and Pancasila serve as the foundation for Indonesia's national identity in foreign policy, which is represented in the "free-active"

concept (Widhiyoga & Harini, 2019). Pancasila serves as the Ideal, Constitutional, and Operational foundation of Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution in the opening section reads *"Indeed, all countries have the right to independence, hence colonialism on earth must be eradicated"* which contains the values of independence, peace, and social justice in every aspect of citizenship. The law that regulates Indonesia's foreign relations and serves as an operational basis is Law No. 37/1999. In Article 3, it is explained that Indonesia pursues its national interests by adhering to the principles of "free-active" foreign policy (Nugraha & Maura, 2023). Thus, the values and meanings contained in the "free-active" principle make Indonesia have an "outward-looking" orientation toward international issues/phenomena that occur (Abdurofiq, 2016).

With Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution serving as the cornerstones of a state based on the principles of struggle, independence, and anti-colonialism, Indonesia remains steadfast in its opposition to Israel's colonization of Palestine and continuously backs Palestinian independence. This is reflected in the statement of the first President of Indonesia, Soekarno who said *"The Indonesian people support their opposition to Israeli colonization as long as the Palestinians have not been granted their freedom."* (Mukthi, 2014).

Indonesia became one of the many countries that refused to recognize Israel's independence in 1948, even when the first Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung in 1955, Israel was denied arrival and participation by Indonesia in the conference. Under Soeharto, Indonesia's second president, on November 11, 1988, Indonesia recognized the independence of Palestine. During the reformation period with different regimes until now led by Joko Widodo, the seventh president, Indonesia

consistently continues to support Palestine with various kinds of diplomatic meetings between countries and humanitarian assistance provided.

In addition to national identity, Islamic identity also colors and influences foreign policy of Indonesia, particularly in the Palestine-Israel conflict. Islam is an identity that may be utilized to represent a moderate political attitude, which is one side of Indonesia's foreign policy (Anwar, 2010). Islam has a significant impact on Indonesia's foreign policy, despite the fact that Indonesia is not an Islamic nation and based its laws on Islamic law. The fact that the vast majority of Indonesians are Muslims and that the country is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation lend credence to this, and Indonesian community support based on the brotherhood and solidarity of Muslims. (Setiawati, 2024).


1.2 Multi-Track Diplomacy

In the field of international relations, Multi-Track Diplomacy (MTD) emerged as a term that reflects the actions involved in achieving peace through a conceptual framework. The presence of various actors other than the state in MTD indicates that the science of international relations does not only focus on state actors but other actors have a role in the world of international relations.

In addition, the end of the Cold War between the northern and southern camps and the fall of the Berlin Wall indicate that the emergence of MTD according to IR academics is a critical form of the role of state actors which are considered less effective in realizing world peace (Mujiono & Alexandra, 2019). The presence of actors other than the state such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), was first coined by Josep Montville in 1982 in the Foreign Service Institute which explained the role of NGOs in

playing diplomatic roles other than the state so that NGOs are associated with the term track two in MTD (McDonald & Diamond, 1996).

Figure 2: The Nine Tracks of Diplomacy



Source: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

John W. McDonald (2012) states that there are nine tracks in Multi Track Diplomacy, which are:

Track One: Government/State Diplomacy

This track is traditional diplomacy between government officials and representatives of different countries. This form of diplomacy involves negotiations, agreements and cooperation between countries. Governments play an important role in making political and policy decisions that have a major impact on international humanitarian issues.

Second Track: Civil Society or Non-Governmental Organization Diplomacy

This track includes non-governmental actors, including humanitarian organizations and conflict resolution experts. These actors often act as

intermediaries between conflicting parties, helping to facilitate mediation and dialogue. They act independently of governments and often have direct access to affected communities.

Third Track: Enterprise/Business Diplomacy

The private sector also plays an important role in modern diplomacy, particularly in supporting humanitarian initiatives with financial assistance and resources. Large corporations can also contribute directly through Corporate Social Responsibility programs and social investments that impact communities in conflict or disaster-affected areas.

Track Four: Private Citizen/Individuals Diplomacy

Citizen diplomacy refers to individuals or groups involved in international relations through cultural exchanges, education or people-to-people cooperation programs. Through this diplomacy, citizens can help promote cross-cultural understanding and build bridges between different societies.

The Fifth Lane: Research, Education and Training Diplomacy

Educational institutions, research institutes and training organizations play a role in diplomacy by developing knowledge, skills and a deep understanding of global issues. They assist evidence-based decision-making in international relations and humanitarian diplomacy by offering information and insights through research and teaching.

Track Six: Activism and Advocacy Diplomacy

They play a role in influencing public opinion and government policy on important global issues such as human rights, climate change and refugees. This diplomacy aims to raise awareness and pressure governments or international organizations to take action on humanitarian issues.

Track Seven: Religious/Moral Authority Diplomacy

In religious diplomacy, religious leaders and religious communities work together to promote peace, tolerance and reconciliation. This field aims to promote interreligious dialogue and cooperation on humanitarian issues.

Track Eight: Financing Diplomacy

Financing diplomacy involves both private and public donors supporting humanitarian aid and peace projects. Strong funding sources are crucial to conducting humanitarian diplomacy, especially in emergencies. This area directs resources where they are needed to maximize the impact of humanitarian aid.

Track Nine: Communications and Media Diplomacy

Media and communications have great power to influence public opinion and disseminate information about global issues. Media can draw attention to humanitarian crises, pressure governments to take action, and mobilize public support. Social media also plays a role in humanitarian diplomacy by reaching global audiences and accelerating responses to urgent problems.

1.2.1 Humanity Diplomation and Multi-Track Diplomacy

Humanitarian diplomacy is a diplomatic approach that aims to address humanitarian crises, promote assistance for victims of conflict, natural disasters and champion human rights. The concept has become increasingly relevant as humanitarian crises around the world escalate, requiring cross-border action and international cooperation. Humanitarian diplomacy

involves various actors working together to provide humanitarian assistance to communities affected by disasters or conflicts.

In humanitarian diplomacy, there are four main principles:

1. Humanity: This principle aims to alleviate human suffering wherever they are, especially those affected by conflict or disaster;
2. Neutrality: Humanitarian diplomacy does not take sides in existing conflicts or political issues, thus allowing access to aid without being hampered by ideological differences;
3. Independence: Humanitarian organizations involved must be able to operate independently without being influenced by political or economic pressures;
4. Impartiality: Assistance is provided based on need, without discrimination against any particular group, race, or religion (Kınık & Aslan, 2020).

To realize the objectives of humanitarian diplomacy, a framework and operational structure are needed to coordinate these objectives, in this case in the form of Multi-Track-Diplomacy. This is because MTD provides a framework and responsibility that does not only focus on one actor, but the involvement of many actors to achieve an integrated goal.

Tracks two through nine are implemented to set the stage for the government's first track, which is the positive reforms. Tracks two through nine can guarantee the appropriate execution and implementation of governmental decisions. Recognizing that NGOs and other actors are also necessary to support government performance in transforming deeply ingrained conflicts, Tracks Two through Nine also function as a systems-based approach. Consequently, using this strategy will bring lasting peace (Solihin et al., 2023).

In this study, the researcher will focus on tracks 1 and 2 where the act of government and NGOs focuses on resolving the Palestine-Israel conflict. The Indonesian government continues to provide support to Palestine in humanitarian-focused diplomacy in Palestine such as supporting the UN Security Council's efforts to authorize a variety of resolutions related to the events in Gaza, participating in the 10th Emergency Special Session (ESS-10) with the theme "Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of Occupied Palestine Territory", and taking part in the OIC member associations that discuss Palestinian issues. In addition, the government of Indonesia likewise provided material in the form of 90.41 tons of aid in November 2023, financial assistance worth 1 million USD to help medical care for victims of Palestinian civil society, and Indonesia has also increased the nominal amount of assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)³ from 200,000 USD / year to 600,000 USD / year.

In addition, the role of Muhammadiyah as the largest Islamic-based NGO in Indonesia also tried and helped to provide support to Palestine. After the October 7, 2023 attack in which Israel launched a retaliatory attack that killed thousands of children, women, teenagers, and the elderly, Muhammadiyah issued 7 statements that essentially contained an urge to immediately end the war, calling on the government to immediately end

³ On October 28, 2024, the Knesset, Israeli parliament passed a law prohibiting state authorities from establishing contact/relations with the UNRWA organization due to their belief and assumption that UNRWA has ties to Hamas. In addition, several senior Israeli politicians stated that UNRWA is a "Palestinian organization that supports the destruction of Israel" and "UNRWA teaches [Palestinian] children to hate Israel and spreads anti-Semitic teachings." This decision by the Israeli parliament received much criticism from many parties, which will result in a worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza. UNRWA's role has been an important humanitarian organization in providing humanitarian facilities such as health facilities, education, and vocational training to the Palestinian people. In response to the provisions of the law, the UN tried not to implement it because it would cause a wave of criticism and protests from many groups. United Nations, Israeli laws blocking UNRWA – devastating humanitarian impact for Palestinians?, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1156326> accessed on 27 December 2024.

the war. On November 1, 2023, Muhammadiyah distributed the second humanitarian aid for Palestine amounting to 13 billion during the previous two periods in 2018-2023 it had distributed aid of 27 billion so the total aid provided by Muhammadiyah reached 40 billion.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

The end of the French Revolution in the 18th century gave birth to many ideas, one of which was nationalism, which managed to inspire nations from various regions (Köse, 2018). This idea has continued to develop throughout time, resulting in people from various parts of the world starting to identify themselves as part of a state entity and demanding to be given the right to manage or organize their own territory (Self-determination and sovereignty). This also happened to Jewish and Palestinian entities throughout the 20th century when they started to mobilize and cultivate a sense of national identity in order to accomplish their national objectives. On the one hand, the Jewish people have an identity that they are a superior nation in the eyes of God, and the emergence of the ideology of Zionism convinces them to immediately establish a nation for the Jewish to avoid anti-Semitism from other nations. But there is a serious problem: Palestinians are living in the areas that the Jews claim as the 'promised land'. The Palestinians live in their homeland, which has been under the preservation of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years.

The clash between the Arab-Palestinian and the Jewish people is basically the struggle for a territory. Initially, Britain came to Palestine with the authorization to take control from the hands of the Ottoman Empire and make Palestine an independent political unit entity, but the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which increased the wave of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, became the initial seed of a prolonged conflict. Various efforts between the two parties and the UN through agreements and decisions that have been made until now have not been able to reconcile and resolve this

conflict. In this section, the researcher will explain the early history of the Palestine-Israel conflict.

2.2 Zionism in the Framework of Israeli Social Beliefs

Talking about Zionism, we need to look back to find out how the Zionist movement or ideology emerged and became an identity for the state of Israel. Previously, we need to understand the concept of social belief which is based on the concept of "victimization" of various incidents that befell the Jews such as the phenomenon of the "pogrom" in 1881 in Russia, and anti-Semitic movements throughout the world aimed at the Jews. These things are what drove them to have the idea of establishing their own Jewish state as stated by Theodor Herzl⁴.

Zionism is a political philosophy based on the opinion that "The Jewish people have territory rights in the Middle East and the territory is currently being occupied by the Arab-Palestinian community for over a millennium" (Akkus, 2019). This claim is also supported by a statement from Yael Zerubavel who said *"Their claim that the Jews were the original owners/occupants of the land 2000 years ago also points to it as a justified reason to occupy the place (Zerubavel, 1995)."*

⁴ "There is no denying the seriousness of the Jewish condition. They are essentially persecuted wherever their population is noticeable. Their statutory right to equality before the law has all but disappeared. They are prohibited from holding jobs in the army, the public sector, or even moderately high ones. There are also attempts to drive them out of business by saying things such as, "Don't buy from Jews!"

"There are an increasing number of attacks every day in parliaments, legislatures, the press, pulpits, streets, traveling, and even recreational areas. Persecution takes several forms depending on the nations and social groups where it happens. Jewish villages in Russia face taxes; in Romania, a few people are executed; in Germany, they sometimes receive a severe beating; in Austria, anti-Semites terrorize public life; in Algeria, there are several traveling agitators; and in Paris, Jews are expelled from the supposed elite social circles and clubs. There are numerous aspects of anti-Jewish sentiment. However, this is not meant to portray a depressing picture of Jewish suffering." Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State)*, retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-jewish-state-quot-theodor-herzl#google_vignette accessed on 27 December 2024.

Zionism is an advanced attempt to realize the dream of the Jewish people long-held to return to their own land after two millennia of exile. However, it was met with a lot of opposition from the Jews themselves, especially those of the Judaism faith. According to them, although they also supported and trusted in the idea that the Jewish people would return to their holy land, they left the matter to God's decree and forbade any human intervention to "advance the decree" because to them it was heresy and the perpetrators should be punished. This is in contrast to the proponents of Zionism, who rely more on their own abilities and disregard God's decree rather than waiting and leaving everything to God in order to achieve their dreams. The fundamental point of Zionism is that the Jews are a nation, not a religion, which gives rise to the identity narrative of modern Jewish nationalism (Stanislowski, 2017).

The Zionist ideology emphasizes the belief that with the various kinds of rejection and anti-Semitic movements carried out by countries around the world in the 18th century, they believe that all are enemies for them without reason (Chomsky & Achar, 2008). Although the emergence of the Zionist ideology was due to the anti-Semitic actions and "pogroms" experienced by the Jews in Europe, according to Stanislowski, the Zionist ideology emerged due to the rise of modern Jewish nationalism as an ideology that became part of their new self, even before the various acts of persecution against the Jews (Stanislowski, 2017).

2.3 Herzl and Zionism

When the Jews were exiled during the first century of Roman Empire's era until 1948 when Jewish people succeeded in establishing the country they dream of, during that long period, they were rejected from various social communities where they lived. In fact, they were also blamed for various disasters that occurred. This is what prompted many large-scale rebellions

aimed at the Jews which resulted in many casualties. One important reaction by the Jews in responding to this action came from a Russian Jew named Leo Pinsker.

In a pamphlet entitled "Auto-Emancipation: A Warning to His Kinsfolk by a Russian Jew", Pinsker expressed his opinion that the Jewish people did not have a safe life so he emphasized the security aspect by building a shared awareness. Only by building this shared awareness could the Jews establish their own state. However, Pinsker had no idea where the Jewish state would be established even though he initially recommended North America as a good place for the Jews considering that they themselves could not establish a state in Russia. This eventually led to 2.5 million Jewish people fleeing to the US and almost 10,000 of them fleeing to the British colonial countries and South Africa. In addition, nearly 100,000 Jewish people likewise lived in the Western Europe (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

Although Pinsker had provided the notion of establishing a state for the Jewish people, there was no Jewish organization capable of accommodating the idea until 1884. The formation of a Jewish organization named "Lovers of Zion" in 1884 brought the political ideology of Zionism which began its activities by buying a small piece of land in the Palestinian territory which was controlled by the administration of the Ottoman Empire. This organization was led by a Jew named Theodor Herzl to spread Zionist politics in Europe. In his efforts to achieve his goals, Herzl discussed, negotiated and offered to the Ottoman Empire which at that time was led by Sultan Abdulhamid II to allow the Jews to buy land in Palestine in exchange for paying all the debts and bills of the Ottoman Empire which were worsening after the Crimean War (1853-1856) (Köse, 2018). Of course, the proposal was rejected outright and firmly by the Sultan.

Herzl had the same beliefs and ideas as Pinsker to establish their own country for the Jews. This was motivated by Herzl's experience of witnessing anti-Semitism in France with slogans scattered on the streets that read "Death to the Jews." In the pamphlet entitled "The Jewish State/*Der Judenstaat*", he wrote about the characteristics of the approach of a country that was considered "special" to establish a government, which was a manifestation of Herzl's courage. In other words, Herzl intended to establish a nation-state for the Jews to solve their problems at that time, which was achieved by colonizing the Palestinian territory.

To realize this idea, Herzl commenced various studies in Europe to support the ideology of Zionism. This was based on the assumption that to establish a Jewish state, assistance from large countries such as England through its parliament and financial support from wealthy Jews in Western Europe was needed. Wealthy Jews living in the US and Western Europe had a good privilege in the community because of the economic cooperation and rights they received from the government. This proves that Herzl's efforts exceeded his predecessors, Moses Hess and Leon Pinsker, who brought the notion of building a Jewish state to a higher level through diplomacy and politics (Akkus, 2019).

2.4 The First Zionist Congress

A pamphlet written by Herzl in 1896 named "A Jewish State" written in German, French and English. The pamphlet contains Herzl's ideas about the importance of the Jewish people to establish a Jewish state and a complete explanation of the blue-print as the basis of the Jewish state. Herzl offered two choices of areas for the Jewish people that would serve as their National Home, namely Argentina and Palestine (Massad, 2006). Finally, Palestine was chosen as the destination for the National Home region at the insistence

of Zionist supporters and they were even able and ready to fund the entire cost of realizing this in Palestine (Köse, 2018).

A year later in Basel, the first Zionist congress was held by Herzl which aimed to establish the World Zionist Organization to build a Jewish state in Palestine. At this congress, the Zionists concealed their intentions to the world about their plans as stated:

“... some of the delegates wanted to proclaim openly the objective of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine... [opposing this idea] [we] would say [our aim] in a way so as to avoid provoking the Turkish rulers of the coveted land...”

2.5 The Defeat of the Ottoman and Balfour Declaration

Initially, the Palestinian region was part of the administrative area of the Ottoman government in Istanbul for hundreds of years until the 20th century. However, over time, the influence of the Ottoman Empire in various regions became increasingly shaky and weak, especially in the region of the Middle East. When the Ottoman Empire joined World War 1 which had to experience defeat and great losses, and many regions separated themselves into separate political units, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly on the verge of destruction. This made the superpowers in Europe target and interested in obtaining Ottoman territory in the Middle East, one of which was Palestine.

During the World War 1, seeing the defeat of the Ottoman Empire which was increasingly visible, the Entente had discussed and negotiated the division of the Ottoman territory that would be obtained after the war was over. Negotiations conducted by Britain, Russia, Italy, and France in 1916 culminated in a confidential agreement called the Skyes-Picot agreement

aimed at spreading influence and control over the Middle East region (UN, 2021).

Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, had a covert affair with Husayn ibn 'Ali, the Ottoman administrator in Mecca and Medina and the patriarch of the Hashemite dynasty. With the understanding that the British government would back the establishment of an independent Arab state governed by Hashemite principles in the former Ottoman Empire, including Palestine, McMahon persuaded Husayn to spearhead the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire and aid Britain in World War 1. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was overthrown by the Arab uprising led by T.E. Lawrence and Husayn, and Britain was able to readily take control of much of these regions.

Although Britain through its High Commissioner in Egypt established secret relations with Husayn, on the other hand in November 1917, Through Sir Arthur James Balfour, as foreign secretary, the British government publicly declared its intention to assist in the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. It seemed to be a letter from Balfour to prominent Zionists, Lord Rothschild. According to this proclamation, the British government was firmly in favor of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as their "National Home," as explained:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The Balfour Declaration is often seen as an ambiguous promise fraught with conflict, since, on the one hand, it supported Jewish aspirations, but on the other hand, it also stated that " *There should be no actions taken that might jeopardize the civil and religious rights of Palestine's current non-Jewish populations.*" In other words, the British seemed to be promising support to both groups with conflicting claims: the Jewish community, which wanted to build a national Jewish homeland in the Palestine territory, and the Arab-Palestinian community already living there and fearing the loss of their rights. The Balfour Declaration reflected the British colonial mentality of the time, in which the land and people of the colonies were treated as political commodities. The British government ignored the fact that more than 90% of the population were Arabs who had lived there for centuries in Palestine. Without their consent, Britain gave political support to the Zionist project which ultimately opened the way for the large-scale migration of Jews to Palestine.



Figure 3: Map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916

Source: Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A History of The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2016)

2.6 British Mandate on Palestine after World War I

In 1920, Britain requested a mandate over the former Ottoman lands, particularly Palestine, from the League of Nations following the conclusion of World War I. The obligatory charter that the League of Nations gave Britain over Palestine also included the Balfour Declaration. The British split Palestine into two sections: the Palestine Mandate in the west and the Emirate of Transjordan in the east of the Jordan River, which was ruled by Faysal's brother Abdullah.

Although Britain succeeded in achieving its political goal of controlling the Middle East from the Ottomans, Britain failed to fulfill its pledge to establish an independent state. In particular, the Palestinian region itself has a fairly complicated conflict because Britain also supported the establishment of a Jewish state as their 'National Home' in Palestine's territory. The increasing wave of immigration from European Jews to Palestine to buy land and settle caused a reaction of rejection from the Palestinian people (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

For Palestine, this caused disappointment with the British mandate which allowed and supported the Jews to come and establish a state there. The large number of areas purchased and owned by Jews in Palestine worsened the situation and caused conflict between Jews and Arab-Palestinians. In 1920 and 1921, the first dispute occurred which resulted in almost the same number of victims killed on both sides. Muslims and Jews clashed at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem in 1928 over their different community religious rights. Since the Wailing Wall is one of the remnants of the old Jewish Temple, Jews view it as a sacred location (Khalidi, 1997). However, on the other hand, this wall is also part of the Al Aqsa mosque complex, a place of worship owned by Muslims.




Figure 4: Map of British Mandate on Palestine

Source: Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, *The War for Palestine Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2.7 The Rising Wave of Jewish Immigration (Aliyah) and White Paper 1939

With the support of the Balfour Declaration, many European Jews began to migrate to Palestine in waves of immigration called Aliyah. The first wave occurred in the late 19th century, and after the Palestine Mandate began, there was a prominent increase in the number of Jewish migrants. This migration led to tensions between the newly arrived Jewish people and the long-standing Arab-Palestinian community. Many of the Palestinian Arab communities felt threatened by the increasing arrival of Jewish immigrants, as well as by the purchase of Palestinian lands by Zionist organizations. This conflict has led to deepening inter-community disagreements that often lead to violence (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

The conflict between Arab-Palestinian communities and Jews reached its peak in 1936-1939, known as the Arab Revolt when Britain intervened in the conflict. After the incident, Britain issued new regulations containing policies to limit the wave of Jewish exodus and area purchases in Palestine known as the White Paper policy (Pappe, 2006). The White Paper policy contained three main regulations:

- a. Restrictions on Jewish Immigration: For a five-year period, the White Paper confined the number of Jewish immigrants allowed to enter Palestine to 75,000. After that, all Jewish immigration would only be permitted with the consent of the Arab-Palestinian population. This policy was intended to ease tensions caused by the surge in the Jewish population due to immigration from Europe, especially as the Nazi regime in Germany was increasingly persecuting Jews.
- b. Restrictions on Land Sales: In addition to restrictions on immigration, the White Paper also introduced new regulations limiting the sale of land to Jewish communities. The aim was to

prevent more land from falling into Jewish hands, which had long caused Arabs to fear that their resources and land would be taken over by the Jewish community.

- c. Promise of Independence for Palestine: The White Paper promised independence for Palestine within ten years, with the aim of establishing a state where Jewish and Arab-Palestinian communities could live side by side in peace. Britain hoped that this would ease the fears of the Palestinian Arabs that their homeland was being taken over by the Jewish community.

This policy caused a wave of protests from the Jewish community because it contradicted the promised Balfour Declaration so this policy indicated the British-Zionist alliance in 1939 come to an end. At the same moment, after the loss of the Arab-Palestinians in the Arab Revolt which was marked by many Palestinian figures being exiled and creating unstable political conditions, Palestine experienced crucial times in the future (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014).

What happened in Palestine can be seen as a systematic attempt to replace the indigenous population with new communities imported from outside. This model is similar to what has happened elsewhere, such as in North America, Australia, and South Africa. In the case of Palestine, this colonial project was supported by a combination of international actors, including Western imperial powers, global Zionist organizations, and then Israel (Pappe, 2020).

2.8 The End of the British Mandate and The United Nations Partition Plan

Britain began to lose control of Palestine. Pressure from the Zionist side in Palestine became stronger, especially with the emergence of militant groups

such as the Stern Gang and Irgun who carried out terrorist attacks against not only the Arab-Palestinian people, but also the British. International pressure and Britain's inability to maintain stability in the region led Britain to hand over its mandate and problems to the United Nations (UN) in 1947. Britain also requested that the UN determine the future of Palestine and still hoped that when the Palestinian issue was resolved with a good solution, the UN could hand back its mandate to Britain.

The presence of the UN in Palestine by sending a committee of representatives from various countries to investigate the situation that occurred there, ended in an idea and conclusion to divide the Palestinian territory into two parts in order to fulfill the needs and interest of both parties to the conflict. On 29 November 1947 through Resolution 181, the UN General Assembly approved the division of Palestine into two parts (Rogan & Shlaim, 2008). One part was for Jews with a proportion of 56% (slightly more than the Palestinian part, due to the assumption that there would be an escalated number of Jewish exodus), and the other part for Arabs with a proportion of 43%. Meanwhile, specifically for the areas of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, both areas will become international zones.

This territorial division solution received a positive response from the Zionist leaders, although they also hoped that they could expand the boundaries allocated to the Jewish state. However, the Arab-Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab countries rejected the UN plan because it was considered a form of betrayal and felt that the division was unfair because it gave more to the Jews. Indeed, the Palestinian people were subjected to a globally unfair action by the United Nations partition resolution.

As a result, after the plan was implemented, a battle between the Arab-Palestinian population and the Jews was inevitable. The Arab-Palestinians

had little war experience, causing them to be less organized and have few weapons. In contrast to the Jews who had military strength, although their strength was not much, because they were very organized and well armed, they were able to control the territory.




Figure 5: Map of the United Nations Partition in 1947

Source: Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, *The War for Palestine Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2.9 The Establishment of the State of Israel and the First Arab-Israel War in 1948

The British mandate in Palestine ended on May 15, 1948, when Britain withdrew. Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion took advantage of this chance and declared the state of Israel in Tel Aviv right away (Roslan, 2010). Ben-Gurion announced that Israel was a Jewish nation established on the ancestral homeland of the Jews, which would also be open to Jewish immigrants from all over the world. This proclamation was greeted enthusiastically by the Jewish people in Palestine and was accompanied by the hope of having a safe homeland for the Jewish community, especially after the tragedy of the Holocaust. This caused a strong reaction from neighboring Arab countries of Palestine such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq where they wanted to 'save' Palestine so that an inevitable war occurred between Israel and the Arab countries which marked the first war between the two parties known as the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 or known as War of Independence by Israel (Ezrahi, 2000).

This war consisted of several main phases:

a. Initial Phase: May 1948 - June 1948

At the beginning of the war, the combined Arab forces attempted to attack key areas in Israel. Egyptian forces advanced from the south toward Gaza, Jordanian forces seized the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while Syrian and Lebanese forces moved in on the northern front. Israel was on the defensive during this phase, but managed to retain most of its territory.

b. First Armistice: June 1948

In June 1948, the UN Security Council established the first four-week ceasefire. During this ceasefire, Israel used the opportunity to strengthen

its weapons and improve its military strategy. Israel's arsenal was significantly improved with the help of arms supplies from Western countries, especially from Czechoslovakia, which was then under Soviet influence.

c. Second Phase: July 1948 - October 1948

After the ceasefire ended, the conflict erupted again. Israel began a large-scale military operation to capture more territory and drive out the remaining Arab forces such as Operation Danny, Operation Yoav, and Operation Hiram was launched to expand Israel's territorial control, and they gradually pushed back the Arab forces.

d. Second Armistice and End of the War: January 1949 - March 1949

A number of ceasefires mediated by the UN were put into effect at the beginning of 1949. Israel eventually negotiated armistices with all of the warring Arab nations, including Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon. The Green Line, a demarcation line created by these accords, served as Israel's de facto boundary with its neighbors. Egypt seized control of Gaza and the coastal regions, Jordan captured East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Arab-Palestinian state that the UN split had envisioned never came to be (Shlaim, 1988).

Israel managed to broaden their territory beyond the limits set out in the UN partition plan, and around 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were forced to flee or expelled from their own land. The conflict kick-started the ongoing Palestinian refugee crisis and heightened tensions in the Middle East. For Palestinian Arabs, the war is known as the Nakba or "Catastrophe," which marked the loss of their homeland and made them refugees in neighboring

countries (Rogan & Shlaim, 2008). Palestinian refugees were then spread across various countries, including Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank (Stern, 2010). One of the most complex aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Palestinian refugee situation. As a right of return, the refugees and their descendants continue to hold out hope of going back to their own country. However, Israel rejects this right for fear that it will change the demographic composition of their country and threaten Israel's Jewish identity. The refugee crisis continues to be a source of tension and debate between Israelis and Palestinians and has become a major issue in an attempt to solve the conflict (Khalidi, 1997).

The Soviet Union and the United States were among the main countries that recognized Israel after the war. Nonetheless, a number of countries, including Arab countries, declined to acknowledge Israel's existence. This influenced regional politics and furthered Israel's diplomatic isolation in the Middle East. A protracted string of Arab-Israeli hostilities began with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The underlying reasons of this battle were linked to other significant confrontations, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day battle, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and minor wars in Gaza and Lebanon (Ezrahi, 2000).




Figure 6: Arab-Israeli Armistices in 1949

Source: Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)

2.10 The Six-Day War 1967 and Yom Kippur War 1973: The

Domination of Israel in the Middle East

The Six-Day War in 1967 was a culmination of long-standing tensions in the Middle East. Previous Arab-Israeli conflicts, including the 1948 War and the 1956 Suez Crisis, had created deep animosity between Arab states and Israel, particularly Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The war began on 5 June 1967, when Israel blasted off a surprise air attack on the Egyptian air force, known as 'Operation Focus.' Within three hours, Israel had destroyed most of the Egyptian aircraft still on the ground. This attack gave Israel total air superiority, which was to be a key factor in its success throughout the war. There were three fronts fighting in the Six-Day War of 1967:

1. **Egyptian Front (Sinai and Gaza):** After destroying the Egyptian air force, Israel launched a ground offensive into the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli forces, using effective strategy, managed to push back Egyptian forces all the way to the Suez Canal in less than four days. The Gaza Strip also fell to Israel;
2. **Jordanian Front (West Bank and East Jerusalem):** On June 5, Jordan began bombarding West Jerusalem, prompting an Israeli military response. Within two days, Israel had captured the West Bank area;
3. **Syrian Front (Golan Heights):** In the north, Israel faced resistance from Syria. On June 9–10, after successfully overcoming the Egyptian and Jordanian threats, Israel launched an offensive into the strategic Golan Heights, which was strategically located on higher ground. Syria was defeated, and the territory fell to Israel.

The Six-Day War had a significant influence on the Middle East's geography, giving Israel authority of the Golan Heights (from Syria), the West Bank and East Jerusalem (from Jordan), and the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip (from Egypt). These territories gave Israel strategic advantages

but also created new problems. The Gaza and West Bank, for example, are home to over a million Palestinians who now live under Israeli occupation.

Israel's strong military strategy in the war, led to Israel's easy and convincing triumph over the Arab alliance. Israel's victory had the following impacts:

1. **Military Confidence:** This victory solidified the reputation of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) as one of the most formidable army in the world.
2. **The Problem of Occupation:** With control of a large territory, Israel had to face the challenge of managing the Arab population in the occupied areas. Israel's policies in these areas, including the construction of Jewish residences in the West Bank, created a long-running conflict.
3. **International Image:** Israel's victory increased support from Western allies, especially the US. However, the occupation of new territory also drew criticism from the international community, especially regarding the treatment of Palestinians.
4. **New Refugee Crisis:** The war produced a new wave of Palestinian refugees, with some 300,000 people fleeing the Gaza Strip and West Bank to neighboring countries. Many of them joined the 1948 refugees, exacerbating the existing crisis.
5. **Rise of Palestinian Nationalism:** The loss of the Arab countries in the war weakened the Palestinians' faith in these states as the protectors of their rights. In their place, organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged as the leaders of the Palestinian national struggle.
6. **Military Defeat and Territorial Loss:** The Arab states suffered devastating defeats that undermined their morale and prestige. The

defeat of Egypt in the Sinai, Syria in the Golan, and Jordan in the West Bank marked the loss of important strategic territory.

7. Internal Political Changes: The defeats shook the political stability of several Arab states. In Egypt, Nasser resigned but was forced back by his supporters. In Jordan, King Hussein faced pressure from a Palestinian population angry at the defeat.

Following a truce request by the UN Security Council, the war came to an end on June 10, 1967. Israel increased its strategic edge in the region by capturing a significant percentage of the area in just six days. Resolution 242, which was issued by the UN Security Council following the war, demanded that Israel leave the seized areas and that all governments in the region – particularly those in the Middle East – be granted the right to live in peace.

The Arab world was deeply traumatized by the loss in the Six-Day War. In addition to altering the geopolitical landscape, the loss of key areas like the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula also damaged Arab nations' sense of self.

Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, felt that Egypt had to recapture the Sinai Peninsula to restore national honor and secure domestic political stability. Syria, under President Hafez al-Assad, also had a similar goal of recapturing the Golan Heights. Egypt and Syria feel that diplomatic channels are not enough to constrain Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Resolution 242, which calls for Israel's recall from the occupied areas as part of a peace solution, has not yielded results due to differences in interpretation and Israel's unwillingness to give up territory without security guarantees.

On October 6, 1973, on Yom Kippur — one of the holiest days of the Jewish — a surprise attack launched by Syria and Egypt on Israel on two main fronts:

1. Sinai Front: Egyptian troops broke through the ostensibly formidable Bar Lev defensive barrier after crossing the Suez Canal. They took control of the eastern portion of Sinai with the aid of tanks and anti-aircraft missiles.
2. Golan Front: Syrian forces launched a major offensive to retake the Golan Heights, pushing Israeli armies back.

Israel was caught off guard and suffered losses in several early engagements. However, within days, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) managed to mobilize reserves and launch a counterattack: In Sinai, Ariel Sharon led Israel's armies to launch a counterattack, successfully crossing the Canal of Suez and encircling Egyptian forces on the western flank. Furthermore, Israeli armies pushed back Syrian forces and advanced toward Damascus in the Golan.

Tensions escalated with the direct entanglement of the Soviet Union and the US. The US provided massive military aid to Israel through 'Operation Nickel Grass,' while the Soviet Union supplied weapons to Syria and Egypt.

The war resulted in significant casualties on both sides. Israel lost around 2,800 soldiers, while Egypt and Syria lost over 10,000 military personnel. On October 25, 1973, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, which called for an immediate ceasefire, ending the conflict.



Figure 7: Israel's Military Conquests in Six-Day War

Source: Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A History of The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2016)

2.11 The Palestinian Arab after The Establishment of Israel

After the proclamation of Israel and victory in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, Israel gained control over a much larger territory than had been proposed in the 1947 UN partition plan. From the 56% allotted to the Jewish state, Israel expanded its territory to cover around 78%. This territory included most of the major cities of Haifa, West Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Israel's military successes increased its international legitimacy, although relations with the Arab countries remained hostile.

Domestically, the war strengthened the political position of the Zionist parties, especially the predecessor of the Labor Party, Mapai, led by David Ben-Gurion. The Israeli government used this victory to reinforce the Jewish national identity in their new state. Under David Ben-Gurion, Israel developed a strong government structure, including the formation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) military, a combination of the Haganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang paramilitary organizations, a centralized economic system, and a policy of mass immigration. The Jewish population grew rapidly after the Law of Return (1950) granted all Jews worldwide the right to move to Israel. The goal of this action was to increase the number of Jews and give safety to Jewish communities who were persecuted over the globe (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

Not only did Israel expand its Jewish population, it also faced a new reality regarding its remaining Arab population. Approximately 150,000 Arab-Palestinian people remained in Israel's territory. Although they granted citizenship, they often faced discrimination and were considered second-class citizens. In addition, the Israeli government also enforced the Absentee Property Law, that prohibited refugees from Palestine returned to their homes and confiscated their property by the Israeli government.

After the Arab loss in the Six-Day War, one of the most significant impacts of the war was the collapse of the Palestinian political structure. The divided and disorganized Palestinian Arab political leadership during the war left them unable to respond effectively to political and military changes. Furthermore, many Palestinian political elites fled into exile, leaving the community without clear representation.

The lack of strong leadership left the Palestinian struggle to regain their land dependent on support from Arab states, which often had their own political agendas. After the war, that territory was reduced to just 22%, namely the West Bank (administered by Jordan) and the Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt). This loss exacerbated an identity crisis among Palestinians, who felt betrayed by Arab countries and the international community.



Figure 8: The Palestinian Arab Refugees after Arab-Israeli War 1948

Source: Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A History of The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2016)

2.11.1 The Establishment of Palestinian Liberation Organization

Ultimately, the Palestinian national struggle revolved around the loss of its country. As a symbol of their fight for justice, the Right of Return emerged as the primary demand of the refugee community. As a result, the Palestinian people became more patriotic and formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to establish their social and political identity. The Arab League started to see how crucial it was to establish a Palestinian organization in the early 1960s in order to stop Israel from tightening its hold on the occupied areas. The creation of a formal organization to represent the Palestinian people was resolved at the 1964 Arab Summit in Cairo. Two factors drove this decision: to guarantee that the Palestinian movement stayed within the authority of the Arab governments and to provide the Palestinian people a voice in their struggle.

In May 1964, the first Palestine National Congress took place in East Jerusalem. It was sponsored by the Arab League and attended by Palestinian representatives from a variety of communities living in exile in the occupied areas. The conference set the groundwork for the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt. The first Chairman of the PLO was Ahmed Shukeiri, a Palestinian diplomat who had served with the Arab League. The creation of the Palestinian National Charter, one of this congress's primary accomplishments, stated:

- a. Palestine is the undivided homeland of the Palestinian people, constituting their territory.
- b. Rejection of the existence of Israel, which is considered illegal.
- c. Call for the freedom of Palestine

2.11.2 The Strategic Shift from Yasser Arafat and The Black

September 1970 in Jordan

The PLO succeeded in becoming a symbol of the Palestinian people's struggle to regain their native land and build a national identity for the Palestinian people. This organization is giving voice to the Palestinian people in international forums and uniting their aspirations. However, along the way there were dynamics of internal and external conflicts such as conflicts of interest from various groups/factions such as Fatah, Palestine People Party (PPP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) as well as PLO relations with other Arab countries.

Yasser Arafat from the Fatah faction who initiated the Palestinian people's struggle movement through armed resistance, was elected as chairman of the PLO replacing Ahmedh Shukeiri in 1969. Under Yasser Arafat's leadership, the PLO was more active in carrying out its actions in the international arena such as seeking international support at the UN and changing tactics from diplomacy to armed resistance. The armed resistance tactics carried out by the PLO actually received a lot of criticism from many countries, especially Arab countries because their armed resistance activities against Israel affected domestic security conditions, one of which was Jordan.

Jordan became the headquarters for the PLO in launching various actions, but various actions carried out by the PLO, especially from the PLFP group that spread domestic insecurity in Jordan, made King Hussein immediately take firm action against them. In September 1970, the PFLP group hijacked a civilian plane and threatened to blow it up and kill the hostages, this actually made King Hussein take firm steps to counter the terror by

imposing a state of martial law and ordering Jordanian soldiers to start military operations.

Although both parties established a ceasefire on September 25, 1970, the military operation caused as many as 3,000 Palestinians to be killed and forced the PLO to move their operation's base to Lebanon in 1975. Although in the end the PLO was able to recover from the Black September incident and moved its headquarters to Lebanon, several PLO members formed a group called Black September. This group carried out various acts of terror and one of its most shocking actions was the assault on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972 where they took hostages and killed the athletes.

2.11.3 First Intifada and The Process to The Peace

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, began a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation known as the Intifada in December 1987 (Aslamiah & Jamaan, 2015). The Intifada movement was followed by a lot of people who moved by conducting massive demonstrations (throwing stones, Molotov cocktails, and direct contact with the Israeli military), refusing to pay taxes, boycotting Israeli products, making graffiti that contained political elements, and establishing underground schools.

The Intifada movement was initiated by the Hamas organization, which is the military-political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood that has a strong influence on the Palestinian struggle, and was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. The following year, the Hamas Charter was born, which is a guideline containing the objectives, organizational strategy, and ideology of the movement which includes three main points, namely the rejection of the existence of Israel, the call to establish a state of Islam in Palestine, and the view that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a religious jihad between

Islam and Zionism. The Hamas's presence as a political, social, and military-based resistance movement against Israel, makes Hamas the main competitor to the PLO.

2.11.4 Madrid Conference (1991): The First Step Toward Peace

The Gulf War's ending, affected not only other Arab countries, but also the PLO because of their support for Saddam Hussein's regime. The defeat of Iraq also affected the PLO's support from other Arab countries which was weakening and the appearance of the US as an outside actor in the conflict. The US and the Soviet Union, initiated an instrument to hold an international peace conference held in Madrid, Spain on October 30, 1991 to maintain regional stability in the Middle East. The Madrid Conference became a milestone in the early history of the foundation of the dialogue between Palestine and Israel.

The conference was attended by Israel, represented by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Palestinian delegations from the Gaza Strip and West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. The main points discussed in this conference were the status of the occupied areas where Palestine demanded Israel to withdraw and stop the development of Israeli habitations, as well as the discussion of refugees. This is because Israel is increasingly aggressively expanding its territory by building many settlements, especially in the Palestinian territories. Even the United States threatened Israel that they would not approve a loan fee of \$10 million until Israel stopped the construction.

Although this conference still reached a dead end in terms of negotiation dialogue and diplomacy, this conference opened up other diplomatic paths in various future peace agreements and several Arab countries began to have ideas about normalizing their relations with Israel.

2.11.5 Oslo Agreement I and II: The Hidden Negotiation Between Two Parties

Another historic moment occurred on September 13, 1993, when Palestine, represented by the PLO, and Israel, represented by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, mutually recognized their existence. This was stated in the Oslo Accords, in the first Oslo agreement in Norway. In the "Declaration of Principles (DOP) Concerning the Interim Arrangement of Self-Government" included in the Oslo Accords, Israel acknowledged the PLO as the rightful representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO acknowledged Israel's existence and pledged to refrain from violence against it. Israel consequently pulled its forces out of the West Bank's Jericho and portions of Gaza. President Bill Clinton was present when this deal was signed in Washington, D.C., and it was well-regarded by both the world community and the two nations.

The important thing to underline is the Oslo Agreement is not a reconciliation agreement or a final clearance in the conflict between the two parties, but rather just an agenda for a negotiation meeting containing two things, mutual recognition between the two parties, and fulfillment of demands and discussion of unresolved issues based on the DOP (Harms & Ferry, 2008). Responding to this, Avi Shalim stated:

“Negotiations in the second stage by the two parties, will determine the final settlement's form, as it is not outlined in the DOP. The significant topics like the Palestinian entity's borders, the 1948 refugees' right of return, the future of the Jewish habitations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and Jerusalem's status are all largely ignored by the DOP. There would have been no deal if these matters had been addressed, therefore it is easy to understand why these concerns had been not resolved” (Shlaim, 1994).

Two years after the Oslo I agreement, the two parties signed the Oslo Agreement II which discussed the "Interim Agreement on the Gaza Strip and West Bank" in Taba, Egypt. In the agreement, there is a division of territory in the West Bank, namely Area A (Palestinian gaining 3% of West Bank including Bethlehem, Jenin, Qalqiya, Nablus, Tulkarm, and Ramallah), Area B (Under Palestinian-Israeli joint control, gaining the 24% of West Bank including villages and towns), and Area C (Israeli gaining 74% of West Bank including Jewish habitations, state lands, military bases, Jerusalem and external borders) (Harms & Ferry, 2008). However, there were different views between the two parties concerning Zone C. Palestine's view assumed that Zone C become under Palestinian jurisdiction, meanwhile Israel's view noted that Israel would control 80% of the water, 73% of the land, and 97% of the security, which is that view intensified Palestinian's concern (Bickerton & Klausner, 2016).

However, there are parties from both Israel and Palestine who do not like this idea such as the right-wing party group and Jewish settlers who consider it a threat to their security, while Palestinian militant groups consider the PLO as a traitor to the Palestinian struggle. This dissatisfaction finally culminated in the incident in 1995 where Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Jewish extremists, and the Palestinian military group launched its militant actions targeting Israeli civilians, causing the Israeli government to respond with military operations. This incident further created insecurity and once again delayed peace between the two parties.




Figure 9: Zone A,B, and C in West Bank

Source: Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A History of The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2016)

2.11.6 The Camp David Accord 2000 and The Road Map for Peace 2003

After major obstacles in the implementation of the Oslo I and II Accords, Palestine and Israel were reunited in a forum hosted by the US President, Bill Clinton at Camp David, Maryland to initiate a resolution of the conflict. Palestine was represented by Yasser Arafat, while Israel was represented by Prime Minister Ehud Barak. There were four main issues discussed in the Camp David Accord:

1. **The Holy Places and Status of Jerusalem:** Both sides consider Jerusalem's position to be very important and vital because it is related to past historical relations. Israel considers Jerusalem as the place where the Temple Mount stands and the eternal capital that is inseparable from it. Meanwhile, Palestine claims that Jerusalem is the area that will be used as the future capital of the country and the holy place for Muslims because it contains the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex;
2. **Palestinian Refugees:** Since the Nakba resulting from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Palestine has insisted that the Palestinian refugees are allowed to come back to their homeland by the requirements of UN Resolution 194. However, this proposal has been rejected by Israel because it would threaten the stability of social security and the characteristics of the Jewish state due to the return of refugees;
3. **Borders and Settlements:** Palestinians want their borders to be the same as they were before the Six-Day War and want Israel to recall its forces. Meanwhile, Israel is trying to maintain control of its territory and protect its citizens' settlement blocs in the West Bank;
4. **Security:** Israel proposes that Israel has the right to control certain border areas and suggests demilitarizing Palestine as a security

guarantee to safeguard the Israeli people from the threat of militant attacks.

The Camp David negotiations ended without a satisfactory agreement for both parties. Several factors influenced the failure of this agreement, such as Bill Clinton's lack of time and adequate preparation for holding negotiations at the end of his term, Israel's provocative actions that continued to expand its territory and build settlements, and attacks from Palestinian militant groups. According to Shible Telhami, the negotiations failed due to the weak trust between the two parties in negotiating and the lack of a deep strategy to overcome structural tensions. (Telhami, 1992). Meanwhile, according to Edward Said, the failure of the negotiations was due to the United States' inability to understand the national aspirations of the Palestinian people and its attitude of being too biased towards Israel.

The fiasco of the Camp David Accord 2000, and the provocative visit to the Aqsa Mosque by Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel, caused the wave of rising the Second Intifada. The Second Intifada caused 4,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis to die, worsened the economic and infrastructure conditions of Palestine due to Israeli military attacks, and the establishment of a separation wall by Israel in the West Bank. The "Quartet," which consists of the US, the UN, the EU, and Russia, created and released the "Road Map" paper on April 30, 2003, during the height of the Second Intifada's conflict. The formation of the Quartet was based on George W. Bush's plan as he conveyed in his speech in June 2002 to resolve the Palestine-Israel problem with a two-state solution:

"In the situation the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable. My vision is two states, living side by side in peace and security. There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight terror. Yet, at this critical moment, if all parties will break with the past and set out on a new

path, we can overcome the darkness with the light of hope” (The White House, 2002).

The Road Map consists of three main stages designed to achieve a two-state solution:

1. Phase One: Ending Violence and Building Palestinian Institutions

The first stage focuses on ending all forms of violence, including terrorist attacks by Palestinian groups and military operations by Israel. The Palestinians are required to reform their political and security structures, including establishing a transparent and accountable authority. Israel, on the other hand, is required to freeze the expansion of the settlement and recall Israel’s armies from the occupied area.

2. Phase Two: Establishment of an Interim Palestinian State (Transition)

This phase involves the establishment of a state of Palestine with temporary borders and sovereign attributes. Its main focus is on strengthening trust between the two sides through concrete steps, such as international conferences that support the process.

3. Phase Three: Permanent Status Negotiations and Ending the Conflict

The final phase involves negotiating the core issues that have been the main sticking points in the conflict, including final borders, Palestinian refugees, security arrangements, and the status of Jerusalem. The goal is to achieve a comprehensive settlement and the establishment of a sovereign and independent of the state of Palestine.

Although the Road Map for Peace offers a clear framework, its implementation faces significant challenges. One major obstacle is the lack

of credence between Palestinians and Israelis, exacerbated by a long history of conflict and noncompliance with previous commitments.

On the Palestinian side, Hamas continue to launch assaults against Israel, despite calls for a cessation of violence. Yasser Arafat faces enormous pressure to rein in these groups, but its capabilities are limited by political and military conditions. Meanwhile, the government Israel has shown skepticism about the Palestinian commitment to cessation of violence. In addition, the expansion of habitations in the West Bank continues unabated, violating the terms of the first phase of the Road Map. Sharon also demands major reforms in the Palestinian leadership, arguing that Arafat cannot be a credible partner in the peace process.

2.12 Disengagement Plan and Hamas Election Victory

Israel's recall from Gaza, officially known as the "Disengagement Plan," is one of the most significant phenomena in the modern history of the Palestine-Israel conflict. In 2005, Israel decided to recall all Jewish residents and its armies from the Gaza, which had been under Israel's control since the Six-Day War in 1967. The withdrawal involved the evacuation of 4 habitans in the northern West Bank and 21 Jewish habitans in Gaza. The process took place from August to September 2005 and involved the evacuation of approximately 8,000 Jewish settlers.

Many settlers refused to leave their homes, leading to confrontations with IDF. Although this process was relatively quick, its implementation was fraught with tension and emotion, both on the part of Israelis and Palestinians. On the Israeli side, many conservatives and supporters of the settlement movement viewed the withdrawal as a "capitulation" to Palestinian violence. In contrast, Palestinians welcomed the withdrawal as a victory, although they remained skeptical of Israel's intentions.

From a Palestinian perspective, the withdrawal creates both great hope and great challenges. Gaza, previously under direct Israeli occupation, is now under full control of the Palestinian Authority, at least officially. However, the Israeli blockade of Gaza remains in place, with Israel controlling air, sea, and most of the territory's land borders. Egypt also plays a role in administering the Rafah crossing, but strict restrictions remain in place. As a result, life in Gaza remains difficult, with limited access to basic goods, building materials, and humanitarian aid.

The withdrawal also has major implications for internal Palestinian political dynamics. As a region that has long faced socio-economic and political challenges, Gaza has become an arena for competition between the two main Palestinian forces, Fatah and Hamas, the Islamist movement that has a strong presence in Gaza. Israel's recall from Gaza Strip has opened the way for Hamas to strengthen its support base, both through its rhetoric of resistance and through the social programs it runs among the Gaza population.

Just a year after Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, in January 2006, the Palestinian political landscape underwent a dramatic change with Hamas's triumph in the Palestinian legislative elections. The elections supervised by international observers and declared free and fair, resulted Hamas a landslide majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Of the 132 seats available, Hamas won 74, defeating Fatah's 45. This result surprised many, both in Palestine and in the international community, who largely considered Fatah to be the dominant Palestinian political force.

Hamas' victory reflected widespread Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Fatah government, which was seen as corrupt, ineffective, and failing to protect Palestinian demands in the face of Israeli occupation. Moreover, Hamas's extensive social programs, including the provision of health care,

education, and humanitarian aid, had won the hearts of many Palestinians, especially in Gaza. Hamas's rhetoric of resistance to Israel also had strong appeal, especially among a younger generation frustrated by the worsening conditions.

However, Hamas's victory had major implications, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, tensions between Hamas and Fatah escalated, with each side vying for control of the Palestinian government. These tensions eventually culminated in a bloody conflict between the two factions in 2007, which led to Hamas's takeover Gaza Strip and Fatah's confined control over the West Bank.

Internationally, Hamas's victory presented major challenges to peace efforts. The US and the EU, considered Hamas a terrorist organization and rejected to cooperate with Palestinian government led by Hamas. In response, the international community imposed economic and political sanctions on the Palestinian Authority, worsening living conditions for the Palestinian people. These sanctions included the cessation of international aid, which is vital to the survival of the economy of Palestine people, particularly in Gaza Strip.

Hamas, on the other hand, attempted to navigate this new situation by taking steps to strengthen its political position. As the majority power holder in the Legislative Council, Hamas tries to project itself as a legitimate government and seeks to improve the Palestinian's social and economic conditions. However, the blockade imposed by Israel and international sanctions make these efforts almost impossible to succeed.

Hamas' victory also had a major impact on relations between the Palestinians and Israel. Israel views Hamas as an existential threat, especially because of Hamas' refusal to recognize Israel's existence and its

continued aggressive rhetoric. Following Hamas' victory, Israel tightened its blockade of Gaza and stepped up its military operations to stop rocket attacks launched by the Palestinian militant group.

In Gaza, Hamas faces many challenges in meeting the expectations of the Palestinians who elected them. While the group has managed to organize itself as the dominant power in Gaza, it also faces enormous pressure from Israel, Fatah, and the international community. This creates a complex dynamic, as Hamas tries to balance its rhetoric of resistance with the need to manage day-to-day governance under a tight blockade.

2.13 The Palestine-Israel Conflict in 21st Century and The Responses and Diplomatic Efforts of Indonesia

2.13.1 Operation Cast Lead: The Gaza War 2008-2009

One of the most contentious periods in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the first war in Gaza, also known as Operation Cast Lead, which raged from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009 (OCHA, 2017). The war's backdrop featured Israel's strict blockade of Gaza, which had been in place since 2007 following Hamas's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections and subsequent takeover of the region. Living circumstances for Gazans deteriorated as a result of the siege, since they had less access to basic essentials including food, gasoline, and medication. Tensions were further heightened by repeated rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, carried out by armed groups, including Hamas. Israel stated that the objective of Operation Cast Lead was to stop the rocket assaults and weaken Hamas's military capacity.

The operation began with a massive airstrike on 27 December 2008, targeting Hamas military facilities, including police stations, weapons depots, and smuggling tunnels on the Egyptian border (Reporters Without

Borders, 2009). The attack destroyed much of Gaza's infrastructure and killed hundreds of people within days. Israel then launched a ground offensive on 3 January 2009, deploying thousands of troops to invade the Gaza Strip. The ground operation aims to destroy the underground tunnel network and rocket launching bases used by Hamas.

This war caused more than 1,400 Palestinians were killed, including around 900 civilians, according to reports from the UN and human rights organizations. Meanwhile Israel lost 13 of its citizens, including three civilians. The scale of the damage to Gaza's infrastructure was enormous, with thousands of homes, schools and health facilities destroyed (Britain-Palestine APPG, 2010). The blockade that was already severe before the war was tightened, hampering reconstruction efforts and humanitarian aid.

Operation Cast Lead drew widespread international condemnation due to Israel's disproportionate use of force and violations of international humanitarian law. The Goldstone Report, published by the UN Council of Human Rights, pointed both sides of war crimes, although criticism of Israel was more pronounced due to the much greater scale of casualties and damage on the Palestinian side.

Politically, the war strengthened Hamas' position as the main actor in Gaza, despite the group's heavy losses in personnel and military infrastructure. Hamas used the conflict to project itself as a resistance to the Israeli occupation, which increased its support among Palestinians. On the contrary, Mahmoud Abbas lost credibility for its perceived failure to protect the Palestinians in Gaza Strip.

The long-term impact of Operation Cast Lead was significant. The conflict deepened the polarization between Palestinians and Israelis, and between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Internationally, the war raised

awareness of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but it also emphasized the diplomatic deadlock in solving the Palestine-Israel conflict. Mediation means by Egypt led to a temporary ceasefire in January 2009, but no long-term agreement has been reached. The blockade of Gaza remains in place, perpetuating a cycle of poverty and violence.

2.13.2 Operation Pillar of Defense: The Gaza War 2012

The second Gaza war, known as Operation Pillar of Defense, lasted from 14 to 21 November 2012, was a brief but significant conflict in the dynamics of relations between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip. The background to the conflict was related to the escalating tensions caused by repeated rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory. In previous years, Hamas and other militant groups had increased their capacity to launch medium-range rockets, allowing them to strike major cities in Israel such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

The immediate trigger for Operation Pillar of Defense was an Israeli airstrike on 14 November 2012 that targeted and killed Ahmed Jabari, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (The top commander of Hamas's military wing). Jabari responsible for numerous assaults on Israel and was a key figure in Hamas's military operations. This attack was followed by the launching of hundreds of rockets from Gaza into Israeli territory, which then prompted a massive military response by Israel.

Operation Pillar of Defense consisted of two main phases: intensive airstrikes and the use of defense system of Iron Dome by Israel. Israeli airstrikes targeted Hamas military infrastructure, including weapons depots, rocket launch sites, and underground tunnels used for arms smuggling. Meanwhile, Iron Dome managed to intercept most of the rockets launched from Gaza, reducing the number of Israeli casualties.

During the eight-day conflict, some 174 Palestinians were killed, including a large number of civilians, while six Israelis also lost their lives. Although the conflict was relatively short compared to other wars, its impact on the people of Gaza was significant. Gaza's infrastructure suffered significant damage, while the civilian population faced trauma from continuous airstrikes.

On the diplomatic side, this conflict ended with a ceasefire mediated by Egypt under the leadership of President Mohamed Morsi. The ceasefire agreement included a halt to attacks by both sides and a partial easing of the Israeli blockade of Gaza. However, as in previous conflicts, the ceasefire did not address the root causes, such as the occupation, the blockade, and political tensions between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.

Operation Pillar of Defense marked a significant change in the military dynamics between Israel and Hamas. Israel's use of Iron Dome was a major factor in reducing the effect of rocket attacks on civilian residents. Hamas used the conflict to project itself as the main resistance against Israel, which increased its support among the Palestinians and the Arab countries.

2.13.3 Operation Protective Edge: The Gaza War 2014

The third Gaza war, Operation Protective Edge, from 8 July to 26 August 2014. It was one of the deadliest episodes in the history of the Gaza conflict, with more than 2,200 Palestinians killed, including around 500 children, and thousands more injured. On the Israeli side, 73 people were killed, most of them soldiers.

The background to the conflict was rooted in rising tensions between Hamas and Israel. The June 2014 murder and abduction of three Israeli youths in the West Bank served as one direct catalyst. Hundreds of Hamas members were arrested as part of Israel's major security operation in the

West Bank in retaliation. Tensions escalated when Hamas militants launched rockets into Israeli territory, followed by Israeli airstrikes on Gaza.

Operation Protective Edge began with airstrikes targeting Hamas military infrastructure, including rocket launch sites and underground tunnels used for smuggling weapons. Israel then launched a ground invasion on 17 July 2014 to destroy a network of tunnels running across the Israel-Gaza border. These tunnels are considered a major threat because they can be used to infiltrate Israeli territory and carry out attacks.

During the conflict, Hamas increased its military capacity by launching thousands of rockets, some of which reached major cities such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Although the defense system of Iron Dome managed to detain most of the rockets, these attacks created tension and fear among Israeli citizens. On the other hand, Israel's military air and ground attacks caused extensive damage in Gaza, including the destruction of thousands of homes, schools, and health facilities.

The humanitarian impact of Operation Protective Edge was enormous. Over 2,200 Palestinians, including over 500 children, were murdered, and over 11,000 more were injured, according to UN reports. After thousands of houses and public buildings were destroyed, Gaza's infrastructure suffered significant damage. The continuous embargo, which limited access to relief and reconstruction supplies, made the humanitarian catastrophe brought on by the war worse.

2.13.4 Operation Wall-Guard/Saif Al-Quds: The Gaza War 2021

The 2021 Gaza War, called "*Saif al-Quds*" (Sword of Jerusalem) by Hamas or "Operation Guardian of the Walls" by Israel, lasted for 11 days, from 10 to 21 May 2021, sparked by tensions in Jerusalem, the ongoing blockade of Gaza, and a diplomatic deadlock.

The tensions that led to the war began with a dispute in the Sheikh Jarrah surrounding East Jerusalem. Several Palestinian families faced the threat of eviction from their homes by Israeli authorities, sparking massive protests.

Tensions escalated further when Israeli forces stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound during the holy month of Ramadan, a site of great importance to Muslims. The attack sparked violent clashes with Palestinian worshippers, further escalating the situation. Hamas, as the ruler of Gaza, released an ultimatum to Israel to recall their armies from Sheikh Jarrah and al-Aqsa. When this ultimatum was ignored, Hamas launched its first rocket attack on Israel on May 10, 2021.

Israel responded with a massive airstrike on Gaza, while Hamas and other armed groups launched more than 4,300 rockets into Israeli territory. Some rockets even reached major cities such as Tel Aviv and Ashkelon, demonstrating Hamas's growing military capabilities. Israel relies on the Iron Dome to block incoming rocket assaults. The system claims to have a success rate of around 90%, significantly reducing Israeli casualties. However, the attacks that were not intercepted still caused casualties, with 13 people killed, including two children.

In Gaza, the impact was far more severe. Israeli airstrikes destroyed thousands of homes, apartment buildings, and public infrastructure, including roads, water lines, and electricity networks. According to the UN, more than 260 Palestinians were killed, including 66 children. Thousands were injured, while tens of thousands were left homeless.

After 11 days of violence, a ceasefire was finally reached on May 21, 2021, through mediation by Egypt and Qatar. The ceasefire halted the fighting but did not issue the factor of the conflict. The blockade of Gaza remains in

place, and political and social tensions in the region show no signs of abating.

2.13.5 Recent Conflict: Hamas's Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on 7

October 2023 and Israeli Response as a Genocide

On October 7, 2023, the *Izz ad-Din al-Qassam* brigade carried out the al-Aqsa storm operation from the Gaza Strip to the Israel occupied territories by land, water and air (Mercan, 2023). This attack succeeded in giving a crushing blow and embarrassed Israel, which is known for its strong military defense but easily received a surprise attack from Hamas (Saleh, 2023). In just a few hours, this military operation managed to take over 20 residential areas and 11 military sites, causing 1,300 casualties and 300 wounded on the Israeli side, and more than 200 prisoners, including the senior officer of the Israeli army (Arnaout & Geldi, 2023). It has certainly been a disgrace for Israel to have such a major security failure coupled with a painful sense of humiliation and confusion for the government of Israel.

The aim of this operation according to the Hamas report entitled "Our Narrative...Operation Al-Aqsa Flood", is as a form of natural reaction to the Palestinian struggle against Israel which for more than 75 years has seized Palestinian land, defiled the al-Aqsa Mosque as the holy place of Islam, and persecuted and intimidated Palestinians. This is also a calculated move to ease the blockade on Gaza, relieve the Israel siege, achieve complete independence, and establish a Palestinian state (MEMO, 2024). During the operation, Hamas only focused on achieving its goals without involving or attacking civilians, including children, the elderly, and women (Anadolu Agency, 2024).

This military attack has several strategic implications according to Saleh (2023), first, this operation is the downfall of "Israeli national security

doctrine" where security is a fundamental Israeli doctrine, especially in providing safety and security for the Jewish community in Israel. Second, Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque's significance in Palestine fosters solidarity and a sense of togetherness as the Ummah's strength. Third, the uprising is a successful strategy for reclaiming Palestinian rights and ending Israeli occupation. This is a form of antithesis to the PLO's failure to establish an independent state of Palestine that only relies on the Oslo Accord and the Palestinian Authority which is only considered a tool by Israel to the extent of absorbing the aspirations of the people of Palestine. Fourth, the failure of the Zionist project to conquer/eliminate the Palestinian people after much resistance. Fifth, Israel's failure as a "police guard" in the region after the humiliating defeat of the resistance of the Hamas military group. Sixth, the assumption that ignoring Palestinian affairs while carrying out normalization with the Arab world is a mistake and error.

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood proved that the problems of the Palestinians and their rights, cannot be ignored. The resistance incident also influenced the failure of Israel's efforts to carry out peace and normalization programs with other Arab countries. However, Israel did not remain silent against the resistance launched by the Hamas fighter group, where Israel attacked the Gaza Strip totally and brutally. This resulted in an increasing amount of casualties on the Palestinians including children, the elderly, and women. In addition, Israel also enforced a strong blockade on the Gaza Strip so that the Palestinian people living there had increasingly difficulty in obtaining humanitarian aid from outside. The brutal and excessive actions carried out by Israel have caused many reactions of criticism from various communities in other parts of the world.

2.14 The Responses and Diplomatic Efforts of Indonesia toward Palestine

During President SBY's administration, when the Palestine-Israel conflict occurred from 2008-2014, Indonesia continued to respond to the military aggression carried out by the Israeli military and the humanitarian conditions in Palestine. Indonesia views the attack from Israel military army as a form of disproportionate military aggression, given that the Gaza Strip is a very densely populated area with weak infrastructure due to the prolonged blockade by Israel. In this situation, the Indonesian government affirms its solidarity with Palestine through various concrete steps at the national and international levels. President SBY at that time made a firm statement that the attack violated humanitarian principles and international law. Indonesia also urged the UN to immediately take concrete steps to stop the aggression.

In an emergency session of the UN Security Council, Indonesia, although not a permanent member, worked with other countries to call for an end to the violence. Indonesia fully supported the UN resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza. In addition, Indonesia encouraged the establishment of an international fact-finding mission to investigate alleged war crimes committed during the military operation. Indonesia also expressed its concern over the inability of the international community to immediately stop the violence.

On various occasions, Indonesia has emphasized the importance of an immediate ceasefire to stop the bloodshed and prevent further escalation of the conflict. The Indonesian government also called on Israel to end its blockade of the Gaza Strip, which has exacerbated the suffering of the Palestinian people for years.

In addition to diplomatic condemnation, Indonesia also provides significant humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. Through the Indonesia Red Cross/*Palang Merah Indonesia* (PMI) and the National Zakat Agency/*Badan Amil Zakat Nasional* (BAZNAS), Indonesia sends aid in the form of food, medicine, and other basic necessities to the Gaza Strip. This aid is distributed through international channels in collaboration with UN agencies such as UNRWA.

Indonesia uses international platforms such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to strengthen Palestine's position amid the conflict. As one of the founders of the NAM, Indonesia encourages its member countries to unite in condemning Israel's actions and supporting Palestinian rights. In these forums, Indonesia consistently emphasizes the importance of the two-state solution as a just and peaceful way out to resolve the Palestine-Israel conflict.

During Jokowi's administration period I (2014-2019) and period II (2019-2024), Indonesia's position remained supportive of Palestine. One of the examples is when President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel on December 6, 2017 and moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Indonesia strongly condemns President Trump's decision. President Joko Widodo directly issued an official statement rejecting the recognition, emphasizing that this step not only violates international law but also threatens the stability of the Middle East region. In his statement, Jokowi said that Indonesia stands firmly with the Palestinian people and supports their right to independence with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued an official statement condemning the United States' move and affirming Indonesia's commitment to supporting the Palestinian struggle. Indonesia views the

decision as a serious threat to the long-standing peace process and as an action that could worsen the situation in the region.

Not only did the Indonesian government respond to the incident, but there was also a reaction of criticism from elements of society in Indonesia. Thousands of people from religious organizations, students, and activists, took to the streets to condemn the United States' move. Large demonstrations took place in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and other cities, showing strong solidarity from the Indonesian people towards Palestine.

Religious organizations in Indonesia, such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah*, openly condemned the US decision and called on Muslims to unite in supporting Palestine. They also urged the Indonesian government to take stronger diplomatic steps in supporting the Palestinian struggle.

Another example of Indonesia's response and support towards Palestine was condemning the military aggression of Israel on Gaza in 2021. President Joko Widodo personally delivered a statement condemning the attack, calling it a gross violation of human rights and international law. In an official statement, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasized that Israel's actions in Sheikh Jarrah and the military attacks on Gaza constitute an illegal occupation that violates UN resolutions.

Indonesia affirms its support for the Palestinian struggle to achieve full independence with East Jerusalem as its capital. The government also asked the UN Security Council to immediately take concrete steps to stop the violence and protect Palestinian civilians.

The 2021 Gaza conflict sparked massive solidarity actions in Indonesia. Peaceful demonstrations were held in various cities, including Jakarta,

Surabaya, and Makassar, to condemn Israeli aggression and show support for Palestine.

Mass media and social media in Indonesia also played an important role in spreading information about the Gaza conflict. Online campaigns, such as fundraising and the hashtags #SavePalestine, #freepalestine, #freedomofpalestine and so on went viral and helped raise public awareness of the importance of supporting Palestine. Intensive media coverage also helped the public understand the complexity of the conflict and its impact on the Palestinian people.

CHAPTER 3: INDONESIA'S DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS TOWARD THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT

3.1 Shaping The early Indonesia's Foreign Policy

The process of forming political identity of Indonesia, cannot be separated from the efforts of the nation's founding elites in formulating various policies in preparing for Indonesia's independence. After World War II, when Japan surrendered to the Allies, there was a vacuum of power in its colonies, including Indonesia. Of course, this moment was not wasted and was used well by the nation's founding figures to prepare for its independence from the grip of colonialism. Although in the end the goal of independence was achieved on August 17, 1945, Indonesia had to face challenges both from within and outside.

Indonesia's domestic political conditions at that time were filled with various movements with different ideologies and the threat from the Netherlands who again tried to control Indonesia and did not recognize its independence. This certainly threatened Indonesia's sovereignty and national unity after its independence. The emergence of ideological competition between the nation's founding figures certainly cannot be separated from historical events where national figures with different ideological and political backgrounds discussed formulating a model for the Indonesian state during the preparation for independence. Religious groups want Indonesia to become an Islamic state that uses Islamic law as its legal basis because Indonesia consists of a majority Muslim population. This is different from the Nationalist group which believes that Indonesia consists of various ethnicities, cultures and religions so that the presence of the state will not only focus on one group, and the state is present to be fair to all groups in this diversity.

To resolve the debate between these groups, the founding fathers of Indonesia, formulated and introduced the *Pancasila* ideology as a bridge to unite various group views to achieve national unity based on mutual agreement or consensus (Abdillah, 2020). *Pancasila* consists of 5 principles, namely Belief in God, Humanity, Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Justice. From these principles, it can be concluded that *Pancasila* is neither a religious ideology nor a secular, because *Pancasila* recognizes the diversity of religions in Indonesia (pluralism) and has values and norms that serve as guidelines or philosophies of life for the Indonesian people (Anwar, 2010).

The debate between elite national figures did not stop at the discourse on the form of the Indonesian state, but also on how to determine Indonesia's international identity amidst the competition between the US and Soviet Union blocs that were mutually spreading their influence. In addition, the emergence of threats from the Netherlands which wanted to re-take control of Indonesia and refused to recognize Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945, also colored the turmoil of domestic and international politics in Indonesia.

In an effort to determine an international identity amidst the polemic of pressure from various political groups with different ideologies and seeking international recognition, Muhammad Hatta as vice president at that time formulated the foreign policy of Indonesia in his speech before the Central Indonesian National Committee/*Komite Nasional Indonesiap Pusat* (KNIP) on September 2, 1948 entitled "Rowing Between Two Reefs" (Sukma, 2003). This framework of thought resulted in Indonesia's foreign policy identity known as "free-active" politics, which until now this principle is still used as a guideline and foundation for Indonesia in implementing its

foreign policy as regulated in Article 3 of the Constitution of Indonesia No. 37 of 1999, regarding Foreign Relations.

The principle of free-active is based on four main values, namely, first, Indonesia's behavior in its foreign policy must be based on the fundamental of the nation's ideology, *Pancasila*. Second, foreign policy must have the aim of protecting national interests in line with the constitution of Indonesia. Third, in an effort to achieve the best national interests, it must be based on an independent foreign policy. Fourth, the foreign policy of Indonesia must be carried out pragmatically. Thus, this basis emphasizes three main things, namely independence, anti-colonialism, and pragmatism (Pramuji, 2020). Muhammad Hatta believes that by using the basis of the free-active in foreign policy of Indonesia, can provide positive commitment and result to the main goals and the national interests of Indonesia (Sukma, 1995).

A free-active foreign policy has implications for the international community that Indonesia does not side with any bloc, either the US or the Soviet Union and does not have the ability to establish a third or new bloc to challenge or compete with the two blocs. Meanwhile, for the domestic Indonesian community, this principle is to prevent rivalry of interests between elites in Indonesia. Muhammad Hatta argued that if foreign policy of Indonesia was based on siding with one of the blocs, it would complicate the national consolidation process so Hatta preferred decisions aimed at fostering national unity (Hatta, 1953). In other words, the basis of free-active in foreign policy of Indonesia initiated by Muhammad Hatta aimed to avoid interference from the Eastern or Western blocs and prevent divisions between the nation's elites.

The 'outward looking' orientation applied by Indonesia in its foreign policy based on the opening of the 1945 Constitution, had implications for the reality of international conditions after World War II (Leifer, 1983). For

Indonesia's political elites, the events after World War II presented their own challenges such as the lack of sympathy for the aspirations of the colonized people to have the right to gain independence and self-determination, as well as threats from the Netherlands and England who tried to recapture Indonesia.

In order to gain complete independence with international recognition and to expel the Dutch colonizers, Indonesia took two main paths, namely "physical struggle/revolution" and "diplomacy." One form of diplomacy carried out by Indonesia was to seek international support for the Middle East after the lack of clear assistance from the majority of major countries (Sukma, 2003). In 1947, under the Muhammad Hatta cabinet, Agus Salim, who was the figure of the Islamic political group, represented Indonesia in diplomacy with the Middle East.

3.2 The Emerging of Islamic Identity in Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Diplomatic efforts by Indonesian delegates resulted in the recognition of sovereignty and independence from Arab countries, starting with Egypt (June 10, 1947), followed by Syria (July 2, 1947), Saudi Arabia (November 24, 1947), and Yemen (May 5, 1948). The existence of a factor of brotherhood in religious communities (ummah) in this case played a significant role in the process of persuasion Arab countries to expand their diplomatic support for Indonesia (Bandoro, 1994). This is supported by the statement of a state envoy from Egypt to the Indonesian envoy who stated:

"The Islamic brotherhood inspired support for the struggle of the Indonesian people. The spirit of Islam urges us to fight all kinds of colonialism which in essentially the practice of slavery."

And the statement of Nokrashi Pasha, the Egypt's Prime Minister when welcoming the delegations of Indonesia in Egypt in April 1947:

" Supporting the fight of the Muslim Indonesians is the only option available to us as an Islamic state " (Hassan, 1978).

Although Indonesia through its delegation established diplomacy and received assistance from Arab countries, the important thing to understand is that these actions did not have an impact on changing the foundation of Indonesian foreign policy based on Islamic considerations. This diplomacy was solely intended as part of a diplomatic strategy to seek international support and recognition for the interests of the country. Indonesia continues to adhere to the principle of "free-active" which is based on Pancasila as the state ideology in carrying out its foreign policy (Leifer, 1983). However, this incident was the first step in which Islamic identity colored politics in Indonesia.

According to data from the Central Statistics Agency (2024), 87.2% of the total 284 million Indonesian population are Muslim, followed by Protestant Christians 6.9%, Catholics 2.9%, Hindus 1.7%, Buddhists 0.7%, and Confucians 0.05%. Although Indonesian society is dominated by Muslims, Indonesia is not an Islamic state that uses religious law as its legal basis but rather a unitary state based on the *Pancasila* ideology as a unifier between the diversity of religious, racial, ethnic, and cultural communities in Indonesia (Naim & Mokodenseho, 2023). However, we cannot separate the fact that Islam has played a significant role in the process of Indonesian independence and has become a source of social norms and value for Indonesian society, especially in domestic and international political legitimacy (Murphy, 2020). The use of Islam as an identity, especially in Indonesian foreign policy, was first introduced by the 6th president of

Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), after winning the presidential election in 2004.

In the midst of world challenges at that time where Islam was considered a radical and violent religion due to the 9/11 incident which increased Islamophobia and terror, President SBY attempted to redefine the foreign policy of Indonesia to answer the challenge. On this occasion, President SBY wanted to explain the assumption that Islam is not a religion that spreads terror and violence but rather a religion that teaches peace, goodness and moderation. This was conveyed by President SBY through his speech at the international forum Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) on May 20, 2005:

“Indonesia's international identity must be rooted in a strong sense of who we are. We cannot be all things to all people. We must know who we are and what we believe in, and project that into our foreign policy.... We are the fourth largest Muslim country in the world. We are home to the largest Muslim population in the world. We are the third largest democracy. We are also a country where democracy, Islam and modernity co-exist” (BPPK Kemenlu, 2005).

The meaning of “Who we are” in the speech delivered above is a form of self-concept in a collective society that has a role and influence in determining foreign policy decisions (Hudson & Day, 2020). So it can be understood that the values, norms, and culture that are rooted, embraced and believed in a community group form an identity, influence interactions and become the foundation for foreign policy strategies (Husain, 2024).

From the speech delivered, President SBY tried to emphasize that Islam is not a backward religion, that does not accept modernity, but a religion that accepts globality and maintains world peace. In addition, the message was

also aimed at the global Muslim community, domestic society, and Western society. Indonesia is trying to take a part in the global Muslim community and other Western countries by proving that Islam, modernity, and democracy can go well together and interpreting being a country with a majority of Muslims in the 21st century. It is hoped that this will create a supportive external environment both domestically and internationally (Murphy, 2020).

3.3 The Role of The Islamic Identity of Indonesia in The International World

The foreign policy of Indonesia, which is influenced by the factor of Islam, has two main objectives. First, it is related to the desire to establish broader relations with the Islamic world, one of the objectives of which is to improve the economy of the rich Gulf countries. Second, policies based on the values of Muslim solidarity are reflected in efforts to help other Muslims who are victims of a conflict (Murphy, 2020).

According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2010), the implementation and articulation of the free-active principle in Indonesian foreign policy continues to develop and this is influenced by the conditions of the political constellation, the way the world views leaders, and the government's priorities at that time. In other words, the use of the free-active principle is influenced by domestic and international conditions at that time.

During the SBY presidency, the free-active principle experienced a difference in approach where SBY chose a constructive approach and good connectivity so that Indonesia would not be involved in military alliances and would have healthy relations with other countries. Unlike his predecessor, Muhammad Hatta, who introduced the term "Rowing Between Two Reefs" indicated the international conditions at that time,

President SBY introduced the term "Navigating Ocean Turmoil" to describe Indonesia's efforts to change their image in the international world with its new identity. During SBY's administration, Indonesia always tried to promote and show moderate Islam in the international world (Wicaksana, 2012). This is because the domestic and international conditions at that time influenced the changing views of Islam.

The terrorist incident of 9/11 in the US and the Bali bombing in 2002 made domestic and international communities view Islam as a radical, terror, and violent religion. The dynamics of the international political conditions at that time made Islam take a part in influencing the development of foreign policy of Indonesia which based on four reasons, namely first, as the majority of the country is Muslim, Indonesia has an interest in restoring the negative image/view of the world community toward Islam by projecting Islam as a moderate religion and maintaining peace and separating the relationship between Islam and terrorism. Second, the involvement of Islamic groups/organizations in Indonesia in Indonesia's foreign policy to demonstrate their capabilities and consolidation on these issues. Third, the influence of Islam during the *Reform Era* was responded to more relaxedly and openly by the reform era government compared to the *Old-Order* and the *New-Order* which tended to be repressive toward Islam. Fourth, Islamic political groups are considered no longer a threat (Al-Anshori, 2016).

Although Indonesia is a country that was not involved and suffered material losses due to the 9/11 incident, Indonesia, especially Muslims, were affected by negative framing or misperceptions from the Western world. This incident certainly encouraged the government to implement a different diplomatic strategy, namely cooperating with other countries to fight terrorism and holding/initiating religious and cultural dialogues as an effort to describe Indonesian Muslim society as a moderate society,

upholding peace, and rejecting acts of violence or terrorism to the international community (Al-Anshori, 2016).

As stated by the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, "*Both the government and the Indonesian Muslim community have a commitment to actualize Islam as a religion that is compassionate to others (rahmatan lil' alamin)*," where from that statement it is clear that Islam has a significant role in foreign policy of Indonesia (Nakamura, 2005). To support Islamic moderation, the government is assisted and supported by the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah*, where both organizations have assisted to reducing the amount of radical Islamic groups and deviant teachings (Songbatumis, 2021).

The opportunity to introduce diplomacy with this new Indonesian identity was first implemented during President George W. Bush's visit to the Bogor Palace in 2006. The meeting was used as an opportunity by President SBY to introduce the image of Islam to the US and offer a solution to the problem with Iraq known as the 3R concept (Reconciliation, Replacement, and Reconstruction). The meeting gave positive results for Indonesia's image with President Bush stating "*Indonesia is an example of how democracy and modernization can be present as an alternative to fighting extremism*" (Murphy, 2009). This made the US paradigm change rapidly by referring to Indonesia a model of a country with a moderate and tolerant Muslim society (Nugraha & Maura, 2023).

This diplomatic approach was successful, as Indonesia established the new identity as an example for other Muslim communities and served as a link between the Islamic world and the West, allowing Indonesia to play a role in promoting peace in the Islamic world (Greenlees, 2007). This opportunity was used by President SBY to build deep relations with Arab worlds. For

example, in 2006, President SBY visited Jordan, Saudi Arabia Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates with an agenda to build closer economic relations with oil-producing countries and Indonesia. This cooperative relationship on the one hand became an alternative for Indonesia to increase its economic development, while for Arab countries it tried to find investment places that were disrupted by the 9/11 incident which affected the bad relations between Arab countries and Western countries (Anwar, 2010).

The emergence of an Islamic identity that plays a role in influencing the direction of foreign policy of Indonesia does not change the basis of the Indonesian state into an Islamic state. Foreign policy of Indonesia is based on the conditions and aspirations of Indonesia's domestic national interests which of course run and are in accordance with the values contained in the 1945 Constitution and *Pancasila*, not based on Islamic considerations. Indonesia also avoids narratives and expressions of foreign policy of Indonesia related to co-religious solidarity. The use of Islam in foreign policy during the SBY administration was used as an effort to restore Indonesia's image/view in the international world after 9/11 and the Bali bombings and to correct misunderstandings between Muslim communities and the West.

However, the use of Islam in public diplomacy of Indonesia, which is considered by the United States as a country with a dominant Muslim community that can live alongside with modernity and democracy, is expected to take a part as a bridge and peacemaker between the Islamic world and the West. The role of Islamic groups in Indonesia also influences foreign policy by providing pressure and input to the government on international issues referred to the world's Muslim community. In addition, their presence also encourages and helps the government to introduce

moderate Islam in various Interfaith discussion events in international forums. Thus, Indonesia's foreign policy is influenced by both domestic and international conditions.

3.4 Indonesia's Support and Attitude Toward Palestine

The relationship between Palestine and Indonesia, existed since the era of President Soekarno. President Soekarno firmly gave his support to Palestine through his speech which said *"As long as the independence of the Palestinian nation has not been handed over to the Palestinian people, then as long as the Indonesian nation stands against Israeli colonialism"* (Nugraha & Maura, 2023). This statement was driven by the values of the nation as stated in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution which mentions *"That in fact independence is the right of all nations, and therefore, colonialism in the world must be abolished because it is not in accordance with humanity and justice."*

The spirit brought by Soekarno is a manifestation of the value of anti-colonialism which has implications for support for Palestine and rejecting the recognition of sovereignty over the establishment of Israel in Palestinian land (Bachtiar et al., 2021). In 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia held the Asia-Africa Conference as a forum for consolidating countries in Asia and Africa to jointly fight poverty and anti-colonialism movements and support countries that were not yet independent such as Palestine (Grovoğu, 2011). The Asia-Africa Conference also produced the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a form of impartiality between both the Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War.

Indonesia's support for Palestine continues and is consistent to this day, although there are some differences in the nuances of support for each ruling regime (Setiawan & Nainggolan, 2024). Indonesia also maintains its stance not to recognize Israeli sovereignty (Pramuji, 2020). Islamic groups such as *Muhammadiyah* and NU continue to provide voice and support to

the government to continue to support the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict. However, in understanding Indonesia's foreign policy identity toward this conflict, there has been much debate as to whether Indonesia is driven by its national identity factor based on the 1945 Constitution, or based on the spirit of struggle for Islamic values.

For example, Setiawati (2024) states that Indonesia's commitment to resolving the conflict in the Middle East, especially Palestine, is largely influenced by Islamic solidarity compared to the constitution. This opinion is also supported by Shadiqi et al (2020) stating that the support given by Indonesia to Palestine is based on the similarity of Islamic identity between Indonesia and Palestine and is related to a strong sense of Muslim solidarity.

In contrast, Maharani (2023) said that Indonesia's commitment to supporting Palestinian independence is influenced by domestic political conditions and pragmatism compared to Islamic solidarity. In line with Prasetya dan Srifauzi (2018) emphasizing that Indonesia's role in supporting Palestine is based on the values and mandate of the 1945 Constitution.

However, Pramuji (2020) provides a new perspective, namely uniting national and Islamic identities in influencing and synergizing Indonesia's Proactive and constructive foreign policy. From the studies above, although there are differences of opinion regarding which identity influences Indonesia's foreign policy, national and Islamic identities have a major influence in determining the direction of policy, especially on the issue of the Palestine-Israel conflict (Hassan, 1978). The government of Indonesia has also never formally acknowledged that the Palestine problem is related to factor of religious, but the government continues to try to accommodate input and interests from its Muslim-majority society (Al-Anshori, 2016).

3.5 Indonesia's Diplomacy Toward Palestine-Israeli Conflict after 7 October 2023

Foreign policy of Indonesia during the second term of Jokowi's regime introduced the "Priority 4+1" diplomatic approach consisting of sovereignty and nationality diplomacy, protection diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and active contribution to foreign policy in the international environment, as well as strengthening infrastructure as plus one (Setiawan & Nainggolan, 2024). This policy is reflected in Indonesia's efforts when it was re-elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2019-2020. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Indonesia has four main priorities, namely prioritizing dialogue in resolving conflicts peacefully to strengthen geopolitical stability, resolving conflicts by improving cooperative relations with UNSC members, countering radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, and sustainable development efforts as an effort to create regional and international peace (Nugraha & Maura, 2023).

In highlighting the Palestine-Israel conflict, Indonesia specifically pays attention to three main aspects, namely the principle of inclusiveness, comprehensive aspects, and respect for international law. Inclusiveness means involving the conflicting parties to participate and be involved in the process of peace and provide solutions to resolve the conflict. The comprehensive aspect means the Indonesian diplomatic process in resolving the Palestine-Israel conflict, by respecting the political rights of Palestine fairly and sustainably. And the importance of drafting a peace resolution by considering the legal parameters applicable in the international environment (Gewati, 2019).

The escalation of the Palestine-Israel conflict after the attacks on October 7, 2023, which has increased, has made Indonesia increasingly active in diplomacy in the international arena to promote peace and conflict

resolution. There are several diplomatic efforts made by Indonesia to resolve the conflict:

1. Indonesia seeks a peaceful resolution by holding diplomatic meetings and participating in international organizations. For example, President Jokowi emphasized the urgency of stopping various forms of violence and making humanitarian issues the main focus in the Association South-East Asian Nation-Gulf Cooperation Council (ASEAN-GCC) Summit forum in October 2023, in Riyadh (Setkab RI, 2023). On December 2024, diplomatic meeting forum at the headquarters of the UN Human Rights Council, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi condemned the attacks carried out by Israel in Gaza Strip resulted in many civilian casualties, including the elderly, women, and children. Minister Retno invited and emphasized to other countries the importance of three things, namely emphasizing Israel to immediately implement a permanent ceasefire, rejecting the double standards of Western countries in this matter, and providing support for an independent and responsible International Commission of Investigation (Manurung & Heriamsal, 2024). At another meeting at the International Court of Justice, on February 23, 2024, Indonesia reiterated its stance to reject and condemn acts of crimes against humanity against the Palestinian people that violate international law, and support Palestine to fulfill its right to determine its own destiny (Marsudi, 2024).
2. Indonesia uses a shuttle diplomacy approach. The concept of shuttle diplomacy is an effort by a country to visit and hold meetings with other countries to discuss and resolve an issue (Aksoy & Çiçek, 2018). Indonesia conducted shuttle diplomacy to several countries such as China, Russia, England, and France to discuss the ongoing conflict

in Gaza and received support from UNSC countries to help work together to end the conflict (Manurung & Heriamsal, 2024).

3. Indonesia took the diplomatic route by building cooperation with the OIC at the international level. President Jokowi emphasized to OIC member countries at the OIC Extraordinary Summit forum in Saudi Arabia to unite together to support justice and fight for the humanitarian rights of Palestinian citizens (Mazrieva, 2023). Minister Retno Marsudi also urged the OIC to act actively and firmly in seeking global support, forming a framework for protecting the rights of Palestinians by opposing Israeli occupation and colonization, and mobilizing to support the peace process between the two conflicting parties (Difa & Adji, 2023).
4. On another occasion, Indonesia established bilateral relations with several countries. For example, on November 11, 2023, President Jokowi held a diplomatic meeting with the King of Jordan to support Jordan's efforts to fight for the independence and peace of Palestine and Indonesia is committed to resolving the conflict. On February 28, 2024, the Vice President of Indonesia, Ma'ruf Amin visited New Zealand to meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand. During the meeting, both parties had the same views and political stance in resolving the conflict in Palestine, namely through diplomatic discussions and a ceasefire. Indonesia also invited New Zealand to raise funds and promote peace and tolerance in the international world.

In showing Indonesia's commitment and concern in seeking peace in Palestine, especially the Gaza Strip, on April 3, 2024, Indonesia sent humanitarian assistance in the form of medicines, food, medical equipment, and so on worth 30 billion rupiah. Not only that, other actors such as NGOs,

non-governmental organizations, public figures, and others participated in humanitarian actions such as fundraising/donations for Palestine. For example, the Indonesian Ulema Council/*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI) collected 27 billion rupiah in fundraising, the National Amil Zakat Agency collected 40 million rupiah, and other fundraising actions spread across several regions of Indonesia by certain parties such as the Islamic Education Foundation/*Yayasan Pendidikan Islam* (YPI) Ar Rahmah Tahfidz Hidayatullah Malang, the Muslim Community of Malang, the Youth Organization/*Organisasi Kepemudaan* (OKP) of Sabang City, the student action of Sapta Mandiri Balangan Institute, to Indonesian K-Pop fans (Manurung & Heriamsal, 2024). A total of 4,400 tons of humanitarian aid collected from various parties was sent through the Rafah route to Gaza. Although on several occasions, the distribution of this aid experienced obstacles due to the blockade by the Israeli military, the Indonesian government still tried to conduct diplomacy so that humanitarian assistance could be accepted and arrive in Gaza.

3.6 The Role of *Muhammadiyah* in Promoting Peace

3.6.1 A Brief History of *Muhammadiyah*

Muhammadiyah is one of the largest and most influential Islamic organizations in Indonesia that was established for more than a century since November 18, 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta which is engaged in education, health, and philanthropy (Muttaqin, 2024). In its history, *Muhammadiyah* as the first Islamic organization in Indonesia pioneered and reformed the Indonesian education system at that time which prioritized the principles of accountability and usefulness and became a driving force in the emancipation of the movement of Muslim women.

The purpose of establishing the *Muhammadiyah* organization as a forum for realizing a truly Islamic society based on religious ideology that prioritizes *da'wah*, *tajdid*, and progressive Islam that is *wasathiyah* with a wide range of layers and diversity of society (Nashir, 2017). *Muhammadiyah* has a philosophy of *da'wah* movement *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* and *tajdid* (renewal) to spread the message of Islam which is *rahmatan lil a'alam*.

Tajdid is not only the purification of Islamic teachings from practices considered heretical, but also an effort to make Islam relevant to the changing times. *Muhammadiyah* seeks to eliminate religious practices mixed with superstition (*Tahayul*), heretical (*Bid'ah*), and superstition (*Churafat*) (TBC), which according to KH Ahmad Dahlan have prevented Muslims from progress. Instead, *Muhammadiyah* encourages Muslims to return to the Qur'an and Sunnah, but with contextual and science-based interpretations (Nashir, 2017). This approach makes *Muhammadiyah* known as a modernist Islamic movement that is adaptive to change. The role of *tajdid* is also driven by the concept of *Wasathiyah* Progressive Islam where the *Muhammadiyah da'wah* movement does not only focus on the areas of belief, worship, and morals, but is involved in the renewal of worldly *mua'malah* that focuses on the benefit of humanity (Muhammadiyah, 2024).

3.6.2 The Challenges of Muhammadiyah

During the Dutch colonial period, Muslims were in a depressed socio-economic condition. Political and economic discrimination resulted in a gap between indigenous and non-indigenous communities. *Muhammadiyah* was present as a response to this situation by offering education and social services as a means of community empowerment. Education became *Muhammadiyah's* main weapon to educate Muslims, while charitable efforts in the health and social sectors became a solution to overcome the existing inequality (Arifin, 2016).

Muhammadiyah was not directly involved in the political movement against colonialism, but its contribution in building national awareness cannot be ignored. Through education and teaching liberating Islamic values, *Muhammadiyah* instilled a spirit of nationalism that supported the independence effort. This made *Muhammadiyah* one of the civil forces that supported the creation of an independent Indonesia.

After Indonesia's independence in 1945, *Muhammadiyah* faced new challenges in the context of national development. This organization adapted to the ever-changing political and social situation without losing its identity as a non-political movement. Although not directly involved in practical politics, many *Muhammadiyah* cadres became important figures in government, education, and the health world (Sholeh, 2017).

Muhammadiyah also continues to expand its charitable efforts in various fields. In the field of education, *Muhammadiyah* now has thousands of schools, madrasahs, and universities spread throughout Indonesia. One important achievement is the establishment of Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY), Muhammadiyah University of Malang (UMM), and Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS), which are known as leading higher education institutions.

In the field of health, *Muhammadiyah* manages hundreds of hospitals and clinics such as *Penolong Kesengsaraan Oemat*/Helper of People's Misery (PKU) that provide quality medical services to the community, including the underprivileged. These charitable efforts are managed with the spirit of Islamic philanthropy, which aims to create prosperity for the people.

3.6.3 The Internalization of *Muhammadiyah*: Responding to the Palestine-Israel Conflict

Muhammadiyah's mission of benefit is not only limited to the Indonesian people, but through the renewal movement, *Muhammadiyah* has a cosmopolitan approach in its Islamic paradigm. The cosmopolitan approach in *Muhammadiyah's* da'wah movement produces a global-minded paradigm to create peace, tolerance, and diversity in the international world, resulting in the concept of "*Muhammadiyah Internationalization*" (Mahdi, 2024). *Muhammadiyah's internationalization* consists of three main concepts, namely the internationalization of ideas, roles, and movements which are manifested in the form of a commitment to bring change and improvement of civilization, creating solidarity, prosperity and peace through da'wah (Masmuh, 2020).

This cosmopolitan attitude, thought, and movement are reflected in *Muhammadiyah's* efforts to respond to the Palestine-Israel conflict. The first *Muhammadiyah* figure who participated in fighting for Palestinian independence was Abdul Kahar Muzakkir who represented Southeast Asian Muslims in the World Islamic Scholars Congress forum at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt in 1931. The results of Kahar Muzakkir's diplomatic activities have built a framework for introducing Indonesia's struggle to the Islamic world to gain sympathy and support and emphasize the importance of Palestine for Muslims in the world, including Indonesia (Afandi, 2023).

Kahar Muzakkir's struggle was used as an implementation of *Muhammadiyah's* attitude toward the Palestinian struggle as stated in the official *Muhammadiyah* document in the 31st *Tanfidz Muktamar* in 1969 where *Muhammadiyah* was in line with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution which was anti-colonialism and anti-colonialism in supporting the

Palestinian struggle and condemning the military aggression carried out by Israel. These efforts are still continuing to this day, even *Muhammadiyah's* support for the Palestinian struggle is increasingly consistent and strong as stated by Prof. Haedar Nashir as the General Chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership/*Pimpinan Pusat (PP) Muhammadiyah*:

"We, Muhammadiyah and the people of Indonesia, always continue to defend and support the struggle of the Palestinian people for the sake of upholding the sovereignty of the Palestinian state that is free from all forms of Israeli arbitrariness. The modern world should create freedom and eternal peace for all nations on earth for the sake of creating a civilization of humanity that lives together with dignity and sovereignty."

After the events of October 7, 2023, *Muhammadiyah* responded by issuing a press statement numbered 006/PER/1.0/1/2023 regarding the Palestine-Israel War, signed by Haedar Nashir, General Chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, and Abdul Mu'ti, General Secretary of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, which contained seven points of *Muhammadiyah's* position. The seven points are that *Muhammadiyah* is concerned about the war that has caused civilian casualties, urges the UNSC to take diplomatic action to stop the war, calls on Israel not to use the war to expand its territory, encourages the Indonesian government to be actively involved in resolving the conflict, appeals to the Indonesian people to respond to the conflict wisely and rationally, calls on Muslims to pray and perform absentee prayers, and *Muhammadiyah's* commitment to support the Palestinian struggle and will send humanitarian aid (Afandi, 2023).

During the Palestine-Israel conflict after October 7, 2023, *Muhammadiyah* has provided and distributed significant humanitarian assistance, one of which is through the *Muhammadiyah* Aid program with the *Muhammadiyah* Zakat,

Infaq, Shadaqah Institute/*Lembaga Amil Zakat Infaq Sadaqah* (LAZISMU) as the source of its financial management and also collaborating with other NGOs (Fitriyani, 2023). Some examples of concrete evidence of Muhammadiyah's commitment to distributing humanitarian assistance include:

1. On November 1, 2023, *Muhammadiyah* distributed 13 billion rupiah in financial assistance which was handed over directly by the General Chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, Haedar Nashir. Previously, from 2018-2023, *Muhammadiyah* had distributed 27 billion rupiah. The assistance was accompanied by the delivery of 2,400 cans of rendang meat, and 600 Family Kit packages consisting of towels, blankets, and underwear;
2. On February 5, 2024, *Muhammadiyah* collaborated with The Egyptian Red Crescent (ERC) in distributing humanitarian assistance in Palestine;
3. On June 21, 2024, *Muhammadiyah* through the Muhammadiyah Special Branch Leadership/*Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Muhammadiyah* (PCIM) Jordan as an extension and representative of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, prepared and prepared sacrificial meat for Palestinian refugees in the Widhat Camp, Amman, Jordan. LAZISMU also participated in providing and distributing assistance in the form of 100 basic food packages to support daily needs;
4. On June 8 and 9, 2024, LAZISMU collaborated with *Gazze Destek Derneği* (GDD) to distribute clean water in the Gaza area at three different locations, namely 70,000 liters of water in Gaza, 50,000 liters of water in Deir al-Balah, and 39,000 liters of water in Khan Yunis;

5. On July 15, 2024, PCIM Egypt collaborated with LAZISMU, handing over medical equipment assistance in the form of 2 defibrillators and 1 diathermy device worth \$32,710 which were handed over to the Palestine Hospital, in Egypt.

The form of *Muhammadiyah's* consistency in continuing to fight for and support Palestine and efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully shows the attitude, ideas/concepts, and movements of *Muhammadiyah's* Internationalization of da'wah which are based on the concept of progressive Islam that is *wasathiyah*. This is one proof that *Muhammadiyah* as an Islamic organization does not only focus on da'wah in the realm of faith but also on the order of muammalah both domestically and internationally to introduce to the world that Islam is a peaceful religion with high solidarity among the people and upholding peace.

3.7 The Support of Indonesia Toward Palestine Under the New Regime

On October 20, 2024, Prabowo Subianto was officially inaugurated as the 8th president of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2024-2029 period, replacing President Joko Widodo who had ruled for two terms (2014-2024). In front of the participants of the Plenary Session of the People's Consultative Assembly/*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR), President Prabowo delivered his first speech and one of the issues discussed was the support of Indonesia for the Palestinian struggle:

"We have a principle that we must be solidary, we must defend the oppressed people in this world. Therefore, we support the independence of the Palestinian people."

The speech showed that Indonesia under the Prabowo regime will continue to be committed to defending the Palestinian struggle by adhering to the

mandate of the 1945 Constitution which has anti-colonial, anti-oppression, and global solidarity values. On the same occasion, President Prabowo also conveyed the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy orientation in the future:

"We choose the path of friendship with all countries. I have repeatedly stated that Indonesia will implement foreign policy as a country that wants to be a good neighbor. We want to be the good neighbor."

This clarifies Indonesia's position in its international relations as a country that remains committed to maintaining and promoting peace and humanity while emphasizing the policy of "free-active" foreign policy orientation (BPMI Setpres, 2024).

CONCLUSION

The Thufan Al-Aqsa Military Operation attack on October 7, 2023, by Hamas in Israeli territory, is a new episode in the prolonged conflict between Palestine and Israel that began after the end of World War I. The various actors involved and the methods used, both through diplomacy and military attacks, have not been able to provide a bright spot for a peaceful and good resolution between the two parties. The Palestine-Israel conflict has become the focus of attention and discussion for many countries, one of which is Indonesia.

Indonesia has a historic relationship with Palestine which at that time played a role in assisting the diplomacy of Indonesian delegations to Arab countries to gain international support and recognition during its independence. Indonesia is also one of the countries that continues to be committed to fighting for PUse the "Insert Citation" button to add citations to this document.

alestinian independence and peace and rejects the recognition of Israeli sovereignty. This refers to Indonesia's national identity which was formed by the history of the struggle for independence, and is reflected in the Indonesian constitution based on the 1945 Constitution and *Pancasila* which have values and principles of anti-colonialism, anti-oppression, and spreading world peace.

Islamic identity also strengthens this support, considering that Indonesia with the largest Muslim population has emotional and religious ties to the Palestinian people's struggle. Although there are some differences of opinion regarding Indonesia's foreign policy based on national identity or Islamic identity, both complement each other and strengthen Indonesia's attitude and commitment to continue to provide support to Palestine and seek alternatives to resolve the conflict peacefully.

National identity reflected in the values of the 1945 Constitution provides a strong legal and moral foundation in the nation and state to oppose colonialism and support human rights, which are in line with the principles of freedom and justice. Meanwhile, Islamic identity provides a dimension of religious solidarity and social support that strengthens Indonesia's commitment to Palestine. Islamic identity also strengthens the position of Indonesia in international organizations such as the OIC and the UN, where Indonesia actively advocates for Palestinian rights and works with other Muslim countries to discover a resolution. The existence of a factor of support from the majority Muslim Indonesian people for Palestine also influences foreign policy. Religious sentiment and solidarity of Muslims in Indonesia encourage the government to take a proactive stance in supporting the Palestinian struggle.

In actualizing Indonesia's role and commitment to the Palestinian struggle, after the October 7, 2023, Indonesia has been proactive in various

international forums, both the OIC and the UN, to advocate and conduct diplomacy on the importance of ending the conflict peacefully. Indonesia also continues to support the Two-State Solution approach, which is believed to be the best way to create sustainable peace. On various occasions, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that the establishment of a sovereign and independent state of Palestine is an absolute step to resolve the root causes of the conflict. In addition, the Indonesian government has contributed and sent humanitarian aid to Gaza in collaboration with various parties, NGOs, community groups, and individuals.

The role of *Muhammadiyah* as the largest Islamic civil society movement in Indonesia, is also committed to voicing the Palestinian struggle in the national or international levels. *Muhammadiyah's* commitment to supporting the Palestinian struggle is a form of implementation of *Muhammadiyah's* international preaching movement which depicts progressive Islam that is wasathiyah with the principles of empowerment, advancing life, and overcoming humanitarian problems. In addition, *Muhammadiyah's* consistent attitude is also reflected in its commitment to the mandate of the 1945 Constitution to fight various forms of oppression, be anti-colonial, and participate in maintaining world peace.

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