

**T.C.
ISTANBUL MEDENİYET UNIVERSITY
THE INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL OTTOMAN STUDIES**

**THE MOSUL INCIDENT OF 1909 AND ITS SOCIOPOLITICAL,
JUDICIAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES**

M.A. THESIS

NURKAN SEVER

AUGUST 2021

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ADVISOR

ASSOC. PROF. M. TALHA ÇİÇEK

AUGUST 2021

BİLDİRİM

Hazırladığım tezin tamamen kendi çalışmam olduğunu, akademik ve etik kuralları gözeterek çalıştığımı ve her alıntıya kaynak gösterdiğimi taahhüt ederim.

Nurkan SEVER

Danışmanlığını yaptığım işbu tezin tamamen öğrencinin çalışması olduğunu, akademik ve etik kuralları gözeterek çalıştığını taahhüt ederim.

Doç. Dr. M. Talha ÇİÇEK

İMZA SAYFASI

Nurkan SEVER tarafından hazırlanan ‘**The Mosul Incident of 1909 and Its Sociopolitical, Judicial and Military Consequences**’ (1909 Musul Hadisesi ve Sosyopolitik, Adli ve Askeri Sonuçları) başlıklı bu yüksek lisans tezi, ‘**International Ottoman Studies**’ (Uluslararası Osmanlı Çalışmaları) Anabilim Dalında hazırlanmış ve jürimiz tarafından kabul edilmiştir.

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PREFACE

This comprehensive study which is based on a long-term archival research was carried out in a 11-month period between September 2020 and August 2021. As it is almost entirely an archive-based work, the detection, transcription, and interpretation of documents has been a laborious and time-consuming process. Since the bureaucratic language and technical format used by Ottoman state institutions in their official correspondence is particularly my area of interest, it was a pleasure for me to analyze these documents. However, I must admit that the lexiphanic and grandiloquent language in the messages from the quarters such as religious cliques, tribal formations, notables, merchants, and shopkeepers challenged my perception and vocabulary. In particular, interpreting the rhetoric of Sâdât's messages, which includes praise, glorification and blessing, required a serious dictionary search. After all, I still think that my deep interest in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, Institutions and Provincial Authorities encouraged and gave meaning to this work as a driving force behind.

While my initial aim was to investigate facts such as corruption, misconduct and administrative violations in administrative authorities and law enforcement agencies, I discovered and completely focused on the Mosul Incident. The fact that many different conflicts, cliques, or authorities were somehow related to the Mosul Incident, and the incident has some consequences that extend to the present day, makes the case a laboratory in itself. Researching this incident gave me the chance to take a closer look at the Post-Constitutional Mosul and to observe the power struggle between the religious cliques inherited from the Hamidian regime and the Unionist clique that began to influence the administration. In addition, this incident has been a unique opportunity to see the historical codes of the Arab-Kurdish dispute which is also inherited by today's Iraq. In this way, I hope that the study will make a worthwhile contribution to the Post-Constitutional Ottoman Iraq and Modern Iraq literatures.

I am grateful to my thesis advisor Associate Professor M. Talha Çiçek, for his valuable guidance, advice, and revisions. I am delighted to have gained my first professional experience in historiography under the supervision of an academician like him, who has a great command of Middle Eastern History and has a great reputation in this

discipline. In order to be able to utilize extensively from the archive and to read handwritten (*riqa*) documents, I took online lessons for two months from Ottoman Archive Expert Orhan Sakin who teaches at the Kubbealtı Foundation. I would like to express my gratitude to him as these lessons and his command of his discipline have helped me a lot at this point. I would like to thank my mother for her unconditional love and support, even though I sometimes weakened, lost my focus, and even almost gave up during this long research. Without my mother's encouragement, faith and empathy in me, this study would probably have been incomplete or failed.

ABSTRACT

THE MOSUL INCIDENT OF 1909 AND ITS SOCIOPOLITICAL, JUDICIAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES

Sever, Nurkan

Master's Thesis,

The Institute of Graduate Studies, Department of International Ottoman Studies

Advisor: Assoc. Prof. M. Talha Çiçek

August, 2021. 319 pages

This study examines the Post-Constitutional provincial history through a public order incident that took place in Ottoman Mosul in 1909. The primary objective of the study is to bring the Mosul Incident to the literature, which has not attracted the necessary attention in neither the Ottoman nor Iraqi historiography until now. The banishment and murder of *Sheikh Said Barzanji* who was the clan leader of *Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah* as the most influential religious organization of region, created a critical threshold in the history of Mosul. This catastrophic incident had revolted *Sâdât* (*Seyyids*), Kurdish tribes and religious orders against the state authority, almost sparked a civil war in the province and eventually deepened the ethnic discrimination between the Arab and Kurdish Ulema. After the incident, some local administrators were also polarized as *Anti-Sâdât* and *Pro-Sâdât*, the provincial tension reached its peak and the allegations and accusations of the administrators against each other left their mark on the process. In this respect, the study aims to analyze the Post-Constitutional power shifts, the sociopolitical conflicts between different cliques, administrations and ethnicities, provincial security policies and how the state authority managed the crisis after such a catastrophic incident.

The study approaches the Mosul Incident from a micro-historical perspective and provides an utterly detailed narrative. Since the subject is extremely limited in the existing literature, the largest part of the research is based on the Ottoman State Archives. For this reason, the incident has been analyzed on a multilayered level

through the administrative, judicial, and military archival documents and parliamentary minutes. Some personal accounts related to the incident, such as memoirs and travel books, were partially utilized as well.

Eventually, the study demonstrated us that how the tension accumulated among different sociopolitical groups turned into a minor civil war after an ordinary street incident. The fact that *Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah* is a socioeconomic class or a supra identity that can organize mass movements by incorporating sub-religious and tribal elements, played a major role in the expansion of the crisis. However, it was also evident that the allegations and suspicions on the local administrators pushed the process into a vicious circle. As the study indicated, the state authority chose to carry out small-scale military and judicial reforms in order to cope with the crisis and keep down the repercussions of the incident. As a result of the long investigation and trial process, 11 of the 291 detainees were executed, 127 were convicted of major and minor crimes, and 153 were acquitted.

Keywords: Mosul, Iraq, Constitutional Monarchy, Unionist Governors, Administrative Corruption, Kurdish Sheikhs, Collective Violence, Arab Kurdish Dispute

ÖZET

1909 MUSUL HADİSESİ VE SOSYOPOLİTİK, ADLİ VE ASKERİ SONUÇLARI

Sever, Nurkan

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Danışman: Doç. Dr. M. Talha Çiçek

Ağustos, 2021. 319 sayfa

Bu çalışma, 1909 yılında Osmanlı Musul'unda meydana gelen bir asayiş olayı üzerinden Meşrutiyet sonrası taşra tarihini incelemektedir. Çalışmanın temel amacı, bugüne kadar ne Osmanlı ne de Irak tarih yazımında gerekli ilgiyi görmemiş olan Musul Olayını literatüre kazandırmaktır. Bölgenin en etkili dini teşkilatı olan *Sâdât-ı Barzenciye*'nin aşiret reisi *Şeyh Said Berzenci*'nin sürgün edilip öldürülmesi, Musul tarihinde kritik bir eşik oluşturmıştır. Bu yıkıcı olay, *Sâdât'ı (Seyyidler)*, Kürt aşiretlerini ve tarikatlarını devlet otoritesine karşı ayaklandırmış, vilayette adeta bir iç savaşın kıvılcımını ateşlemiş ve sonunda Arap ve Kürt Ulema arasındaki etnik ayrımcılığı derinleştirmiştir. Olay sonrasında bazı mahalli idareciler de Sâdât Karşısı ve Sâdât Yanlısı olarak kutuplaşmış, vilayet genelinde gerilim had safhaya çıkmış ve idarecilerin birbirlerine yönelttikleri iddialar ve suçlamalar da sürece damgasını vurmuştur. Bu bakımdan çalışma, Meşrutiyet sonrası güç kaymalarını, farklı klikler, idareler ve etnik gruplar arasındaki sosyopolitik çatışmaları, taşra güvenlik politikalarını ve devlet otoritesinin böylesine yıkıcı bir olaydan sonra krizi nasıl yönettiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Çalışma Musul Olayına mikro-tarihsel bir perspektiften yaklaşmakta ve son derece ayrıntılı bir anlatı sunmaktadır. Mevcut literatürde konu son derece sınırlı yer aldığı için araştırmanın büyük bir kısmı Osmanlı Devlet Arşivlerine dayanmaktadır. Bu nedenle olay idari, adli ve askeri arşiv belgeleri ile meclis tutanakları üzerinden çok

katmanlı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Anılar ve seyahatnameler gibi olayla ilgili bazı kişisel anlatılardan da kısmen yararlanılmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, çalışma bize farklı sosyopolitik gruplar arasında biriken gerilimin sıradan bir sokak olayının ardından nasıl küçük bir iç savaşa dönüştüğünü göstermiştir. *Sâdât-ı Barzenciye*'nin, alt din ve aşiret unsurlarını bünyesinde toplayarak kitle hareketlerini örgütleyebilen sosyoekonomik bir sınıf veya üst bir kimlik olması, krizin yayılmasında büyük rol oynamıştır. Ancak yerel yöneticilere yönelik iddia ve şüphelerin de süreci kısır bir döngüye sürüklediği ortaya çıkmıştır. Çalışmanın da gösterdiği gibi, devlet otoritesi krizle başa çıkmak ve olayın yansımalarını azaltmak için küçük çaplı askeri ve yargı reformları yapmayı tercih etmiştir. Uzun süren soruşturma ve yargılama süreci sonucunda 291 tutukludan 11'i idam edilmiş, 127'si büyük ve küçük suçlardan hüküm giymiş ve 153'ü beraat etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Musul, Irak, Meşrutiyet, İttihatçı Valiler, İdari Yozlaşma, Kürt Şeyhler, Toplumsal Şiddet, Arap Kürt Çatışması

To my mother, Gülşen Sever
For her unconditional love and support

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
BEO	Bab-1 Ali Evrak Odası
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DH.MKT	Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi
DH.MUI	Dahiliye Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi Evrakı
DH.ŞFR	Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi
İ.ML	İrade Maliye
JTF	Joint Task Force
KSCP	Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SMU	Society of Mohammedan Union
SUC	Society of Unionist Charity
ŞD	Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı
Y. PRK. ASK	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askeri Maruzat
Y. PRK. HR	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Hariciye Nezareti Maruzatı

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Question, Objective and Outline

The real motivation behind this study is the deep interest towards Mosul's domestic security conditions and the provincial law enforcement agencies during the Second Constitutional era. As an Ottoman province hosted by ancient Mesopotamia, known as the cradle of civilizations and comprised of fertile lands between the Euphrates and Tigris, Mosul deserves a chief interest on the historical scene of Iraq. Since the modern Iraq inherited the sociocultural codes of Ottoman bureaucracy, understanding the Ottoman provincial authorities becomes relevant and vital for a better understanding of today's Iraq. Fewness of studies on the Middle East of the Second Constitutional era always pushed me to study on provincial histories for closing the gaps and contribute to building modern histories. Besides, particularly Mosul had always drawn my attention as a province of clashing interests and as a center of gravity between Anatolian heartlands and Mesopotamia. Multiplicity of Muslim and Non-Muslim elements, their networks with other countries and exposedness to the power focuses make this province remarkably strategic as well. Tribal mobility is also a key element to understand the Iranian border disputes, British and Russian provocations, and domestic conflicts.

In fact, my primary purpose when starting this thesis was to take a closer look at the public order incidents in Mosul. I was planning to examine the corruption, misconduct, administrative violation, and resort to violence facts in the Provincial Administration and law enforcement units. However, the archival records that I came across at the very beginning of my study took me to a much bigger incident. The document was titled as "Necessary measures were taken to end the incident that occurred when a soldier of the Kirkuk mule cavalry harassed the Muslim women while he was drunk".¹ The major incident triggered by this individual violation mentioned in this document would cost the province several years and occupy the Central Authority for a long time. The incident, which started with the harassment of a Muslim woman

¹ BOA; DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324- 05 January 1909 "Kerkük Nizamiye ester-süvarlarından bir neferin sarhoş olduğu halde Müslüman kadınlara sarkıntılığıyla çıkan vukuatın sona erdirilmesi için gereken tedbirlerin alındığı. (Musul)"

by a drunken mule cavalry in a downtown square of Mosul, quickly escalated between Arab and Kurdish elements and later almost turned into a provincial civil war. Therefore, it was directly or indirectly linked to many unexpected developments happening throughout the Mosul province during that period. These developments had left provincial administrators under heavy imputation, even caused their dismissals, and triggered the Siege of Sulaymaniyah by Sâdât-backed irregular forces. Due to public order and security concerns, a Joint Task Force (*Müretteb Kuvvet*) was formed, and the process was closely monitored by the Ministries of Interior, Justice and War. The investigation and trial process of the Mosul Incident had also serious repercussions and resulted in the rebuilding of Mosul's judicial infrastructure. In short, the Mosul Incident, one of the most critical thresholds of Mosul after the declaration of the Constitution in 1908, was in front of me and was waiting to be solved like a puzzle.

The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the tensions created by the shifting power balances in Post-Constitutional Mosul through different contexts. The Mosul Incident, which occupied even the parliament for a while, is very contributive in terms of understanding the power shift from the religious cliques inherited from the Hamidian period to the Post-Constitutional administrative cadres. The polarization between the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate and Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah was allegedly resulted in the conspiracy, banishment, and murder of Sheikh Said, according to the Sâdât's point of view. The banishment and murder of Sheikh Said, as an iconic legacy of the Hamidian regime, first provoked religious and tribal groups against state authority and then resurrected the faded Arab-Kurdish dislike. The study closely examines the claims, complaints, and accusations of both Sulaymaniyah notables and Sâdât as opposing parties. Later, these two opposing parties were articulated with different elements and turned into two separate blocs or fronts. In the study, it is seen that the notables of Sulaymaniyah, who received the support of the CUP branch and Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate against the persecution of Sheikh Said, formed a bloc. Sâdât, who formed an alliance with Kurdish tribes, religious orders, associations and villagers after the banishment and murder of Sheikh Said, seemed to form the other bloc. However, the study indicates that the Arab Ulema from Mosul, who was later involved in the equation and actively participated in the Mosul Incident formed a third bloc with

Mosul notables and changed the course of events at all costs. This bloc, whose spokesman was Reşid el-Ömeri as the founder of the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union, claimed that they were unjustly stigmatized and criminalized after the incident. The intention and solidarity of the Mosul Ulema and notables in this incident is an extremely valuable example to have a grasp of the genetics of the Arab-Kurdish dispute that has reached present-day Iraq. Therefore, the study traces an incident that occurred with the involvement of these three parties, tries to understand the strategic backgrounds of each party, and shows what a multi-layered public order incident in the Ottoman locality might cost.

At this point, the different views and dissensus of bureaucrats and Governors towards Sheikh Said and the Mosul Incident are also observed in the study. For instance, in front of the Unionist Governor Zeki, who was thought to be Anti-Sâdât from his critical discourse; we see Governor Reşid, who was thought to be Pro-Sâdât from his sympathetic discourse and whom he was alleged to protect and favor Sâdât through different alliances. While Zeki was alleged of being a spectator or even favoring in the alleged conspiracy against Sâdât, Reşid was seen as the bureaucrat who exposed the conspiracy network and justified Sâdât. The fact that both Governors were subjected to such contrast and contradictory allegations shows how different the attitudes of local bureaucrats can be in the face of such a large-scale public incident. However, this dissensus was not only among local bureaucrats. As we will see in some inter-Ministerial correspondence, the Minister of War Ali Rıza Pasha had adopted a more cautious, objective and even moderate attitude towards Sheikh Said after his banishment. Despite allegations from the Ministry of Interior, he argued that Said should not be accused without a detailed investigation and even praised Said's symbolic position in the entire Kurdish community. Of course, these can be perceived as the views of a pragmatic statesman who does not attempt to confront and provoke the Kurdish community in the region. Consequently, the ultimate aim of studying Mosul Incident is to shed light on Post-Constitutional bureaucracy on Mosul, to observe the Provincial Administration shifts closely, and to analyze the power struggle between Sâdât and the state authority after the Hamidian regime.

The study focuses especially on two Governors, the Governorship of Zeki, when the incident broke out, and the Governorship of Reşid, when the investigations intensified. In the first part of the study, it will be examined how the network of relations between Sulaymaniyah authorities and Sâdât caused Sheikh Said to be banished from Sulaymaniyah. Here, Society of Unionist Charity (*Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiye*), which was established under the leadership of Sheikh Said and perceived as a rival to the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) Sulaymaniyah branch, gains additional importance. In addition, the duality of the CUP Mosul branch and their intervention in the function of the Provincial Administration will be examined under a separate chapter and will shed light on the Post-Constitutional atmosphere in Mosul. The second part, on the other hand, analyzes how the Mosul Incident occurred in general and how provincial administrators were unable to manage the crisis. Different personal narratives revealing the brutality experienced and the allegations of negligence and conspiracy were also reviewed within the framework of this incident. The reflections of the incident in the existing literature are also studied from different aspects. The third part takes a closer look at the parliamentary reflections of the incident through the opinions of the deputies. In particular, the questioning of the legitimacy of the Local Administration, which is the representative of the executive power, is deeply analyzed. In addition, the issue of whether the chamber of deputies has the authority and jurisdiction over the incident, is also noticeable in the discussions. Fourth part is important in terms of showing how the crisis deepened and spread throughout the province. Sâdât's siege of Sulaymaniyah with the motive of seeking justice and revenge, provincial transformation between Zeki's and Reşid's administrations and the accusations against the Sub-Governor Tefvik of Sulaymaniyah form the building blocks of the post-incident period. The allegations of Reşid's patronage over Sâdât, and his controversial dismissal are also critical in terms of seeing the pace of administrative transformation in Mosul. The last part focuses on the judiciary system and examines the impact of the Mosul Incident on the judicial structure of Mosul. The functioning of the trial, how the authorities managed the judicial process, the requests for amnesty by the prisoners during their detention and the insistence of the Mosul notables on the innocence of the prisoners are also reviewed in this context.

1.2. Literature Review

When the modern literature on Ottoman Mosul is scanned at the international level, it is seen that the most researched topics are the Mosul Question that marked the 1922-23 Lausanne Conference, economic ambitions based on oil reserves, the Ottoman-Iranian border conflicts and the Post-World War I Kurdish revolts based on ethnic nationalism. Even a major part of Turkish historiography on Mosul have been focusing on the Mosul Question and oil negotiations through political narratives; some certain studies particularly zoomed in to the 19th century Iraq through a sociocultural prism. At this point, Longrigg's *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, which is regarded as the precursor of these modern sociocultural studies, still remains as one of the most cited works on Iraqi historiography.² The study, which analyzes the four centuries between 1500-1900 in depth, examines the Ottoman expansion in Mesopotamia, the transformation of Iraq into an Ottoman province, the conflicts with the Mamluk rule, the reflections of the Tanzimat reforms and the Provincial Administration of Mithat Pasha. Longrigg's second major work, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, examines the 20-year period that ended with the Ottoman withdrawal from Iraqi territories.³ In this study, he looks closer at the sociocultural and demographic infrastructure of Iraqi provinces, political stance and administrative reforms of the CUP Government, and goes down to the roots of the Arab nationalism. This study is also necessary to understand the Mesopotamian theater of the First World War, the wartime and post-war British administrations and Mandatory Iraq.

Gökhan Çetinsaya's *Ottoman Administration of Iraq* successfully analyzes how the Ottoman authority was configured in the Iraqi provinces during the Hamidian regime.⁴ The study, which was published as a book within the international literature in 2006 from Çetinsaya's doctoral dissertation dated 1994, was also translated into Turkish in 2020.⁵ The study provides an analytical perspective by viewing the traces left by the

² Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925)

³ Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953)

⁴ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, (Oxford: SOAS Routledge, 2006)

⁵ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Irak'ta Osmanlı İdaresi*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2020)

Governors, tribal and religious policies, socioeconomic transformation, and the reforms that have shaped Iraqi history, on a provincial basis. And should be considered as a necessary prereading before studying the Post-Constitutional Iraq. Çetinsaya, who creates an analytical framework on the Governor profiles, particularly analyzes the background of the tribes and notables. Presenting the ongoing interaction of these entities with the state authority through different cases makes this study highly innovative. The study also covers the Hamidian-era Iranian relations in the context of the Shia question and reviews the British ambitions in Mesopotamia.

Davud Hut's doctoral dissertation of *Administrative, Economic and Social Structure of Mosul Province (Musul Vilayeti'nin İdari, İktisadi ve Sosyal Yapısı)* dated 2006 looks closer at the administrative transformation from Tanzimat to Post-Constitutional regime, economic and agricultural configuration, and tribal-based social structure in Mosul.⁶ The study, which examines the administrative history of Mosul according to the periods of the Governors, also reveals the administrative, economic and social structure in Mosul within the framework of center-periphery relations. Hut also covered the organization of the CUP's Mosul branch, the provincial reflections of the declaration of Constitutionalism and the periods of Zeki and Reşid, two of the Post-Constitutional Governors within his narrative. It is obvious that the study made an absolute contribution to the Post-Constitutional Mosul historiography although its main focus is a long span of time between 1864-1909. And I must note that, it is one of the major resources that guided me many times throughout my study.

Although I did not quote directly or indirectly, another reference source that inspired and guided me in the research process is Sinan Marufoğlu's study called *Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak (Northern Iraq in the Ottoman Period)*.⁷ The study, which addresses a long time span such as 1834-1914, is also a demographic and statistical source on Northern Iraq. The tables, lists and maps given on geographic, social and ethnic structure, administrative divisions, tribal settlements, economic background, agriculture and animal husbandry make the study a great reference. Details such as the

⁶ Davud Hut, *Musul Vilayeti'nin İdari, İktisadi ve Sosyal Yapısı 1864-1909*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Marmara University, 2006)

⁷ Sinan Marufoğlu, *Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak (1831-1914)*, (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1998)

geographical locations and religious backgrounds of many Arab and Kurdish tribes and the distribution of non-Muslim minorities can be immensely helpful for the studies on Northern Iraq. The study is so detailed that it includes tables such as the amount of taxes collected from the tribes, which tribes have damaged which villages, the grants (*hıl'at*) given to the tribal chiefs, the population and capacity of the tribes, and even the animal stocks they have. It is one of the few qualified sources on the administrative, social and economic background of Northern Iraq, and is cited in many different studies.

Arabs and Young Turks (Jön Türkler ve Araplar) by Hasan Kayalı examines the Post-Constitutional Arab provinces within the perspectives of political stance and reform movements of the Unionists (*İttihatçılar*).⁸ Revealing the politicization in Arab provinces after the Constitutional Monarchy and referring the parliamentarians' view make Kayalı's work extremely valuable. Although the study does not focus particularly on Mosul, it addresses the tension between civilian and military authorities, the development of CUP branches and the ideological confusion created by the Young Turk secularism, in the Iraqi provinces. The reactions of Iraqi deputies regarding the Lynch Concession, the sensitivity and patriotism of Kurdish and Arab Iraqis in the face of the Italian crisis, and the dispute of decentralization between Basrah Deputy Naqib Sayyid Talib and the Central Authority are also prominent details in the study. Thus, Kayalı analyzed the Ottomanism policy invoked by the Unionists against the Arab decentralization paradigm and reviewed the centralization project in Hejaz as a particular case. I think it is a unique study in terms of understanding the background of the Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliamentary composition and the emerging political representation of Arab provinces. Although I do not make any reference to Kayalı in my study, I have to admit that it is an absolutely necessary pre-reading on the Middle East of the Constitutionalist regime.

⁸ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)

Hasan Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar: Osmanlıcılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık, 1908-1918* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003)

Focusing on the Tanzimat-era, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq* by Ebubekir Ceylan successfully examines the evolution of provincial councils (*muhasıllık meclisleri*) in Iraqi towns, the reflections of the Provincial Law of 1864 in Iraq, and the modernization that came along centralization efforts.⁹ It should be considered as a necessary pre-reading to see what stages have passed before reaching the Post-Constitutional political proliferation and parliamentary representation in Iraqi provinces. The technical details of the modernization infrastructure and the implementation and results of the reforms such as the Land Code of 1858 make the study a very valuable contribution.¹⁰ His analysis on the end of the Jalili Dynasty of Mosul and the decline of the Kurdish emirates in Northern Iraq is also helpful to understand the restoration of Ottoman Central Authority. Considering the chapters on the establishment and organizational history of the 6th Army and the introduction of the military Governors in Iraq, the study can be regarded as an essential resource for probing into the Tanzimat-era Iraqi provinces.

Although it is not directly related to Mosul, another prominent study in terms of Iraqi provincial history is a thesis written specifically for Basra and received great appreciation. Burcu Kurt's PhD thesis *Basra Province in The Second Constitutional Period 1908-1914* dated 2012 is an original contribution to the provincial history of Basrah and also published as a book in 2015.¹¹ The study, which suggests that there was both a continuity and a rupture between the Hamidian and Constitutional periods in terms of Provincial Administration in Basrah, particularly focused on the position of the local elite within the centralization policies. The conflict between Seyyid Talib and Aceymi Es-Sadun in the context of the reflection of local politics on tribal issues is also one of the highlights of the study. The study states that the Porte, which has an ambivalent policy towards the British influence on the Persian Gulf, tends towards centralism on the one hand and alliance with the British on the other. The competition

⁹ Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East* (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2011)

¹⁰ While referring to Ottoman land reforms in Iraq, we should mention that the most important study on this subject is Keiko Kiyotaki's PhD thesis named as *Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad* dated 1997. This study was also published as a book in 2019: Keiko Kiyotaki, *Ottoman Land Reform in the Province of Baghdad* (Leiden: Brill, 2019)

¹¹ Burcu Kurt, *Osmanlı Basra'sında Devlet ve Toplum 1908-1914* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2015)

between the Ottoman and British authorities to attract and gain the favor of local elites could be considered another reflection of this ambivalent policy.

Mosul Before Iraq by Sarah Shields is an incredibly unique piece of material since the particularity on Mosul makes this study really valuable.¹² Shield's study is a great contribution to see the larger geographical, economic, and political boundaries that intersect with Mosul and to understand Mosul's network of socioeconomic relations. Some illuminating analyzes in the book are the European influence on commercial networks, the protractions faced by central economic policies at the local level, and the drawbacks of the pace of change of Governors. The position of Muslim and Non-Muslim groups in the system, their connections with the economic pattern and the gradual loss of influence of local notables in the Provincial Administration are also analyzed in the study. Although Shields devotes a partial place to Post-Constitutional political tensions, confusion of Governors and the Mosul Incident, her book can be regarded as a study of social and urban history to a great extent.

Elie Kedourie's authentic study, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* analyzes the introduction and integration of Constitutionalism in the Arab provinces beginning in the early 19th century.¹³ The Chapter 8th entitled '*The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution in the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire*' is quite contributive to the analysis of the repercussions of the Constitutional Monarchy in the Arab provinces. The study scrutinizes the integration of local councils into the system, the influences of international actors on political processes, the gradual increase of political awareness and representation, and the fate of Constitutionalism in Middle Eastern societies, with a highly successful methodology. The fact that Kedourie also summarizes the story of the political transformation from the period of Mahmud II to the Second Constitutional Regime and the gradual alteration of the absolutism in the Arab provinces, carries the study to an extremely distinctive and unique point.

¹² Sarah D. Shields, *Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000)

¹³ Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1974)

In order to recognize the sociopolitical positions of the Kurdish Sheikhs in general, to understand the hierarchical structures and successions of religious clans, and to comprehend the historical importance of the Barzanji family in the Qadiri network in particular, Martin Van Bruinessen's work *Agha, Sheikh and Devlet* is a masterpiece.¹⁴ The study, which clarifies issues such as the intertwined network of social relations between the orders and clans, their common value system, the economic and political influence of the Sheikhs, also analyzes the Kurdish clans according to Sunni-Shiite doctrines. The study examined the historical backgrounds, influences and connections of the Barzanji and Talabani Sheikhs within the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya orders with a very analytical perspective and inspired many subsequent studies on this subject. Bruinessen's research is an absolutely necessary pre-reading to grasp the prominence of Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah and the operational role of the combination of a Sunni Order and a Kurdish Clan in Kurdish geography. Observing how this combination created a social class through dynastic structures and how the integrated notion of Sheikh-Caliph was flourished is essential to understand the point break in the transition from the Hamidian era to the Constitutional Monarchy.

The Kurdish National Movement by Wadie Jwaideh is a classic in terms of understanding the resistance of the Kurdish tribes in northern Iraq against the Ottoman authorities in different periods.¹⁵ Jwaideh also makes a great contribution to see the impact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Kurds and the driving force behind the Post-Constitutional Kurdish Nationalism. The changing local dynamics in Northern Iraq after the First World War, the strategic impact of British and Russian politics on the Kurdish entities and detailed analyzes of the Kurdish revolts launched both in Ottoman and the Kemalist regimes also take the research to a very large scale. Since its publication in 1960 as a doctoral dissertation, the study has been accepted as a reference source both in the Kurdology studies and in the historiographies of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, as the common geography of the Kurds.

¹⁴ Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1992)

¹⁵ Wadie Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development* (1960) International Relations, Dissertations 8, Syracuse University, New York

1.3. Primary Sources and Methodology

Since this study is built on the history of provincial administration, law enforcement and bureaucracy; the impressions left by the incident on the state authorities are of the greatest importance. Thus, the study mainly uses the Ottoman sources as archival material and sets out to observe the policies, strategies and reactions of both the Ottoman authorities and Sâdât to the incident. Before narrowing the scope, more than 1300 archive files were listed between 1886-1918; and of these, an average of 500 documents were viewed, transcribed, and studied between 1899-1910. Since most of it is an archive-based work, various data from different authorities have been synthesized and integrity has been tried to be achieved. The different sub-processes within the incidents and, in some cases, contradictory claims have also been preserved in order to ensure integrity. Turkish transcribed versions of many archival statements are given in footnotes and Turkish terminology such as ranks, titles and departments are also presented intertextually as an alternative. Civil, military, and judicial cadres and authorities were added to the study in order to guide and contribute to the further research. The movements, deployments and amounts of military units are also included in the text in order to show the tactical assessment and magnitude of the incidents. Arabic lettered versions of authentic names such as villages and tribes are also given along with their Turkish transcription. In other words, all names, places, titles, facts and figures in the archival materials were synthesized and included in the study to create a guide for further research. A chapter is also devoted to the reflections of the incident in the newly established Constitutional Parliament and the political confusion it created among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers. This chapter is based on the parliamentary minutes accessed from the online database of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

In addition, by adding a chronological course of events at the end of the text, it was aimed to avoid the confusion created by the events that were intertwined especially in the same time periods. Events in this chronology were listed in the order of the dates they were referred in the correspondence and naturally the exact dates of the events could be different. However, if there was an exact date in the correspondence regarding the date of the event, it was taken as the basis instead of the date of correspondence.

The incident has been referred to by many different names in archive documents such as the Mosul Incident (*Musul Vukuatı*), the Feast Incident (*Bayram Vukuatı-Vakası*), the Mosul Massacre (*Musul Katliamı*), the Second Karbala Incident (*Vaka-i Kerbela'nın Sanisi- İkinci Vaka-i Kerbela*), the Known Incident (*Hadise-i Malume*), the Disastrous Incident (*Hadise-i Fecia*), the Feast of Sacrifice Incident (*Kurban Bayramı Hadisesi-Meselesi*), the Mosul Disaster (*Musul Faciası*), and the Sheikh Said Incident (*Şeyh Said Vukuatı*). However, it cannot be said that this incident, which is considered as a historical marker or even a threshold in Mosul history, finds itself in a detailed place in the late Ottoman or modern Iraqi historiography. Particularly in academic studies on Iraqi political history or on the last period of Ottoman Mosul; it is not possible to find comprehensive information on the Mosul Incident. The fact that the most detailed accounts on the incident consist of personal memoirs instead of archival studies and the lack of academic studies on Post-Constitutional Mosul can be considered as the main reasons for this. This incident, with its intricate pattern and all background details, has remained in the archive and has not been studied.

Although the course and reflections of the Mosul Incident are superficially found in the works of Shields and Jwaideh, four personal accounts come to the fore for more detailed narratives. The first is Gertrude Lowthian Bell's *Amurath to Amurath* dated 1911 and although it is accepted as orientalist in some respects, it is a prominent travel book in terms of the illustrations, details, and observations it contains.¹⁶ Bell sets out from Aleppo and reaches Mosul via Tell Ahmar, Buseirah, Hit, Karbala and Baghdad. His journey, which will end in Konya, continues through Zakho and Diyarbakir. The information she gave about social classes, her comments on administrative and military cadres, and her sharings on the textures and architectures of cities are really worth examining. Bell, who presented the Mosul Incident and the background of Sheikh Said in a very detailed narrative, praised and heroized Sheikh Said in a biased manner and criticized the CUP administration harshly. At this point, it is conceivable that Bell emphasized her bias towards Turks under the guise of a travel writer and would support whoever opposed Turks, whether Arab or Kurdish.

¹⁶ Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, (London: William Heinemann, 1911)

Another prominent travel book about the region is Ely Bannister Soane's 1912 work titled *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise*.¹⁷ Soane, a British military officer, linguist and intelligence agent, sets off from Istanbul and reaches Mosul via Urfa and Diyarbakir. As a Kurdish linguist, Soane makes remarkable observations of regional dialects such as Kurmanj, Zazaki, Gorani, and Mukri, and gives original details of the Kurds' lifestyles, clothes, and historical background. The study, which includes specific observations on non-Muslim groups such as Chaldeans, Nestorians and Yazidis, is also a unique resource for ethnicity studies. The study, which devotes a separate chapter to the formation of the Hamawands in Sulaymaniyah, also devotes a detailed section to the policies of the Sultans on the Sulaymaniyah Sheikhs, the rupture in the Post-Constitutional regional politics and the outcomes of the Mosul Incident. Even the caravan attack of Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha, which I have not encountered in any other source, is also given in great detail.

The third personal account is Ely Bannister Soane's *Report on the Sulaimania district of Kurdistan* which he prepared and submitted to the Indian Government confidentially in 1910.¹⁸ The first part of the report prepared for intelligence purposes includes details such as the geographic, climatic, social, linguistic, religious and agricultural structure of Sulaymaniyah, as well as strategic information such as the military capacities of the Kurdish tribes. In the second part, all of the local tribes are defined by their geographical locations and sects, and in the third part, the historical backgrounds of the major tribes are given. In the fourth part, traditions and customs, dialects of the Kurdish language, Turkish military forces in Sulaymaniyah and commercial-agricultural infrastructures are reported. Under the title of Sheikh Families in Southern Kurdistan placed in the appendices part, Sheikh Said and the Mosul Incident are particularly focused and the power struggle between the Sheikhs and the Government is mentioned.

¹⁷ Ely Bannister Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise*, (Boston: Small Maynard and Company Publishers, 1912)

¹⁸ Ely Bannister Soane, *Report on the Sulaimania district of Kurdistan*, Calcutta: [Govt of India - Foreign Dept], 1910
<https://www.kurdipedia.org/files/books/2016/133209.PDF?ver=131159680808310342>

Although it is not an academic study, the fourth resource that the incident is briefly described in Refik Hilmi's memoirs published as *Memoirs: Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji Movement in the Language of Its Witness*.¹⁹ The account, first published in 1956 in Sulaymaniyah, was translated into Turkish from the Sorani dialect in 1995. The book is a combination of three volumes of memories of the diplomat and revolutionist Refik Hilmi, who was one of the leaders of the Mahmud Barzanji movement and who was also a member of the Sulaymaniyah Kurdish cabinet in the 1920s. The ambivalent relations of the Kurds with the British military officers and diplomats, the pragmatic politics of Sheikh Mahmud between the Turks and the British, and the Ottoman and Turkish authorities' approaches to the Kurdish problem are interpreted in the book. The account also narrates Sheikh Said's relations with the palace, his murder and gives some interesting details of the Mosul Incident by heroizing the victims and accusing the Governor. Although it consists of a biased account of a Kurdish leader, the book is particularly useful for understanding British politics on Kurds and how the Kurds were persuaded and defeated by British policies despite their anti-imperialist goals at the beginning.

However, since Bell, Soane and Hilmi's works were written with a biased point of view, they were far from giving the Ottoman authorities' views on the subject. Ottoman archival sources were properly processed to analyze Ottoman policies and stance in the face of incident, to see how the state authority coped with the crisis, and to understand the reactions of local administrators to such a large-scale public order incident. In this respect, it can be thought that the study will also contribute to the history of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the context of Mosul. Ultimately, the background of this incident in front of us gives clues of the transition from the Hamidian bureaucracy to the Unionist bureaucracy and proves how a large-scale security incident can cause a fluctuation and transformation in the administrative, judicial and military cadres.

¹⁹ Refik Hilmi, *Anılar: Tanığının Dilinden Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi*, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2010)

1.4. A Schematic Analysis of the Key Arguments, Facts, Concepts and Characters

Mosul Incident is particularly remarkable in terms of analyzing the bureaucratic transformation between the provincial administrators and the power shift between the Monarchist and Unionist cliques which appeared in Post-Constitutional Mosul. These cliques formed different blocs among themselves, clashed with each other and tried to influence the provincial politics and administration. The study also zooms in the facts such as corruption, misconduct, forgery, and administrative violations in the provincial administration through certain conspiracy allegations against administrators and authorities. Allegations that the Mosul Incident was based on a conspiracy by the Anti-Sâdât administration, and the Sheikhs were protected by the succeeding Pro-Sâdât administration in a partisan fashion were at the center of these conspiracies. This remarkable contrast between two Unionist administrations has been contextually analyzed through the allegations and accusations by both the state and nonstate actors. In this section, the key arguments, facts, concepts and characters that shaped the study will be analyzed through a diagrammatic expression.

The argument of **Power Shift**, which is frequently encountered throughout the study, approaches the transition between the two regimes through different cliques and characters. The political, economic and ideological power that Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah had accumulated during the Hamidian regime suffered a major break with the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy. Afterwards, it is clearly observed that this power vacuum in Sulaymaniyah was largely filled by the Unionist clique and Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha. It is quite possible that Landlords of Sulaymaniyah (*Ağavat*), who has an ancient enmity with Sâdât, also turned this power vacuum into an opportunity, and particularly those who had affiliations with the CUP branch gained power with the Constitutional Monarchy.




Diagram 1: Post-Constitutional *Power Shift* in Sulaymaniyah

The fact of **Banishment (*Teb'id*)**, which is analyzed in depth in the study, has an extremely symbolic and strategic importance as it paves the way for a social disaster such as the Mosul Incident. The Unionist authority had both proven its power by interfering with a 700-year-old dynasty blessed in Iran and Iraq territories, and displayed that it could destroy the legacy of Despotism regime in Sulaymaniyah. The Provincial Administration which expelled the supreme leaders of Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul, dealt a major blow to the Society of Unionist Charity (*Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiye*), the sociopolitical organization and lobbying instrument of Sâdât in Sulaymaniyah. The Unionist authority, which banished the decision makers of Sâdât to Mosul, separated the congregation from their Sheikh in theological respect and separated the affiliates from their leader in organizational respect. Furthermore, their connections with Kurdish tribes such as Hamavand, and Sunni orders such as Qadiriyya, which were their major collaborators, were severely interrupted.




Diagram 2: Symbolic and Strategic Importance of the *Banishment* of Sheikh Said

The concept of **Misconduct** (*Vazifeyi Suistimal*), which was my initial motivation for the research, and the fact of **Conspiracy Allegation** (*Komplot İddiası*) that sprouted on it, constitute the Administrative History-oriented parts of the study. All four prominent conspiracy allegations in the study were directed against the Provincial Administrators. The Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy, which is alleged to be organized with the aim of banishing Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah, and the Mosul Conspiracy, which is alleged to be organized with the aim of raiding Said's mansion and murdering him; can be considered as two stages of the same plot. The driving forces behind a conspiracy to banish Said from Sulaymaniyah can be listed as the concessions and powers that Barzanjiyah gained in the Hamidian regime, their persecution on the community and notables of Sulaymaniyah; and their uncontrollable Anti-

Constitutionalism, which began to threaten even the Unionists in Sulaymaniyah. The driving force behind the Mosul Conspiracy was the further provocation of an isolated incident between Arab-Kurdish military elements through manipulating the Arab-Kurdish schism within the Ulema and the Army. While the Sulaymaniyah stage of the conspiracy was alleged to be organized by the tripartite alliance led by Sub-Governor Tevfik, the Mosul stage was alleged to be organized by his relative, Major Ali Said.




Diagram 3: The methods, motivations, and the accused characters behind the *Sulaymaniyah* and *Mosul Conspiracies*

The other two conspiracy allegations were both attributed to Governor Reşid, who was known to be Pro-Sâdât and allegedly served the purposes of patronizing and justifying Sâdât. At a certain point, Governor Reşid seemed to have taken it as a mission to defend Sâdât's rights and liberties and to ensure the manifestation of justice on behalf of Sâdât. The first allegation of conspiracy leveled against Reşid was that he had forged documents to secure the conviction of Tevfik as a result of the Mosul Incident.

The allegations that Reşid covered up Sâdât's criminal records and that he met with Commander İzzet Pasha and Sheikhs in Kirkuk in order to facilitate their return to Sulaymaniyah can also be considered as a component of Reşid's favoritism and patronage towards Sâdât. Although these allegations have been analyzed in depth in the study, whether they were the subject of any warnings, investigations, or lawsuits against Reşid can only be investigated from different archival sources. The second allegation was brought by Reşid el-Ömeri, the prime suspect and detainee of the Mosul Incident. Ömeri claimed that Governor Reşid had accused him of baseless and fabricated charges just because of his hatred for the vision, mission, and success of the Society of Mohammedan Union (*Cemiyet-i İttihadiye-i Muhammediye*). The common point of both allegations against Reşid was forgery and they both paved the way for Reşid's premature dismissal.




Diagram 4: The driving forces behind the *conspiracies* of the Governor Reşid against Sub-Governor Tevfik and Reşid el-Ömeri




Diagram 5: The methods and strategies behind the alleged *conspiracies* of the Governor Reşid against Sub-Governor Tevfik and Reşid el-Ömeri, and his methods of favoring and patronizing Sâdât

Another pillar which the narrative of the thesis built on is the argument of **Bloc (Blok)**, which depicts the strategic partnerships involved in various conflicts of interest with each other. When the entire study is regarded, three major blocs which we can consider as the Sulaymaniyah based *Unionist Bloc*, the Sulaymaniyah based *Kurdish Bloc* and the Mosul based *Arabist Bloc*, stand out. These blocs powered by different political, socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic actors, have navigated the course of events from beginning to the end and represented the urban and rural layers of Post-Constitutional Mosul society. The first observed conflict over the intricate relations between the blocs is the ideological one between the Unionist and Monarchist cliques. The second observed conflict is the ethno-religious one between the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah and the Arabs of Mosul, although they are both Sultanist and Sunni. Although, the reference of ethno-religious here does not qualify a sectarian conflict, qualifies an ethnic-based (*Kurdish-Arab*) conflict over two religious' leaderships (*Sâdât-Ulema*) of two different localities (*Sulaymaniyah-Mosul*).




Diagram 6: Schematic analysis of *Unionist*, *Kurdist* and *Arabist Blocs*

The concept of **Duality** (*İkilik*) appears in many different platforms throughout the study. What is meant by duality here is a distinction based on contrasted variables, visions, mentalities, and origins appeared within different elements. While this duality was embodied as the *First* and *Second Societies* within the same CUP formation in Mosul, it was embodied in Sulaymaniyah as two opposing societies, the branches of the *Committee of Union and Progress* and the *Society of Unionist Charity*. In the Mosul Governorate, this duality was shaped on the axis of sympathy and affinity to Barzanjiyah Clan and was concretized in the administrations of two Governors who were *Anti-Sâdât* and *Pro-Sâdât*. The army also had its share of this duality, and the *Kurdish-origin Kirkuk Mule Cavalry* and the *Arab-origin Mosul Cavalry* fought each other as different elements of the very same Ottoman Army. Within the Sunni-Monarchist platform, the duality finds its place in the opposition of *Kurdish Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah* and *Arab Ulema of Mosul*. The last example we will give is based on the parliamentary debate of the deputies regarding the practice of Sheikh Said's

banishment. While one group of deputies argued that the decision of banishment is within the jurisdiction of the *Legislative and Judicial Powers*, the other group of deputies defended the initiative of the *Executive Power* and found the Governor to be fully justified. At some point, the two opposing components in this distinction might need each other to be a meaningful whole as much as they are mutually exclusive. For example, the Governors may have benefited the opposition to each other to legitimize their own administrative moves and policies in their tenures. Or, in the case of Sulaymaniyah, the CUP may have used SUC's policy as an ultimate goal to overcome and a motivation tool to consolidate its own organizational base. Going through these examples, it can be discussed whether this **Duality** can be a **Dichotomy**. However, this is the subject of a completely different research which can be produced through different theories and approaches.




Diagram 7: The concept of *Duality* in different platforms

The concept of **Locality (Yerellik)**, which was frequently mentioned by the Governor Zeki Pasha especially after the Mosul Incident, was employed for depicting the **unreliability** of the local elements and perceived in this sense by the state authority. The concept covers the unreliability of both local soldiers in the army units and local officials in the judicial organization. Governor Zeki trusts neither the Kurdish-origin Mule Cavalry of the 48th Regiment of 12th Division stationed in Chamchamal, nor the Arab-origin soldiers of the 33rd Cavalry Regiment and 46th Regular Regiment both stationed in Mosul. It was not detected in the Ottoman State Archive whether these soldiers had any tribal or religious order affiliation. However, if any, this may have been one of the major reasons for the state's unreliability on these local forces. At this point, the Ministry of War activated the 4th Army stationed outside Mosul (headquartered in Erzincan) and handed over the public order of urban area and the security of investigation and judicial process to the troops from the 4th Army garrisons.




Diagram 8: The concept of *locality* through the origins, operations, and garrisons of military forces

The argument of ***Manifest (Manifesto)***, on the other hand, constitutes one of the main pillars on which the study is based. This document, which consists of four main notions, can be read as a joint declaration prepared by the Barzanjiyah Sheikhs to legitimize and justify themselves after the Mosul Incident. This document dated February 25, 1909, which is one of the most important turning points in Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah's seek for justice, also serves as a warning against the state. The text glorifying the ***holiness*** of Sâdât through different religious motivations, analogies, and symbols, also stood out as a cry for ***victimization***. This rhetoric which allegedly revealed the conspiracy networks against Sâdât, also revealed what strategic partnerships, interests, intentions, and conditions that these networks were relied on. The Sheikhs, who vehemently denied the Caravan Attack attributed to them, claimed that there were others who were fed up with Sub-Governor Tevfik's persecution and that these might have set up the ambush. Naturally, Sheikh Said's holy personality was considered above the blame, his absolute ***innocence*** was emphasized, and his honor and dignity were valued above all. But the most critical part of this rhetoric was the fourth notion, a ***veiled threat***. Barzanjiyah Sheikhs signaled that their collective strength based on different social strata will now emerge and they also argued that this would be far beyond their control.




Diagram 9: Notions of the *Manifest* of Sâdât

It is easily noticed that the fact of ***Seek of Justice (Adalet Arayışı)*** appeared after the Mosul Incident has gradually dominated the entire network of relations between Sâdât and the State Authority. Demands for the Central Authority from different Kurdish

social circles, tribes and Kurdish congregations of Sunni orders soon turned into diplomatic pressure through lobbying channels such as the KSCP in Istanbul. However, according to Sâdât, justice delayed was the justice denied, and after a point this anxious wait turned into the *Seek of Revenge (İntikam Arayışı)*. The Barzanjiyah Sheikhs, who intended to murder Sub-Governor Tevfik with the motivation of **revenge**, organized the Caravan Ambush with the armed support of the local assets such as Hamawand, and acted to be the masters of the rural. But most importantly, they exhibited that they could easily harm an official local administrator through a vulgar display of power as the most effective means of **intimidation**. Using a strategic language in the Manifest they sent a few days later, the Sheikhs **flatly denied** the Caravan Ambush, and claimed that they were with their guests in their own mansions during the attack. Already in official correspondence, there were allegations that the Sheikhs had organized the Hamawand tribesmen remotely, with verbal and written instructions without leaving Kirkuk. On the other hand, *the Siege of Sulaymaniyah (Süleymaniye Kuşatması)* was the ultimate demonstration of Sâdât's **full defiance**. The irregular forces under the command of the Barzanjiyah Sheikhs had blockaded an Ottoman town, disrupted daily life, and proved that they could **seize control** in the face of authority anytime.




Diagram 10: Sâdât's actions, motivations, and methods from *Seek of Justice* to *Seek of Revenge*

One of the most prominent arguments of the study is the post-incident ethnic division between the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah and the Arabs of Mosul despite belonging to the same Islamic sect and doctrine. Focusing on the period, there is a general opinion that the consciousness of ethnocentric nationalism has not yet emerged among the Kurds and Arabs in that region. However, some certain emphases, concerns and inspirations particularly reflected in the correspondence after the Mosul Incident suggest that the incident may have originated the codes of ethnic awareness in Mosul at an earlier period. Moreover, the full certainty of this argument depends on proving that the non-sectarian conflict between these two ethnic elements is non-tribal as well. As no tribal animosity could be detected between these two ethnic elements of Mosul in the Ottoman State Archives, further research based on foreign archives would certainly be eye-opening. In this study, the subject is analyzed through the Military, Religion and Judiciary, as the three main platforms where the *Arab-Kurdish Dispute* is thought to be experienced.




Diagram 11: The parties, motivations and determining factors of the *Arab-Kurdish Dispute* on different grounds of the Mosul Incident

CHAPTER 2: THE STATE AUTHORITY AND SÂDÂT-I BARZANJIYAH IN THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL ERA

2.1. Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah as a Social Class Against Shia Expansionism

Throughout history, Hz. Muhammad's family and close relatives, especially descendants of the two sons Hasan and Hüseyin of his daughter Fatima had an exceptional position in their society and it is accepted as a religious duty to respect and love them.²⁰ The titles of *Seyyid* and *Şerif* were used for these people, who are descendants of Fatima and continued the lineage of the Prophet of Islam, and they were highly respected both in the state and society.²¹ Although the terms of *Seyyid* and *Şerif* are used to qualify the glorification and affiliation to 'the pure generation of Muhammad' (*nesl-i pak-ı Muhammedi*), the etymological origins of the words define broader social titles.²² Küçükaşçı states that, although they did not constitute a socioeconomic class in Ottoman society, they were exempted from certain customary taxes and equipped with various privileges.²³ During the Abbasid period, the Naqib al-ashraf (*Nakîbü'l eşrâf* or *Nekabet*) institution was established in order to keep the records of the descendants of Muhammad and to protect the privileges of the Seyyids and Şerifs.²⁴ Seyyids and Şerifs also undertook the administration of Hejaz under the titles of Mecca Sharifate or Emirate and these institutions and privileges continued until the fall of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ Sâdât, which will be used as it is taken from archive sources throughout this study, is the plural of the word Sayyid, and describes a religious group and a social class led by Sheikh Said Barzanji.

²⁰ Mustafa S. Küçükaşçı, *Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif Kavramlarının Kullanımı*, Prof. Dr. Muammer Kemal Özergin Hatıra Sayısı- I, *THE JOURNAL OF OTTOMAN STUDIES XXXIII*, (İstanbul:2009), p.87

²¹ Küçükaşçı, *Ibid*...p.87

Seyyid was derived from the root 'siyadet' which means "to be a ruler and a pioneer, to lead, to rule, to be supreme" in the Arabic language. And used for the persons who have assumed the titles and qualities such as 'master, lord, leader, supreme, virtuous, generous and gentle'. *Şerif* was derived from the root 'şerafet' which means 'to be honorable and noble' and used for those who has the qualities and titles such as 'honorable, noble, respected, supreme, dignified, holy and blessed' However, as the title of Sheikh Said, the term of *Seyyid* completely qualifies the descendants of Hz.Muhammad.

²² Küçükaşçı, *Ibid*...p.87,88

²³ Küçükaşçı, *Ibid*...p.108,109

²⁴ Küçükaşçı, *Ibid*...p.101,102

²⁵ Küçükaşçı, *Ibid*...p. 111-129

Before moving further, it would be useful to look deeply into the sectarian roots of Barzanjiyah and to understand its strategic position and function in the Hamidian regime. Bruinessen wrote that two Seyyid brothers, Seyyid Musa and Seyyid Isa, who came from Hamadan (*Hemedan*) to Shahrizor (*Şehrizer*) in 1360, settled in Barzinj and were said to have introduced the Qadiriyya order to Southern Kurdistan.²⁶ Bruinessen also emphasizes that Seyyid Musa had not a child, that the Barzanjis came from the lineage (*silsile*) of Seyyid Isa, and that they were the most prominent of the Qadiri families in the Kurdish geography.²⁷ However, it should not be thought that the Barzanjis were members of the Qadiriyya order from the very beginning.²⁸ Because the ancestors of the family, Seyyid Isa (d. 1353) and Seyyid Musa al-Barzanji (d. 1297) who first settled in the Shahrizor region have promulgated the Hamadaniyya (*Hemedaniyye*) [attributed to their father Seyyid Ali al-Hamadani] and the Nurbahshiyya (*Nurbahşiyye*) branches of the Kübreviyya (*Kübreviyye*) order.²⁹ Seyyid Ali al-Venderini, the son of Baba Resul al-Barzanji, took the Qadiri caliphate from the Qadiri postnish in Baghdad in the 17th century, initiated the first serious Qadiri activity in Shahrizor and became the first representative of the Qadiri Order in Kurdistan.³⁰ However, it is also seen that the Barzanjis, who started to promulgate Qadiriyya from the 17th century onwards, partially switched to Naqshbandiyya as of the first quarter of the 19th century.³¹

²⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1992) p. 216

For the strategic position of the Barzanjis within the Qadiriyya order, their dynasty and genealogy, their sociopolitical and socioeconomic status in Sulaymaniyah, and their historical background as a social class: please see the *Chapter 4. Shaikhs: mystics, saints and politicians* in Bruinessen, p.205-264

To see the Barzanji genealogy as a diagram: please see Bruinessen, p.320

To see the rank of the Barzanji family in the succession line of Siyadet (Seyyid Insitution): please see. Bruinessen, p.217

For the sociopolitical influence and the power struggle of the Barzanjis within the region, please see Hut, p.319-323

²⁷ Bruinessen, *Ibid*, p.216

²⁸ For a comprehensive research elaborating how the Baghdad based Sunni orders were promulgated in the Sanjak of Shahrizor and the sectarian origins of the Barzanji and Talabani families, please see: Abdulcebbar Kavak, *Kadiriyye'nin Şehrizer Bölgesinde Yayılışı*, Tasavvuf İlmî ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi, 36 [2015/2], p. 51-71

²⁹ Kavak, *Ibid*...

³⁰ Kavak, *Ibid*...

³¹ Kavak, *Ibid*...

The mission of fortifying the Sunni doctrine against the Shiite expansionism from Iran was previously undertaken by the Baban Emirate (16-19th cent.) in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk territory and by the Jalili Dynasty (18-19th cent.) throughout the Mosul Province. Afterwards, it can be said that Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah took over this mission and was integrated into the Hamidian regime as an apparatus of propagating and maintaining the Sunni Orthodoxy on the Iranian border. The functional merge of a Sunni Order and a Kurdish Clan in a Kurdish-dominated geography created a social class through dynastic structure within the Barzanjiyah Clan. This intermingled formation, nourished by the Sunni and Kurdish common values system, also served pragmatic politics and became a game changer during the Hamidian regime. Abdulhamid had positioned the Barzanjiyah Clan as an outpost or as an ideological device against the Shiite threat spreading from Iran's borders. According to the Hamidian regime which was adhered to the Hanafi-Sunni doctrine, issues such as preventing the expansion of the Shiite sectarianism that started to penetrate along the Iraqi line, correcting the superstitious beliefs (*akaid-i batile*) of those who belonged to this sect, and leading to the right path for these misguided people were extremely important.³² Therefore, in order to achieve these objectives, the assignment and reinforcement of the local Ulema was a necessity.³³ At this point, the Hamidian regime supported the Barzanjis financially and morally, and almost put all of Sheikh Said's family members and professors of the Sulaymaniyah Madrasah on a payroll.³⁴ The real estate, land and sheep belonging to the dervish lodge, of which Sheikh Said was the Postnish, were also exempted from tax through an imperial decree.³⁵ Naturally, Sheikh

³² BOA, İ..ML..10/61, 19 Mayıs 1310- 31 May 1894

“Hıttı-i Irakiye’de intişara başlayan Mezheb-i Şia’nın men-i tevsii ve intişarı bu mezhebe salık olanların akaid-i batilelerinin tashihi ile kendilerine irae-i hakk ve savab eylemesi için de bazı ulema-i mahalliyenin tavzif ve ikdarı lazıme-i hal ve maslahattan bulunmasına mebnî”

³³ BOA, İ..ML..10/61, 19 Mayıs 1310- 31 May 1894

³⁴ BOA, İ..ML..10/61, 19 Mayıs 1310- 31 May 1894

“Süleymaniyeli Kâk Ahmed Efendi hafidi Said Efendi’nin biraderleri Seyyid Mustafa ve Seyyid Maruf ve Seyyid Hasan ve Seyyid Ömer ve Seyyid Ali ve mahdumu Seyyid Mehmed Efendilerle mumaunileyh Şeyh Said Efendi’ninzadesi olub Kazankaya Tekkesi’nde bulunan Seyyid Maruf Efendi’ye 2’şer yüz ve Süleymaniye Medresesinde bulunan 13 Müderrise 100’er Kuruş ve Mumaunileyh Said Efendinin Ceddesi olub şayan-ı merhamet ve atıfet-i ulya bulunan Aişe Hanıma 300 Kuruş Maaş tahsisi şerefsüdur olan irade-i seniyye cenab-ı hilafetpenahi iktiza-i celilesinden olarak icray-ı icabı Maliye Nezareti Celilesine işar kılınmış olmakla”

³⁵ BOA, İ..ML..11/6/Lef 4, 22 Haziran 1310- 4 July 1894

Said himself as a member of Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah and as the Sheikh of Qadiriyya order, was allocated a suitable salary due to his necessity.³⁶

At this point, it is possible to multiply examples. In 1900, the former Mosul Governor Salih Pasha has demanded a salary allocation of 150 kuruş to Seyyid and Hafız Hasan and his brother Mehmed, who were from the Sulaymaniyah Town and Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah.³⁷ In 1904, a monthly food allowance of 300 kuruş was allocated to Ahmed Efendi's dervish lodge and madrasah, located close to the Iranian border.³⁸ According to the Hamidian policy, the sanctuary of Ahmed Efendi, who was both a member of Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah and the former Nakib-ül Eşraf Kaimakam of Sulaymaniyah, would probably act as a shield against the Shiite threat from Iran.³⁹ Apparently, Abdulhamid's rule cherished and encouraged the Kurdish clans belonging to the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya orders in order to consolidate the Sunni doctrine against the Shiite propaganda. However, this patronage, exemption and privilege enjoyed by the Barzanjiyah during the Hamidian era would quickly leave their place to marginalization, dissipation, and antagonism after the Constitutional Monarchy. In other respects, issues such as how the Post-Constitutional CUP government saw the Shiite threat and expansionism from Iran, whether it prioritized it and, if so, which actors it engaged in, stand in front of us as different research topics. Eventually, the question of why the function of Barzanjiyah, which was seen as an advantage by the state authority against Shiite influence and propaganda in the Hamidian era, lost its importance after the Constitutional Monarchy can be explored in depth.

"Süleymaniyeli Kâk Ahmed Efendi hafidi Şeyh Said Efendi'nin postnişini olduğu dergah-ı şerife mahsus emlak, arazi ve ağnamin vergi ve rüsumdan istisnası mahalinden vürud edenkılınması üzerine şerefsüdur olan irade-i seniyye"

³⁶ BOA, BEO 444/33240, 24 Muharrem 1312- 28 July 1894

"Sâdât-ı Berzenciye'den ve Tarikat-ı Aliyye-i Kadiriye Meşayihinden Şeyh Said Efendi'ye zaruret-i haline mebni münasib mikdar maaş tahsisi hakkında Musul Vilayet-i Celilesinden meb'us tahrirat"

³⁷ BOA, BEO 1542/115582, 14 Ağustos 1316- 27 August 1900

"Süleymaniye Kasabası ahalisinden ve Sâdât-ı Berzenciye'den Seyyid ve Hafız Hasan ve biraderleri Mehmed Efendilere 150'şer guruş maaş tahsisi Musul Vali-i Esbakı Saadetli Salih Paşa Hazretlerinden gelen tezkire melfufuyla berabersavb-ı atufetlerine irsal kılınmış olmakla"

³⁸ BOA, İ..ML..58/11, 25 Mart 1320- 07 April 1904

"Süleymaniye Nakib-ül Eşraf Kaimakamı Esbak Sâdât-ı Berzenciye'den Ahmed Efendinin hudud-u İran karibinde vaki dergah ve medresesine şehri 300 guruş taamiye tahsisi ve itası şerefsüdur buyurulan irade-i seniyye-i cenab-ı hilafetpenahi iktiza-i aliyesinden olmakla"

³⁹ BOA, İ..ML..58/11, 25 Mart 1320- 07 April 1904

Bruinessen examines the Kurdish clans such as Barzanjiyah in a separate or a supra category under the name of 'Shaikhly Families' apart from religious orders or tribes.⁴⁰ He states that Shaikhly Families such as the Barzanjiyah Clan, derive their congregations and political power from regions where tribalism is intense, inhabited by small tribes and which these tribes has blood feuds and constant conflict with each other.⁴¹ Stating that 'land registration' (*tapu*) and 'pious foundations' (*waqf*) constitute the biggest financial background of these Shaikhly Families, Bruinessen underlines that the family that gains its power and congregation can use this network for other purposes, including class-based movements.⁴² In the context of anti-Shiism, Barzanjiyah can be described as a hybrid social element with an ultimate mission, serving a specific purpose, and consisting of a functional combination of a Sunni Order and a Kurdish Clan. In addition, the fact that this class which lost power rapidly after the Constitutional Monarchy, regained its influence in the post-colonial context after the British Invasion, is also inspiring for further research. In this respect, analyzing the power graph of Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah between the Constitutional Monarchy and the British Occupation may be a further research question in order to expand and advance the scope of this study.

Although it is stated in Küçükaşçı's study that the Seyyids did not constitute a socioeconomic class in the Ottoman Empire, Bruinessen's approach seems convincing that the Shaikhly Family was a separate class powered by socioeconomic paradigms. In this respect, we can verify and summarize the qualities of Sâdât as a socioeconomic entity through different parameters. First of all, Sâdât is a Supra-identity/category above a tribe or a religious order. Because as we will see throughout the study, it can incorporate, motivate, guide and control different tribes and religious orders and most importantly, can engage in social class-based movements. Secondly, it may seem like a Clique or a Group of Interest, Influence or Pressure, but it is beyond them. Because Sâdât's gravity is originated of an aristocratic power based on his descent from the

⁴⁰ For the appearance, formation, and advancement of Shaikhly Families in the 19th century, please see the part of "Sociopolitical changes in Kurdistan in the early nineteenth century" in Bruinessen, p.228-234

For the family trees of the prominent Shaikhly Families please see the part of "Appendix: The Major Shaikhly Families of Kurdistan": Bruinessen, p.319-340

⁴¹ Bruinessen, *Ibid*, p.232,233

⁴² Bruinessen, *Ibid*, p.232,233

Prophet, of a political power based on governmental privileges and of an economic power based on land ownership. However, as Bruinessen points out, Shaikhly Families did not have great influence and control in the areas dominated by the large tribes such as Jaf, which has strong leadership, territorial influence, and land ownership.⁴³ As we will see throughout the study, the eternal rivalry and hostility between Sheikh Said Barzanji and Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha probably stemmed from these factors.

2.2. Transition from Hamidian Regime to the Consitutional Monarchy

Accordingly, Sheikh Said Barzanji was a very influential figure in nineteenth century Mosul due to his family origins. Since the Barzanjis (*Berzenci*-برزنجی) were coming from a Seyyid family, Abdülhamid II was always cautious and tactical towards their leaders and he always avoided of violent action against them.⁴⁴ Barzanjis' struggle with another Kurdish tribe Talabanis (*Talabani*-طالبانی) was one of the major disputes in the region and the Ottoman authorities have been trying to mediate them for a stabilized province.⁴⁵ This mediation politics continued for a long period since the Talabani Sheikhs were also cherished by Abdülhamid; and this tolerance towards both tribes was a determinant factor in shaping center-periphery relations of Mosul.⁴⁶ But Sheikh Said was a special personality for Abdülhamid II since their relationship started when Sheikh Said was invited to Istanbul and allegedly cured Abdülhamid's sick son with his intercessory prayer.⁴⁷ After that incident the whole Barzanji family was taken under direct protection by the Sultan.⁴⁸

⁴³ Bruinessen, *Ibid*, p.232

⁴⁴ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, (Oxford: SOAS Routledge,2006) p.77

*For a more detailed perspective on Hamidian background of Kurdish tribes in Mosul please see Çetinsaya p.74-86 and Hut p.306-332

⁴⁵ BOA Y..PRK.ASK. 36/20, 17 Safer 1304 – 15 November 1886 ; DH.ŞFR.141/11, 09 Haziran 1305- 21 August 1889; Y..PRK.HR..13/32, 25 Zilkade 1307- 13 July 1890

⁴⁶ Davud Hut, *Musul Vilayeti'nin İdari, İktisadi ve Sosyal Yapısı 1864-1909*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Marmara University, 2006), p.375

⁴⁷ Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, (London: William Heinemann, 1911) p.249

⁴⁸ Bell, *Ibid*, p.249

However, after 1908 social and political dynamics of Mosul started to change radically. When the Second Constitution was declared, there was already an ongoing turmoil bred by Hamawands (*Hemvend*-هموند) and Barzanjis (connected to each other somehow) and the situation got worsened after the revolution.⁴⁹ Hamawand rose a rebellion partially by the provocation of Sheikh Said and partially by the opportunism of power vacuum.⁵⁰ Said fueled the rebellion since he was aware that the benefits of “notable/Islam” politics were going to be disappeared by the termination of Abdülhamid regime and the new regime had a completely different prospect towards him.⁵¹ In the post-revolutionary period, Hamawand attacks on local population and merchants reached to an unbearable level.⁵² Regional trade and transportation almost came to a halt since all the roads connecting Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad were blocked.⁵³

Some of provincial administrators in the region also had their share of the Post-Constitutional transformation. Mustafa Yumni Bey, who has been serving as the Governor of Mosul since 1905, was going to leave his office to Zeki Pasha, whose name will appear frequently in our study. Mustafa Yumni, who was appointed as the Governor of Mosul in September 1905 from the Karak Sub-Governorate of Damascus Province, was seen as a legacy of the despotism regime (*istibdad*) by the Unionists due to his despotic connections he developed with local elements in Mosul during the Hamidian era.⁵⁴ Mustafa Yumni was always perceived as a threat by the Unionists, as he was the brother of Arab İzzet (*Holo*) Pasha, one of the most prominent statesmen of Abdülhamid regime.⁵⁵ According to the allegations of the Unionists, Mustafa Bey had kept the CUP's regional activity under constant pressure and concealed and

⁴⁹ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *II. Abdülhamid döneminde Kuzey Irak'da tarikat, aşiret ve siyaset*, Dîvân İlmi Araştırmalar, Sayı:7 (1999/2)p.167

⁵⁰ Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.167

⁵¹ Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.167

⁵² Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.167

⁵³ Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.167

⁵⁴ BOA, BEO.2669/200106, 6 Eylül 1321- 19 September 1905; DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324- 13 September 1908

For an overview of Mustafa Yumni Bey's Mosul Governorate, please see *Hut, Musul Vilayeti'nin ...*, p. 155-159

⁵⁵ Emre Gör, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in Mabeyn İkinci Kâtibi Arap İzzet Paşa : Şam'dan Yıldız Sarayı'na Uzanan Bir Yaşamın Öyküsü (1852-1924)*, (İstanbul: DBY Yayınları, 2020) p.84

Arab İzzet (Holo) Pasha was 'Secretary of the Imperial Chamberlain' (*Mabeyn-i Hümayun Başkatibi*) and the 'Chief of The Espionage Agency' (*Hafiyelik Teşkilatı Reisi*) of Abdülhamid II.

postponed the announcement of the Constitution until the 28th of July, the day he left Mosul.⁵⁶

Zeki Pasha [*Kolaç, Baraz or Kılıçoğlu*], also known as Aleppine (*Halepli*) since he was born in Aleppo, is a particularly important figure in terms of Ottoman military, diplomatic, and administrative history.⁵⁷ His background in Mosul dates back to a few years ago, and therefore both his familiarity with the region and his Unionist character played a major role in his appointment. After the suicide of Major General (*Ferik*) Vacid Pasha, the ‘Head of the Committee of Investigation’ (*Heyet-i Tahkikiye Reisi*) at the Iranian border, in 1906, General Staff -Brigadier General (*Erkan-ı Harbiye Mirliva*) Zeki Pasha, who was the ‘Director of the Imperial School of Medicine’ (*Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane Müdüri*) at that time, had replaced him.⁵⁸ Zeki, who had been on active duty in the region since that year and was promoted to the rank of Major General, was to replace the Mosul Governor Mustafa Yumni in August 1908, when he was stationed in Baghdad.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324- 13 September 1908

“11 Temmuz 1324 tarihinde teşkil etmiş ve devlet ve millet ve vatanlarına karşı hidemat-ı hükümet-i mahalliye'nin nazar-ı tahsinini kazanmış ve cemiyet-i muhteremelerine irtibat ve iltihakıyla müftehir bulunmuş olan Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti acizanemizi istibdadlarına muvafık görmeyen bazı müstebidan-ı mahalliye meşhur İzzet'in kardaşı ve yadigarı olan vali-i esbak Mustafa Yumni Bey'le bil-ittihad el birliğiyle ve hükümetin nüfuz ve kuvve-i müessiresinin inzimamiyle cemiyet-i acizanemizin tazyikine, kanuni esasının ilanına dair irade-i seniyyeyi de Mustafa Yumni Bey'in infisali gününe müsadif Temmuz'un 28. Gününe kadar mektum kalmasına sırf mazeret etmişlerdi.”

⁵⁷ Sinan Kunalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922)*, (İstanbul: İsis Ltd, 1999) p.127

For a well-established and comprehensive chronology of Zeki's military and diplomatic career please see:

Volkan Marttin, *Halepli Zeki Paşa'nın Almanya'daki Görevi Üzerine*, Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi , 24 December 2018 , (40) , 313-338 . DOI: 10.21497/sefad.515376

<http://dergipark.gov.tr/doi/10.21497/sefad.515376>

For an overview of Zeki Pasha's Mosul Governorate please see: *Hut, Musul Vilayeti'nin ...*,p.168-174

Particularly for the missions and achievements of Zeki Pasha in the Balkan War please see: Sema Demirtaş (ed), *Zeki Paşa'nın Balkan Savaşı Hatıratı /Korgeneral Zeki Kolaç (1862-1943)*, (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım,2012)

⁵⁸ BOA, Y..PRK.ASK.239/81, 11 Mayıs 1322- 24 May 1906; BEO.2835/212577, 11 Mayıs 1322- 24 May 1906;

⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1279/11, 28 Temmuz 1324- 10 August 1908; BOA, BEO.3374/253011, 30 Temmuz 1324- 12 August 1908

2.3. Deep-rooted Dispute Between Ağavat and Sâdât

In September 1908, a telegram including some statements and complains regarding the violations by Sheikh Said, his brother Naqib al-ashraf (*Nakîbü'l eşrâf*) Maruf and his sons in Sulaymaniyah was echoed in state authorities.⁶⁰ It was written by 'land owners' (*Ağavat*) of Sulaymaniyah and including serious allegations on Sâdât such as that they caused more than 15.000 lira financial loss, killed eight individuals from their relatives and looted, assaulted and destroyed ten of their villages so far.⁶¹ They had been reporting these banditry incidents to the higher authorities for the last 11 months, but their damages and grievances increased gradually since they could not get any response.⁶²

In fact, these problems between the Ağavat which was consisted of the prominent landlords and notables of Sulaymaniyah, and Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah, dated back to the beginning of 1904. In April 1904, Governor Mustafa Nuri reported that in the skirmish between Sâdât and Ağavat, two people from both sides were killed and several were injured.⁶³ Mustafa Nuri also stated that both sides were gathering crowds to revenge each other and that in case of possible turmoil, the available military forces would not be enough to suppress the incident.⁶⁴ Only 60 cavalry from Kirkuk and the Hamidiye Regiments could be dispatched and although the Regular Army (*Nizamiye*) Command ordered the infantry detachment in Bazian (*Bazyân*) to depart for Sulaymaniyah, this force was not enough to suppress the disorder.⁶⁵ Since the entire gendarmerie force (*zabtiye*) was dispersed in the duty of collecting the Sheep Tax (*Resm-i Ağnam*), they

⁶⁰ BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326- 16 September 1908

It was transmitted from 'Public Prosecutor of Court of Appeal' (İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiği) to 'Deputy Public Prosecutor of Sulaymaniyah' (Süleymaniye Müdde-i Umumiği Muavinliği) and eventually reached to the 'Council of State' (Şûrâ-yı Devlet).

⁶¹ BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326- 16 September 1908

"Hafid Şehy Said ve mahdumları, biraderi Maruf Efendiler tarafından Süleymaniye'nin nefsi merkezinde ve hükümetin gözü önünde ağavatın başına getirdikleri bunca vakalariyle on beş bin liradan mütecaviz hasarat, sekiz nefer akrabalarımızı katl ve on adet kuramızı nehb, tahrib ve tecavüz ettikleri.....muhaberat-ı resmiyece de tahakkuk etmiştir"

⁶² BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326- 16 September 1908

⁶³ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

"Süleymaniye'de Sâdât ile Ağavat beynindeki mücadelede tarafeynden ikişer maktul ve birkaç mecruh vuku bulmasından naşi yekdiğerinden ahz-ı sar için cemiyet tedarik eylemekte bulundukları cihetle"

⁶⁴ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

⁶⁵ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

were not able to be regrouped and dispatched.⁶⁶ The Governor also informed that the necessary recommendations and notifications were made to the necessary parties through the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate.⁶⁷ It was also requested from the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate to send Abdurrahman Ağa, the Mayor of Sulaymaniyah whom Sâdât complained the most, to the provincial center.⁶⁸ Since the local judicial committee will not be eligible for the investigation and prosecution of the incident, Public Prosecutor in Mosul provincial center was asked to be swiftly sent to Sulaymaniyah.⁶⁹

When it came to June 1904, the hostility between Sâdât and Ağavat had not ended, and the skirmish started again. Although detachments were dispatched under the command of Colonel (*Miralay*) Tevfik Bey and a 30-person gendarme force was sent from the provincial center under the command of a mule cavalry (*ester süvar*) officer, this was not enough to maintain order in Sulaymaniyah and neutralize the perpetrators.⁷⁰ According to the message of Governor Mustafa Nuri, Sheikh Said's son Mahmud and his accomplice Seyyid Ahmed had fled before the military force reached, and hid in one of the villages they dominated.⁷¹ The Governor suggested on taking effective measures and attempting severe practices, such as the expulsion and banishment of several of Sâdât and Ağavat, particularly Sheikh Said, from Sulaymaniyah.⁷² Mustafa Nuri claimed that if these were not implemented, the dispute would not end, the people would not be free from persecution and atrocities, the

⁶⁶ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

⁶⁷ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

⁶⁸ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

"Sâdât'ın en ziyade şikayet eylediği Belediye Reisi Abdurrahman Ağa'nın birmerkez vilayete izamı mutasarrıflığa işar kılınmış olub"

⁶⁹ BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320- 9 April 1904

"vukuatın esasının tahkik ve tetkikiyle takibat-ı kanuniye icrasına mahalli heyet-i adliyesinin muvafık olması ihtimalden baid bulunduğundan bahisle mutasarrıf vekaleti ve kumandanlığıyla Kerkük fırka kumandanlığınca da tasdik ve izbar olunduğu vechle vilayet İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliğinden Süleymaniye'ye azimetle lüzumu"

⁷⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.329/58, 2 Haziran 1320 – 15 June 1904

⁷¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.329/58, 2 Haziran 1320 – 15 June 1904

"Şeyh Said efendinin oğlu Mahmud ile refik-i habaseti Seyyid Ahmed'in sureta askerin muvassalatındanederek firar eyledikleri"

"hakikatta yed-i tagallüblerinde bulunan köylere gidip ihtifa etmekten ibaretişbu firarileri"

⁷² BOA, DH.ŞFR.329/58, 2 Haziran 1320 – 15 June 1904

"meşayih ve rüesay-ı Sâdât and Ağavatın merkez vilayete celb ve tebi'idi gibi tedabir-ı müessire ve icraat-ı şedideye teşebbüs edilmediğinden"

administration and order of the sanjak would gradually disappear, and even the annual tax revenues such as *ağnam* and *öşür* would be endangered.⁷³ Endangerment of the collection of land-based taxes was a highly anticipated risk, as hostility was mostly based on land issues.

When it came to the beginning of 1905, Sheikh Said's request for amnesty, who had regretted his actions and had asked for mercy, was approved and granted by the Sultan.⁷⁴ However, in such a situation, if Ağavat was not pardoned as well, it would lead to bigger problems and in a short time the amnesty of aghas was also questioned by the Public Prosecution of Mosul.⁷⁵ The Council of State (*Şûrâ-yı Devlet*), which reached a consensus on the fact that the Sheikhs were the attacking and the aghas were the defending and victimized parties in the issue of Sulaymaniyah, ruled that the aghas were also included in the scope of amnesty.⁷⁶ Because, according to the members of the Council of State, criticizing and judging only aghas would cause the repetition and continuity of the dispute and the would increase the atrocities of the Sheikhs even more.⁷⁷ When it came to 1906, peace was established between Sâdât and Ağavat and even their court summons (*celb ve ihzar müzekkereleri*) due to their previous criminal records were suspended in order not to cause any further excitement.⁷⁸ However, it

⁷³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.329/58, 2 Haziran 1320 – 15 June 1904

“başta Şeyh Said Efendi olduğu halde meşayih ve Sâdât and Ağavattan bir kaç Süleymaniye’den ihraç ve teb’id edilmedikçe münazaata nihayet verilemeyeceği gibi umum ahali taaddiyat ve mezalim takatfersadan kurtulamayacak, livanın muamelat ve asayışı güçleştikçe fenapezir olacağından ve sal-i hali ağnam rüsumu kısmenkülliye olacağından uğradığı misüllü varidat-ı öşriyenin de bu suretle heder ve telef olacağı

⁷⁴ BOA, DH.TMIK.M..190/35/Lef 2, 1 Kanunusani 1320- 14 January 1905

“Hareket-i vakıalarından dolayı izhar-ı nedamet ve arz-ı dehalet ettikleri beyanıyla afv-ı aliye mazhariyetleri leffen savb-ı devletlerine irsal olunan telgrafnamede istida edilen Süleymaniye meşayih hakkında afv-ı celile merahim-i delil-i hazret-i hilafetpenahiye şayan buyurulmuş olduğu Mabeyn-i Hümayun-u Mülukane Başkitabet Celilesi’nden beyana göre...”

⁷⁵ BOA, Y..A...RES.133/7/Lef 2, 14 Mayıs 1321 – 27 May 1905

“işbu afv-ı ali-i cenab-ı padişahinin şeyhlerin şerik-i cürmü bulunan ağalara şumulu olup olmadığı Musul İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliğinden işarına atfen...”

⁷⁶ BOA, Y..A...RES.133/7/Lef 2, 14 Mayıs 1321 – 27 May 1905

“Süleymaniye mesele-i malumunda şeyhler mütecaviz ve ağalar müdafii ve....mağdur olduklarından afv-ı alinin yalnız şeyhlereağavatın muaheze ve muhakemesi fesadın tekrar ve temadisini ve şeyhlerin tagallüblerinin bir kat daha tezayidni mucib olacağı cihetle bukalmamak için afv-ı aliyeden ağaların dahi ...edilmeleri muvafık-ı hal ve maslahat olacağı izbar olunduğu beyan..”

⁷⁷ BOA, Y..A...RES.133/7/Lef 2, 14 Mayıs 1321 – 27 May 1905

⁷⁸ BOA, BEO.2757/206707, 24 Kanunusani 1321- 06 February 1906

“Beynleri te’lif edilmiş olan Süleymaniyedeki Sâdât and Ağavat ile adamlarının ceraim-i sabıkalarından dolayı haklarında mahkemece sadır olan celb ve ihzar müzekkerelerininahkamı mucib heyecan olacağı cihetle bunların şimdilik hükümetçe aranılmamaları lüzumu”

seems like nothing was resolved up to that point as of 1908 since Sheikh Said was allegedly accustomed to enjoy his privileges and liberty provided by Abdülhamid II.

2.4. Allegations Against Sheikh Said and his ‘Society of Unionist Charity’ (Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiye)

In a short while, Ministry of Interior discussed a different telegram, this time from Sub-province (*sancak / liva*) Commander Mirliva Mustafa Pasha and Jaf Tribe Chief (*Caf Aşiret Reisi*) Mahmud Pasha regarding to the banishment (*teb'id*) of Sheikh Said, his brother Sheikh Maruf and his sons from Sulaymaniyah.⁷⁹ Grand Vizirate (*Sadaret*) instructed the Ministry of Interior (*Dahiliye Nezareti*) to investigate the issue and dispatch inspectors to Sulaymaniyah regarding to the complaints received from Mustafa, Mahmud and their 44 companions.⁸⁰ Mustafa and Mahmud were the two names led the opposition against the Sheikh Said in Sulaymaniyah and they were the major actors through the petitioning process as we will see. Mufti Abdülaziz, Mayor Abdülgafur and Councilman Abdurrahman, who formed the core staff of the CUP Sulaymaniyah branch, also took an active part in the Anti-Sâdât bloc. Mahmud, who was the chief of the Jaf tribe, took the title of Pasha during the reign of Abdülhamid II, was brought to the District Governorship of Gulanbar (*Gulanber Kaymakamlığı*) and he was given the authority to collect taxes.⁸¹ As we will see later, it was to be alleged that he had collaborated with the Sub-Governor Tefvik for the purpose of a tax collection embezzlement. Mahmud Pasha, who had shown loyalty until 1888, started to cause troubles and he was appointed as the Sub-Governor of Urfa to be distanced from the settlement area of his tribe.⁸² However, as it was understood that this appointment would not solve the problem, the decision was canceled and he was summoned to Istanbul where he had compulsorily resided until his to return to Mosul

⁷⁹ BOA, BEO.3412/255869, 15 Ramazan 1326- 11 October 1908

⁸⁰ BOA, BEO.3412/255869, 15 Ramazan 1326- 11 October 1908

⁸¹ For Mahmud Pasha's tribal background, position and function in the Abdulhamid II regime, please see: Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, p.75-82

⁸² Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.78-80

in 1894.⁸³ Meanwhile, Seyyid Muhammed Barzanji was also subjected to compulsory residence in Istanbul and he was allowed to return to his homeland with Mahmud Pasha in 1894.⁸⁴ The simultaneous return of these two problematic characters to the locality caused a power struggle between Jaf and Barzanjiyah, and worsened the situation in Sulaymaniyah.⁸⁵

Their second telegram on 11th of October included a major allegation on Sheikh Said which was that his congregation has been forming a political opposition against the Constitutional regime. In the telegram directly transmitted to Grand Vizir (*Sadrazam*), Mustafa and Mahmud Pashas reported that Sheikh Said and his congregation have been causing disorder under a society called “Society of Unionist Charity” (*Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiye*) and have been provoking the community against the Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*).⁸⁶ While the real ruler of the lands of Kurdistan with a population of about three million was the Sultan, Said and his affiliates, consisting of five or six households, claimed a title such as the ‘Presidency of Kurdistan’ (*Kürdistan Riyaseti*) and sought benefits by destroying the nation.⁸⁷ According to the allegations of Mustafa and Mahmud, Sheikh Said and his affiliates contacted the CUP headquarters of Salonika under the title of Presidency of Kurdistan and were able to obtain a positive opinion to establish their own society.⁸⁸ Since the CUP headquarters did not have the insight of their true background, it had not acted very carefully and was convinced of the seriousness of the applicants.⁸⁹ However, Mustafa and Mahmud labelled Said’s clique as traitors and referred their tyranny through the non-deserved titles and salaries they have grabbed from former regime.⁹⁰ Sheikh’s exclusive opportunity of

⁸³ Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.78-80

⁸⁴ Hut, *Ibid*, p.321,322, footnote 1525

For the sociocultural background of the Barzanjis and the problems they have created, please see:

Hut, *Ibid*, p.319-323

⁸⁵ Hut, *Ibid*, p.321,322, footnote 1525

⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

“Takriben üç milyon nüfusu havi Kürdistan kıtasının reis-i hakikisi padişah efendimiz hazretleri iken beş altı hane halktan ibaret olup milletin mahvı suretiyle menfaat-ı arayan takımdan Şeyh Said ve akrabasının Kürdistan Riyaseti namı altında Selanik Heyet-i İttihadiyemize keşide ettikleri telgraf cemiyet-i muhteremece senciden..... dikkat edilmeyerek ciddiyetine kanaat hasıl eylemişyine o nam ileverilmiş”

⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

dispatching telegrams directly to the Imperial Chamberlain (*Mabeyn-i Hümayun*) through a telegram codebook (*şifre mihtahı*) was also mentioned.⁹¹ His privilege and opportunity of direct communication with the palace meant that he was exclusively favored by the imperial authority especially after his close relation with Abdülhamid II. However, the codebook was going to be retrieved from his grandson and sent back from Mosul to Istanbul in couple of months.⁹² According to the correspondence, Society of Unionist Charity was re-named as “committee of mischief” (*fesad komitesi*); and this committee desperately imitated the Committee of Union and Progress which has 20 thousand members for now.⁹³ They also claimed that the money they have collected was going to be an instrument of all kinds of evil disguised under a name like “charity” (*hayriye*) and their entity meant nothing but pure anti Constitutionalism.⁹⁴ According to the message, Sheikh Said and his affiliates have managed to deceive the CUP headquarters which was unaware of their real characters, have recruited unqualified men to establish their organization, and have begun to raise money illegally.⁹⁵ Mustafa and Mahmud reported that the public agitation had severely increased and they wanted an investigation to be conducted against them as soon as possible to reveal their true faces and to calm the agitation.⁹⁶ As we will see the example of Mosul in the section of ‘CUP’s Problematic Entity in Mosul’, it is obvious that after the Constitutional monarchy, Sulaymaniyah also had its share from the uncontrolled branching and multitude of CUP formations.

“Halbuki devr-i sabıkta ba-şıkayet tahsin ve izzet-i hainlerinin sayesinde bila istihkak aldıkları rütbeler kaptıkları maaşlar elde ettikleri mabeyn şifresinin kuvvet ve tesiriyle kaptıkları taaddiyattan yeni kurtarılmış ve hürriyet lezaizini tatmak üzere bulunmuş olan biçare ahaliye rağmen”

⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.2694/16, 04 Zilhicce 1326- 28 December 1908

⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

“ve şimdilik yirmi bin nüfusu raddesindeki İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetini takliden bir takım adamı tulumbacı makulesinden cem ettikleri fesad komitesine taktıkları Cemiyet-i Hayriye namı altında mestur envai habasetlerin icrasına alet olmak üzere gayrimeşru ve kabih bir surette toplayabildikleri birkaç lirayı kabul”

⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324 – 11 October 1908

“ve haklarında iltifatı ettirir ve ahvallerinden bi-haber olan Selanik Heyet-i Muhteremesinden aldıkları telgrafi su-i tefsirle Kanun-i Esasi aleyhindeki bilumum ahali ve aşairin heyecanını müstelzim olmuş olduğundan evvel emirde bunların vaktiyle makamata ve vilayeti işgal eden ahvallerin tahkikiyle tezahür edecek neticesine kadar haklarındaki fikrin ve mütehassıl heyecanın teskini ehemmiyetle maruzdur.”

The next telegram by Mustafa and Mahmud on 4th of November was directly transmitted to Ministry of Interior and also signed by major administrative bureaucrats, notables and military officers of the town.⁹⁷ It was a collective petition by both officials and community of Sulaymaniyah requesting the banishment of Sheikh Said with his relatives of six households from Sulaymaniyah because of their oppression and numerous atrocities.⁹⁸ According to the message; after the promulgation of constitution they hoped that the thirty years of despotism will be defeated finally.⁹⁹ However, they claimed that their applications to the imperial authorities and Ministries for the banishment of Sheikh Said were eventually failed.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the level of cruelty and hatred of Sheikh Said, whom they refrained from even writing, had increased so much more rather than ended.¹⁰¹ They also sent an ultimatum, if they were not paid attention; their ‘Society’ (*Cemiyet**) of 20 thousand people as the Ulema, Sheikhs, administrative officials, military commanders and officers, notables, tribal chiefs and various nations were not going to tolerate the dishonorable and illegitimate practices of Said and his congregation.¹⁰² They clearly stated that, in order to protect their own civil and national rights, they would all be willing and ready to banish Said

⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

Petitioners were Brigadier General Mustafa, Jaf Chief Mahmud, Müfti Abdülaziz, Administrative Members (*İdare Azaları*) Abdurrahman, Said, Salih and the other Abdurrahman, Imperial Property Official (*Emlak-ı Seniyye Memuru*) Abdullah, Head of Penal Chamber (*Ceza Reisi*) Re’fet, Regular Army Battalion Commander Senior Captain (*Nizamiye Tabur Kumandanı Kolağası*) Salih, Registrar (*Nüfus Memuru*) İzzet, Reserve Major (*Redif Binbaşı*) Mahmud, Notable (*Vücuhdan*) Abdülfettah, Battalion Commander (*Tabur Ağası*) Fehmi, Notable Fettah, Merchants (*Tüccardan*) Hacı Ahmed Cader, Hacı Fettah, Medical Senior Captain (*Tabib Kolağası*) Ziya, Bank Clerk (*Bank Memuru*) Abdurrahman and many others as well.

⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

“Otuz sene zarfındaki istibdadı Kanun-i Esasinin neşriyle def edileceği me’mul iken hakkında makamat-ı aliye ile nezaret-i celilelerine tevali iden maruzat ve müracaatımız akim kalmasından dolayı kalem ile ta’dada gelmez zulüm gadr.....tezyid eyleyen Hafid Şeyh Said ve altı haneden akrabası livadan aldırılmak suretiyle vuku bulan teskin ve istirahatimize ehemmiyet verilmezse evvelce de arz olunduğu vechle memleketin Ulema ve Meşayih, Memurin-i Mülkiye, Ümera ve Zabitan-ı Askeriye, Vücuha ve Aşair-i Rüesa ile Milet-i Muhtelifeden yirmi bin kişiden mürekkeb teşkil eden ve mumaunileyhle itbaat-ı denaet namusşikenane ahval-i gayrimueşrularına tahammül edemeyen cemiyetimiz hukuk-u şahsiye ve milliyelerini muhafaza etmek maksadıyla her ne suretle olursa olsun bu livadan ihraçları için amade bulunduğunu ihbar ve rızayı aliye Kanun-i Esasiye zamanında.....olan işbu halin nazar-ı dikkate ahzıyla bu babda hükümetçe yapılması icab eder muamelenin şimdi makine başında bulunan binlerce ahaliye tefhim olunmak üzere iradeleri intizar olunur.”

⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

¹⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

¹⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

¹⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

*by the term of ‘Cemiyet’ it might be referred to Committee of Union and Progress

and his despicable affiliates on their own.¹⁰³ Ministry of Interior was going to take this message serious and was going to decide to banish Sheikh Said mostly relying on this telegram.¹⁰⁴

As the Government contemplated and practiced Said's banishment, complaints continued to be raised against him during the process. Müfti Abdülaziz of Sulaymaniyah with his companions Mayor Abdülğafur, Sheikh of Naqshbandiyya Tarikah (*Hulefa-yı Nakşibendiye*) Emin and many members of the Ulema such as Mazlum, Emin, Ömer, Mehmed, Mahmud, Maruf reported that Sheikh Said who was 'informant' of former regime (*devr-i sabık hafiyyelerinden*) had been tyrannizing the community and opposing to the constitution.¹⁰⁵ According to Abdülaziz and companions, Said's affiliates had burnt the market and houses multiple times and had seized the properties and merchandizes of people.¹⁰⁶ The blood they have spilled unjustly so far painted the earth red, and the bazaar shops they burned many times turned the sky into a pile of dense clouds.¹⁰⁷ They complained that their cries and moans of Said's oppression and illegitimate practices were heard everywhere so far, but not at the state.¹⁰⁸ According to their allegations, Sheikh Said did not obey the Government's oath after the proclamation of the constitution and rejected the invitations to adopt the Constitutionalism regime since it contradicted with his own doctrine.¹⁰⁹ According to them, it was a known fact that Said was already disobedient

¹⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 04 November 1908

¹⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 09 November 1908

¹⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

With these names, the message was additionally signed "89 Companions" (*Seksen Dokuz Rüfekası*) at the end.

¹⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

"Devr-i sabık hafiyyelerinden Süleymaniyeli Hafid Şeyh Said biraderi mehadimi ve taalukatları elindeki mazlumin masumiyetde hun-u nahak ile ruy-i zemini müdhiş bir şekl-ü hamraya vaz' defaatle ihrak ettikleri Çarşı hanelerin devriyle ahakk-ı semayı bir sehab-ı kesif rengine kalb ettikleri gibi"

¹⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

¹⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

"gasp ettikleri emlak ve emvali az görerek ahali-i muti hakkında reva gördükleri mezalim ve l'tisafat-ı nameşrualarından dolayı ayyuka çıkan feryad figanımız idare-i zailerindehoşnudiyyetlerinde ahengden başka biretmediğine bilgurur hayatımıza hatm çekilmeye azm-i katiyyette bulunduğumuz bir sırada"

¹⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

"Kanun-i Esasininhürriyetin ilanından müstefid olmak üzere hükümet-i seniyyede edilen ahd ve peymanına ne Şeyh mumaunileyh dahi itba-i islah-ı nefisle iştirakleri hakkındaki teklifatımıza zaten meslek-i namarziyelerine tevafuk etmediğinden naşi adem-i itaatla iktifa etmeyerek"

to Constitutionalism due to his attitude and doctrine.¹¹⁰ However, after a certain point, Said was not content with only an ideological opposition and attempted a threatening activism against Constitutionalism.¹¹¹ They alleged that Said has been agitating public opinion against Constitutionalism to revive despotism and he had been emphasizing the new regime's contradiction with religious law (*sharia*) and Sultanate.¹¹² They also alleged him with aggravating the hate towards the Committee of Union and Progress through declaring its members infidels and even issuing a fatwa for murdering them.¹¹³ They even claimed that Said had encouraged some men to have them killed, and stated that they had abandoned hope on their lives.¹¹⁴ His banishment following a proper investigation conducted by imperial and provincial authorities meant restoring public order of their hometown and maintaining their lives.¹¹⁵ They were all grateful to 'just and gracious practices' (*icraat-ı adilane ve reaya-nüvazaneye*) of Sultan and finished the message with their prayers to Sultan, justice, nation and fraternity.¹¹⁶

2.5. Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul

As the complaints keep incoming, Mosul Governor Major General (*Vali Ferik*) Zeki Pasha had already asked for a military support to *banish* Said Effendi with some of his relatives and affiliates (*akraba ve taallukatı*) to provincial center since his crowd was increasing in number and the situation was becoming crucial.¹¹⁷ Even provincial

¹¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

¹¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

"istibdad vakalarınıfıkr-i fasidiyle bir tarafta Kanun-i Esasinin şeriat.....padişahiye mugayyiratına bahisle efkar-ı umumiye teheyüç diğer tarafta İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetini teşkil eden ahali-i muti hakkında bir kat daha husumeti teşdid, kendilerini harici namıyla tekfir, katllerine bile fetva vererek fedailer tayin eylemiş"

¹¹² BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

¹¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

¹¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

¹¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

"hayatımızdan na-ümid bırakması üzerine tevali iden şikayat-ı istirhamatımızın esbab-ı.....makamat-ı aliyye, vilayet-i celile, hükümet-i mahalliyece layıkıyla tahkik etmesine mebni mumaunileyhin buradan tebidleri memleketin istikrar-ı asayiş ile hayatımızın temini emrinde"

¹¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 13 November 1908

¹¹⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/108, 2 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 15 October 1908

In the archival materials used for the study, it can be said that the most frequently referred term for the 'penalized exclusion' of Said and affiliates from Sulaymaniyah, is 'banishment' (*teb'id*). Other

authorities agreed that detaining Sheikh Said considered in provincial center might be quite unfavorable.¹¹⁸ Governor Zeki suggested to relocate them temporarily in Istanbul (*Dersaadet*) or Aleppo since they could pose a bigger threat in Mosul.¹¹⁹ Then he proposed transferring him to a province like Aleppo, Syria or Hejaz to avoid possible damages from his ‘excessive abilities of mischief’ (*erbab-ı mefsedetü pek ziyade olan*).¹²⁰ However, it was not easy to force a strong figure like Sheikh Said to live in a place without his consent. In the first place, it was planned to invite him to Mosul as a

frequent expressions in the archive can be listed as ‘to be taken’ (*aldırılmak*), ‘to be removed’ (*çıkarılmak / kaldırılmak*) or ‘to be sent’ (*i’zam edilmek, kılınmak*). Thus, the terms of ‘exile’ (*nefy*) or ‘expulsion’ (*tagrib*) were found only in parliamentary minutes questioning the judicial and bureaucratic dimensions of the Sheikh Said’s case. According to their dictionary meanings, [even both words are alternatives to each other in some cases], ‘banish’ means ‘being forced to reside elsewhere or being relocated by authority’ while the ‘exile’ literally means ‘being expelled from native land’. In this study, the words ‘banish’ and ‘banishment’ correspond to the Ottoman term *teb’id* which literally means ‘to expulse a person away from a location and restrain in another by state authority’

In her study, Deniz Dölek Sever discusses the difference between ‘banishment’ and ‘exile’ according to the dynamics of Istanbul’s public order during the Great War years. From Sever’s point of view, suspects or criminals who were removed from Istanbul during the Great War years were not ‘exiled’ because they were generally not natives of Istanbul. According to her, people who were expelled from a city like Istanbul, which had elements from all over the empire, were technically banished from a place to another because they were not in their hometown anyway.

Although Sulaymaniyah is Said’s hometown, his situation seems controversial in this respect. Because, despite the pending decree for his removal to Basrah Province in case of recidivism, it was not implemented and Said eventually, was not taken out of Mosul Province borders. Although the word ‘exile’ (*nefy*) is mentioned in parliamentary minutes, it seems much more correct to call Said’s case as a ‘banishment’ (*teb’id*), as the word ‘exile’ is not referred in any relevant correspondence and technically he was not even taken outside the province. However, if the term ‘exile’ is not used in correspondence for political or strategic reasons, or if exile is technically a term that can be used even in expulsions within the same province, this debate is in a completely vicious circle.

Then, the other option we might have that the ‘fact of exile’ consists of two parts and the first part ‘nefy’ means ‘to expulse someone from a location’, and the second part ‘teb’id’ means ‘to force someone to live in another location and keep distant’. Sibel Kavaklı Kundakçı mentions that, in a 19th century Kalebend Register used as the main source of her study, the term *nefy* is mostly not used as a single word term and is used in ways such as “*nefy ü icla*”, *nefy ü tağrib*, “*nefy ü irsal*” and “*nefy ü te’dib*”. For a better understanding of the concepts such as *nefy-i ebed*, *nefy-i muvakkat*, *nefy-ve teb’id*, *nefy ü tard*, *nefy ve tagrib*, *teb’id*, *tagrib*, *icla*, *tard*, *ikamete memur* see Tugay’s comprehensive study on exile.

Deniz Dölek Sever, *War and Imperial Capital: Public Order, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 1914-1918* (Ph.D Dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2015) p.148

Sibel Kavaklı Kundakçı, *An Assessment on Exile (Nefy) Penalty*, Gazi University Journal of Social Sciences, Vol:4, No:11, 2017, p. 595-613

Biray Tugay, *Exile in the Province of Aydın: From Tanzimat to Republic*, (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Ege University, 2013)

¹¹⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/117, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 17 October 1908

¹¹⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/117, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 17 October 1908

¹²⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 406/11, 9 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 22 October 1908

guest for an interview rather than escorting him since it might ignite an armed conflict or a public incident.¹²¹ However, Governor Zeki reported that Sulaymaniyah merchants had closed their stores, armed together and sworn an oath to kill Sheikh Said and his sons.¹²² For maintaining public peace and avoiding a possible incident, Zeki highlighted that the official priority was to transfer them to provincial center before Sulaymaniyah community would possibly lynch them.¹²³ He also urged for a military deployment from the adjacent Kirkuk (*Kerkük*) division to secure the transfer conditions.¹²⁴

On 7th of November* Zeki sent a telegram to Ministry that the caravan of Said and his retinue including his family and affiliates, was departed under the supervision of Mule Cavalry Battalion (*Ester Süvar Taburu*) without any incident.¹²⁵ It was time to be much more decisive and cautious especially after the 4th of November telegram that pushed the Government to decide his banishment without hesitation.¹²⁶ While instructed his banishment, the Ministry of Interior reminded that the priority was to avoid any scene during his departure since his removal from Sulaymaniyah was especially desired by both state officials and public.¹²⁷

Next week, Ministry of War (*Harbiye Nazırı*) Ali Rıza Pasha informed the Government, that a deployment of a hundred soldiers from the 1st Battalion of 48th

¹²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2641/48/Lef 4, 16 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 29 October 1908

¹²² BOA, DH.ŞFR.406/71, 21 Teşrinievvel 1324 -03 November 1908

“Süleymaniye ahalisi dükkanlarını kapatarak Şeyh Said ile oğullarını telef etmek üzere ahd-ı peyman ettiklerinden silaha sarıldıkları cihetle ahalinin teskini için mumaunileyhin oğullarıyla mensubiyetinden iki adamı bil-mecburiye vukuatsızca celb ve taht-ı nezarete aldırıldığı, ahalinin dağıtılması içinkadar vesaya ve ikdamat icra olunmuş ise de bu familya Süleymaniye’den çıkarılmadıkça dağıtılmaları imkan haricinde bulunduğuifade ettiklerinden büyük bir fenaliğe mahal kalmamak içinbehemehal vilayete aldırılması Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı’ndan işar olunması üzerine...”

¹²³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.406/71, 21 Teşrinievvel 1324 -03 November 1908

¹²⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.406/71, 21 Teşrinievvel 1324 -03 November 1908

¹²⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 406/91, 25 Teşrinievvel 1324- 07 November 1908 *However, on his 17 November 1908 (4 Teşrinisani 1324) dated ciphered telegram (BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef1) Zeki was mentioning that Sheikh and his retinue were brought to Mosul in 5 November 1908 (23 Teşrinievvel 1324). Even Zeki might have reported the departure with a 2 days delay in his first message, it’s quite improbable that the group arrived Mosul on such an early date as 5 November.

¹²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 1-3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 09 November 1908

¹²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 1-3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324 – 09 November 1908

“Şeyh Said ile akrabasının Süleymaniye’den kaldırılması Mirliya Mustafa Paşa ve Caf Reisi ve memurin ve ahali tarafından Süleymaniye’den çekilen telgrafnamede istida olunmakla 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 telgrafname mucibince mumaunileyh.....ve bu yüzden bir gaile hudusuna meydan verilmemesi ihtar ve cevaba intizar olunur.”

Regiment in Chamchamal (*Çemçemal*) and 140 soldiers from Mule Cavalry Battalion in Kirkuk were ordered to perform the transfer mission.¹²⁸ 12th Division in Kirkuk of the 6th Army in Baghdad was in the command of this critical mission and reported that Sheikh Said Effendi, his sons Muhammed (*or Mahmud*)* and Ahmed, his Naqib Sheikh Maruf , Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed and former Müfti (*Müfti-i Esbak*) Sheikh Muhammed Efendizade Sheikh Salih were escorted by Mule Cavalry Captain Ibrahim Effendi through Chamchamal to Mosul.¹²⁹

After they arrived in Mosul, Zeki reported that there was not a legitimate reason to take them into custody; but their freedom in such a populated location with many tribes, clans and crowds could facilitate their escape.¹³⁰ They could also make bigger troubles by communicating with their relatives and affiliates staying in Sulaymaniyah and the gendarme officers watching them were not reliable since they were mostly their fellow townsmen.¹³¹ It seems that Zeki did not trust on Kirkuk mule cavalries from Sheikh's hometown even they were authorized Ottoman officers. He also

¹²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2647/71/Lef 3, 2 Teşrinisani 1324- 15 November 1908

"Akdemce Musul Vilayetiyle cereyan eden muhabere üzerine 48. Alayın Çemcemal'deki Birinci Taburundan 100 neferve Kerkük'teki Ester Süvar taburundan 140 nefer Çemçemal mevkiilerine gönderilmiş"

¹²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2647/71/Lef 3, 2 Teşrinisani 1324- 15 November 1908

"ve Hafid Şeyh Said Efendiyle mahdumlarından Şeyh Mehmed ve Ahmed ve Nakib Şeyh Maruf, Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed ve Müfti-i Esbak Seyyid Mehmed Efendizade, Şeyh Salih Efendilerin Çemçemal'e izam olunan Ester Süvar müfrezesine teslim edilmek üzere Ester Süvar Yüzbaşısı İbrahim Efendi'ye terfikanSüleymaniye'den izam edildikleri Süleymaniye Kumandanlığından ısharına atfen 12. Fırka Kumandanlığı Vekaletinden bildirildiği 6. Ordu-yu Hümayun Kumandanlığı Vekaletinden mevrud telgrafnamede izbar kılınmış olmakla"

*Although in some documents accidentally written Muhammed or Mehmed, Said's sons who were banished to Mosul with him are referred as Ahmed and Mahmud in many sources and documents. Because the Arabic versions of the names Mahmud (محمود) and Muhammed-Mehmed (محمد) are very close to each other, it is thought that they can be written incorrectly in handwriting. However, Kedourie identifies Said's sons who were involved in the harassment incident as Muhammed and Mahmud and gives the name of Said's murdered son as Muhammed, although he is referred to as Ahmed in all other accounts. Apart from Mahmud, Ahmed, and his youngest son (10 years) whom he took with him to Mosul to enroll in school, it could not be determined whether Sheikh Said had a fourth son, named Mehmed or Muhammed.

¹³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 1, 04 Teşrinisani 1324 – 17 November 1908

"Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Said ve biraderi Maruf ve oğullarıyla damadı Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Salih nam şahıslar merkez vilayete aldırılmış ise de taht-ı tevkife alınmalarını mucib şimdilik elde bir şey olmadığına ve aşair ve kabail ve ahali kesretli olan böyle bir mevkide serbest bırakılmaları firarlarını..."

¹³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 1, 04 Teşrinisani 1324 – 17 November 1908

"veya Süleymaniye'deki ekarib ve taallukatlarıyla bil-muhabere yine bir gaile çıkarmaları melhuz olmasına ve zabita vasıtasıyla nezaret ve muhafızları zabitanın ekseri hemşehrileri olmak cihetiyle kendilerine emniyet edilemeyeceğine mebni.."

recommended that Sheikh and his relatives to be relocated in a distant place like Istanbul or Aleppo to avoid possible threats.¹³² However this proposal was not approved by the Ministry of Interior since relocating them out of the province of Mosul was legally impossible for now.¹³³ As we will see below, an Imperial Decree (*İrade-i Seniyye*) was required for such a level of practice. After disapproval, Vali Zeki notified the Ministry that the security measures were to be tightened and Regiment Command with Police Commiserate were to be informed to prevent their possible escape.¹³⁴

Zeki might be right in his suspicions about the possible escape of Said. In a short while, Mosuli local authorities received an intelligence that Said and his retinue were planning to escape from Mosul back to Sulaymaniyah.¹³⁵ That was a telegram signed by several officials like Mustafa and Mahmud Pashas, Müfti Abdülaziz, Imperial Property Official Abdullah, Senior Captain (*Kolağası*) Salih, Head of Penal Chamber Ahmed, Army Reserve Major (*Redif Binbaşısı*) Mahmud with many others and notables.¹³⁶ This collective petition warned that the Sheikh who was released to live free by Mosul province through the attempts of his other sons, relatives and affiliates in Sulaymaniyah, was about to escape back to his hometown.¹³⁷ These petitioners also reminded that the criminal record of Sheikh reached almost 160 documents until now and there was a pending Imperial Decree to exile him to Basrah in case of recidivism.¹³⁸ In their opinion, Sheikh has been planning to take a revenge from the people who filed complaints against his tyranny and despotism and sought justice through his banishment.¹³⁹ According to them, Jaf and other tribes which were made

¹³² BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 1, 04 Teşrinisani 1324 – 17 November 1908

“bunların ibkalarınamahsus olan mahazire mahal kalmamak üzere muvakkaten olsun Dersaadet’e yahud Haleb’de ikamet etmek üzere izamlarına emr-i seria itası lüzumu icab-ı hal ve maslahata binaen müsterhamdır.”

¹³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 5, 13 Teşrinisani 1324 – 26 November 1908

“Şeyh Said ile akrabasının Haleb’de yahud Dersaadet’de ikamete icbarları kanunen gayr-i mümkün olduğundan merkez vilayette hüsn-i muhafazası zaruridir”

¹³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 2, 15 Teşrinisani 1324 – 28 November 1908

¹³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

¹³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

¹³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

¹³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

“ceraimlerine mebnî şimdiye kadar hakkında toplanan evrak takriben 160 takımdan ibaret ve bahusus ceraimlerinin tekrarı takdirde Basra’ya sevkleri idare-i seniyye-i hazret-i padişahi iktizasından bulunan mumaileyhin”

¹³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

up of more than thousand families were also very concerned about the possible return of Said which might trigger bigger conflicts.¹⁴⁰ That was why he should be kept in custody away from Sulaymaniyah with his relatives, and his remaining affiliates in town should be adjoined him as well.¹⁴¹ Otherwise they were afraid that the danger and evil posed by him will increasingly continue in Sulaymaniyah and this was clearly against to the justice and equality rendered by the constitution.¹⁴² They were grateful that the constitution had fortunately liberated the community to live under comfort and security by unchaining them after 30 years of despotism.¹⁴³ Long message ended with urgency notifications, requests of preventive measures and a number of signatures by almost 40 names.¹⁴⁴

The banishment of Sheikh Said to Mosul had both symbolic and strategic importance in the eyes of the Unionist government. The symbolic importance lay in the fact that the Unionist government had demonstrated its power and displayed that it was able to intervene in a dynasty that had ruled in Iran, Iraq and Kurdistan for 700 years. By displacing Sâdât from their homeland and separating them from their families, the Unionist authority also wanted to display that it could eliminate the traces of the Despotism regime. However, the pressure practices applied on the Sâdât families left behind in Sulaymaniyah had put the provincial administration and military command in an exceedingly difficult situation.

The strategic importance lay in the weakening of the Sulaymaniyah-based Society of Unionist Charity. The state authority, who drove Sâdât's executive team to Mosul, intended to leave their organization in Sulaymaniyah headless. In this way, Sheikh Said was disengaged from the rest of Sâdât, the Hamawand tribe, and the religious

“zulüm, gadr, istibdadinden kurtulmak ümidiyle tebidleri hakkındaki müracaatları adalete iktiran iden ahaliden intikam almak için muemelat ve iğtişâşlarıyla kıyası kabul etmez bir raddede ettirecekleri emsaliyle müsalebet bulunan kanlarbulunduklarıicabınca irtikab idecekleri cinayetleri memleketin dahili ve haricine çıkaracakları ihtilalin derecesini ve bu ahvalin umuma iras edecek takdir iden memleketin ahalisiyle”

¹⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

“min heyet-ül mecmua yekün bin haneden ibaret bulunan Caf ve aşair sairen tekrar heyecana gelen mesuliyeti sebeblerine ait olmak üzere tahammüle mümkün olmayan bu halde”

¹⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

¹⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

¹⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

¹⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisani 1324 – 20 November 1908

orders which meant a severe damage on their organizational network. Nevertheless, provincial administration persistently tried to legitimize the action through claiming that the banishment was carried out for Sâdât's own safety and to prevent further incidents in Sulaymaniyah.

2.6. Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate as a Controversial Place of Duty

It was not only the Sâdât front that was complained and that the allegations were brought against. Sulaymaniyah administrative authorities and officials were also constantly being complained to the superior authorities in Istanbul by different elements in the Sâdât bloc. In fact, the most serious of these allegations was that a conspiracy was set up against Sheikh Said under the leadership of the Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha, and that Said was banished and murdered as a result of this conspiracy. In this section, both the controversial position of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate vis-à-vis the Central Authority will be examined and the allegations made by the Sâdât bloc against the Sulaymaniyah administration will be exemplified. However, before moving on to these further interpretations, it is useful to render a brief background of the Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha whose name will be mentioned continuously throughout the work since he was one of the major suspects in Sâdât's allegations.

The previous Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Salih Vasfi Efendi had resigned from his office in November 1906, when he could not adapt to the local climatic conditions and suffered a dangerous disease.¹⁴⁵ In February 1907, Tevfik Bey, the District Governor (*Kaimakam*) of Nevşehir District (*Nevşehir Kazası*) in Konya Province, who was deemed appropriate due to the importance of the position, was appointed to Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate (*Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı*).¹⁴⁶ Unfortunately, although his name is referred in a few studies such as Hut's, no detailed content or a comprehensive literature is available on Çerkes Tevfik Pasha, who was to serve until his dismissal in February 1909. It is interesting that Tevfik Pasha, who allegedly

¹⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1228/58/Lef 3, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1906

¹⁴⁶ BOA, BEO.2989/224116, 22 Kanunusani 1322 – 4 February 1907; DH.MKT.1228/58/Lef 3, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1906

played a key role in the Mosul Incident and who left deep traces in the history of Sulaymaniyah, has been overlooked by this time. Although he was one of the civil administrators who were inherited from the Abdulhamid II period, he was contrasted with the Islamic clique in the region and his name was allegedly involved in the Sulaymaniyah conspiracy against Sâdât. It can be thought that the archive-based information about Tefvik Pasha that will be given in this study will contribute to the literature and be a guide for future research on the Post-Constitutional transformation of Mosul.

On 15 November 1908, the Ministry of War reported to the Ministry of Interior that the existing situation of Sulaymaniyah was pathetic due to the mismanagement of the Sub-Governor Tefvik.¹⁴⁷ Tefvik should have been well known by Istanbul authorities as he performed the task of District Governor of Prince Islands (*Adalar Kaimakamlığı*) for many years.¹⁴⁸ The Mosul Command notified the Ministry that there was a severe need for skilled, diligent and competent officials throughout the province after the former Governor who escaped without punishment despite all crimes.¹⁴⁹ However, Zeki stated in his reply to the Ministry that Tefvik did not show any mismanagement and that the condition of the sanjak was better than before.¹⁵⁰ According to Zeki, only Sheikh Said complained about Tefvik.¹⁵¹ On the other hand, Zeki emphasized that the people of Kirkuk also dissatisfied with their sub-Governor and suggested that Tefvik be appointed to that sanjak, where an active and capable sub-Governor was needed.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2666/57/Lef 1, 2 Teşrinisani 1324 – 15 November 1908

“Süleymaniye Sancağı dahi acınacak bir halde olub”

¹⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2666/57/Lef 1, 2 Teşrinisani 1324 – 15 November 1908

“Mutasarrıfı senelerce Adalar Kaimakamlığında kullanıldığından ahvali Dersaadetce malum olacağı beyanıyla”

¹⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2666/57/Lef 1, 2 Teşrinisani 1324 – 15 November 1908

“Vilayetçe idare-i sabıka berdevam olduğu ve vali-i sabık leylen kaçırılarak irtikabat-ı külliye yanına bırakıldığı gibi”

“şu sırada vilayetin ıslah-ı ahvali gayurkargüzar ve tehdidini icraya ve daire-i vilayetlerini bizzat teftişle icraat-ı lazımeyle ifaya muktedir memurinin vücuduna mütevakkıf bulunduğu”

¹⁵⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 407/47, 19 Teşrinisani 1324 – 02 December 1908

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı paşanın idaresizliği görülmemiş ve sancağın ahvali sabıkına nisbeten daha iyi bulunmuştur.”

¹⁵¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 407/47, 19 Teşrinisani 1324 – 02 December 1908

“Muşarunileyhi yalnız Şeyh şikayet ediyor”

¹⁵² BOA, DH.ŞFR. 407/47, 19 Teşrinisani 1324 – 02 December 1908

“ve Kerkük Mutasarrıfını da ahali mütevali istemiyor. Bineanaleyh şu aralık faal ve muktedir bir mutasarrıfa ihtiyacı derkar olan Kerkük Mutasarrıflığına Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının nakli”

He wanted an active person, who knew the conditions and temperaments of the tribes well, to be appointed instead of Tevfik.¹⁵³ If not, he specifically suggested the appointment of the ‘Chief Secretary of the Province’ (*Mektub-i Vilayet*) Ahmet Münir Efendi, a person known as a merit holder.¹⁵⁴ Although the complaints about Tevfik increased, Zeki's suggestion of appointing him to the Kirkuk sub-Governorate could be seen as a move of distancing him from Sheikh Said and relocating him to a relatively less problematic sanjak. The important point here was that he could have made this suggestion just to prevent Tevfik from being dismissed and remained idle.

After the banishment of Sheikh Said took place in early November 1908, tension and disagreement between the Central Authority and the Provincial Administration already began to escalate. According to the message by Zeki, Sheikh Said had claimed that Sub-Governor Tevfik was provoked by the Jaf Chief Mahmud who has been bearing a long time hostility towards Said.¹⁵⁵ By referring to the allegations of Said, Zeki quoted that Tevfik had taken the Sâdât into custody by unfounded accusations since there was no complaints filed by the community.¹⁵⁶ Zeki also reported that, Provincial Administrative Council functioned and the decision was still in progress.¹⁵⁷ However, complaints and allegations from the Sâdât front increased and allegation of an illegal cooperation between Sub-Governor Tevfik and Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha regarding to a tax-collection fraud was exposed.

Almost a month later, Zeki reported that allegations that Sheikh Said and his retinue were falsely accused and banished, were still on the agenda. While the investigation deepened and his statement was taken, Sheikh Said had claimed that there were no complaints or accusations against them by the Sulaymaniyah community.¹⁵⁸ According

¹⁵³ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 407/47, 19 Teşrinisani 1324 – 02 December 1908

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığına ahval ve emzice-i aşirete vakıf ve faal birinin tayin ve izamı”

¹⁵⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 407/47, 19 Teşrinisani 1324 – 02 December 1908

“ve yahut liyakatı mucib olan mektub-i vilayet Ahmed Münir efendinin tayini”

¹⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 5, 9 Teşrinisani 1324- 22 November 1908

¹⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 5, 9 Teşrinisani 1324- 22 November 1908

¹⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 5, 9 Teşrinisani 1324- 22 November 1908

“bittahkik muktezayı muadeletin ifası istida olunmakla meclis-i idare kararı derdest-i arz bulunmuş olduğu maruzdur”

¹⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 – 13 December 1908

“Muhaberat-ı cariyeyle Şeyh Said efendinin ifadesine nazaran haklarında ahali tarafından bir guna şikayet ve müracaat vaki olmayıp”

to the Sheikh, they were banished to Sulaymaniyah by the unfounded accusations of Jaf Chief Mahmud, Sub-Governor Tevfik and Commander Mustafa.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, Said had expressed Mahmud Pasha's involvement into this tripartite plan as some factions of Jaf tribe were excluded from Mahmud Pasha's domain of influence and that situation caused a raise in their tax rates to be collected.¹⁶⁰ While the amount of taxes that Mahmud Pasha had to collect and compensate for the state were the same, the population he had to collect was now reduced. This was quite probable that Mahmud Pasha was trying to get rid of Barzanji penetration to achieve his freedom of movement and to maintain a full-scale rule on his own tax domain. Zeki also mentioned that the conduct of the Sheikhs in Sulaymaniyah was not entirely innocent and that there were aspects that required investigation.¹⁶¹ According to Zeki, a deeper investigation was needed to uncover the truth in Sulaymaniyah.¹⁶² For this, it was expected to form a committee consisting of administrative, judicial and military members.¹⁶³

In the middle of December, Ministry of Interior notified Mosul Governorate that a new Sub-Governor for Sulaymaniyah was to be appointed and sent.¹⁶⁴ Meantime, if the Tevfik Pasha's stay in Sulaymaniyah was not approved by the Mosul Governor, he was going to be summoned to Mosul and a deputy was recommended to substitute him until the arrival of his successor.¹⁶⁵ Obviously, Central Government considered the risk of remaining him there until a new Sub-Governor arrives but left the initiative to Zeki Pasha's decision in any case. Next day Governor Zeki Pasha telegraphed a

¹⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 – 13 December 1908

"bu hal mukaddema Caf aşiretinden bazı fırkaların Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşa'nın taht-ı nüfuzundan çıkarıp vergilerinin tezyid-i tahsiline tavassut eylesinden müteessir olan Mahmud Paşayla Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik ve Kumandanı Mustafa Paşaların bil-ittifak hilaf-ı hakikat işaratiyla merkez vilayete aldırıldıkları iddia olunuyor"

¹⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 – 13 December 1908

"bu hal mukaddema Caf aşiretinden bazı fırkaların Caf reisi Mahmud Paşa'nın taht-ı nüfuzundan çıkarılıp vergülerinin tezyid-i tahsiline tevsit eylemiştir"

¹⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 – 13 December 1908

"Gerçi şeyhlerin de Süleymaniye'ce mucib-i muahaze ahvalleri yok değil ise de hakikatın zahire ihracı 22 Teşrinisani 1324 tarihli telgrafla arz olduğu vechiyle cihet-i mülki ve adliye ve askeriyeden mahaline bir heyetin gönderilmesinde mütevakkıf bulunduğumuzun icabatın icrasımüsaade-i daverileridir"

¹⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 – 13 December 1908

¹⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 – 13 December 1908

¹⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2686/36, 5 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 18 December 1908

¹⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2686/36, 5 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 18 December 1908

ciphered message to Ministry of Interior including a short summary of events up to that point.¹⁶⁶ Despite his previous message, which included allegations of a triple alliance against Said, this time Zeki justified Sheikh Said's banishment. He reminded that during the despotism era the Sulaymaniyah community was in really poor conditions and the town's incomes had fallen to one-fifth because of the oppression by Said's affiliates.¹⁶⁷ In addition, Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha had administered the sub-province better than ever with his power and dignity.¹⁶⁸ However, after the declaration of constitution, the community had observed that Sheikh Said has been enhancing his power and his mass through the Society of Unionist Charity.¹⁶⁹ According to Zeki, since the community was allied for breaking the chains of captivity now, the critical position of tyrant Sâdât had raised difficulties and their stay in Sulaymaniyah was about to generate a public agitation.¹⁷⁰ Zeki reminded as these circumstances could endanger the lives of Sheikhs, Tevfik Pasha had appropriately transferred them to Mosul provincial center under state protection.¹⁷¹ In addition, the Sheikhs were handed over to an investigative committee composed of military and administrative elements, which undertook the investigation.¹⁷² On the other hand, both the Sheikhs in Mosul and Sheikhs remained in Sulaymaniyah have continuously been filing complaints about the Commander Mustafa Pasha.¹⁷³ Zeki remarked that the case was submitted to

¹⁶⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

¹⁶⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“Devr-i İstibdadda hafid Şeyh Said Efendi ve taallukatı yüzünden Süleymaniye ahalisi zebun ve varidatı hums derecesine tenzil eylemiş idi.”

¹⁶⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa iktidar ve haysiyyetle sancağı her vakitten iyi idare etmiş”

¹⁶⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“İlan-ı meşrutiyetle beraber Şeyh Said efendinin Cemiyet-i Hayriye namıyla..... uygunsuz bir cemiyet teşkili avanesini tezyid ettiğini gören ahali”

¹⁷⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“Sâdât'ın kesb-i kuvvet istidadını gösteren zincir-i esaretini kesr için ittifak Müttegallib Sâdât'ın mevkii hemen müşkûlat kesbetmiş”

¹⁷¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“ve mutasarrıf tarafından muhafaza-ı hayatları için ikdamat-ı ciddiye sarf edilmiş ise de Süleymaniye'de kalmaları tezyid-i heyecanı sebep olacağı anlaşıldığından makam-ı devletle bilmuhabere mezkur vilayete aldırılmış idi”

¹⁷² BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“Ol babdaki iradeleri üzerine cihet-i mülkiye ve askeriyeden mürekkeb bir heyet-i tahkikiye teslim-i derdest-i izamları icra”

¹⁷³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“Mirliya Mustafa Paşa aleyhine gerek buradaki şeyhler ve gerekse orada kalan bakiye-i Sâdât şikayat-ı mütevellide bulunmaları üzerine mesele cihet-i adliyeye tevdi edilmekle beraber”

the judicial authorities and Army Command was already notified to relocate Mustafa regarding to his excessive level of intervention in community matters.¹⁷⁴ Eventually, Ministry of War was the state organ which was expected to declare his replacement since he was a military officer.¹⁷⁵ However, unlike his neutral attitude towards Mustafa, Zeki kept paying tribute to Tevfik and praised him as the “Sub-Governor who introduced the proclamation of liberty to each officer under his authority”.¹⁷⁶ If he was sacrificed without an investigation, that would leave a bad impression in the eyes of provincial officers and community.¹⁷⁷ Zeki also suggested that would be better to appoint him to a convenient location if his replacement was inevitable.¹⁷⁸

After Ministry received these interpretations, Zeki was instructed to clarify the reason of his favoring messages on Tevfik which caused a hesitation in Istanbul.¹⁷⁹ Zeki, who had reported on Said's allegations that he was wrongfully accused by the tripartite alliance and demanded that an investigation committee be sent, suddenly took a stand in favor of Tevfik. The Ministry naturally questioned why Zeki changed his mind after he was notified that the military and administrative investigators were arranged to come for these officials who were continuously complained.¹⁸⁰ First of all, it was imperative him to specify the reasons behind his two mismatching statements which created a pure contradiction in the eyes of the Ministry.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“ahali işine lüzumundan ziyade müdahale eden kumandan Mustafa Paşanın tebdili için ordu kumandanlığına yazılmış olduğundan”

¹⁷⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

¹⁷⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“ilan-ı hürriyetin her memura takdim eden Mutasarrıfın”

¹⁷⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“şikayata bila tahkik feda edilmesi memurin-i vilayet ve Süleymaniye ahalisine su-i tesiri mucib olacağından”

¹⁷⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 19 December 1908

“mutlaka kaldırılması lazım ise münasib bir mahale nakli”

¹⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 5, 13 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 26 December 1908

¹⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 5, 13 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 26 December 1908

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı ile Kumandanı hakkında tevali eden şikayatin tetkik-i mahiyeti için cihet-i mülkiye ve askeriyeden birer zatın Süleymaniye’ye gönderileceği evvelce bildirilmiş iken şimdi Mutasarrıf mumaunileyhin lehinde idare-i kalam edilmesi mucib-i tereddidi olmakla”

¹⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 5, 13 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 26 December 1908

“evvel ve evvel yekdiğeriyle gayrikabil-i te’lif olan şu iki iş’ar beynindeki mübayenet esbabının serian ve mühiman inbası muntazırdır.”

Soon afterwards Zeki dispatched another long message to Ministry of Interior clarifying the prior conditions. He reminded that there was founded an “imitative” (*takliden*) Committee of Union and Progress in Sulaymaniyah as in many other places after the proclamation of constitution.¹⁸² Afterwards, the Sheikhs in there had attempted to found another association called Society of Unionist Charity with the participation of tribes for protecting their concessions acquired in former era.¹⁸³ Zeki highlighted that the members of first society were worried and anxious after the second one’s attempt of establishment and that they started raining complaints to the authorities reminding the privileged status of these Sheikhs in former regime.¹⁸⁴ Provincial Administration instructed Sub-Governorate of Sulaymaniyah to recognize and introduce both societies officially but resisted the growth of Society of Unionist Charity by giving effective advices to tribal chiefs.¹⁸⁵ Although he did not express it clearly, Zeki seemed to base his reasons of justifying Tevfik on the risks that Sâdât’s associational organization in Sulaymaniyah might bring. Above all, perhaps Zeki thought that the state authority should have displayed an image of unity in the face of such a deep crisis. In addition, all non-Governmental organizations were officially supported in terms of Constitutional civil liberties but tribal participation to the society of Sâdât was being prevented by some back-channel administrative efforts.

As Zeki mentioned above, after their removal to Mosul provincial center, Sâdât continuously filed complaints on these officials to the Government authorities.¹⁸⁶ According to Zeki’s message, the Sheikhs claimed that the public did not have a hand in this plan.¹⁸⁷ According to the Sheikhs, the plan was entirely the work of the Sub-Governor, the Commander and some administrative officials of Sulaymaniyah.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

¹⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

¹⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

¹⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

“Vilayetçe her iki cemiyetin tanınmaları ve tanıtırlmaları Mutasarrıflığa yazılmış ve aşair rüesasına da vesaya-ı müessire ifa ve mezkur büyük cemiyetin vücuda gelmesine mümanaat olunmuş idi”

¹⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

¹⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

“Buraya gelen şeyhler ahalinin bu işte iştiraki olmayıp Mutasarrıf ve Kumandanın ve orada memurların eser-i olduğu ve cüzi miktar halkın da onların tesvilatına kapıldıklarını iddiaya ve makamât-ı aliyyeye şikayata koyulmaları üzerine bir heyet-i tahkikiyenin izamı nezareti celilerine istizan edilmiş ve cevab-ı muvafık dahi alınmış idi”

¹⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

However, some ordinary people were also deceived by these instigators.¹⁸⁹ Zeki also reminded that after Mustafa Pasha had pressured the relatives and families of Sâdât in Sulaymaniyah on the pretext of tax collection, Sheikhs in Mosul and Sulaymaniyah attempted to sue him.¹⁹⁰ Mustafa Pasha had interfered with the families of Sâdât on behalf of state authority and this was their red line that should not be crossed. The case was conveyed to the relevant court, and the situation of the Commander was reported to the Ministry of War to ensure the necessary supervision and control over him.¹⁹¹ In Zeki's opinion, replacement of Commander and Sub-Governor was the last resort since an investigation through a committee was not enough to satisfy and pacify these people anymore.¹⁹² Zeki justified his statement favoring Tevfik since his removal to provincial center meant victimizing him through his dismissal and also invoked the report of the investigation committee will be ruling on his status eventually.¹⁹³ As it is clearly seen, Zeki was still expecting a comforting solution for the rest of Tevfik's career and invoking to decision makers for his relocation rather than a full dismissal. However, it is not understood from the archival materials whether the relationship between Zeki and Tevfik is a personal friendship or the solidarity and unity of the two local administrators in the face of such an anti-state crisis.

¹⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

¹⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

"Şu sırada Süleymaniye kumandanı tahsilat bahanesiyle şeyhlerin oradaki taallukatını tazyik ettiğinden kumandan mumaunileyh aleyhine Süleymaniye'de ve buradaki şeyhler tarafından davaya kıyam olunması üzerine ise"

¹⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

"mehakim-i aidesine tevdi edilmiş, vuku bulan müracaat-ı mütevelliyeleri üzerine de nezaret-i celilesine bu mesele hakkında mütalaa-i çakeranem izam ve icabı istilam buyrulması üzerine"

¹⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

"kumandanın oradan kaldırılması ve şeyhlerin hedef-i ihtiraslarından biri olan mutasarrıfın tahvili suretiyle meseleye nihayet verilmek istenmiş idi."

¹⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

"ancak Süleymaniye mutasarrıfının yerinebirisinin tayini ve müşarünileyhin merkez vilayete aldırılması mazuliyet gibi mağduriyetini mucib ahvallerin bulunduğu lehlerinde idare-i kelim olunmuş ve heyeti tahkikiyenin vereceği rapor üzerine hakkında muamele-i lazime icrası istirham edilmiş idi"

2.6.1 Allegations Against Sulaymaniyah Authorities

In this section, we will look at the telegrams from the Sheikhs, tribes and organizations within the Sâdât bloc, which contain striking allegations against the authorities of Sulaymaniyah. While the internal disagreement and indecision within the state regarding the Sub-Governor Tevfik continued, harsh statements started to reach from the opposing party. These statements alleged the names of the officers, their connections to each other, and even an illegal association of a provincial administrator with a chief of the tribe.

Sheikh Said in his direct message to Sultan, appreciated the constitution and cherished the liberty and equality which were the blessings bestowed by his majesty.¹⁹⁴ As all Sâdât, Ulema, tribal chiefs (*rüesa*) and community (*ahali*), they were convened around the tomb of his ancestor Sheikh Kâk Ahmed to appreciate the blessings of constitution.¹⁹⁵ In their prospect, the Society of Unionist Charity was founded for protection and appreciation of the constitution in the name of pursuing Sultan's invitation of liberty.¹⁹⁶ However, he alleged that now it was threatened through some official warrants issued by Sub-Governor (*Mutasarrıf*) Çerkes Tevfik Pasha, Sub-province Commander (*Liva Kumandanı*) Brigadier General (*Mirliva*) Mustafa Pasha, Deputy Battalion Commander (*Tabur Ağası Vekili*) Fehmi and Regular Army Senior Captain (*Nizamiye Kolağası*) Salih Efendi who had served their illegitimate interests.¹⁹⁷ According to Said, these officials had attempted to confuse the mind of community and threatened the society members through these allegations for concealing their own aggression in the face of authorities.¹⁹⁸ Said was seeking justice through the requirements of law and order against these people who defamed the Sâdât

¹⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324- 26 October 1908

¹⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324- 26 October 1908

¹⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324- 26 October 1908

“devamı-ı ömr-ü şevket-ü padişahın davat-ı hürriyesine terdifinhazretiefendimiz hazretlerinin şerifiyle medd-i yed olan Kanun-i Esasinin muhafaza ve takdir-i ahkamı yolunda akdedilmiş İttihad Cemiyeti Hayriyesi”

¹⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324- 26 October 1908

“daima menafi-i gayrimeşrualarına hadim oldukları evrak-ı resmiyeyleMutasarrıf ve Kumandan paşaların Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi, Nizamiye Kolağası Salih Efendilerin hedef-i arzı ve”

¹⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324- 26 October 1908

“efrad-ı cemiyet.....tehdidat icrasıyla tahdiş-i ezhan-ı ahaliye müteşebbis oldukları”

and Ulema and breached the laws of sharia.¹⁹⁹ Same message was viewed by Sheikh'ul-Islam Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi as well and forwarded to the Grand Vizier Mehmed Kamil Pasha with Sheikh'ul-Islam's remarks.²⁰⁰ Obviously, the office of Sheikh'ul-Islam (*Daire-i Meşihat-ı İslamiye*) was monitoring the developments closely since the case was related to a religious group. Ministry of Interior extended the case to Vali Zeki, reminded not to allow any circumstance caused by factiousness and hypocrisy and instructed him to reveal the truth.²⁰¹

Babaresulzade Seyyid Ahmed's complaints on Mustafa, Fehmi and Salih were quite noteworthy as well.²⁰² He invoked to the Ministry of Interior and alleged those names with conducting a fictitious and unfair judicial investigation on Sâdât.²⁰³ He claimed that those names were fabricating some allegations, provoking some individuals, and making a public fuss for intimidating Sâdât.²⁰⁴ For Ahmed, Sâdât had never disobeyed the law and that was why he was not able to accept their baseless custody since it was totally contrary to law and justice.²⁰⁵ He also stated that this investigation was a total plot designed by those names whom one of them was plaintiff and other was witness.²⁰⁶

Sheikh Said himself also corresponded to Grand Vizier* directly.²⁰⁷ He accused Tefvik Pasha of being an informant of previous regime, building his career on espionage and showing his obedience on 'snitching tip offs' (*jurnallemek*).²⁰⁸ According to Said,

¹⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324- 26 October 1908

²⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324- 09 November 1908

²⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 4, 5 Teşrinisani 1324- 18 November 1908

"nifak ve şikaka mucib ahvale meydan verilmemesi"

²⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2655/9/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinievvel 1324- 05 November 1908

²⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2655/9/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinievvel 1324- 05 November 1908

"hakkımızdaki teşebbüsât-ı mefsedetkarilerine bir hakikat süsü vermek fikriyle vuku bulan tecavüzât-ı şahsiyelerini tahkirlerini makamat-ı..... arz ve istirham muadeletten başka bir..... görmediklerinden hakkımızdaki isnadlarının tahakkuk edeceğini teminle Mutasarrıfı fikirlerine uydurarakbir takım eşhası tahrir itma' ederekihtilal çıkarmak bu suretle nail-i maksad olmağa teşebbüs ve elyevmtaht-ı tevkif-i ahz ve vasita-i mefsedetle el altından haber vererek bir velvele berpa itmişlerdir"

²⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2655/9/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinievvel 1324- 05 November 1908

²⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2655/9/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinievvel 1324- 05 November 1908

"Hiçbirhükümete adem-i itaatımız vuku olmadı. Bilasebeb-i kanun tevkifimizi kanun ve adaletle kabil-i tatbik ve ülfet göremiyoruz"

²⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2655/9/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinievvel 1324- 05 November 1908

²⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908 * He transmitted the same message to the Ministry of Interior as well DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 2

²⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908

Tevfik was the root cause of banishment and alienation of many people until now and his violations will appear through a detailed investigation of his former office.²⁰⁹ Said insisted that, since Tevfik Pasha was aware of his despotic rule will be disallowed by the Society of Unionist Charity as a formation of thousands Sâdât, Ulema and aşair, he had built these unfounded claims and detained them through a fraudulent warrant.²¹⁰ He also complained about their transfer conditions that even their oldest seyyid was more than 70 years old they were escorted with 300 cavalries and routed to the provincial center like the villains of ‘Great Flight’ (*Kaçgun-u Evvel canileri gibi*).²¹¹ Before he concluded his message, he reminded that even their innocence was determined through an investigation by a committee of honorable officials, they were treated totally unjust, unfair, and inappropriate.²¹² He was seeking justice to be manifested on Tevfik “the traitor” who was the ‘relic of despotism era’ (*devr-i istibdadi yadigari*) and his ‘accomplice of evil’ (*refik-i habaseti*) Mustafa.²¹³

Said and his comrades shared their complaints with Sheikh Abdülkadir (Ubeydullah) who was the founder and president of ‘Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress’ (*Kürd Teaviün ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) in Istanbul.²¹⁴ According to their explanation, ‘Society of Unionist Charity’ which was founded to maintain constitution and peace of motherland, was a victim of conspiracy by Tevfik and Mustafa Pashas.²¹⁵ They remarked that these two malicious names inherited and cherished the most terrible and damned profession of despotism era as being informants.²¹⁶ Said alleged both names of treating them despotically and underlined that a further investigation might uncover their misconducts.²¹⁷ Said also emphasized that these state officials were in an illegal

“Devr-i istibdad zulümlerinin en dehşetlilerine intisab iderek meslek-i mezbuuresini bir hizmet-i fahire olmak üzere kabul etmiş ve itaatlerini jurnaller üzerine ahrar imtaden birçoklarının teb’id ve tağyirlerine sebep -i müstakil olmuş olduğunu”

²⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908

²¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Çerkez Tevfik Paşa binlerce Sâdât, Ulema, aşair....mürekkep teşkil edilmiş Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiye’imizin badema fikr-i istibdadkaranesine meydan vermeyeceğini anlaması üzerine hilaf-ı hakikat sebk iden işar ve istihsal ettirdiği emre teb’an...”

²¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908

²¹² BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908

²¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisani 1324 – 21 November 1908

²¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1908

²¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1908

²¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1908

²¹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1908

alliance with Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha in order to embezzle some of the tax collection flowing from the Jaf territory.²¹⁸ He added that Salih and Fehmi were also involved into this alliance for their mutual interests and all of them were tyrannizing Said and his congregation.²¹⁹

Ministry of War Ali Rıza Pasha was also notified about these telegrams and on 30th of November he instructed the 6th Army of Baghdad to conduct a military investigation.²²⁰ He depicted Sheikh Said to the Ministry of Interior as a very dignified and revered man in the eyes of 20 or 30 thousand Kurdish population.²²¹ After the proclamation of the Constitution, it was not heard that Sheikh Said, Sayyid Ahmed and Sheikh Salih were involved in an illegal activity or behaved in a condemnable manner.²²² However, the martial treatment on these Sheikhs who were regarded as extremely sacred in the eyes of the Kurds, was considered disrespectful and inappropriate by the Kurdish population.²²³ Ali Rıza Pasha declared that he had assigned the 6th Army to investigate the allegations that those responsible for this situation were Commander Mustafa, Battalion Commander Fehmi and Senior Captain Salih.²²⁴ He also underlined the necessity of conducting a civil investigation as well as a military investigation.²²⁵

As can be seen from his lines, Ali Rıza Pasha was not in favor of accusing Said before the process was fully understood as a result of a detailed investigation by both military and administrative authorities. Presumably, allegations about military authorities and

²¹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1908

“kendi müşterilerinin ve Caf tahsilatında sabıkta yaptıkları ihtilasatı bu sene de icra, Caflıların İran’dan ettikleri menhubata karşı istirdad olunan mebalighden hisse çıkarmak fikriyle”

²¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisani 1324- 23 November 1908

²²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 – 30 November 1908

“Nezaret-i Alilerin tensibi üzerine ahiren Musul’a aldırılan Şeyh Said ile Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Salih’in Kanun-i Esasi’nin ilanından sonra nazar-ı istihan ile görülecek mugayir-i merzi bir guna halleri mesmu’ olmadığı halde Sâdât-ı mumaunileyim haklarında örfi olarak muamele ifası 20-30 bin nüfusça pek muhterem tanılan, Ekrad nazarında hanedan-ı celil-i....bir nevi hürmetsizliği mutazammın ve binaberin gayr-i caiz idüğü ve bu halin müsebbibleri Süleymaniye Kumandanı Mustafa Paşa ile Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Salih Efendiler oldukları beyanı ile ıştika ve müracaat olunması ve Altıncı Ordu’yu Hümayun Kumandanlığına istifsar-ı muamele edilmiş olmakla cihet-i mülkiyece de tahkikat-ı lazıme ifasıyla”

²²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 – 30 November 1908

²²² BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 – 30 November 1908

²²³ BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 – 30 November 1908

²²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 – 30 November 1908

²²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 – 30 November 1908

officers may have made Said's investigation and banishment even more suspicious and unreliable in Ali Rıza's eyes. At this point, it can be said that Ali Rıza Pasha approached Sheikh Said more objectively or cautiously, and even more moderately in some ways. However, his insistence for a deeper administrative-military investigation on the accusations against Said can also be read as a pragmatic move in order not to confront the military forces in the region with the entire Kurdish community. Instead of a hawkish policy of opposing the entire community, Ali Rıza might have been making dove moves to appease the other side.

We do not know whether Sâdât knew Ali Rıza Pasha's objective approach towards Sheikh Said. However, on December 5th, Ali Rıza Pasha received another message from Sâdât directly. Müfti-i Esbak Seyyid Muhammed and his numerous comrades reached him and reported that Mustafa Pasha was pursuing his personal interests in social disputes and was betraying to the peace of tribes.²²⁶ According to his striking claims, the children and women of Sâdât were also threatened and insulted by Mustafa Pasha through his outlaw practices which were adverse to both constitution and sharia.²²⁷ Seyyid Muhammed remarked that, this was pure treason to create this much aggression and agitation through these revengeful policies in such a time of solidarity and peace empowered by constitution.²²⁸ Subsequently, Ali Rıza Pasha re-clarified the Ministry of Interior Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha that he had instructed 6th Army of Baghdad for a prompt military investigation and re-urged for an administrative investigation from Ministry of Interior as well.²²⁹ Repeated correspondence between the Ministry of War and Interior regarding to the investigation of these military officers might be relevant to the recent appointment of Ministry of Interior Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Since he was appointed to the newly structured Kamil Pasha cabinet on 27 November 1908, Ali Rıza Pasha probably refreshed him during the ongoing process

²²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 2, 22 Teşrinisani 1324 – 5 December 1908

²²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 2, 22 Teşrinisani 1324 – 5 December 1908; DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 4, 24 Teşrinisani 1324 – 7 December 1908

“Süleymaniye’den Musul’a kaldırılan Şeyh Said Efendi Kanun-i Esasinin idame-i ahkamına sami idenlerden bulunduğu halde Kumandan Mustafa Paşa’nın menafi-i şahsiyesine hedef olduğu ve eşraf-ı Sâdât ın etfali nisvanı şiar-ı İslamiye ve adalet mugayire suretiyle tahkiratta bulunduğu beyanıyla icraat-ı adılaneye intizar eylemekte olduklarına dair”

²²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 2, 22 Teşrinisani 1324 – 5 December 1908

²²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 4, 24 Teşrinisani 1324- 07 December 1908

of this extremely critical investigation.²³⁰ However, Ministry of Interior had already received a direct telegram from Sâdât reporting even their children and women were under threat and swiftly forwarded this remarkable and urgent message to Mosul Governorate.²³¹ Seemingly, Sâdât captured the urgency of both Ministries and triggered them to take action after disclosing the circumstances of their children and women.

Sheikh Seyyid Salih with some other Sâdât dispatched a telegram to the Ministry of Interior including similar allegations on the same officials.²³² He had written that it was obvious there were some self-interested lowlifes who had adopted the espionage as a rejected profession.²³³ According to Salih, they were self-seekers as being the traitors of religion and state, while being the destructors of motherland and hometown as well.²³⁴ After the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, many of them were given the punishments they deserve, but some of them had the chance to spread immorality, malversation and embezzlement to the provinces.²³⁵ He expressed that shameful acts like corruption, immorality, embezzlement and extortion of former era were embodied in the profile of Çerkes Tevfik Pasha and a further investigation will reveal that he was a terrific informant.²³⁶ Salih particularly indicated that, apart from his evil and tyranny, Tevfik had embezzled the yearly tax income of the Jaf tribe by the cooperation of Chief Mahmud Pasha.²³⁷ He claimed that although thousands of liras they have embezzled could be determined through inspecting records, they were still being employed by state authorities.²³⁸ From Salih's perspective, these corrupted

²³⁰ Mahir Aydın, *Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa (1855-1923)- Osmanlı Sadrazamı*, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/huseyin-hilmi-pasa>, Access Date: 21.10.2020

²³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2676/86, Lef 2, 24 Teşrinisani 1324- 07 December 1908
"etfal ve nisvan-ı Sâdât dahi duçar-ı hakaret olmakta bulunduğundan"

²³² BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

²³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

"Saltanat-ı Osmaniye'nin şu hal-i esef.....iştimaline başlıca sebep-i mürettib-i müstebitleriyle menafi-i şahsiyelerinin temini için hafiye meslek-i merdudesinde bulunan alçaklar olduğu derkardır"

²³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

"Kanun-i Esasinin ilanı üzerine hain-i din-i devlet, tahrib-i vatan ve memleket olan menfaat-perest birçokları saye-i adalet ve hürriyetin ceza-i sezarlarını görmüş ve görmekte bulunmuş ise de önü ef'albazılarına mücerred ahlak-ı umumiyeyi ifsad ve ihtilas irtikab maksadıyla taşralara yayılmıştı."

²³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

²³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

²³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

²³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

traitors who were employed in state service and Sub-Governorate were supposed to be prevented by the Unionist Government for disallowing a further destruction of the holy motherland.²³⁹ He concluded his message as; they were supposed to be dismissed from office since they were not eligible and reliable to govern such an important and vulnerable sub-province like Sulaymaniyah regarding to its strategic location on Iran borderline.²⁴⁰

Meanwhile, a news article about Fehmi, the Deputy Commander of the Sulaymaniyah Gendarmerie, published in the issue of Sabah Newspaper on November 21, 1908, was being explained to the Grand Vizirate by the Sulaymaniyah CUP branch.²⁴¹ According to the article, Fehmi had been organizing some officers and had been making threats and insults against the Society of Mohammedan Union (*Cemiyet-i İttihadiye*)* whose number of members exceeded 12 thousands in Mosul.²⁴² And because of this behavior of Fehmi, a strong revolution was being prepared throughout the entire Kurdistan.²⁴³ However, CUP members declared that the issue was not related to entire Mosul but only to Sulaymaniyah and stated that the truth was not in that way.²⁴⁴ They also stated that, the complaints constitute the source of the article were transmitted from a telegraph machine outside of Sulaymaniyah by the ‘mischief committee’ (referring *Cemiyet-i Hayriye*), which was founded against the CUP under the guidance of Sheikh Said.²⁴⁵ According to CUP, they were spreading these news because of the grudge and

“İşte bu cümleden Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığında bulunan tercüme-i halinden müthiş hafiye olduğu anlaşılacak olan Çerkes Tevfik Paşanın taaddiyat seyyiat-ı sairesi şöyle dursun bir senelik Caf tahsilatının reisi Mahmud Paşa ile müştereken irtikab ettikleri binlerce lira kayden sabit iken her ne esbaba mebnî ise halen istihdam olunuyor”

²³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

²⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisani 1324- 5 December 1908

“İran hududu üzerinde olub ehemmiyet ve nezaket-i mevkiyesi müstağni-i izah bulunan Süleymaniye Sancağının devr-i istibdadın en müdhiş ve muarrız hafiyelerinden mürtekib Tevfik Paşa ile kuvve-i zahiriye ve fikriyesi olan Kumandan Mustafa Paşa’nın daha ziyade devam-ı memuriyetlerinısfet muadelet olamayacağından haklarında muamele-i lazime...”

²⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

²⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

“Sabah Gazetesinin 8 Teşrinisani 1324 tarihi ve 6852 numarolu nüshasında Musul’da teşkil edilmiş 12 Bini mütecaviz Cemiyet-i İttihadiye aleyhinde Jandarma Binbaşısı Vekili tarafından zabtiyeler vasıtasıyla bir takım tehdit ve tahkirat icra ettirilmekte olduğundan”

*For Cemiyet-i İttihadiye please see the section of “Investigation, Arrests and Trial”

²⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

“umum Kürdistanında azim bir ihtilal-i mütehazzırasını olunduğu beyan olunmuştur”

²⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

²⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

hostility they nurtured about Fehmi, who prevented their intrigue and plans from functioning.²⁴⁶ In fact, authorities were even asked to appoint Fehmi to another location promotionally because of his sacrifices about the arrest of bandits, the stability of the security and the preservation of constitution.²⁴⁷ Contrary to the groundless news, CUP branch reported that in Sulaymaniyah, which means the spirit of today's Kurdistan, the general safety and public order were perfectly ensured thanks to justice.²⁴⁸ As can be seen, the CUP branch stood behind its member Fehmi in every way by emphasizing his achievements and flatly denied the spreading news of the public disorder in Sulaymaniyah.

Other telegram by Sâdât had the autograph of Saliha Hanım, the wife of Sheikh Maruf was also destined to Ministry of Interior.²⁴⁹ Apparently, she had been subjected to a military intervention on the pretext of a tax collection issue. She particularly remarked that the tax collection authority was entitled to the state officers according to the regulations and military officers did not have such an authority.²⁵⁰ Even her brothers and husband were exiled in Mosul, she alleged that she was disturbed for two times by the armed troops under the command of Mustafa Pasha and Senior Captain Salih regarding to a land tenure (*muqataah*) issue of his brother's land.²⁵¹ She outcried that her pregnant daughter had miscarried her baby for her fear and stress of this armed enforcement and she questioned which article of the constitution had such a brutal practice.²⁵² She also reminded as the women and kids of Sâdât they never deserved this and she sought justice through the dismissals of these officers.²⁵³ Ministry of Interior instructed Zeki Pasha to perform an objective and duly investigation since such an armed enforcement requires an illegal accountability.²⁵⁴ Zeki Pasha responded

²⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

²⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

²⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2680/85/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1324- 06 December 1908

²⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 2, 29 Teşrinisani 1324- 12 December 1908

²⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 2, 29 Teşrinisani 1324- 12 December 1908

²⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 2, 29 Teşrinisani 1324- 12 December 1908

²⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 2, 29 Teşrinisani 1324- 12 December 1908

“Biraderim Şeyh Ali, zevcim Musul'da başka mahrem yok iken cariyeleri hanelerine şiar-ı İslamiye mugayir olarak Kumandan Mustafa Paşa ve Kolağası Salih ifza emirleriyle iki defa süngülü müsellah askerin mecmuasına müteessiren hamile kerimem ıskat-ı cenin etmiştir”

²⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 2, 29 Teşrinisani 1324- 12 December 1908

²⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/ Lef 3, 6 Kanunuevvel 1324- 19 December 1908

as the Sulaymaniyah Administration was restraining all possible threats on Sheikh's relatives and they were in progress of fulfilling the investigation .²⁵⁵

İbrahim Ağa, Chief of Dodukan (*Dudikan* دودگان) tribe from Sardasht (*Serdeşt*) town in İran and his retinue also reported same names including Imperial Property Official Abdullah as well.²⁵⁶ On their way to Sulaymaniyah for joining the Society of Unionist Charity with the spirit of Constitutionalism and democracy, they were exposed to an aggression by some groups provoked by these names.²⁵⁷ He also mentioned that Sheikh and his congregation were victimized for unfair reasons and these allegations were based on nothing but slander and defamation.²⁵⁸ In their opinion these tyrannic treatments were totally in contrary with the liberty and equality principles of Constitutionalism and had a very negative impression on all Kurdish groups.²⁵⁹ Actually this was not the first telegram by İbrahim Ağa regarding to the unfair treatments they were exposed. In his previous message to the Ministry of Interior he had expressed that they rushed to Sulaymaniyah to affiliate the Society of Unionist Charity on behalf of their tribe with a population of four thousand people.²⁶⁰ However, after their attempt to Said's society they had witnessed grudge of army and administration instead of appreciation and respect.²⁶¹ They were publicly humiliated, scolded and insulted through various individuals and they were 'alienated by their beloved one' (*yarı ağyar eylemek*) which meant the Ottoman state in that case.²⁶² Ministry had took it serious and forwarded the case to the Mosul Governorate with a

²⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 1, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324- 28 December 1908

²⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 3, 2 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 15 December 1908

²⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 3, 2 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 15 December 1908

²⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 3, 2 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 15 December 1908

²⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 3, 2 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 15 December 1908

²⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2639/92/Lef 1, 6 Teşrinievvel 1324- 19 October 1908

"Kanun-u mezkurun tamamı ahkamını muhafaza veve selamet-i vatan saadet-i milleti temin efkar-ı hayriyesiyle umum Kürdistan ve SâdâtHafid Şeyh Said Efendi hazretlerinin riyasetinde teşekkül Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiyeye dört bin nüfusu aşiretimiz halkıyla iltihak ve duhul zımında Süleymaniye'ye hemen şitaban olduk."

²⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2639/92/Lef 1, 6 Teşrinievvel 1324- 19 October 1908

"Böyle bir niyet ve gayret-i hayriyemize karşı cihet-i askeriyeden mülkiyeden mazhar-ı takdir ve ihtiram yerine buğz menfaatperest-i istibdad-ı taraftaranete'vil ile"

²⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.2639/92/Lef 1, 6 Teşrinievvel 1324- 19 October 1908

"yar-ı ağyara karşıçarşılarda mahal-i namusu ve haysiyeti enva-i tekdirlere ihanetlere ve bazılarımızın bilaesbab-ı kanuniye hapse ilka veolunmak gibi tahkirata hedef olmaklığımız Kanun-i Esasiye adalet müsavat hürriyet uhuvvete reva mıdır?"

note of “*not to allow an extralegal enforcement*”.²⁶³ In couple of days Zeki Pasha had replied back to Ministry that it turned out to be a false complaint which was the other petitioners were motivated by Ibrahim himself.²⁶⁴

2.6.2. The Manifest of Sâdât

On 25th of February, a five pages long manifest signed and sealed by principal Sheikhs Maruf, Mahmud, Ahmed and Salih reached to the Ministry of Interior and signalled an imminent peril in the eyes of the state.²⁶⁵ This lengthy message, elaborated the complicated networks between tribal chiefs and state officials, alleged the local administrators of being involved in a conspiracy against Sheikh Said and attempted to justify the Sâdât in front of this organized crime .²⁶⁶ Throughout the study, we will refer to this material as ‘The Manifest of Sâdât’ and discuss its different parts in different chapters since it has a very long-term and detailed narrative regarding to the alleged administrative conspiracy.

Manifest begun with explaining the background of the Jaf tribe chief Mahmud Pasha as a character inherited from the despotism era.²⁶⁷ According to the Sheikhs, in the name of appreciating the desires of sordid despotism, the traitors of former regime had damaged and devastated the Ottoman realm even worse than surrendering it to the enemy.²⁶⁸ They have particularly emphasized that the community of the grand Jaf tribe, as almost 10 thousand households, was exploited and even dishonorably violated by Mahmud Pasha since he was backed by the despicable practices of the former regime traitors.²⁶⁹ They have remarked that he had gained such a big wealth, at a level of being

²⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.2639/92/Lef 2, 12 Teşrinievvel 1324- 25 October 1908

“hilaf-ı kanun muameleye meydan verilmemesi”

²⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2641/34/Lef 1, 15 Teşrinievvel 1324- 28 October 1908

²⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

²⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

²⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

²⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“Amal-i müstebide-i menfurelerinin tervici uğurunda memleketi bir düşman eline teslim etmekten ziyade mutazarrır ve perişan eyleyen”

²⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

a real billionaire, through this system of exploitation.²⁷⁰ However, they have also mentioned that thousands of household individuals, who were aware of his feudal tyranny which was not respected anymore, consulted to Sheikh Said couple of years ago and asked for his guidance.²⁷¹ Sheikhs have reminded that the requests of these people were the collection of taxes directly by the Provincial Government and elimination of the disturbance caused by Mahmud Pasha.²⁷² The manifest praised Sheikh Said as the grandson of Kâk Ahmed, who was the precious heirloom inherited from the prophethood family to the residents of these blessed lands.²⁷³ Sheikhs elaborated as, in the name of ending the tragic victimization of these people and protecting the rights of local treasury, Said had invoked law eventually.²⁷⁴ Because they have claimed that, the nine tenths of the treasury was devoured by getting into the pockets of persons with evil interests so far.²⁷⁵ From their perspective, Sheikh Said was required to invoke the law since he was full of excessive loyalty and devotion to the four great Islamic caliphs and Ottoman sultanate.²⁷⁶ Naturally, his attitude had nourished the traitorous intentions of Mahmud Pasha and stimulated him to nurse a grudge and look for revenge against the Sheikh, his relatives and affiliates.²⁷⁷

“devr-i sabık havenesinin muamelat ve hareket-ı denaetkaraneleri sayesinde on bin haneden mürekkeb Caf kabile-i azimesi halkının bütün memalikine ve hatta ırz ve namusuna musallat olan”

²⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ve bu yüzden gerçekten milyarder denecek mertebe-i servet ve samana malik bulunan”

²⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“Cafli Mahmud Paşanın eski derebeylerine mahsus mezalim ruz-u efruzundan artık cari kalmayan binlerce hane efradı bundan kaç sene akdem Hafid Şeyh Said efendiye müracaatla”

²⁷² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“fi-maba’d vergülerinin salyane hükümeti tarafından doğrudan doğruya alınması ve Mahmud Paşa tasallutunun üzerlerinden def-i hususuna delalet eylemesini talep eylemişlerdi.”

²⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ehl-i beyt-i nübüvvetin bu hita-ı mübareke sekenesinde yadigar-ı kıymetdarı”

²⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“Şeyh Said Efendi hazretleri hilafet-i kübra-i İslamiye ve saltanat-ı seniyye-i Osmaniye’ye karşı mütehassıs oldukları fart-ı sadakat ve merbutiyet iktizasınca efrad-ı merkumenin zaten mütehakkık olan mağduriyet-i facialarına nihayet vermek”

²⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“onda dokuzu ceyb menfaat-i habiseye girerek ekil ve bel’ idilen hukuk-u hazineyi siyanet etmek üzere icab iden tedabir-i kanuniyeye tevsil etmiş ve”

²⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

²⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“işte bu hal Mahmud Paşa’nın bittabi Şeyh Müşarünileyh ve bittabi ekarib ve taalukatı olan Sâdât’a igras intikamkarini müteheyyic ve manende serma-dide maksad-ı hainanesine husulu istidadını haiz bir zaman ...dide-davz intizar eylemiştir.”

The manifest also claimed to explain how the tripartite alliance between Mahmud, Tevfik and Mustafa Pashas was formed. According to the allegations by Sheikhs, right after the appointments of former Sub-Governor Tevfik and former Commander Mustafa to Sulaymaniyah, a hatred arose between these two.²⁷⁸ Since Naqib Maruf had justified Tevfik and tended to support him on this issue, he had arisen the hatred and grudge of Mustafa and this situation pushed Mustafa toward Mahmud.²⁷⁹ Thereafter, as Tevfik was deceived by well-disguised traps of Mahmud during a tax collection visit to Jaf, eventually he had consented and adhered to the reached agreement among these three.²⁸⁰ From their point of view, this process eventually eliminated the hatred between Mustafa and Tevfik and facilitated the unity of all three.²⁸¹ According to this narrative, when Tevfik got closer to Mahmud for some of the advantages he would gain, he automatically got close to Mustafa and the alliance of the trio with overlapping interests was established.

In Sâdât's viewpoint, Mahmud Pasha has been manipulating the Local Administration as a servant fulfilling his personal desires and enjoyment.²⁸² Besides, he was not reluctant to resort to all miserable means for favoring his damned intentions and despicable benefits.²⁸³ Sâdât discredited the Sub-Governor and Commander by declaring them as 'who were embodied and allied of all evil thoughts and attitudes which were proper to become his cohorts'.²⁸⁴ They have also put forward that

²⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Süleymaniye Mutassarır-ı sabıkı Tevfik, Kumandan-ı sabıkı Mustafa Paşa'ların muvassalatları akabinde aralarında münaferet zuhur"

²⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"ve Nakib-ül eşraf Kaimakamı Hafid Şeyh Maruf efendinin mutasarrıfı o mesailde haklı görerek muzaharete temayül etmiş, mumaunileyh Mustafa Paşa'nın dahi hissiyat-ı gayz nefsanîyetini tahrik ve Mahmud Paşa'ya temayülünü tevliid"

²⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"ve müteakiben Mutasarrıfın Caf tahsilatına azimetinde Mahmud Paşa'nın dam-ı igfalat-ı telbiskaranesine tutulduğundan akd-i peyvende muvafakat ve mürafakat etmesini"

²⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"ve Mustafa Paşa ile aralarındaki münafereti def' ve her üçünün ittihadını teshil ettirmiştir"

²⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Hükümet-i mahalliyeyi arzu ve keyfiyetinin bir hizmetkar-ı icraiyesi gibi kullanan"

²⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"makasid-ı mel'unane ve menaf-i reziliye-i denaetkaranesinin tervici için bütün vesait-i sefîleye müracaat etmekten çekinmeyen Mahmud Paşa"

²⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"kendisinin fitrat..... ve kendisine hempa olmak üzere bilcümle efkar ve mişvar-ı hasisenin mecmu olarak bir olmuş bulunan mutasarrıf ve kumandanı"

Mahmud had resorted to all means for the sake of making them as the servants of his villainous intentions and had truly achieved the desired success.²⁸⁵ Sâdât had also observed that, Sub-Governor Tevfik and Commander Mustafa had absorbed Fehmi, Salih, Doctor Ziya, Sarchinar Accounting Officer Abdullah (*Serçınar Şube Memur-u Hasibi*), Head of Penal Chamber (*Ceza Reisi*) and General Staff Major Ali Said (*Erkan-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı*) who was one of the closest relatives of Tevfik, into their entourage as means of immunity.²⁸⁶ According to the narrative of the Sheikhs, there was solidarity against them between different departments of Local Government and they have managed to be exempted from responsibility through their authority. Manifest stated that, when they were all engaged to work on a major plan against Sâdât, telegrams gradually received from Unionist society in the name of upholding the constitution had facilitated the fulfillment of their plan, favored their slanders and evil desires.²⁸⁷ Which means, seemingly they had invited the Ulema to the confidence and alliance but practically to factionism and discord.²⁸⁸ The Sheikhs claimed that the libertarian atmosphere of the Constitutional Monarchy and the branching of the CUP made these conspirators' work easier. And according to Sâdât, they had summoned Mahmud Pasha to Sulaymaniyah, who was the despicable architect of these damned formations.²⁸⁹ Allegedly, right after the architect of evil had arrived to Sulaymaniyah, he had selected laborers to be his assistants and incorporated them into his capital.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"makasıd-ı leimesine hadim edecek vesailin kaffesine müracaatla hakikaten muvaffakiyet-i matlubeye mazhar olmuştur"

²⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Kumandan ile Mutasarrıf namusunu vicdanını ayaklar altına alacak kadar alçak tıynette bulunan Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Salih ve Doktor Ziya ve Serçınar Şube Memuru Hasibi Abdullah ve Ceza Reisi efendilerle Erkan-ı Harbiye Binbaşılığından ve Mutasarrıfın en yakın ekaribinden Ali Said Beyefendiyi alet-i muafat olmak üzere maiyyetlerinde bulundurmuş"

²⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"ve aleyhimizde azim bir plan yapmakla müştakil bulunmuşlar iken Kanun-u Celil-i Esasinin mevki tatbiki ve mübeşşir İttihad Cemiyetleri namına peyderpey gelen telgrafnameler planlarının ikmalini , planlarının, iftiralarının, amal-i habaset-i istihallerinin tervicine büyük, pek büyük yardımı olmuştur."

²⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Şöyle ki....alimi zahiren itimada, ittifaka ve fakat hakikatda ika-i tefrike ve nifaka davet"

²⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"ve bu mebani-i mel'unatın mimar-ı denaetkârdarı olan Mahmud Paşayı dahi Süleymaniye'ye celb etmişlerdir"

²⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Mimar-ı habasetdar muvassalatla beraber kendine muavin olacakırgatları kendisinin sermayedarı"

Sâdât was listing these assistants were selected out of some ‘damned personalities’ (*eşhas-ı mel’anet*) such as Hacı Said and Aziz as the members of Sub-province Administrative Council (*Meclis-i İdare-i Liva*) and merchants, Abdurrahman as the grandson of Sub-Governor (*mutasarrıf hafidi*), other Abdurrahman as the son of Sergeant Major (*Başçavuşzade*), Hacı Salih, Abdülgafor Agha as the Mayor (*Belediye Reisi*), Hacı Ahmed Çelebi and Mufti Aziz Efendi.²⁹¹ Thus, Sâdât interpreted as these people had managed their businesses by enjoying the capital of Mahmud Pasha and schemed their administrations by fawning on Sub-Governors and commanders.²⁹² The manifest referred them ‘insects’, which were innately deprived from humane bravery as one of the good manners of Islam, compelled to live in a darkness far from any light and in a despicableness far from any sublimity.²⁹³ Therefore they had affiliated some other filthy evildoers, who were unknowingly convinced in the way they did, into their society.²⁹⁴ Sâdât also referred CUP’s local branch anonymously and degraded them as they could not get their official status confirmed from the Salonika Headquarters despite to their hard attempts.²⁹⁵ On the other hand, they asserted that the official status of Sheikh Said’s society, reached to more than 12 thousands members from faithful people, was confirmed with full appreciation.²⁹⁶ By the rhetoric of Sâdât, this issue had totally agitated the factionist ideology of discord masters and this was clearly seen in the lines of their defamation letters originated from deception and resembled despicable dirty waters overflowing out of damned minds.²⁹⁷ Sheikhs kept degrading

²⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ve yekdiğerinin ekarib-i akar-ı miş’arı olan Meclis-i İdare-i Liva ağasından ve tüccarandan Hacı Said ve Aziz...hafidi Abdurrahman ve Başçavuşzade diğer Abdurrahman ve Hacı Salih ve Belediye Reisi Abdülgafor ağalarla Hacı Ahmed Çelebi ve Müfti Aziz Efendi nam eşhas-ı melanetintihab etmiş”

²⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ve bunlar ise bir minval.....Mahmud Paşa’nın sermayesiyle ticaretlerine, mutasarrıflarla kumandanlara yaltaklanmakla idarelerine düzen vermiş,”

²⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“İslamiyetin hasail-i esasiyesinde insaniyetin hissiyat-ı merdanesinden mahrum ve her nuraniyetten ari zulmette ve her ulviyetten beray-ı safiliyyette yaşamağa fitraten mahkum bulunan bu haşerat”

²⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“İa ya’lemun kendileri gibi kani murdar eşrarı dairen cemiyetlerine almışlardır”

²⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ve fakat her ne kadar çalışmışlar ise de Selanik merkez-i umumisinden resmîliklerini tasdik ettirememeklerine karşı”

²⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“hafid Şeyh Said Efendi merhumun teba-i sadıkadan olmak üzere on ikibinden ziyadeye ulaştırdığı cemiyetin resmîyeti kemal-i şükran ile tasdik edilmiş”

²⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

them as they were completely away from shame, modesty, honor and conscience; as eventually they had demonstrated their despicableness in the form of murder.²⁹⁸

The manifest addressed to the constitution and enumerated the offenses by these state officials as; through violating the 9th article, they had violated the rights of Sâdât.²⁹⁹ Through violating the 10th article, they had violated and crushed their individual liberties.³⁰⁰ Through violating the 22nd article, they had frequently assaulted and devastated their households and residences by alleged pretexts, deployed platoons to their houses, defied and insulted to their families.³⁰¹ And the document invoked to the law as; no matter how big, unless an allegation against an individual pronounced as a verdict in a respective court, it is obviously accepted like it never happened.³⁰² More importantly, they argued that even the banishment of an individual from his hometown was judicially sentenced by martial law, an imperial decree as a last resort was required to finalize such a crucial sentence.³⁰³ However, Sheikhs emphasized that these

“ve işte bu husus erbab-ı nifakın fikr-i şikakını büsbütün heyecana götürdüğünün satırları, noktaları efkar-ı melanetkariden taştan çirk-âb -ı denaet ve tezviriden müteşekkil iftiranamelerinde”

²⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ar ve hayadan, namus ve vicdandan külliye bi nasip kalmalarıyla fazilet-i denaet..... cinayet suretinde göstermişler”

²⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909; A.Şeref Gözübüyük, Suna Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri 1839-1980*, (Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982) p.27-42

“ve Kanun-i Esasinin dokuzuncu maddesine muhalefetle hukukumuz tecavüz”

Madde 9.- Osmanlıların kâffesi hürriyeti şahsiyelerine malik ve aherin hukuku hürriyetine tecavüz etmemekle mükelleftir.

Art. 9. All the Ottomans enjoy individual liberty on condition of not attacking the liberty of other people.

³⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909; Gözübüyük, Kili, *Ibid...*

“ve onuncu maddesinin hilafı olarak hürriyet-i şahsiyemize taaruzla payimal ettirmişler”

Madde 10.- Hürriyeti şahsiye her türlü taaruzdan masundur. Hiç kimse kanunun tayin ettiği sebeb ve suretten maada bir bahane ile mücazat olunamaz.

Art. 10. Individual liberty is absolutely inviolable. Nobody can under any pretence suffer any penalty whatever except in the cases determined by law and according to the forms prescribed by it.

³⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909; Gözübüyük, Kili, *Ibid...*

“ve yirmi ikinci maddesi hükmünce mesken ve menzilimizin taaruzdan mahviyetini derkar iki günde bir bahane ile hanelerimize müfrezeler sevk ve harem-i dairelerimize kadar tahatti ve tahkirata”

Madde 22.- Memaliki Osmaniyede herkesin mesken ve menzili taaruzdan masundur. Kanunun tâyin eylediği ahvalden maada bir sebeble hükûmet tarafından cebren hiç kimsenin mesken ve menziline girilemez.

Art. 22. The domicile is inviolable. The authorities cannot forcibly enter the domicile of any person what- ever except in cases determined by the law.

³⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“ne kadar büyük olursa olsun bir kimseye edilen isnad mehakime-i aidesinde bir hükme iktiran etmedikçe ke-en lem yekün tanıyacağı bedihi bulunduğu halde katiyet kesbetmiş bir hükmü infaz idercesine fikriyyatlarını icraya”

³⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

conspirators had fulfilled their plans just like executing a final judgement approved by the Sultan and they had managed to banish Sâdât from their hometown to Mosul.³⁰⁴

2.7. CUP's Problematic Entity in Mosul

In this section, the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress in Mosul, its dual branching over two contradictory ideologies and its interventions on Local Government will be examined. As we have seen throughout the study, the CUP Sulaymaniyah branch assumed an interventionist attitude and followed an insistent policy, especially in matters concerning Sheikh Said. It should not be forgotten that this branch is an extension of the first central branch established in Mosul and this vision is a continuation of this very same culture. In order to understand this continuity, the history of the Mosul central branch will be briefly examined, and the confusing duality of this entity will be discussed. However, prior to this, an ultimatum message from the Sulaymaniyah branch will be examined in order to see the pressure and impact that CUP branches can create on Provincial Administration and central authorities.

2.7.1. Interventionism and Uncontrolled Branching

A few days before the Mosul Incident, an interesting and remarkable telegram from the Sulaymaniyah branch of the CUP reached the Grand Vizirate. According to this anonymous message, Said and his affiliates in Mosul have been lobbying the central authorities in Istanbul through their relative Sheikh Kadir Nuri of Sulaymaniyah who the member of the Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress.³⁰⁵ The message

"ve bir kimsenin me'va ve beldesinden teb'idi velev idare-i örfice de karargir olsa bile yine irade-i seniyyeye muhtaç iken"

³⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"hükümüne, iradesine bizleri yurdumuzdan beldemizden çıkarmakla beraber hakarettten rezaletten hatra hayale gelmeyen iştatıifaya mütecasir eylemiş ve Musula teb'id ettirmişlerdir."

³⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 2, 19 Kanunuevvel 1324- 01 January 1909

allegedly mentioned a sum of 2.000 Lira sent via Sheikh Kadir Nuri, but it was not specified whether the money was transferred to the KSCP's Istanbul headquarters or to some Government officials.³⁰⁶ However, according to the message, the ultimate goal of this money transfer was clear, and the banished Sheikhs in Mosul have been trying to secure their return to Sulaymaniyah through their connections in Istanbul.³⁰⁷ But more importantly, as the possibility of their return was heard, it created great panic in Sulaymaniyah and if these Sheikhs returned, the sanjak people, consisting of twenty thousand domestic and external households, were ready to migrate to another place.³⁰⁸ In other words, this attempt with a clear purpose had to be left unfinished, but if they still had to be returned eventually, possible bloodshed should be prevented.³⁰⁹ Ultimately, CUP branch strictly stated that a suitable location for 20 thousand households to immigrate should be determined and the necessary procedures should be taken for their transfer.³¹⁰

At this point, Davut Hut necessarily highlights the particular interventions by local branches and clubs of CUP towards Provincial Administration mechanisms after the proclamation of constitution.³¹¹ According to Hut, CUP operated those practices as a fundamental way of enhancing central penetration and efficiency on the Provincial Administrations.³¹² There were usually no problems experienced as long as the provincial administrators were also the CUP members or partisans.³¹³ Otherwise, there

³⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 2, 19 Kanunuevvel 1324- 01 January 1909

“Musul’a teb’id edilen mütegalib-i hafid Said ve rüfekaşının Kürd Teavün Cemiyeti azasından bulunan akrabaları Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Kadir Nuri vasıtasıyla gönderdikleri tevâtüren anlaşılan iki bin liradan dolayı tekrar Süleymaniye’ye iadeleri için makamât-ı aliyeye fevkalade bir teşebbüs icra edilmekte olduğu tahakkuk etmiş”

³⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 2, 19 Kanunuevvel 1324- 01 January 1909

³⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 2, 19 Kanunuevvel 1324- 01 January 1909

“bütün livanın mahvını müztelzim bulunan avdetlerine bu suretle vakıa olan teşebbüs ve muavenet bilumum memleket ahalisini heyecana getirmek ve bunların azimetleri dahilen ve haricen yirmi bin haneden ibaret olan ahalinin hicret etmelerine mütevakkıf bulunduğuna”

³⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 2, 19 Kanunuevvel 1324- 01 January 1909

“bu..... sencide-i mizan-ı muadelet buyurulması ile bir maksada mebni olan teşebbüs-ü mezkurun bırakılması..... iadeleri yoluna gidilecek ise arada bir hun ve dima’nın sefkine mahal kalmamak üzere....”

³¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 2, 19 Kanunuevvel 1324- 01 January 1909

“ve emirde maruz yirmi bin hane halkı için bir mahal tayini ve nakillerine müteallik muamelat ve icabatın icra buyurulması”

³¹¹ Hut, *Musul Vilayeti’nin ...*, p.169 footnote 850

³¹² Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 850

³¹³ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 850

was a total dispute between the CUP representatives and Provincial Administrations.³¹⁴ Hut, by referring to Zeki's report to Grand Vizierate (*Sadaret*) on October 1908, attributed the foundation of the "Secondary CUP"* in Mosul to "Primary CUP"s partially impracticable obligations and demands imposed on Provincial Administration.³¹⁵ According to the report, even this second society was founded by notables, Sheikhs, and Sâdât to reduce the interventionist moves of the first one, had the same opinion of protecting the provisions of constitution and assisting the Government.³¹⁶ However, the first society had exceeded its limits and requested the dismissal of Sabuncuzade Muhammed Pasha from the membership of Provincial Administrative Council.³¹⁷ Zeki had reported, after their requests were denied, hundreds of people stormed the telegraph offices, violated public order, and threatened the telegraph officials.³¹⁸ However, the second society was against such interventionist requests and practices according to Governor Zeki Pasha³¹⁹.

In fact, the duality of the CUP's branching in Mosul attracted the attention of both Sublime Porte and the CUP center in Salonika headquarters and kept them busy for a while. According to the message Zeki sent in September 1908, during the office of his predecessor Mustafa Yumni, a branch in Mosul which had no connection with the Salonika center was automatically established and made demands from the Provincial Government by submitting its member list and seal.³²⁰ However, Zeki also reported that while the members of this existing society have been increasing rapidly, other notables of the province who did not share the same ideal and interests with them, established another society with the same name.³²¹ He stated that it was obvious that

³¹⁴ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 850

³¹⁵ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 851 *Hut titles this one as 'The Second Committee of Ottoman Union and Progress' as quoted from Zeki's report

³¹⁶ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 851

³¹⁷ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 851

³¹⁸ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 851

³¹⁹ Hut, *Ibid*, p.169 footnote 851

³²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

"Merkezi Selanik'te olan Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile evvelce hiçbir münasebeti olmadığı halde selefim zamanında burada o nam altında bir cemiyet teşkil ettiğini ve mikdarıyla belli ve başlılarının esamisini ve muahharen bir de cemiyet mühriyle hükümete bir takım tekalife dermeyan edildiğini arz etmiştim"

³²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

both of them would make demands from the Local Government, and that these demands would be evaluated as long as they were in line with Constitutionalism.³²² However, Zeki was worried that the conflict of interest between these two entities would cause further incidents and there was no other choice but to give advice to both parties.³²³ Because the major part of the officers in Mosul were members of the aforementioned society before they occupied the provincial authorities.³²⁴ He stated that he would try his best to reconcile these two entities, but he particularly demanded the necessary advices and warnings to be directly given from the headquarters in Salonika to these branches for a more constructive influence.³²⁵ In addition, a request had to be made to the Ministry of War for the military officers not to be involved in political affairs and to take care of their essential duties.³²⁶ Although himself a CUP member, Zeki might have considered the party members in the local administrative cadres as risky. At this juncture, too much political influence in the Provincial Administration could relegate Zeki's position in the decision-making mechanism and tarnish his image vis-à-vis the Central Authority. On top of that, the number of CUP branches increased to two and they fell into dispute with each other. This meant a bigger problem, and so much political confusion within the province could not be resolved without the guidance of the CUP headquarters.

"Cemiyet-i mezkure gittikçe teksir ettiği gibi bunlardan hariç kalan memleketin vücut vesairesinden ibaret ve menfaati hususiyeleri icabatından olarak evvelkilerle birleşemeyenlerden mürekkep Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti namı altında bir ikincisi daha teşkil etti."

³²² BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

"Bunların her biri hükümete karşı bir takım mütalebede bulunacakları bedihi ve hükümet-i seniyyenin Kanuni Esasi ahkâmını muhafaza etmek şartıyla iktizay-ı hale tevessül edeceği tabii ise de"

³²³ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

"her iki cemiyet arasında mevcut olan menfaat-i hususiyeden dolayı bir vukuat zuhuruna meydan verilmemesine çalışılacak ise de makam-ı vilayeti işgal etmezden evvel buradaki zabitanın bir kısm-ı mühiminin mezkur cemiyete dahil olmasından naşi hükümünce her iki cemiyet idaresini telif ve bir vukuata meydan verilmemek için icra-yı nasahiden başka bir çare yoktur"

³²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

³²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

"Binaberin, naib-ül vilayet ve ileri gelenlerle bil-ittihad her iki cemiyetn telif-i beynlerinde alâ-kadr-il-istitaa gayret olunacaktır. Mamafî Selanik merkez cemiyetinden bunlara nesayih ve ihtaratı lazıme icra olduğu halde tesirat-ı hüsnisi görüleceği varid-i hatır olmaktadır."

³²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324-08 September 1908

"Diğer cihetin de zabitanın vezaif-i asliyeleriyle bil-işgal bu gibi mesail-i siyasiyeye müdahaleleri caiz olamayacağı hakkında Harbiye Nezaret-i Celilesinden tebligat icrası elzem olduğundan arzına ictisar olunur."

Governor Zeki had already reported that his predecessor Mustafa Yumni had not accepted and had not announced the proclamation telegraphs sent to Mosul by the CUP headquarters at the beginning of the Constitutional Monarchy.³²⁷ He had written that the first formation in Mosul was triggered and established as a reaction to this, labelled itself as the CUP, pressed a seal, made a request from Provincial Government and its members rapidly reached 400.³²⁸ Zeki had also shared the prominent names of these applicants in the correspondence, and Ömeri Reşid Efendi was particularly noteworthy as a Mosuli notable among them.³²⁹ However, it is not understood whether this Ömeri Reşid was the same person who was going to found the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union and was going to be accused and judged as one of the chief instigators of the Mosul Incident. It was also possible that Ömeri Reşid, one of Mosul's prominent Ulema, applied to such an organization, was not accepted, and therefore displayed his reaction by establishing an organization with an opposing viewpoint. Zeki had particularly reported that these applicants were not affiliated with the original committee and established the society on their own initiative.³³⁰ These persons were consisted of partly indigenous people and partly civil servants, and made demands from the Provincial Government on behalf of the CUP.³³¹ Zeki had also stated that a

³²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 3, 20 Ağustos 1324 - 02 September 1908

"30 Temmuz 1324 Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti tarafından umum sırasında buraya da keşide olunan telgrafların vali-i sabık tarafından kabul ve ilan edilmemesinden dolayı"

³²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 3, 20 Ağustos 1324 - 02 September 1908

"kendilerine cemiyet süsü vererek namlarına hakk ettirdikleri mühür altında mütalebede bulundukları evvelce arz olunan kesanın esamisi zire derç olundu. Bunların adedi gittikçe tezayid ederek elyevm efradının 400'e karib bulunduğu tahkikat-ı vakia üzerine olunur."

³²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 3, 20 Ağustos 1324 - 02 September 1908

Major applicants named were the following:

" From Chief of Notables (*Reis-i Vücuhan*) Ömerizade Mecid Efendi, Member (*Aza*) Ömeri Reşid Efendi, Celili Emin and Süleyman Beyzade Fuad and his brother Abdullah and Şerif Beyzade Neşait Bey, Head of Indictment Committee (*Heyet-i İthamiye Reisi*) Abdurrahman Efendi and from officers, Chief Interrogator (*Sermüstantık*) Abdülgani and Gendarmerie Clerk (*Zabtiye Katibi*) Reşid and his brother Accounting Clerk (*Muhasebe Ketebesinden*) Hikmet and Accountant (*Muhasebeden*) Aziz and Senior Captain Nuri of Mosul Reserve Army (*Musul Redif Kolağalarından*) and Clerk of Navkur Reserve Army (*Navkur Redif Katibi*) Rüşdi, 4th Army Captain Tahsin on Duty of Tax Collection in Mosul (*Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümayuna mensub Tahsil Memuriyetiyle burada bulunan Yüzbaşı*), and Clerk of Rawandiz Battallion (*Revandüz Tabur Katibi*) Hüseyin and 2nd Company Captain Sırrı of 3rd Mosul Reserve Battallion (*Üçüncü Musul Redif Taburunun İkinci Bölük Yüzbaşı*), 1st Battallion Captain (*Birinci Tabur Yüzbaşı*) Fehmi and Navkur Battallion Captain (*Navkur Taburundan Yüzbaşı*) Tevfik and Clerk of Mosul Regie (*Musul Rejisi Katibi*) Ahmed and Court Member (*Muhakeme Azasından*) Fethullah.....and Pharmacist (*Eczacı*) Cercisi Efendi"

³³⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.404/65, 15 Ağustos 1324 – 28 August 1908

³³¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.404/65, 15 Ağustos 1324 – 28 August 1908

deputy delegation was sent to Istanbul by the CUP headquarters, that delegation met with the Government and Ministries for taking necessary precautions, and had been trying to prevent uncontrolled branching and arbitrary interventions on behalf of CUP.³³² Zeki was worried that this situation would lead to disorder and questioned what he would have to do if these people interfered with the duties of civil servants through their domineering actions.³³³ The issue had already crossed the provincial borders and the CUP took over the situation by sending a delegation of its own deputies to the Sublime Porte.

Therefore, the first society saw the second as a product of despotism and never considered it as a legitimate entity. After the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, the first branch was established in Mosul by itself on July 24, 1908, as in every quarter of the empire, and it started serving the country and nation in coordination with the Local Government.³³⁴ However, according to this first branch of CUP, although their services had won the appreciation of the Local Government and the community, they had been pressured by some famous local despots who allied with the former pro-despotism Governor Mustafa Yumni.³³⁵ They particularly claimed that Mustafa Yumni deliberately delayed the declaration of Constitutionalism until his leave, and created a suitable environment for the pro-Abdulhamid despots in the

“evvelce cemiyet-i esasiyeye hiçbir münasebetleri olmadıkları halde kendi kendilerine kısmen yerli ahali ve kısmen memurinden teşekkül eden ve cemiyet namı taşıyan bazı adamlar hükümete müracaatla bir takım mütalebede bulunuyorlar”

³³² BOA, DH.ŞFR.404/65, 15 Ağustos 1324 – 28 August 1908

“Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Selanikteki Merkez-i umumisi tarafından Dersaadete gönderilen heyet-i mebusanın hükümete ve nezaretlere müracaatla temin-i selameti memleketemülahazat dermeyan ederek devletçe icabına bakılmakta olduğundan herkesin Cemiyet namına serd-i müdahaleye hakkı olmadığı ve teferruatı hakkındaki 30 Temmuz 1324 tarihli telgrafname-i nezaretpenahileri”

³³³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.404/65, 15 Ağustos 1324 – 28 August 1908

“İhlal-i asayişe meydan vermemek için kendi irade olunmakta ise de bunların hallerinden memul olan hareket-i tahakkümaneye cüretle vazife-i memuriyete müdahale eyledikleri halde haklarında olunacak muamelenin emr ve inba buyurulması”

³³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324- 13 September 1908

“Kanun-i Esasiden hissedar-ı adalet ve hürriyet olmak üzere memalik-i mahrusanın her köşesinde tesis edildiği gibi buraca dahi 11 Temmuz 1324 tarihinde teşkil etmiş ve devlet ve millet ve vatanlarına karşı hizmet-i hükümet-i mahalliye'nin nazar-ı tahsinini kazanmış ve cemiyet-i muhteremelerine irtibat ve iltihakıyla müftehir bulunmuş olan Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti acizanemizi”

³³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324- 13 September 1908

“İstibadlarına muvafık görmeyen bazı müstebidan-ı mahalliye-i meşhur.....kardaşı ve yadigarı olan vali-i esbak Mustafa Yumni Beyle bil-ittihad el birliğiyle ve hükümetin nüfuz ve kuvve-i müessiresinin inzimamıyla cemiyet-i acizanemizin tazyikine”

province.³³⁶ Now these pro-despotisms, as existed among state officials, united in the same ideal and established a second CUP branch to hide their secret agenda.³³⁷ According to this claim, the second branch had a different ideology of its own rather than the original ideology of the CUP. Although it had the same label, it was referred to as the ‘second society’ or ‘other society’, not as the ‘second branch’ in most correspondence.

However, the major problem was that these formations, which were spontaneously established and proliferated everywhere after the Constitutionalism, interfered with the Government affairs, and started to tarnish the name of the CUP.³³⁸ All Provincial Administrations were warned not to abide by the interventions of these branches and to continue their duties as before.³³⁹ In addition, in order to prevent the interventions of these CUP formations, the Ministry of War was notified for arranging military support from the local commands when necessary.³⁴⁰ As a matter of fact, the problem was not only specific to Mosul and all provinces across the empire were at risk. This dominant character of the CUP, which had such a wide and professional organization throughout the empire, started to pose a disadvantage for the Provincial Administrations. The last thing to ask for was a dichotomy between the Central Government and the political party over the provinces.

³³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324- 13 September 1908

“Kanun-i Esasinin ilanına dair irade-i seniyyeyi de Mustafa Yumni Bey’in infisali gününe müsadif Temmuzun 28. Gününe kadar mektum kalmasına sırf mazeret etmişlerdi”

³³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324- 13 September 1908

“Ancak şimdi bu müstebidler memurinden bulundukları tarafıyla bil-ittifak bir noktada ve aynı maksadda içtima ise de efkar-ı desaiskaraneleri diğer bir cemiyetteşkiline çevirmiş”

³³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 5, 3 Eylül 1324- 16 September 1908

“Devam eylediği İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetimizi takliden taşralarda kendiliklerinden teşekkül eden şuubatin”

³³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 5, 3 Eylül 1324- 16 September 1908

“umur-u hükümete müdahalelerini redd ile her tarafı kema kane ifay-ı vazifeye devam”

³⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 5, 3 Eylül 1324- 16 September 1908

“ve men-i müdahelat için ledel hâce cihet-i askeriyeden muavenet ifası için kumandanlıklara talimat itası Harbiye Nezareti Celilesine işar olunduğundan”

2.7.2. Political, Administrative and Social Tensions Between Two CUP Branches in Mosul

Staff Major Ali Said Bey, whom we frequently encountered throughout the study and who was alleged to be one of the collaborators of the Mosul Incident, was also involved in this process. A group led by Ali Said had reported that the first entity, instead of serving the Constitutional Government by maintaining provincial harmony and moderation, pursued specific and factionalized interests and left the Government in a difficult position.³⁴¹ According to their allegations, these were the few who pursued individualization and self-interest, who were now incapable of perceiving the delicate situation to which the state and religion were subjected internally and externally.³⁴² In order to establish this organization, they allegedly collaborated with some suspected officers who had ongoing files in the Court Martial.³⁴³

According to this claim, instead of assisting to the Provincial Administration by explaining the Constitutional system to the Kurdish and Arab tribes, this organization has been intervening to that through special purposes.³⁴⁴ The officers, civil servants, notables and Ulema of the opposing view, who did not want to give opportunity to self-interested thoughts that can tarnish the name of the homeland and cause disorder, had to constitute the second society.³⁴⁵ According to Ali Said, it was proposed to unite the two entities that were expected to serve the homeland and the nation and protect

³⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

³⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“teferrüd ve temin-i menafi-i zatiye ehinden ve şu sırada devlet ve dinimizin dahilen ve haricen maruz bulunduğu ahvali teferrüsten aciz olan birkaç zat-ı

³⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“evrakları Divan-ı Harbe mehul bazı zabitanla bil-iştirak ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti namı tahtında zuhur”

³⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“Kanun-i Esasiye ahaliye, Aşair-i Ekrad ve Urbana hüsn-i tefhim ve muhafaza-i itidal ile hükümet-i muavenet-i ciddiye ibraz veMeşrutiyete hizmet edecek yerde içlerinde birkaç kişinin tahrikiyle efkar ve meserret-i umumiye tahallüfe igras-ı şahsiye ve makasid-ı hususiye takib ve müdahelat ile hükümeti müşkül mevkide bıraktıkları”

³⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“bir tefrika ihdasıyla memleketimizin namını lekedar ve asayiş-i mahaliyeyi ihlal fikrinde oldukları görüldüğünden bu hallinve aşair ve kabaile sui-i seranıyla gaile-i ihdasında veihtiraza-i ümera ve zabitan Ulema ve Sâdât ve eşraf ve milel-i muhtelif ve muteberan-ı memleketle diğer ahalinin kısm-i azimi bittecmi ve Kanun-i Esasiye ve asayiş-i memleketine muhafaza ve hükümete ezher-i cihet-i itaat ve muavenetle efkar-ı menfaatcuyaneye meydan vermemek üzere tekrar-ı amm et-tekrar-ı beyn ederek ayn-ı nam-ı mukaddesle ikinci bir cemiyet teşkil edilmiş”

freedom, free from any specific purpose.³⁴⁶ However, this proposal was not accepted by the first society and they started to disturb the public opinion by making false denunciations and complaints against the Governorate and the other organization.³⁴⁷ Ali Said stated that they were expecting a deputies delegation to be sent to Mosul by the CUP headquarters for inspection.³⁴⁸ Although it is not known with what guise or duty he filed a report on CUP branching, the statements in this message suggested that Ali Said might be one of the founders of the second society. His message can be read as an attempt by some military officers to approach the central CUP authority by displaying a patriotic image. Another possibility is that the CUP could have made some reliable and partisan military officers in the provinces responsible for monitoring and reporting the political situation. However, alongside Ali Said, the telegram signers were consisted of major Mosul notables, Ulema, Sâdât and interestingly non-Muslim community leaders such as Chaldean, Jewish and Armenian.³⁴⁹ This makes us think that those who dispatched this telegram were the founders of the second society.

In his following comment, Governor Zeki endorsed Ali Said and wrote that the movements of the first society, which had private, selfish and strategic purposes, were restricted with the establishment of the second society.³⁵⁰ This restriction and proposal of unification disturbed the first society and caused their false denunciations and

³⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“maksadları her türlü igrâz-ı hususiyeden azade olarak vatanımıza ve hükümetimize hizmet ve hürriyetimizi muhafaza altında bulunması lazım gelen iki cemiyetin ittihamı teklif edilmiş ise de”

³⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“kabul etmeyip makam-ı vilayetle cemiyetimiz de aleyhinde ihbarat ve şikâyet-ı kazibeye teşebbüsle efkar-ı umumiyeyi tahdişe başlamak olduklarından”

³⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

“bu babda enzar-ı dikkat-i hamîyyetperverane-i celile beraber Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Hayriyesinin karibenmemul heyet-i mebus vüruduna intizar edilmekte bulunduğunu malum buyurulmak ve cemiyet-i mezkurenin hilaf-ı hakikat işarları nazar-ıbakılmak üzere”

³⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 8, 3 Eylül 1324 – 16 September 1908

Those who signed the telegram were: Chief of Staff Major (*Erkan-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı*) Ali Said, Şerif Beyzade Mahmud, Kasım Ağazade Namık, Kasım Ağazade Said, Müftizade Muhammed, Mütevellizade Asaf, Ömerizade Mahmud, Sâdât Habib, Sâdât Ali Fazıl,zade Mehmed, İbadağazade Ali, Regiment Head Clerk (*Alay Başkatibi*) Mehmed, Chaldean (*Keldani*) Süleyman....., Chaldean (*Keldani*) Yusuf Ağazade Davud, from Jewish Community (*Musevi Milletinden*) Salih, from Armenian Community (*Ermeni Milletinden*)

³⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 12, 12 Eylül 1324 – 25 September 1908

“Cemiyet-i mezkure efradı amal-i hususiye takib eylemelerinden dolayı Kanuni Esasının ahkâmına mugayir ve bilahare münakaşat-ı münafiî müstelzim ahvale muhal kalmak ve hükümeti müşkülata düşürmemek maksadıyla Sâdât ve vücuh ve zabitan ve memurinden mürekkeb olarak muahharen teşkil eden ikinci cemiyet evvelki cemiyetin amel-i hodseranelerine mani olduklarından”

complaints in order not to lose tactical superiority.³⁵¹ Also Zeki regarded the first society as incompatible with the Constitutional regime due to its special ambitions and thought that the second society was established with a purpose of balance.³⁵² Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interior had contacted Mosul and Baghdad Provinces and stated that the CUP headquarters issued the necessary warnings to prevent uncontrolled branching with their unfair interventions and attempts.³⁵³

Meanwhile, the Grand Vizier's Office requested the Ministry of War to send additional forces to Mosul for the necessary detentions regarding to the interventionism displayed by this CUP formation.³⁵⁴ Grand Vizirate emphasized that this entity which was formed under the title of CUP attempted to encourage some undesirable notables (*erkân -ı gayri marziye*) and community against the system.³⁵⁵ Thus, it was inevitable to arrest and sentence those encouragers and instigators who made these harmful attempts such as interfering with the government's affairs and disturbing the public order.³⁵⁶ It was requested that these individuals, whose names were listed in the telegram sent from the Mosul Governorate, be referred to the court as soon as possible.³⁵⁷ And a sufficient force had to be temporarily dispatched from the nearest garrison to handle the necessary detentions smoothly and to ensure the public

³⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 12, 12 Eylül 1324 – 25 September 1908

³⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 12, 12 Eylül 1324 – 25 September 1908

³⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 11, 8 Eylül 1324 – 21 September 1908

“Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti namına her tarafça muhtelif cemiyetler teşkiliyle katiyen müdahaleye hakları olmayan mesail için mütalebede ve cemiyetin namını lekedar edecek yolda teşebbüsata kıyımları caiz olamayacağı cemiyetin merkez-i umumisi tarafından lazım gelenlere tebliğ edildiği ifade kılınmış ve bu yolda teşebbüsatda bulunan zabitan için Harbiye Nezaretinden icabı veçhiyle icra-i tebligat olunacağı

³⁵⁴ BOA, BEO.3409/255623, 19 Eylül 1324- 02 October 1908

“Musul Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti namıyla teşekkül bir heyetin umur-u hükümete medhale ve ihlal-i asayişe tasaddi ederek bazı erkan-ı gayri marziyeyi ve ahaliyi teşvikat-ıbulunmakta olduğundan ve bu halin devamı mehazirinden bahisle müşevvik ve muharriklerden ön ayak olan muharrer-ül esami-i kesanın tedibleri lüzumunu havi Musul vilayetinden alınan telgrafnamenin suretti leffen savb-ı alinize irsal kılınan ve öyle cemiyet tertibiyle teşebbüsat-ı muzırrada bulunanların mücazaatı labüdd olunduğunun eşhas-ı merkumenin bittevkif muhakemeye tevdileri cevaben vilayet-i müşarünileyhe yazılmış olunmakla temin-i ve teyid-i inzibat için en yakın mevzi-i askeriyeden muvakkaten oraya kuvve-i kafiye sevki zımında iktizasının ifasına”

³⁵⁵ BOA, BEO.3409/255623, 19 Eylül 1324- 02 October 1908

³⁵⁶ BOA, BEO.3409/255623, 19 Eylül 1324- 02 October 1908

³⁵⁷ BOA, BEO.3409/255623, 19 Eylül 1324- 02 October 1908

security.³⁵⁸ The incident had now gone beyond the dimension of a political polemic and had become a threat to public security.

In the message Zeki sent in mid-October, we understand that two deputies were sent to Mosul by the Salonika CUP headquarters.³⁵⁹ However, it cannot be understood from archive records whether these were the same people as the delegation in Istanbul or a separate delegation sent directly from Salonika. Zeki stated that these people wanted to establish a genuine branch connected to the CUP headquarters, they prepared an activity schedule, they requested an official seal from the headquarters, and that branching would also include sub-divisional units of the province.³⁶⁰ However, Zeki said that even if the people of this region were pleased with the Constitutionalism, establishing branches and arranging a program by means of a special delegation were not something that the local people were pleased with.³⁶¹

It seems that eventually CUP took over the issue and sent representatives directly from the center in order to prevent uncontrolled branching and endless interventions in Mosul. However, after this move, this message suggests that Zeki could have a different concern rather than the proliferation of branches or their uncontrolled interventions. Perhaps he considered this delegation sent by Salonika as a de-facto partner to the Provincial Administration and was worried that a second administration backed by the political party would take office. In any case, it was the CUP Government that also appointed Zeki as the Governor of the province. But an alternative administration consisting of party members other than the appointed

³⁵⁸ BOA, BEO.3409/255623, 19 Eylül 1324- 02 October 1908

³⁵⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/119, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324 - 17 October 1908

“Selanik İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti merkez-i umumisi tarafından mebus sıfatıyla buraya 2 zat gönderildiğini arz etmişim”

³⁶⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/119, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324 - 17 October 1908

“Heyet-i mezkurenin Musulca merkez-i umumiye merbut olmak üzere bir şube teşkiliyle hatt-ı hareketleriniprogram tanzim ve ita-i azim ve tasavvurunda bulundukları şube namına merkez-i umumiden mühr-ü resmiye istedikleri tedricen şubenin mülhakata da teşmil edebileceği anlaşılmıştır”

³⁶¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/119, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324 - 17 October 1908

“Bu havalı ahalisinin Kanun-i Esasinin ilanından memnun-u mucibince amel edecekleri derkar ise de ahval-i memleket icabı böyle heyet-i hususiye marifetiyle şubeler teşkili ve program tanzimi ahalinin pek de memnun olmadıkları hissedilen olunabilecek ahval-i bihuşa hakkında vilayetçe yapılacak bir muamele var ise emr ve işarı maruzdur”

Governor Zeki could cause confusion in a province like Mosul that stands on delicate balances.

CHAPTER 3. THE MOSUL INCIDENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE

3.1. The Transformation of an Individual Violation to Provincial Chaos

This section, which includes a more technical analysis, will focus on how the Provincial Administration managed this crisis, the problematic background of the military structure in the province, and other public security threats that appeared throughout the province during the Mosul Incident. The critical point here is how an individual violation turned into a provincial violence incident on such a large scale. For this reason, many technical details such as facts and figures are not omitted as much as possible while describing the course of events. In addition, some influence groups that try to mobilize regional elements ideologically will be mentioned.

3.1.1. From Street Harassment to Urban Shootout

On the 5th of January, Zeki Pasha reported a crime case to Ministry of Interior that will become a critical threshold in terms of public security, peace and future of Mosul. During the occasion of ‘The Feast of Sacrifice’ (*Eid al-Adha*), an intoxicated mule cavalry from Kirkuk Regular Army (*Nizamiye*) Battalions had violated a veiled-honorable* Muslim woman walking in the sightseeing place of Mosul and literally all the hell broke loose.³⁶² This incident sparked a series of outrage in the city which will breed unpredictable consequences and shift all urban dynamics. According to the message, although the violator was apprehended by the downtown patrol squad for being taken to the police station, almost 50 of his friends who had gathered around, assaulted and fired upon the squad.³⁶³ Zeki additionally emphasized that the issue

³⁶² BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“İyd-i Edha münasebetiyle el-yevm teferrüc mahallinde dolaşan Muhadderat-ı İslamiyeden birine beray-ı memuriyet harekette bulunan Kerkük Nizamiye Ester Süvarlarından bir nefer sekr-i hal olarak taarruz etmesiyle”

* The Arabic word of ‘muhadder’ (مخدر) has a dual meaning as ‘covered-veiled’ and ‘honorable Muslim woman’ <http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=Muhadder&t=@> Access Date: 01.11.2020

³⁶³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“kasaba içinde dolaşan devriye kolu taarruz eden neferi derdest ile karakolhaneye getirdikleri sırada nefer-i merkumun mahal-i vukuata civar bulunan tavladaki elli kadar arkadaşları devriye kolu üzerine hücum ve ateş etmeleriyle”

became crucial since the ignorant public crowd which was exposed to manipulation was also involved into this incident.³⁶⁴ Zeki detailed that the cavalries had retreated from the angry crowd and taken cover in their stables but had kept firing around.³⁶⁵ Even the commander of the province had visited the crime scene and given necessary advice to the perpetrators, he had failed to impress them.³⁶⁶ Then the stable was surrounded by the deployment of soldiers, but ten army soldiers and civilians were killed and five to ten were wounded in action through the bullets fired by sheltered cavalries.³⁶⁷ Final statements from the scene by Zeki shown that even there was an ongoing agitation in crowd, required precautions were taken and people were dispersed.³⁶⁸ However that was a hush before the storm and things were going to get much more complicated than this. In the same day Zeki dispatched another message reporting that the mule cavalries sheltered in their stables were removed from there and sent back to their barracks under custody at 5 o'clock in the night.³⁶⁹ The public crowd was pacified, and the exact number of casualties was going to be reported after the final information obtained next day.³⁷⁰

Next day Ministry of Interior notified the Mosul Governor as; enforcing the law on the perpetrator soldiers and restoring a prompt order were the initial objectives.³⁷¹ Kurdish soldiers and civilians who dared to violate public order and commit murder were ordered to be severely punished.³⁷² Ministry was also urging that the foreign consulates

³⁶⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“ahali de cahilane vukuata iştirak eylediğinden mesele kesb-i ehemmiyet eylemiş”

³⁶⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“ve bu sırada ester süvar efradı kargir tavla derununa tahassun ederek ateşe devam eyledikleri haber alınmasıyla”

³⁶⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“Kumandan Paşa kasriyyetleriyle bizzat mahal-i vukuata gidilerek vesaya-ı lazıme ifa edilmiş ise de tesiri görülmediğinden”

³⁶⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“tavlanın etrafı asker marifetiyle abluka altına alınmış ve tahassün eden efradın endaht eyledikleri mermilerden ahali ve askerden on kadar maktulün beş on kadar kadar da mecruh olup”

³⁶⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

“ahalice heyecan vaki olmuş ise de tedbirat-ı lazıme müracaat olunarak ahali dağıtılmış olduğu ve neticenin başkaca bildirileceği maruzdur”

³⁶⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/54, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

³⁷⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/54, 23 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 05 January 1909

³⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 3, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

³⁷² BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 3, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

“Kürd askerden ve Kürd efrad-ı ahaliyeden asayışı ihlale ve ifa-yı cinayete mütecasir olanların şedid tedipleriyle beraber”

and institutions in the city were supposed to be protected with maximum care in case of possible assaults.³⁷³ And the city prison was to be particularly guarded with a sufficient military force since the angry crowd would attempt to evacuate detainees and convicts according to the intelligence received.³⁷⁴ The number of military force in Mosul was also questioned at the end of the message.³⁷⁵

On the same day Zeki Pasha also reported that Sheikh Said's son was also among those who violated the women yesterday.³⁷⁶ The house they resided was sieged by thousands of armed people at 6 o'clock today and Said with one or two of his sons were killed.³⁷⁷ One cavalry regiment (*süvari alayı*), three regular army battalions (*nizamiye taburu*) made up 500 soldiers each and a regular army field cannon (*nizamiye sahra topu*) were urgently requested by Zeki from the nearest location of the 4th Army for quelling the excessive agitation of the people.³⁷⁸ In the meanwhile, Governorate was instructed to maintain security through the available military force of the province until the requested force deployed.³⁷⁹ Besides, the Governor was also reminded to take necessary measures since the killing of Sheikh Said with his sons would have a serious impact on Kurdish community and could trigger them to make further troubles.³⁸⁰

According to Zeki's following message the next day, the available force was not sufficient and competent to neutralize the people who violated the order and were involved in the murders.³⁸¹ In the center of Mosul, there was a regular army battalion

³⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 3, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909; Lef 4, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

"konsoloshanelerle müessesat-ı ecnebiyenin muhafazasıpek ziyade itina olunması"

³⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 3, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

"ve ahali tarafından mahbusinin tahliyeleri gibi teşebbüsatta bulunduğu yolda ışarataolmakla hapishanenin de kuvve-i kafiyeyle taht-ı muhafazaya alınmasına"

³⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 3, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

³⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 5, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

"Kadınlara tecavüz edenler miyanında Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Said'in mahdumu da bulunduğundan"

³⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 5, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

"ikamet ettikleri hane bugün saat altıda müsellaah binlerce ahali tarafından abluka edilerek kendisiyle mahdumlarından bir ikisikatl edilmiştir"

³⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 5, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

"ahalinin derece-i nihayeye gelmiş olan heyecanının teskini için Süvari Alayı ile beşer yüz mevcudlu üç tabur Nizamiye askeri ile bir Nizamiye Sahra Topunun Dördüncü Ordunun en yakın noktasından alâ-cenâhil-isticâl yetiştirilmesi"

³⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 6, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

"askerin vüruduna kadar kuvve-i mevcude-i mahalliye ile muhafaza-i inzibata"

³⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 6-8, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

³⁸¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

of 450 and a cavalry force of 200.³⁸² The problem, however, is that some of the soldiers were those with a shortened military service for a payment (*bedel-i nakdi*), many were reservists (*efrad-ı redif bakayası*), and especially all were locals (*bahusus cümlesi yerli*).³⁸³ For this reason, armed conflicts continued until the evening, as their existence was unhelpful and, on the contrary, their disobedience was seen.³⁸⁴ In two days, four soldiers of the mule cavalry were killed and eleven were injured.³⁸⁵ However, the total casualties of the soldiers and residents were not yet known.³⁸⁶ Said's brother Maruf, his two sons and a few of his servants were rescued with minor injuries and were kept in the military barracks.³⁸⁷ The Sheikh's son, Sheikh Salih and Baba Resul, who were in another house, had fled.³⁸⁸ As a last measure, Zeki had met with Commander Ferik Zühdü Pasha and engaged Rıdvanizade Hacı Abdullah Efendi, one of the active Sheikhs of Mosul, to give advice to the people and to disperse them as much as possible.³⁸⁹ During the chaos, the homes of military officers and civil servants were looted, all military officers, civil servants and the public panicked, everyone was locked in their homes in great fear.³⁹⁰ Although the Kirkuk division was asked for support, the division command was particularly warned about the Kurdish immigrants who started to come to the center of Mosul due to the murder of Sheikh Said.³⁹¹ The

³⁸² BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

³⁸³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

“Burada dört yüz elli mevcudlu bir tabur-u nizamiye ile iki yüz mevcudlu bir süvari kuvveti var ise de nizamiye taburunda bulunan efradın bazıları bedel-i nakdi ita eden takımdan ve bir çokları da efrad-ı redif bakayasından bulunduklarından ve bahusus cümlesi yerli olduklarından mevcudlarından istifade olunamadığı ve bilakis itaatsizlikleri görüldüğü cihetle”

³⁸⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

³⁸⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

³⁸⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

³⁸⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

We know from further correspondence that one of his sons, Sheikh Ahmed, was killed.

³⁸⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

The surviving son must be Sheikh Mahmud, who was a guest in Lt Col Mustafa's house during the raid.

³⁸⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

“Son bir tedbir olmak üzere Ferik Paşa ile bil müzakere buranın faal meşayihinden Rıdvanizade Hacı Abdullah Efendi celb olunarak o vasıta ile ahalinin ateşi kestirilüb mehma emken dağıtılabilmiş iseler de”

³⁹⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

“esna-yı şurişde ümera-ı askeriye ve memurin-i mülkiyeden bazılarının hanelerine de tecavüz olunarak yağma edilmiş olduğundan bütün ahali ve memurin büyük bir havf ve telaş içinde ve hükümet de elde kuvvet olmadığından mahsur ve me'yus bir halde bulunduğu cihetle Kerkük ve Süleymaniye zabitanıyla memurin ve ahali hanelerinden dışarı çıkamadıkları gibi evleri derununda da bir havf ve haşyet içinde bulunduklarından”

³⁹¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

Kirkuk Command had announced that it would set off some of the cavalry units tomorrow, but Zeki found this insufficient and specifically demanded that the dispatch of the heavily armed units expected from the 4th Army be accelerated.³⁹²

Zeki's next message stated that things had settled down a bit and that the people were returning to their daily lives.³⁹³ However, for now, the agitation was partially quelled and not by the support of the local Mosul soldiers, but by those who gave advices.³⁹⁴ According to Zeki, Mosulis who dared to do such a thing were completely spoiled after this incident, since they did not see any discipline.³⁹⁵ He emphasized that the confidential investigation had already begun but the full establishment of public security was dependent on the timely arrival of the expected force and sentencing death penalty for those who initiated the incident.³⁹⁶ Zeki, who made the necessary notifications to the military and civil officials in order to prevent the incident from spreading to other parts of the province, was persistently reminding the expected support from the 4th army.³⁹⁷

3.1.2. Zeki's Premature Resignation and the Assignment of the 'Joint Task Force' (*Kuvve-i Mürettebe*)

Unfortunately, chaos escalated really quick, and disorder was everywhere. Zeki Pasha was under so much pressure that he submitted his resignation on the very same day that he was instructed to maintain security and to take necessary measures.³⁹⁸ He

³⁹² BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

³⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2701/89/Lef 2, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

"Bugün bir vukuat zuhur etmemiştir. Ahali işleriyle meşgul olmuşlardır"

³⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/89/Lef 2, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

"Askeri yerli olan Musul kuvvetinin muavenetiyle değilnussah ile teskin-i heyecana şimdilik muvafakiyet olunabilmiştir. Fakat asayiş tamamıyla temin edilmiştir denilemez."

³⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2701/89/Lef 2, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

"Birkaç kere bu gibi ahvale mütecasir olan Musullular bir terbiye görmediklerinden bu vukuatla büsbütün şımarmıştır"

³⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2701/89/Lef 2, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

"Şimdiki halde tahkikat-ı hafiye olunmaktadır. İnzibatın tamamıyla takriri işar buyurulan kuvvet-i askeriye'nin vakt-i zamanıyla yetişmesine mütevakıf ve vukuata ön ayak olanların idamıyla mücazat edilmeleri de lazımdır"

³⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2701/89/Lef 2, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

³⁹⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/58, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

justified his decision by declaring it had become impossible to perform his duty against this public agitation and he proposed Commander Zühdü Pasha to take over his office through deputation.³⁹⁹ While Zeki expected his premature resignation to be accepted by the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of War Ali Rıza Pasha ordered to arrange a ‘Joint Task Force’ (*Müretteb Kuvvet*) under the command of a capable person (*muktedir bir zatın taht-ı kumandasında*) for suppressing the turmoil.⁴⁰⁰ Both Ottoman official correspondence and French Consulate sources indicated that there were almost 50 casualties and the crowd was expected to assault the city prison according to the many sources.⁴⁰¹ Preventing the further crime based on prison evacuation and protecting the foreign institutions against to possible attacks in the city were particularly prioritized by the Ottoman Government.⁴⁰² Therefore, provincial Army Command was particularly instructed for a full unity with the Governor for a more coordinated operation of restoring order, neutralizing perpetrators, and enforcing the law.⁴⁰³ 4th Army Deputy Command (*Dördüncü Ordu Müşiriyeti Vekaleti*) was ordered to immediately deploy two battalions from Diyarbakir, three companies of the Cavalry Regiment in Viranşehir and a mountain artillery battery from the nearest location to Mosul.⁴⁰⁴

Zeki’s untimely resignation reason was neither considered reasonable nor welcomed by the Ministry of Interior. According to the statement of Ministry, it was not an understandable necessity to hand over his office to Provincial Commander in such a time that pacification measures were supposed to be taken against the agitation and

³⁹⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/58, 24 Kanunuevvel 1324- 06 January 1909

“Ahalinin galeyanına karşı bendeniz için ifa-i vazife gayr-i mümkün olduğundan bir vali tayin edilinceye değin vekaleten Kumandan Zühdü Paşaya tevdiyle çakerlerinin afvı”

⁴⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/24/Lef 1, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

⁴⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/24/Lef 1, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

“tahdis eden faciaya dair vilayetten gelen telgrafnameninve Fransa konsolosununnazaran elli maktulün ve mecruhun olduğu ve ahalinin hapishaneye de taarruz etmek üzere bulundukları anlaşılması üzerine”

⁴⁰² BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/24/Lef 1, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

“vukuatın önü alınması ve müessesat-ı ecnebiyenin taaruzdan vikayesine pek ziyade olunması hususu”

⁴⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/24/Lef 1, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

“işler Vali Paşa ile bil-ittihad idamen sükuna akdem edilmesi ve mütecasirlerin derdestiyle muamele-i müessire-i kanuniyenin düçar edilmeleri”

⁴⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/24/Lef 1, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

“muktedir bir zatın tahtı kumandasında olarak Diyarbakir’den acilen iki tabur ve Viranşehir’den süvari alayının üç bölüğüyle en yakın bir mahalden bir cebel bataryasının Musula yetiştirilmesi”

public order was supposed to be restored.⁴⁰⁵ As the Mosul Governor, he must keep performing his duty and secure the public security since he was not obviously the reason of this civil turmoil.⁴⁰⁶

Next day Ministry instructed Zeki Pasha to quell the public agitation and prevent the recurrence of incidents by operating the available forces at hand.⁴⁰⁷ He should have taken the possible measures until the expected force is deployed.⁴⁰⁸ He was also expected to apprehend the ringleaders and perpetrators of the incident at the arrival of military force.⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, the Ministry of Justice was expected to be notified as these detainees were supposed to be judged as quickly as possible.⁴¹⁰ For the swift trials of the detainees by the provincial judicial authorities, he was also instructed to report the precise number and names of the detainees.⁴¹¹ Perpetrators within the Kurdish soldiers and community, who violated public order and committed murders were particularly mentioned and their severe punishment was expected without any delay.⁴¹²

Zeki crucially admitted that, there was no attempt to apprehend any individual as a perpetrator or encourager of the murder case since it would trigger further incidents that hard to recover.⁴¹³ If there were some attempts made already, they would be

⁴⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 3, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

“heyecana karşı tedabir-i teskiniyenin ittihazıyla asayişin takririne himmet buyrulması lazım gelir iken vazifey-i vilayetin kumandan paşaya tevdiine lüzum gösterilmesi sebebi anlaşılamamış”

⁴⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 3, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324- 07 January 1909

“ahalinin galeyanı şahs-ı alilerine aid olamayacağı derkar bulunmuş olduğundan ifa-yı vazifeye ve teyid-i inzibata akdem buyrulması icab eder”

⁴⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 08 January 1909

⁴⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 08 January 1909

⁴⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 08 January 1909

“askerin vusulunda badi-i şer ve vak’ada zi-l hâl olanların derdestlerine”

⁴¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 08 January 1909

“ve mahkemelerinin sürat-i kamile ile icrası Adliye Nezaretine”

⁴¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 08 January 1909

“faillerin adliyeye tebliğ ettirmek üzere derdest olunanların adediyle isimlerinin işarına itina ve ihtimam olunması temennadır”

⁴¹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 08 January 1909

“Kürd ahaliden ve Kürd askerden ihlal-i asayişe ve katl-i nüfusa mütecasir olanlar aleyhlerinde sudur edecek ahkam-ı şedidenin bilatehir icrası”

⁴¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 5, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“Kuvve-i mezkure gelmedikçe badi-i şer ve vakada da medhal olanların derdestine tavsil telafisi müşkül hadisatın tekririne sebep olacağı derkar bulunduğundan şimdiye kadar vuku-u cinaiyyenin mütecasir ve müşevviklerinden hiçbir ferdin derdestine teşebbüs olunmamış ve teşebbüs edenler de faide-i husulü gayri mamuldür”

remained inconclusive according to him.⁴¹⁴ Therefore, a public prosecutor and his assistance (*müdde-i umumi ile muavenetinin*) were urgently requested by Mosul Governor for initiating judicial and legal proceedings of suspects.⁴¹⁵ It is understood that Zeki did not want to start the arrests without strengthening the military and judicial infrastructure.

The central authorities, who was well aware of Zeki's anxiety and panic during the events, his inability to act according to his position and situation, and his inability to remain calm, was considering all the options, although they did not accept his resignation.⁴¹⁶ However, even if Zeki's replacement was appropriate at the moment, it was crucial for him to remain in his post for now, and work to ensure safety and order, since his successor's arrival at the place of duty would take at least one month.⁴¹⁷ From this correspondence between the Ministries of Interior and War, we notice that the names of Major General (*Ferik*) Muhlis Pasha and 4th Army Commander Marshall (*Müşir*) Abdullah Pasha were proposed for the Mosul Vilayet administration.⁴¹⁸ However, Muhlis Pasha's condition and competence were thought to be insufficient to undertake the civil and military affairs of a critical province like Mosul.⁴¹⁹ Since it was more convenient and possible for a strong figure like Abdullah Pasha to come to Mosul, seize the situation and restore order, his appointment was especially requested by the Ministry of Interior.⁴²⁰ However, at this point, the Ministry of Interior offered a third option and, if a military administrator could not be appointed to the Governorship

⁴¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 5, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

⁴¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 5, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

⁴¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

"Musul valisi Ferik Zeki Paşa hazretleri esna-yı hadisede endişe ve telaşa duçar olarak ehemmiyet-i mevkîye ve maslahatla mütenasib surette ibraz-ı metanet edemediği istifa etmesinden dahi istidlal olunabiliyorsa da"

⁴¹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

"şu sırada tebdili muvafık-ı maslahat olsa bile halefinin vusulü laakall bir aya tevakkuf olacağından vazife-i vilayet....devam ve muhafaza-i inzibata ikdam etmesi müşarünileyhe tavsiye"

⁴¹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

⁴¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

"Ferik Muhlis Paşa hazretlerinin hal ve kifayeti Musul Vilayetinin umur-u mülkiye ve askeriyesini deruhte etmeye kafi olamayacağı"

⁴²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

"Dördüncü Ordu-u Osmani MüşiriAbdullah Paşa hazretlerinin şu aralık Musula azimet ve vazife-i vilayeti dahi...deruhte ederek asayişî tahrir etmesive muvafık-ı maslahata müşarünileyh hazretlerinin muvafakatları celile-i nezaret penahilerine müsterhamdır."

of Mosul, it suggested that a suitable person be appointed from the civilian staff.⁴²¹ Until this civilian administrator was appointed and reached there, Lieutenant General (*Birinci Ferik*) Mehmed Fazıl Pasha from Baghdad would temporarily take over the provincial affairs and carry out the necessary investigation in the accompaniment of some judicial and administrative officers.⁴²² Again, in the same correspondence, we read that the dismissal of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor and the appointment of a new one instead was already decided before the incident, and the transfer of the Kirkuk Sub-Governor to another district was also decided.⁴²³ Apparently, the crisis in Mosul alarmed the Central Authority and all possibilities were discussed for the roadmap of the Provincial Administration.

The vulnerability has been growing throughout the province, and due to the prosecution process and excessive sensitivity in the center of Mosul, it was not possible to raise troops everywhere. A telegram reached the Parliament by Fuad and his comrades was expressing that the fugitive prisoners and bandits violated the public order in Mosul Province because they could not be neutralized yet.⁴²⁴ However, in the response from the Governorate, it was stated that after the public order of the provincial center stabilized, it would be possible to deal with the issues concerning the whole of the province.⁴²⁵ In addition, in the following message that reached the Parliament from the Interior, it was stated that the Gendarmerie force of the province was unavailable and insufficient for the pursuit and crushing of the fugitive prisoners

⁴²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

"Bu suret mümkün olmadığı takdirde Musul valiliğine cihet-i mülkiyeden münasib bir zatın tayinine"

⁴²² BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 2, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

"oraya vusulüne kadar hem vazife-i vilayeti ifa ve hem de cihet-i adliyeden ve mülkiyeden terfik olacak zevat ile birlikte tahkikat-ı mukteziyeyi icra etmek üzere Bağdad'dan Birinci Ferik Fazıl Paşa hazretlerinin Musul'a izamı muktezası muvafık görülüyor"

Gokhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, p.22,77,89,90,95,96,97

Muhammed Fazıl Pasha Dagestani was of Circassian origin and was also a relative of the legendary Sheikh Şamil. He was exiled to Baghdad in 1880 and since that year he has taken many positions in the 6th army, commanded many operations against the tribes in different territories and became one of the prominent notables of Baghdad.

⁴²³ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 5, 3 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

⁴²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2721/62, Lef 2, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

"Musul Vilayetinde hal-i firarda olup asayiş-i memleketi ihlale tasaddi etmekde bulunan mahkumin ile eşkıyanın tenkilleri cihetine gidilmediği hakkında Fuad ve refikası imzalarıyla çekilip sureti irsal bulunan telgrafname üzerine sebkeden tebliğe"

⁴²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2721/62, Lef 2, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

"vilayet-i muşarunileyhden gelen cevapta merkez vilayetin asayışı istikrar olunduktan sonra bu gibi işlere bakılması mukarrer bulunduğ u bildirilmiştir."

and bandits.⁴²⁶ Ultimately, ensuring the order and security in the center of Mosul, bringing the involved parties to justice and capturing the fugitives across the province all depended on the Joint Task Force expected from the 4th army.⁴²⁷ In a few days, the expected news came from the Ministry of War. To form the Task Force in Mosul, a mountain artillery battery (*cebel bataryası*), two regular army battalions (*nizamiye taburu*) and three cavalry companies (*süvari bölüğü*) were dispatched from Van, Bitlis, Midyat and Mardin between January 22 and 25.⁴²⁸

However, the financing, supply and maintenance of the soldiers were also a big problem at such a critical period. Zeki had to ensure their subsistence before the expected force arrived, and 3.000 lira allocated from the Ministry did not reach to Mosul yet.⁴²⁹ In addition, Zeki reported that the monthly expense of the existing military formation in Kirkuk amounted to 1.500 lira and their supplies were exhausted, their animals had no food left, and even the shoemakers cut off the allocation of boots to the soldiers because they could not receive their payments.⁴³⁰ Since it was the end of the year, no financial resources could be allocated from elsewhere and under these conditions neither the settled army nor the expected extra force could be subsidized.⁴³¹ The Ministry of Interior demanded the Ministry of Finance to quickly send the aforementioned 3.000 lira of allowance; so that the Joint Task Force from the 4th Army

⁴²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2721/62, Lef 2, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

“Filhakika firar eden mahkumin ile eşkıyanın takib ve tenkiline halen imkan yoktur. Çünkü vilayetin Jandarma kuvveti bu gibi takibatı icraya müsaid derecede olmadığı”

⁴²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2721/62, Lef 2, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

“Musul Vakasından dolayı muhafaza-i asayiş ve inzibat için Dördüncü Ordu-yu Osmaniyyeden kuvve-i kafiye sevki ihtiyaç görülmesiyle de Kuvve-i Mürettebe’nin Musul’a vusulünde vaka-i mezkurede zimmedhal eşhasın ahz-u girift edilerek cihet-i adliyyeye teslimleri mukarrer”

⁴²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2729/42/Lef 1, 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

“Dördüncü Ordudan Musul’a sevki kararlaştırılmış olan kıtaat-ı askeriyyeyi teşkil etmek üzere Van’dan bir Cebel Bataryasının 9 Kanunusani 1324 ve Bitlis’ten bir Nizamiye Taburunun 10 Kanunusani 1324 ve Midyat’tan diğer bir Nizamiye Taburuyla Mardin’den üç Süvari Bölüğünün 12 Kanunusani 1324 tarihlerinde hareket eyledikleri”

⁴²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 1, 10 Kanunusani 1324 - 23 January 1909

“Masarif-i zaruriye ve mücerreme için şehri polîçe-i telgrafiye ile yetiştirilmiş istirham olunan 3000 lira hakkında henüz bir emr-i şerifolunamadı”

⁴³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 1, 10 Kanunusani 1324 - 23 January 1909

“Yolda bulunduğu haber alınan taburların vürudundan evvel idarelerinin temini zaruri olmakla beraber Kerkük’de mevcut olup idare-i şehriyeleri 1500 liraya mütevakıf bulunan askerin erzakı ve hayvanlarının yem ve yiyeceği kalmamak ve sene nihayeti olmak itibarıyla mümkün-et tahsil emval bulunmadığı ve kunduratçılar da para alamadıklarından erzakı kestiği cihetle mugayir-i marzi bir hal vukuuna mahal kalmamak üzere para yetiştirilmesi”

⁴³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 1, 10 Kanunusani 1324 - 23 January 1909

would not be in a difficult situation when they reached Mosul.⁴³² However, the eventual response from the Ministry of Interior to Mosul was that there was no need for such a fuss before the force arrived there.⁴³³ Besides, the Ministry advised the Governorate not to wait for the entire required amount to be sent from Istanbul.⁴³⁴ Instead, the Governorate was asked to pay more attention to the collection of its receivables and to obtain this required amount gradually from local sources.⁴³⁵ It was interesting that the Central Authority provided the necessary military support in the face of such a crisis but imputed its financial infrastructure to the provincial assets.

At this point, some law enforcement officers have also had their shares from the paradigm shift after the incident. The replacement of Edhem Bey was one of the most strategic moves made by Zeki, who did not trust the local army elements and entrusted the security of Mosul to the 4th Army. Zeki had requested the replacement of the Gendarmerie Regiment Commander Edhem Bey, whom he did not see appropriate and capable of ensuring the order and security of a critical location like Mosul.⁴³⁶ It was quickly reported to the Ministry of War that Edhem Bey had a limited capacity and did not have the qualifications adequate with the importance of locality.⁴³⁷ The Ministry was asked to transfer him to an easier place of administration and to quickly appoint a powerful and active commander in its place based on the current condition of Mosul.⁴³⁸ Edhem was relocated to Diyarbakir Gendarmerie Regiment within a few days and Said Bey, one of the commanders of the Istanbul Gendarmerie Regiment, was appointed in his place.⁴³⁹ However, afterwards, we see that Said Bey's

⁴³² BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 2, 14 Kanunusani 1324 -27 January 1909

⁴³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 2, 14 Kanunusani 1324 -27 January 1909

"Masarif-i askeriye için istenilen para hakkında Maliye Nezareti Celilesine teyiden tebligat icra olunmak için asker henüz vasıl olmadığı cihetle el yevm bu kadar telaşa mahal olmadığı gibi"

⁴³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 2, 14 Kanunusani 1324 -27 January 1909

"icab eden mebaliğin kamilen buradan gönderilmesine intizar olunmayıp vilayetçe tahsilata bil-itina mebaliğ-i lazimenin istifa ve istihzarına gayret edilmesi"

⁴³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2720/98/Lef 2, 14 Kanunusani 1324 -27 January 1909

⁴³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2723/39/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324 -27 January 1909

"Jandarma Alayı Kumandanı Edhem Bey'in evvelce de arz olunduğu vechle irtikabi yoksa da mahdud ve haiz-i ehemmiyet olan buranın temin-i inzibat ve iradesiyle gayri münasib bulunduğundan mumaunileyhin sehl-ül idare bir mahale nakliyle vilayet Jandarma Alayı Kumandanlığına muktedir ve faal bir zatın tayin ve izamı"

⁴³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2723/39/Lef 2, 17 Kanunusani 1324- 30 January 1909

⁴³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2723/39/Lef 2, 17 Kanunusani 1324- 30 January 1909

⁴³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2734/71/Lef 1, 22 Kanunusani 1324 – 04 February 1909

appointment was to be canceled and Salih Bey, the Bitlis Gendarmerie Regiment Commander, was to be appointed instead.⁴⁴⁰ The new Governor Reşid had particularly requested for the appointment of Commander Salih, with whom he served in Bitlis together.⁴⁴¹ Before this replacement, there were also some allegations that Edhem Bey broke the banners and tambourines of some tariqah dervishes decorated with the verses of the Qur'an, and insulted and arrested them.⁴⁴² However, the Governorate of Mosul stated that the allegations were unfounded and that the complaints were based on personal grudge and hatred against Edhem.⁴⁴³ Although it has not been proven, it was possible that Edhem had disputes with the religious organizations in Mosul and was sent from Mosul before these disputes deepened. The last thing that could be asked of Ottoman military officers in Mosul to have problems with religious organizations in such a complicated and sensitive process. Perhaps the Provincial Administration tried to eliminate the risks by changing the staff that could increase the tension.

3.1.3 Post Incident Influence and Mobility of Kurdish Circles

At this point, it would be helpful to look at the post-incident reactions and approaches of other Kurdish circles throughout the province since the state authority was not dealing only with the Barzanjis. Turning the crisis into an opportunity, some kingpins held strategic meetings, some tribes launched attacks and revolts, and some associations tried to gain influence. Because the sphere of influence created by the Mosul Incident on Kurdish circles triggered both the ideology of Kurdistan and the provincial anti-Constitutionalism.

Sayyid Taha, the grandson of the deceased Sheikh Ubeydullah Efendi and the nephew of Seyyid Abdülkadir in Istanbul, was rapidly on the way to becoming a prominent

⁴⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/30/Lef 1, 05 Mart 1325- 18 March 1909

⁴⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/30/Lef 1, 05 Mart 1325- 18 March 1909

⁴⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2737/65/Lef 2, 31 Kanunusani 1324 – 13 February 1909

“Musul vilayeti Jandarma Alayı Kumandanı Edhem Bey tarafından ahalinin Ayat-ı Kuraniye ile müzeyyen alemleriyle defleri şakk ve dervişanın tahkir ve tevkif edildiğinin asıl ve esası olmadığı ve şikayat-ı vakiyenin agraz-ı şahsiyeden münbais bulunduğu”

⁴⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.2737/65/Lef 1, 1 Kanunusani 1324 - 14 January 1909

figure in the region.⁴⁴⁴ According to the encrypted message from Governor Zeki, Sayyid Taha had invited the influential scholars, Sheikhs, and chiefs of Kurdistan to his lodge (*tekke*) as his residence, and the intelligence of this invitation reached the authorities with its evidential documents.⁴⁴⁵ However, the timing of the invitation was noteworthy, and this meeting was thought to be based on the measures to be taken against the extreme sensitivity emerged and possible reactions expected in the province after the Mosul incident.⁴⁴⁶ Apparently, Taha had felt the expected turmoil in the region and tried to take control of the crisis even before it broke out, using his influence on the Kurdish elements. However, Zeki's expressions in the same message were ambiguous and his attitude was ambivalent. Because, although it was not explicitly stated, Taha could use this influence to pacify the Kurds and stand by the state, or, on the contrary, to revolt the Kurds against the state. For this reason, the state should not let go of control and, as Zeki warned the necessary authorities; actions and attitudes that would disrupt the public order should not be allowed.⁴⁴⁷

As Zeki was cautious and aware of the superior influence of some Kurdish actors in the region over other ordinary Kurds, he might have felt that Taha's movements could be directed or restrained through his uncle Abdülkadir. As he clearly remarked in his message, ultimately it would have been a beneficial and auspicious duty for the state authority if Taha, through the influence of his uncle Abdülkadir in Istanbul, notifies and advises influential leaders in the region not to act on their own.⁴⁴⁸ However, this

⁴⁴⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/40, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

“Taha, who had a serious influence on the tribal elements in the region due to his origins, was going to cause disturbances in the region within a few years, he was to be judged in Istanbul and the dispute between him and his uncle Abdülkadir was going to be the subject of an investigation in Istanbul. As part of a Russian-controlled insurrection plan, Taha was going to be appointed to rule a region from Baskale to Mosul, by the Russian Emperor. Receiving Russian patronage and weapon support, he was going to revolt many Kurdish tribes in Eastern Anatolia against the state and engage the Ottoman authorities until the years of the First World War.”

Fatih Ünal, “Rusların Kürt Aşiretlerini Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Kullanma Çabaları”, *Türk Yurdu*, 7. Devre, Cilt 28 (60), Sayı 254 (615)., Ekim 2008., s.31-41

⁴⁴⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/40, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

“Şeyh Ubeydullah Efendi merhumun hafidi Seyyid Taha Efendi Kürdistan Ulema ve meşayih ve rüesasıyla bilmükatebe icab eden müteneffizanı ikametgahı olan tekkesine davet eylemekte olduğu mevsukan istihbar kılınmış”

⁴⁴⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/40, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

“bu ise Şeyh Said Efendi ile daha bir çok bigünahilerin Musul’da katl ve cerh olunmasından müstahsil tesirata karşı bir tedabir ittihazı maksadına mübtteni olduğu melhuz bulunmuş olduğundan”

⁴⁴⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/40, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

⁴⁴⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/40, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

policy may have stalled afterwards, because there was not found any other documents in the state archives showing Taha's influence or involvement in the events after the Mosul incident.

But most importantly, the chaos was extremely prone to deepen, and Mosul was not the only location exposed to threats. French Consulate has been providing crucial intelligence regarding to the possible tribal activities in the northern highlands.⁴⁴⁹ According to the intelligence, anti-Constitutionalist Kurdish tribes which were agitated after the killing of Sheikh Said were expected to carry out a massacre against the non-Muslim community resided in the mountains.⁴⁵⁰ Landlord (*Ağa*) Soranoğlu* had attempted to provoke some local elements (*yerliler*) for an uprising against Zakho community and landlords of İnade** and Akre (*Akra*) were also in the same attempt.⁴⁵¹ Immediate military deployment was crucial for the towns exposed to threat, according to the French Consulate intelligence.⁴⁵²

However, Zeki's message the next day stated that, there was no information or feeling about the anti-Constitutionalism of the Kurds in that area.⁴⁵³ Of course, this did not mean that no action would be taken. As it was confirmed by different sources that some mischief makers could increase agitation throughout Kurdistan and direct their vengeful feelings towards Christians after the Mosul Incident.⁴⁵⁴ Zeki stated that the

"Mumaunileyh Seyyid Taha efendinin Dersaadet'de bulunan amcası Şeyh Abdülkadir Efendi'nin Kürdistanca malum olan nüfuzu hasebiyle bir guna harekatda bulunmaması hakkında icab eden müteneffizan ve rüesaya tebliğ ve vesayada bulunması fevaid ve muhassestattan hali olmayacağından icray-ı icabı"

⁴⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 9, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

⁴⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 9, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

"Şeyh Said'in katlinden müteheyyic olan ve Meşrutiyet aleyhinde bulunan Kürd kabilelerinin cibalde sakin ahaliyi gayrimüslime aleyhine bir katliam tertib etmekte oldukları mevsukan haber alındığı"

⁴⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 9, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

"ve Ağa Soranoğlu yerlileri Zaholular aleyhine kıyam ettirmek teşebbüsünde bulunduğu ve İnade ve Akra ağalarının daşeyhleri ve satitiyle aynı teşebbüsatta bulundukları"

This name of *Soranoğlu (صورك اوغلی) could not be verified from a different source.

A settlement named **İnade (غنادة) could not be spotted in the available sources.

⁴⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 9, 10 Kanunusani 1324 – 23 January 1909

"ve taht-ı tehditte bulunan kazalara acilen asker sevki mukteza olduğu Fransız Konsolosunun işaretine atfen sefaretten ifade olunmasına nazaran"

⁴⁵³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/49, 11 Kanunusani 1324- 24 January 1909

"Bu havalice Kürtlerin meşrutiyet aleyhinde bulunduklarına dair malumat ve hissiyat yoktur."

⁴⁵⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/49, 11 Kanunusani 1324- 24 January 1909

"Musul'daki vaka-i malumeden dolayı bazı müfsidlerin teşvikine kapılmış olarak Kürdistanca heyecana müstelzim ahval vücuda getirmeleri melhuz olmasından ve efkar-ı intikamcuyaneyi Hristiyanlara da teşmil etmek istedikleri buraca istihbar olunmasından naşı"

‘sub-divisional officials’ (*mülhakat memurları*) of the province were instructed and the necessary tribal chiefs were also advised.⁴⁵⁵ However, just in case, he had asked the 6th Army to form two mountain artillery units and an infantry battalion to maintain order in the towns of Zakho, Duhok, Amadiya and Akre and quickly deploy them to the aforementioned positions.⁴⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Zeki reported that the Mosul branch of the Istanbul-based KSCP could carry out activities that awaken the ideology of nationalism (*kavmiyet*) in the Kurds.⁴⁵⁷ This was only a risk for the time being, but if it became reality, the already sensitive region could raise a second disaster. The society would be asked to advise and remind to the Kurdish community that the aim of the Constitutional Monarchy was not to break up the unity and solidarity of the Ottoman people.⁴⁵⁸ In the contrary, this regime aimed to support and glorify the harmony of the people through an appropriate language and social intercourse.⁴⁵⁹ Zeki wrote that the necessary advices were given to the necessary people in Mosul, but the major notification should have been made to the Istanbul.⁴⁶⁰ The next day, the Ministry of Interior stated that the necessary people in Istanbul were immediately advised regarding to the KSCP association.⁴⁶¹ The Governor was concerned that the Kurds would take a threatful action with a nationalist and separatist awakening after the Mosul Incident.

Towards the end of February, the tribal activity in the province reached a higher level and it was expected that five regular battalions and 600 cavalries from the 6th Army

⁴⁵⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/49, 11 Kanunusani1324- 24 January 1909

“mülhakat memurlarının ve icab iden rüesay-ı aşaire vesayat-ı lazıme ifa kılınmış ise de”

⁴⁵⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/49, 11 Kanunusani1324- 24 January 1909

“her ihtimale karşı Zaho, Dohuk, İmadiye, Akra kazalarının hal-i sükunda bulundurulması için iki cebel topu ile bir piyade taburunun tertibiyle icab eden mevakiide ikamesi için altıncı ordu kumandanlığına müracaat edildiğinden”

⁴⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2718/36/Lef 2, 11 Kanunusani 1324- 24 January 1909

“Dersaadetteki Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyetinin her tarafda olduğu gibi burada dahi bir şubesi mevcut olup bunların umum Kürd’lerde kavmiyyet iddiası uyandırmayahidmet etmekte olması melhuz olup”

⁴⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2718/36/Lef 2, 11 Kanunusani 1324- 24 January 1909

“Kanun-i Esasi ve Meşrutiyet-i idareden ma’kud iddia-yı kavmiyyet ile aheng-i ittihad ve ittifakı ihlal olmayıp”

⁴⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2718/36/Lef 2, 11 Kanunusani 1324- 24 January 1909

“hüsn-ü lügat ve muaşeretin takviyesiyle vatan ve milletin saadet ve selametine hidmet olduğunun cemiyet-i mezkure tarafından tavsiye ve ihtar ettirilmesi”

⁴⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2718/36/Lef 2, 11 Kanunusani 1324- 24 January 1909

⁴⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2718/36/Lef 3, 12 Kanunusani 1324- 25 January 1909

would be deployed to suppress Kurdish tribes such as Hamawand, Talabani and Dawda (*Davda* - داوده).⁴⁶² However, heavily populated Arab tribes such as Shammer (*Şemmer* - شمر) and Al-Sayeh (*Es-Sayeh*-الصيح) also had to be suppressed, and therefore additional forces would be sent from the 4th and 5th armies.⁴⁶³ Both Kurdish and Arab tribes took the Mosul Incident as an excuse to attack and tried to turn it into an advantage.⁴⁶⁴ As the deployment delayed, Zeki had to specifically remind that Hamawand posed the greatest danger and the mounted troops should be dispatched as soon as possible.⁴⁶⁵ Naturally, mounted troops were a must in order to follow and suppress such irregular forces in mountainous areas.

3.2. The Transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk

The Provincial Administration also struggled with taking the Sheikhs from Mosul to a safe location during the crisis period. This transfer was essential both for the safety of the Sheikhs and for the tranquility of the provincial center. However, the return of the Sheikhs to their hometown Sulaymaniyah or to a nearby location would have had great drawbacks. Because while the Sâdât bloc persistently demanded the return of the Sheikhs to their homeland, the notables of Sulaymaniyah definitely wanted them to be sent to a distant neighborhood since their return would cause further troubles. In this section, tension, concerns, negotiations and judicial follow-up experienced during the transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk will be examined.

⁴⁶² BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/65, 10 Şubat 1324 - 23 February 1909

“Musul vakasınıtecavüz ittihaz iden ve zaten öteden beri vilayetin asayişini ihlal etmekte bulunan Hemvend, Talibani ve Davdalılarla saire eşkiya-i aşairin bir hadise çıkaracakları revan-ı halden anlaşıldığına göre”

“Hemvendliler ile aşair-i sairenin tedibleri için beş nizamiye taburu ile altı yüz kuvve-i rakibeye lüzum görülerek keyfiyetin Harbiye Nezareti Celilesine yazıldığı bildirilmesi”

⁴⁶³ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/65, 10 Şubat 1324 - 23 February 1909

“aşair-i maruza ile Şemmer ve Es-Sayih gibi kesir-ül nüfus ve muhtaç-ı tenkil olan aşair-i Urbanın dahi ihlal ve terbiyyeleri hakkında 4. ve 5. Ordulardan mikdar-ı kafi asakir-i şahanenin sevkı”

⁴⁶⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/65, 10 Şubat 1324 - 23 February 1909

⁴⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2758/28/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

Zeki has been questioning how to proceed with the survived brother and son of Said.⁴⁶⁶ His brother Sheikh Maruf and his son were taken under protection after they were rescued from the assault.⁴⁶⁷ However, Zeki reminded that their residence in Mosul was not considered harmless now.⁴⁶⁸ On the other hand, if they were sent back to Sulaymaniyah, they could make a trouble through establishing a society as they did before.⁴⁶⁹ Zeki asked what procedure to be followed with them.⁴⁷⁰ Next day Ministry instructed him to keep them in Mosul for another while since their transfer to another place beyond Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah would be perceived as another banishment and would have a double impact on Kurdish community.⁴⁷¹

Meanwhile, another interesting development took place. Kirkuk Sâdât, Ulema, notables and the mufti of town visited the Kirkuk administration together, expressed their sorrow about the incident and also thanked the Government for ensuring the peace and security.⁴⁷² The delegation demanded that Said's son, brothers and other relatives who were still residing in Mosul be allowed to come to Kirkuk.⁴⁷³ In addition they all assured and vouched that these people, who were asked to come to Kirkuk, would not take any unwanted attitude or action as long as they were in Kirkuk.⁴⁷⁴ The Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah also requested that Said's 10-year-old son, who went to Mosul with his father to enroll in school and stayed in Mosul after the incident, should be allowed to return to Sulaymaniyah in order to relieve his longing.⁴⁷⁵ We knew that

⁴⁶⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/69, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

⁴⁶⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/69, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

⁴⁶⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/69, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

“Musul’da ikametleri mahzurdan salim olamayacağından”

⁴⁶⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/69, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

“oralarda cemiyet teşkiliyle bir gaile çıkarmaları”

⁴⁷⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/69, 25 Kanunuevvel 1324 – 07 January 1909

⁴⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 4, 26 Kanunuevvel 1324- 08 January 1909

“Ektradin bundan bir kat daha müteessir olmaları”

⁴⁷² BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/79, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“Şeyh Said Efendi ile mahdumunun ve adamlarının katlinden dolayı Kerkük’ün Sâdât ve Ulema ve eşrafı müfti-i belde ile beraber hükümete gelerek bu hadiseden dolayı ne kadar müteessir ve mükedder iseler sükun ve emniyetin iadesine karşı o mertebe müteşekkiri ve mesrur olduklarını”

⁴⁷³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/79, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“ve merhumun berhayat olup Musul’da bulunan mahdum ve biraderleriyle sair taallukatının Kerkük’e azimetlerine müsaade olunmasına istirham ettikleri”

⁴⁷⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/79, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“bunların Kerkük’de bulundukları müddetçe muhalif-i marzi bir hal ve harekete bulunmayacaklarına mütekeffil ve müteahhid olduklarını”

⁴⁷⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/91, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

Said had his grown up sons Mahmud and Ahmed with him during his banishment to Mosul. However, as understood from this telegram, Said had a third son at the age of 10 and he was taken to Mosul by Said's own choice.

Post-incident messages from the Sâdât front continued to pour down on the authorities. In a telegram from Simele, Sheikh Maruf complained that they have not received any response to their demands for three months.⁴⁷⁶ He asked for permission to receive the bodies of Sâdât members killed in Mosul, at least as a memorial gift or an heirloom to the Sâdât family and entire Kurdistan.⁴⁷⁷ Apparently, Mosul authorities had not handed over the bodies, considering the excitement and confusion that an eventful funeral ceremony could create. Under such tense circumstances, the funeral of a character like Sheikh Said could be expected to be as eventful as his death.

Also on the same days, it was reported to the Ministry of Interior that Said's son and brothers were still in Mosul and that they were threatened and insulted.⁴⁷⁸ The Ministry also stated that it would be more appropriate to send them to Kirkuk rather than return them to Sulaymaniyah and clearly ordered them to be sent to Kirkuk under certain conditions.⁴⁷⁹ Next day Zeki reported that Said's younger son was transferred from Mosul to Sulaymaniyah, with the consent and approval of the sub-Governorate.⁴⁸⁰

The salary paid to Sheikh Said by the state until today has also become a policy-making issue among the central authorities after his death. The Grand Vizier was consulted about the allocation of the salary left by Said to his eldest son, and even before this request was concluded, it left a good impression as a means of soothing the sadness in

"Şeyh Said Efendi merhum Musul'a aldırıldığı sırada on yaşında bulunan bir oğlunu da mektebe vermek üzere beraberce getirmiş idi. Bu çocuğun olsun teskin-i iştiyakleri için Süleymaniye'ye iadesine müsaade-i itası Sâdât tarafından istirham olunur"

⁴⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2716/48/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324- 18 January 1909

⁴⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2716/48/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324- 18 January 1909

"Hiç olmazsa ailemize umum Kürdistan'a bir hediye ve yadigâr olmak için şühedamız naaşlarının bilteslim tahlisine müsaadeleri muntazırdır."

⁴⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2712/76, 7 Kanunusani 1324- 20 January 1909

"Şeyh Said efendinin mahdumu ile biraderlerinin hala orada ve tehdid ve hakaret altında bulundukları"

⁴⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2712/76, 7 Kanunusani 1324- 20 January 1909

"ve bunların Süleymaniye'ye iadelerinden ise Kerkük'e izamları daha münasib olacağı haber veriliyor"

⁴⁸⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/29, 8 Kanunusani 1324 – 21 January 1909

the Sâdât front.⁴⁸¹ According to Zeki, the Barzanjis welcomed this first step with great pleasure and gratitude.⁴⁸² In addition, they demanded that the salary of 500 kurush of Said's son Sheikh Ahmed, who was killed in the incident, be allocated to his son Celal Efendi.⁴⁸³ The positive atmosphere regarding the salary allocation and Zeki's conviction that the second allocation would be appropriate to the situation were brought to the attention and approval of the Grand Vizier.⁴⁸⁴ The Central Authority aimed to pacify Sâdât by allocating their remaining salaries to their family members, rather than completely abolishing such a practice inherited from the Abdulhamid II era.

Nakib Maruf, who always assumed the function of being the spokesperson of Sâdât, continued to press the state authorities to be transferred to Kirkuk.⁴⁸⁵ He stated that they did not feel safe and secure even for one single minute due to their stay in Mosul for interrogations and asking to be transferred to Kirkuk under the vital and legal guarantees as soon as possible.⁴⁸⁶ According to the ongoing correspondence, Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate had already informed that it was not considered risky to transfer these Sheikhs back to Kirkuk.⁴⁸⁷ Therefore, Kirkuk Sub-Governorate had already assured that the Kirkuk Ulema, Sâdât and notables vouched for these Sheikhs, that they will not take any action adverse to the Governmental practices in case they were sent back to Kirkuk.⁴⁸⁸ What was the problem then and why were they still being

⁴⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2714/11/Lef 1, 6 Kanunusani 1324- 19 January 1909

"Merhum Şeyh Said efendiden münhal maaşın büyük mahdumuna tahsisi hususunun Sadrazamdan istizan buyurulduğu Sâdât'a tebliğ olunmuş idi. Bu hal teessürlerinin teskinine medar olmuş ve hüsn-i tesir hasil etmiş olduğundan kemal-i şükranla beraber esnay-ı vakada maktul olan şeyh mumaunileyhin mahdumu Şeyh Ahmed Efendiden münhal kalan beş yüz gurusun da mahdumu Şeyh Celal Efendiye tahsisi istida olunduğundan is'af-ı istidalarıyla tatyib-i hatırına inayetleri"

⁴⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.2714/11/Lef 1, 6 Kanunusani 1324- 19 January 1909

⁴⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.2714/11/Lef 1, 6 Kanunusani 1324- 19 January 1909

⁴⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2714/11/Lef 2, 8 Kanunusani 1324- 21 January 1909

⁴⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 3, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909

⁴⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 3, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909

"Musul'ca isticvabımızdan bir dakika olsun canımızdan emniyetimiz münselibdir. İleride hukukumuzun takibi canımızın tahlisi için verilen teminat dairesinde bir an evvel Kerkük'e izamımıza emr-ü katisinde itası ehemmiyetle müsterhamdır."

⁴⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

⁴⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

"mumaunileyhin Kerküke izamları halinde icraat-ı hükümete intizaren mugayir-i merzi bir harekette bulunmayacaklarına Kerkük Ulema ve Sâdât ve eşrafının tekeffül eyledikleri de Kerkük mutasarrıflığından bildirilmesiyle muhafaza altında olarak Kerkük'e izamları kararlaştırılmış ise de"

held in Mosul provincial center? Even if it was determined to transfer them back under protection, Governor Zeki reported that the Public Prosecution of Court of Appeal (*Vilayet İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliği*) in Mosul had notified that it was not appropriate to send these individuals before interrogation.⁴⁸⁹ Moreover, Zeki also reminded that they will not testify until the expected force is deployed and they will not be staying in Mosul provincial center until the major investigation begins.⁴⁹⁰ Obviously, the Governorate did not want to risk the Sheikhs leaving for Kirkuk before the investigation begin. In that case, Zeki consulted to Ministry of Interior on a different option such as their testimonies were to be taken by the Kirkuk court; but eventually they were to be back in Mosul when the Government proceeded with the major investigation and judgement.⁴⁹¹ Despite of these drawbacks, Mosul Province had admitted that it was not unfavorable to keep them in Kirkuk since they were not ‘defendants’ (*maznun*) but ‘plaintiffs’ (*müddei*).⁴⁹² Thus, their judicial control and proceedings in Kirkuk will be legally possible and legitimate when the major investigation begins, and apparently they were consent to return to Mosul for giving their testimonies when required.⁴⁹³

The dismissal of Tevfik and the appointment of Ziya as the Sub-Governor at the beginning of February was expected to calm the atmosphere of Sulaymaniyah even a little. However, organized violence spread more and more to the sub-divisions of the province and the issue was frequently brought to the agenda of the parliament. But more importantly, patience of Sâdât, who persistently sought justice, was running out.

⁴⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

“mumaunileyhin muhafaza altında oraya izamları mukarrer ise de, kable’l isticvab gönderilmeleri muvafık olmayacağı vilayet istinaf müddei umiliğine ifade kılınmasına”

⁴⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

“kendüleri de askerin vüruduna değin ifade veremeyeceklerini ve tahkikata mübaşeret olununcaya kadar burada kalamayacaklarını beyan”

⁴⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

“Kerkük’de dahi ifadelerinin ora muhakemesinden alınması veya hükümet-i seniyye cidden icraata başladığı anda Musul’a avdet edeceklerini dermeyeran ettiklerine mebni burada kalmaları mahzurdan salim olamayacağından Kerkük’e gönderilib gönderilmemeleri istizan”

⁴⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

⁴⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kanunusani 1324- 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

Although a month has passed since the incident, the transfer of Said's brother, other son, and relatives from Mosul to Kirkuk still occupied the agenda of the Chamber of Deputies. On February 7, the letter from the parliament to the Ministry of Interior stated that the people in Kirkuk have still been asking when the murderers would be brought to justice and when the Sheikh's relatives would be sent to Kirkuk.⁴⁹⁴ However, the transfer order has already been issued, the 'letter of guarantee' (*kefaletname*) of those who vouched in Kirkuk was signed and sent by mail, and Zeki stated in his telegram dated January 28 that the Sheikhs will be sent to Kirkuk next day.⁴⁹⁵ In order not to interrupt the judicial process if they could not come to Mosul, the Kirkuk departments were even given the authority to take and issue the testimonies of the Sheikhs regarding the case.⁴⁹⁶ However, it is unknown why their sending to Kirkuk was delayed so long although all the conditions were met and all authorities approved. Could this process have been intentionally delayed by some back-channel policies of certain bureaucrats who have foreseen the risks?

The ongoing telegrams sent from the Sulaymaniyah branch of the CUP to the Ministry of Interior proved that the local sensitivity and concern regarding to the return decision of the Sheikhs still continued⁴⁹⁷. The branch was worried that, the transfer of these Sheikhs with their high crime potential to Kirkuk, where is close enough to be regarded as a district of Sulaymaniyah, eventually would cause incidents.⁴⁹⁸ According to them, the people were not sure of their lives and property, and they expected the Government to take measures to prevent the Sheikhs from continuing their troublesome activities in Kirkuk.⁴⁹⁹ This time, the Ministry asked the Governorate who the Sulaymaniyah CUP branch consists of.⁵⁰⁰ According to Zeki's answer, the people who formed the

⁴⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2735/63/Lef 1, 25 Kanunusani 1324- 07 February 1909

⁴⁹⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/85, 15 Kanunusani 1324 – 28 January 1909

⁴⁹⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/85, 15 Kanunusani 1324 – 28 January 1909

"Kerkükçe isticvabnamenin tanzimi kabil olmasına mebni Kerkük'e azimete muhtar bulundukları İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliğinden resmen beyan olunmuş"

⁴⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/23, Lef 1, 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

"Can ve mallarından me'yus millet namına yüzlerce mühürden ibaret feryadame-i telgrafımıza adem-i iltifatlar, şeyhlerin bunca ceraimle iadeleri yüzünden tevlid-i tabii-i vukuat ve firarilerinin ve Süleymaniye'nin bir mahallesi olan Kerkükde ifa-i ilka-i fesadatlarının men-i zımında tedabir saye-i hükümet-i mütemenna"

⁴⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/23, Lef 1, 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

⁴⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/23, Lef 1, 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

⁵⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/23, Lef 2, 19 Kanunusani 1324- 1 February 1909

branch consisted of ordinary people who were not good with the Sheikhs since the past; and personalities such as Brigadier General Mustafa, Jaf Chief Mahmud, Deputy Battalion Commander Captain Fehmi, Senior Captain Salih, Head of Penal Chamber and telegraph officers.⁵⁰¹ And he particularly added that Tevfik Pasha is also likely to be included in the branch.⁵⁰² Apparently the branch did its best to attract the attention of the Ministry and managed to reflect their concern.

Finally, we understand that Zeki had convinced the Ministry and therefore the Parliament about the option he proposed. Accordingly, the Sheikhs were transferred to Kirkuk on the condition of returning to Mosul when the investigation started. However, their transfer to Kirkuk despite all these preventive efforts and objections, was the main reason that they were able to organize the Siege of Sulaymaniyah so comfortably and effectively. The Sheikhs had planned and organized the siege from Kirkuk and mobilized the necessary forces by using the advantage of vicinity to Sulaymaniyah.

3.3. The Mosul Incident from Different Narratives

In this section, the place the Mosul Incident occupied in the literature will be examined and different sources will be compared to each other. The incident has taken place in very few sources and the course of events has been described in slightly different ways. Although different details stand out in different narratives, it can be thought that the Mosul Incident consists of the following stages in general terms:

“A drunk Kirkuk mule cavalry harasses a woman in Bab-u Toub square on the third day of Feast of Sacrifice and he gets beaten by the crowd afterwards. Later, his friends come to help him, and the incident escalates. The incident that started as an ordinary fight turns into armed conflict and both sides suffer losses. Kirkuk cavalry retreats to their stables, but the armed conflict continues and the cavalry surrender. The next morning, the angry crowd asks the Governor to surrender the cavalry, but the Governor

⁵⁰¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/162, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

⁵⁰² BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/162, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

hesitates and the whole town gets mixed up. The angry crowd led by Ulema breaks into Sheikh Said's house, and brutally kills Said, his son Sheikh Ahmed and major part of his men. His brother and other son Mahmud survive. Afterwards, almost a civil war between Arabs and Kurds takes place in the provincial center of Mosul and hundreds of people are brutally killed.”⁵⁰³

In his study, Hut gives remarkable details of the day that Sheikh Said killed by quoting from the diary of British Consulate H. E. Wilkie Young.⁵⁰⁴

*“Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji (son of Said) was sitting with two other individuals called Ahmed Bey and Baha at the window of Sheikh’s house. Meanwhile, a crowd of women were walking at the square in front of the house. Baha noticed a prostitute in the crowd and sent a soldier from Kirkuk units to invite her to house. However, when she refused to come, the soldier tried to bring her dragging. After the screams of her and other women heard, an angry mob gathered in a short while. The soldier was beaten and injured. When the patrol units arrived, the men at the window opened fire at the crowd and a turmoil broke out. At that moment, a crowd headed by Muhammed Ebu Casim from Ulema with some notables slaughtered Sheikh Said, his son and 16 family members. Remaining Kirkuk soldiers also arrived at the scene and the crowd started to grow. Kirkuk soldiers started to get in positions and build barricades. Angry crowd of Mosul soldiers and community got on rooftops and started firing at Kirkuk Ester-Süvar unit. Engagement lasted three hours and most of the Kurdish gendarmeries were killed in action at this atmosphere without authority. Rest of the Kirkuk soldiers surrendered before the night and 60 people including women and children were killed at incident.”*⁵⁰⁵

However, Young’s narrative is different than the official correspondence. The violated woman depicted as a ‘veiled-honorable Muslim’ in the official telegrams was now identified as a ‘prostitute’. Besides, his expression as ‘the men at the window opened

⁵⁰³ For very detailed narratives of the Mosul Incident from different witnesses:

Hut, *Ibid*, p.174-178 cited from “PRO, FO 195/2308, “Political Diary of the Baghdad Residency for the week ending 11th January 1909”

Refik Hilmi, *Anılar: Tanığının Dilinden Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi*, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları,2010),p.26

Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, (London: William Heinemann, 1911) p.249,250

Ely Bannister Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise*, (Boston: Small Maynard and Company Publishers, 1912) p.189-195

BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

⁵⁰⁴ Hut, *Ibid*, p.174-178

⁵⁰⁵ Hut, *Ibid*, p.177,178 cited from “PRO, FO 195/2308, “Political Diary of the Baghdad Residency for the week ending 11th January 1909”

fire at the crowd' and the ringleader named Muhammed Ebu Casim are such details which contradict with the official telegrams as well.⁵⁰⁶ In addition, in official records and in all other narratives, Sheikh Said's house was raided [and he was killed] on the following day of the harassment and armed conflict. Young presented the house raid and assassination of Said with the day of harassment and armed conflict as if it were the same day. However, the course of events extended to two long days.

In the memoirs of the Kurdish writer Refik Hilmi, the details of the incident are explained from a different account:

"On the second day of the Feast of Sacrifice in 1908, Sheikh Mahmud, his brother Sheikh Ahmed and their friends Baha Effendi were hosted by Lieutenant Colonel (Kaimakam) Mustafa Bey in Mosul. After leaving the house, they went to Bab u Kop** Square, which was a festive promenade. Rumor has it that when Baha Efendi is drunk, he taunts a woman passing by, and the woman begins to shout in anger. The people of Mosul around want to intervene and kill Baha Efendi. When Sheikh Ahmed and his friends are forced to protect Baha Efendi, a fight breaks out with pistols and daggers and as a result several people are injured. With the crowd coming from around, the situation gets bigger, and Sheikh Ahmed and his friends get stuck there. Meanwhile, the Kurdish gendarmerie and cavalry, who are close to the incident, come to the rescue of Sheikh Ahmed and his friends. The conflict grows, and both sides suffer casualties. With more Mosul residents gathering, Sheikh Ahmed and the gendarmes took refuge in the Government palace. The next day, Mosul residents come to the Government palace and ask Governor Zeki Pasha to hand over the gendarmes. The Governor of Mosul at that time was Zeki Pasha from Aleppo and he was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. When the Governor does not hand over the gendarmes, the armed people want Sheikh Ahmed and his friends. To appease the armed people, the Governor says that Sheikh Ahmed and her friends are not in the palace and they can go and find themselves. Then the armed group attacks Sheikh Said's house. The Governor caused the events to grow even more. He chooses three people from the Mosul people to calm down the incident and summons Sheikh Said to the Government palace to protect him. Sheikh Said believes and goes to the palace, but as soon as they arrive, on the order of the Battalion Commander (Tabur Ağası), the palace gate closes and Said remains outside. A person from the crowd there hits a large stone on Sheikh Said's head and Said dies right there. After the crowd also kills his companion, they attack Said's house again. Those in the house resisted these attacks bravely, but Sheikh Ahmed was eventually killed as well. The crowd then goes to another house with Sheikh Said's men and kills them all."*⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁶ In the requests for amnesty reaching the authorities, the name Ebu Casim is seen only among those prisoners who signed the telegrams. It is unknown whether he is the same person in Young's narrative or not. However, Ebu Casim is not mentioned as one of the ringleaders in any official correspondence.

⁵⁰⁷ Refik Hilmi, *Anılar: Tanığının Dilinden Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi*, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2010), p.26

Both stories indicate a common personality called ‘Baha Effendi’ as the provoker of this harassment incident. However, Baha Effendi was not found in the official correspondence. Refik Hilmi adds that Baha Effendi, who caused the events, hid from the first day and saved himself.⁵⁰⁸ Moreover, the incident referred as a ‘violation’ (*tecavüz*) or ‘harassment’ (*taciz*) in the official correspondence and depicted as an explicit ‘violation’ in Young’s narrative as well, was degraded to a ‘taunt’ or ‘tease’ (*sataşma*) in Refik Hilmi’s book. The person referred as Ahmed Bey in the Young’s narrative should be the son of Sheikh Said who was properly referred as Sheikh Ahmed in Refik Hilmi’s book. Hilmi also quotes from the book ‘Three Sacrifices’ (*Üç Kurban*) of a person named *Gulami Hoca* and states that although Sheikh Mahmud was also a guest in the house of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Bey, he was not involved in the Bab-ı Tub incident or in any of the incidents which his father and brother were killed.⁵⁰⁹ According to Hilmi's narrative, Said's son Sheikh Ahmed hides in the Government House with the Kirkuk gendarmes and the angry crowd asks Governor Zeki to surrender them. However, there is also an accusation against the Governor at this point. Because instead of stopping the attackers, the Governor points to Sheikh Ahmed as a target and says that they can go and find them themselves. Hilmi even claims that Zeki summoned Said to the Government House on the pretext of protecting him, but actually lured him into a trap.

It is not known what kind and level of relationship there is between Mustafa Bey and Sheikh Said. However, Lieutenant Colonel (*Kaimakam*) Mustafa Bey from 33rd Cavalry Regiment of 6th Army was a Mosul resident, and his house where he lived with his brother Gendarmerie Captain Ali Bey was raided by aggressors who thought that they were harboring Sheikh Said’s son during the turmoil.⁵¹⁰ Since their property

*In official correspondence, the day of the incident is mentioned as the third day of the Eid al-Adha/ Feast of Sacrifice or 5 February 1909.

** As we will see in the letter of First-Lieutenant Mehmed Salim, the correct name of this promenade is Bab-ı Tub (Bab al-Toub). In the memoirs of Refik Hilmi, it was inadvertently written as Bab-u Kop.

⁵⁰⁸ Hilmi, *Ibid*, p.26

⁵⁰⁹ Hilmi, *Ibid*, p.27

⁵¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2801/7, 13 Rebiülahir 1327- 04 May 1909; DH.MKT.2887/3/Lef 2, 10 Receb 1327- 28 July 1909

was destroyed and household goods were looted during the assault , months later he was going to file a complaint to state authorities for a compensation of their loss and for the punishment of aggressors.⁵¹¹

In Amurath and Amurath, Bell claimed that the Governor remained ineffective and passive during the incident:

*“In an instant arms were out, the Arab soldiery attacked the Kerkuki sowwars, a fight ensued that lasted many hours, and in the confusion several Mohammadan women, holiday-makers, who had not had time to seek refuge in their houses, were killed and wounded, a most unusual disaster. Meantime, the Vali sat trembling in the serai and lifted not a finger to restore order”*⁵¹²

Bell also told how this conflict turned into a civil war and how was the CUP was helpless in the face of events. What she sees as the reactionary party, as the opponent of the CUP and calls the League of Mohammad must be the Society of Mohammedan Union:

*“If the leaders of the reactionary party had wished to embarrass the Government and to show up its weakness, they were more than commonly successful. During the six weeks that elapsed before the arrival of troops from Diyarbekr and elsewhere, Mosul was in a state of complete anarchy. Christians were openly insulted in the streets, the civil and military authorities were helpless, and no less helpless was the local committee of Union and Progress. When the troops came some degree of order was restored, but the reactionary movement was not arrested. The formation of the League of Mohammad, which was designed as a counterblast to the Committee of Union and Progress, went on apace”*⁵¹³

“Merhum Şeyh Said’in oğlunu hanesinde ihfa eylediği zannıyla binlerce eşhas kendisiyle biraderinin hanelerinemallarını yağma ve meskenlerini tahrib etmelerinden dolayı duçar-ı zaruriyyat olduklarından bahisle emval-i menhubenin tazmin ve hanelerinin ta’mir ettirilmesi istidasına dair Altıncı Ordu-u Osmani Otuz Üçüncü Süvari Alayı Kaimakamı Mustafa Bey tarafından Makam-ı Sami-i Sadaret-i Uzmaya bit-takdim tevdi buyurulan arzuhal”

“Şeyh Said’in oğlunu hanesinde ihfa eyledikleri zannıyla” “biraderi Jandarma Yüzbaşısı Ali Bey’in de eşyası ve nükudu nehb edildiğinden”

⁵¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2841/50/Lef 1, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1327 – 06 June 1909

“324 senesi İyd-i Edhasında zuhur eden hadise esnasında kendi ve biraderinin haneleri tahrib ve eşyası da yağma edildiğinden ve menhubat-ı mezkurenin iadesi için vuku bulan müracaatın dahi neticesiz kaldığından bahis ile ve duçar oldukları zaruretin def’ ve izalesi zımında eşyasının aynen ve yahut nakden iadesi ve hanelerinin tamiri”

⁵¹² Bell, *Ibid*, p.249

⁵¹³ Bell, *Ibid*, p.249

E.B. Soane depicts the post-incident atmosphere in Mosul as follows and accuses Sheikh Kadir in Istanbul of warmongering:

*“This was the signal for redoubled anarchy in southern Kurdistan. Shaikh Sa'id had, as has been shown, acquired a reputation for unusual sanctity, and this, coupled with his power, gave reason for loudly expressed indignation on all sides. The representative in Constantinople, Shaikh Qadir, made a series of inflammatory speeches demanding in the name of all the laws of Islam, summary and awful vengeance upon the murderers.”*⁵¹⁴

Mourning in Sulaymaniyah finds its place in these expressions:

*“The town of Sulaimania was forced to go into the deepest mourning. All gramophones and musical instruments were taken by force from their owners and destroyed, and any celebration at weddings was brought to an abrupt and melancholy termination.”*⁵¹⁵

Elie Kedourie's authentic study, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, also provides remarkable details about the Mosul Incident:

*“The riot seems to have been instigated by notables and ulamas in furtherance of obscure intrigues and tenebrous ambitions. Its immediate pretext was an allegation that a Kurdish employee of the tobacco régime at Mosul, strolling through the city on the second day of 'id al-adha-04 January 1909- together with Muhammad and Mahmud, the sons of Shaykh Said, the head of the Naqshbandi tariqa at Sulaymaniyya (who was then living in Mosul) molested or made improper advances to a local woman. An altercation ensued, and on that and the following two days, a mob led by a local bravo, Muhammad abu Jasim, attacked and murdered the eighty-year-old Shaykh Said himself, his son Muhammad and sixteen others of his descendants, together with a large number of Kurdish gendarmes stations in Mosul. In consequence of this riot, Wilkie Young wrote, ‘the unfortunate impression’ seemed to be gaining ground ‘that the old landmarks of authority have disappeared and that as yet nothing stable has replaced them’.”*⁵¹⁶

However, contrary to all other accounts, Kedourie writes that the one who harassed the Muslim woman was not a Kirkuk Mule Cavalry, but an employee of the Mosul Tobacco Régie. It is highly probable that this employee was Baha Effendi, who is also mentioned in Hut's study. Kedourie who utilized of Consul Young's reports just like

⁵¹⁴ Ely Bannister Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise*, (Boston: Small Maynard and Company Publishers, 1912) p.192

⁵¹⁵ Soane, *ibid*, p.192

⁵¹⁶ Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1974), p.143

Hut, also notes that the person who led the mob that killed Sheikh Said was Muhammad Ebu Casim. More importantly, Kedourie identifies Said's sons who were involved in the harassment incident as Muhammed and Mahmud and gives the name of Said's murdered son as Muhammed, although he is referred to as Ahmed in all other accounts.⁵¹⁷

Çetinsaya's arguments are critical at this point as well. He claims that the new regime was decisive to 'eradicate' the problem.⁵¹⁸ According to Çetinsaya, the Government that viewed the legitimate instruments were incapable, probably invoked to a "typical Unionist tactic".⁵¹⁹ Hut also mentions that the assassination of Sheikh Said was really mysterious since he was such a strong personality who was relied on provincial politics and cherished by Abdülhamid II.⁵²⁰ He elaborates on that it was really improbable him to be coincidentally killed and he might have been targeted by some powers -including Unionists- aiming to prevent his possible interference to the Local Administration.⁵²¹ Plus, Hut adds that it was probable that the lynching mob was consisted of some people who suffered from Sheikh Said's tyranny and were encouraged by the Constitutionalist regime.⁵²² On the other hand, Hut reviews that Consulate Young was suspicious of some remarkable contradictions within the incident committed by these fanatic Ulema and notables.⁵²³ According to Young, it was interesting that the Ulema performed such a move against a religious personality descended from the prophet's lineage.⁵²⁴ But what Young overlooked was that the Arab-Kurdish dislike could be much deeper than a religious alliance within *Sunnism* or a Pan-Islamist view such as *Ummah* and that this conflict could very easily flare up. For Young, the lynching plot was designed one night before and Muhammed Ebu Casim with some contracted gangsters were instructed to execute the plan.⁵²⁵ As the activity begun neither Ulema nor notables

⁵¹⁷ Please see page 46 footnote 129

⁵¹⁸ Çetinsaya, *II. Abdülhamid döneminde Kuzey Irak'da tarikat, aşiret ve siyaset*, p.167

⁵¹⁹ Çetinsaya, *Ibid*, p.167

⁵²⁰ Hut, *Ibid*, 175

⁵²¹ Hut, *Ibid*, 175

⁵²² Hut, *Ibid*, 175

⁵²³ Hut, *Ibid*, 176

⁵²⁴ Hut, *Ibid*, 176

⁵²⁵ Hut, *Ibid*, 176

were present at the scene; and when all this was over these groups appeared and visited the Governor.⁵²⁶

Sarah Shields relied on British reports, mentions that the demonstrations of January 1909 were coordinated by the Mosul elites to demonstrate the weakness of the new provincial and Unionist Government.⁵²⁷ Since some of these elites were connected with Sheikh Said's family it was probable that the massacre may not be a part of the plan.⁵²⁸ However, the public crowd motivated by them was really angry and targeted the Sheikh and his followers instead of religious minorities or Government functionaries.⁵²⁹

3.4. The Mosul Incident in the Manifest of Sâdât

Although considered to be biased, the most detailed account of the murder of Sheikh Said can be reviewed in the Manifest of Sâdât dated February 25.⁵³⁰ As the writers of the manifest disclosed all details regarding the murder of the Sheikh; they claimed that Staff Major Ali Said Bey was in the tactical command of the assassination and they accused Governor Zeki of being a bystander to the event. The text claiming that Ali Said Bey coordinated the angry crowd in Mosul, also included some military officers, officials and notables into the conspiracy who were not mentioned in official correspondence until now. Following the murder of the Sheikh, how the brutality in the city got out of control, what this brutality was capable of and how the event was trivialized by the provincial administrators in the eyes of the imperial authorities were also elaborated in the text.

The relevant part of the manifest begins by discrediting Major Ali Said and disclosing his relation to the illegal potential in Mosul:

⁵²⁶ Hut, Ibid, 176

⁵²⁷ Sarah D. Shields, *Mosul before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000) p.61,62

⁵²⁸ Shields, Ibid, p.62

⁵²⁹ Shields, Ibid, p.62

⁵³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

*“General Staff Major Ali Said Bey, as one of the senior careerist mischief-makers, was basically a more harmful creature than predators and poisonous greedy men. Ali Said himself and his damned companions in Mosul had attempted to banish Sâdât to a further location but they had failed eventually. Thus, they had convinced and subjugated the infamous bloodthirsty monsters of Mosul and poisoned their minds with malicious intentions against Sâdât.”*⁵³¹

In the sequel, there were remarkable details about the day of the murder:

“On the third day of Eid al-Adha, a common violation by an intoxicated soldier in the sightseeing place which could be seen everywhere maybe for hundred times and easily disregarded under normal circumstances, was manipulated for their ultimate intention and fueled the unrest among community and military. For fusing the ‘bomb which was already planted’ (metaphorically), they had convened at that night and decided a covert operation collectively. Next morning, they had started the operation in a disguised fashion and their first step was going into the presence of Governor for asking him to surrender the accused soldier for execution. Governor had naturally denied such a request even lunatics would not accept, and they had responded as “then we will do it in our own way!” in a threatening form. Then they arrived at the house of Sheikh Said where was sixty meters away from Government office at most. Captain Arab Nuri of Sulaymaniyah, Cavalry Captain Davud of Mosul, Captain Cemil, an escorting regular army unit and some irregulars from Mosul waited in ambush behind. Ömeri Reşid from Mosul notables, Ali Efendi the preacher of Prophet Sheth Mosque and couple of their companions knocked the door and said that they would like to talk about some important issues. As the door opened, they had asked to take Sheikh Said to the presence of Governor in the name of taking necessary measures for avoiding further mischief. However, Sheikh had refrained from coming and tried to convince them that he cannot get involved into this issue since he was not a native resident of Mosul or had not have such an official authority. Eventually he was not able to convince them and desperately surrendered himself to be taken to the Government office after he gave his Koran to his servant

At the gate of Government office, Ömeri Reşid, Ali and their companions walked away from Sheikh Said. The servant of Major Ali Said approached first, insulted and trampled on the Kuran and killed Sheikh Said in such a brutal way which can make the angels cry and make the spirits of martyrs tremble. Meanwhile the Mosul Governor and commander were watching the incident twenty thousand steps away from the crime scene just like onlookers. Then the aggressors had intruded Sheikh’s house, had killed his noble son Sheikh Ahmed with his relatives and affiliates of 42 individuals, had extorted salary and cash worth of more than 5.000 lira and had looted from household items to clothes on the martyrs. These wild monsters with their eyes full of looting, acquisition and blood, had randomly killed or injured poor people from Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. They had shot people by firearms or killed

⁵³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“müfsidin pişeganının erkanından olan erkan-ı harbiye binbaşısı Ali Said Bey esasen yırtıcı hayvan ve azur-ı zehrefşandan beter muzır bir mahluk olmak cihetle Musul’a can atarak kendisi ve orada bulunduğu rüfeka-ı melaneti daha uzaklara defimizi ve sairine teşebbüs etmiş ve bundan me’yus kalınca Musul’un meşhur ve hatta hunhar canavarları ıtmah ve kendilerine itbaya ikna ve fikirlerini semum mefasid-i müdhişle işba ederek”

barehanded, had thrown the wounded to Tigris (Dicle) river and even burnt people alive in furnaces. The effect of the tragedy they had created was equal to the horror of the judgment day."⁵³²

As we will see in later chapters, it was claimed that the people leading the crowd were Reşid el-Ömeri and Imam Ali from the Ulema. The strategic extent of the incident according to Sâdât, disclosed how the senior staff was involved in the conspiracy and how they managed to conceal it from the superior authorities:

"Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha, Former Sub-Governor Tevfik and Former Commander Mustafa Pashas were placed and accused as the major promoters of this huge tragedy which is impossible to fade away. Above all, the gradual involvements and participations of General Staff Major Ali Said, Sulaymaniyah Deputy Battalion Commander Fehmi and Senior Captain Salih; were undeniable. Former Mosul Governor Zeki and Commander Major General (Firik) Zühdü were undeniably involved since they had favored and appreciated the despicable deceptions by Ali Said, Fehmi and Salih without regarding any formal allegation or a judicial verdict. Even the entire provincial community was impartially convinced in the innocence of Sâdât; these names were acting in such infidelity and shamelessness that would even disgust

⁵³² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"İyd-i Edha'nın üçüncü günü saike-i bedmesti ile askerden bir neferin seyrangahda her yerde belki yüzlerce emsali görüldüğü halde nazar-ı ehemmiyete alınmayan adi bir tecavüzü asker ve ahali arasında büyük bir yangın gibi iktisab-ı tevsî ve fecaat eylemesini tam husul-u maksadlarına uygun bir fırsat ittihazıyla müstahzırları olan fesad bombasına ateş vermek hatta hareketi de o günün gecesi zarfında bilmüzekkere karargir olduğunun sabahıyla kararın tatbikatına mübaşeretle ihtiba ve evvel emirde Vali nezdine azimet ve dün günkü vakada bulunan efradı askeriye li-eclî idam ellerine teslim olunmasını teklife..... divanelerin dahi kabul edemeyeceği mutalebeyietmiş ve bittabi Vali tarafından vuku bulan red üzerine "öyleyse biz de bildiğimizi yaparız" diyerek hükümetten nihayet 60 metre uzakta olan Şeyh Said efendinin hanesine gelmişler ve Süleymaniyeli Nuri Arab nam yüzbaşı ve Süvari Kolağası Musullu Davud, Yüzbaşı Cemil efendiler refakatlarındaki efrad-ı nizamiye ve Musullu başıbozuktan mürekkeb itbailerile pusuya bırakarak Musul muteberanından Ömeri Reşid ve Nebi Şit Aleyhisselam Hazretlerinin hatibi Ali efendilerle birkaç refikeleri şeyhlerin kapısını çalarak bazı hususat-ı mühime için görüşmek istediklerini beyan ve ikna etmeleri üzerine kapı açılmış ve bu işin fesadı teskin tedabirini ittihaz zımnında behemehal vali nezdine azimetini teklif ve Şeyh tarafından her ne kadar Musullu olmamak ve me'muriyetinin bulunmamak cihetle böyle bir işe medhal edemeyeceğini dermeyan ve imtina etmiş ise de kargir olmadığından Şeyh efendi naçar İnnallah diyerek nefsinin anlara teslim ve hazreti Kur'anı üstünce kaldırmak üzere hizmetçisine vermiş ve saraya doğrulmuştur. Saray kapısı önünde merkumun Ömeri Reşid ve Ali ve refikaları Şeyhden uzaklaşarak en ibtida Ali Said Bey'in hizmetçisi takrib ve hazreti Kur'anı zir-i pay hakarete alarak Musul Vali ve Kumandanı'nın seyirci gibi durdukları mahalden nihayet yirmi bin hatve uzaktan sakinen melekâtı ağılatacak ve ervah-ı şühedayı titretecek suret-i vahşiyane katl ve ondan sonra da hanesinde mahdum-u necibi şeyh Ahmed efendiyi kırk iki nefer ekrab ve mutaalakatıyla itlaf ve beş bin liradan ziyade değeri olan maaşı ve sair nükudu ve eşyayı şüheda üzerindeki elbiseye kadar nehb ve gasb edilmesine ve gözlerini yağmagirlik ve tahami ve kan bürümüş şu vahşi canavarların artık nereli oldukları aranılmayarak Kerküklü, Süleymaniyeli, Erbilli ve saireli gurebadan tesadüf edebildiklerini kurşun ve elle cerhile katl ve mecruhan Dicle nehrine ilka ve hatta diri diri külhanlarda ateşe ihrak gibi su-i tesiri dehşet-i mahşerden eşid bir faciaya girip ve belanın vaki olmasına sebebiyet vermişlerdir."

the demons. Through these abilities, they were able to disguise their fields of evil, degrade and downplay the issue into a very common incident in the eyes of imperial authorities and attempted to crush the personal liberty of Sâdât in addition to all these atrocities. It was noticed with a great sorrow and astonishment that, they were sending fake-sealed defamation letters to the press and misguiding the superior authorities through falsifying the incident as insignificant and minor."⁵³³

In the manifest, it was perceived that the gap between Sâdât and the State was widening, the social polarization was getting more intense and Sâdât could mobilize some elements from the public, as can be seen in the following chapters. However, a month before that, the state had to reduce the tension in Mosul, ensure the public order and adopt a calming attitude towards the Kurdish community. After this assassination, which was allegedly involving some state elements, chaos would spread throughout the province and the state would resort to different tactical maneuvers to pacify the region.

3.5. The Mosul Incident Through the Eyes of Ottoman Military Officers

Different comments and evaluations from the Ottoman military officers regarding the Mosul incident also reached to the central authorities. In this section, three different letters from three Ottoman army officers reached to the central authorities will be analyzed. The most striking point here was the harsh criticism of the officers against their comrades in the army which they belonged and the Provincial Administration in the face of the incident. The embarrassment and anger they felt over the failure of their own comrades in arms to manage this crisis had found its place in the lines. In addition,

⁵³³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"söndürülmesi kat'a mümkün olamaz fecai azimenin.....ber apa olmasına müstaid ve bu meselede Caflı Mahmud Paşa ve Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı ve Kumandan-ı sabıkı Tefik ve Mustafa Paşalarla avanelerinin esamileri bilada.... eşhas ve alelhusus Erkan-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey ve Süleymaniye Taburu Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Salih Efendilerin ve bunların tezvirat-ı danaetkaranelerini bila-hükm bila-müstenid tervic eyleyen Musul Vali-i Sabıkı Zeki ve Kumandanı Ferik Zühdü Paşaların işbu muamelat-ı canıyanede derece derece medhal ve müşareketleri gayri münker ve bizim masumiyetimize bir vilayetin bitaraf bütün ahalisi kani bulunduğu halde şeytanları bile nefrete mecbur edecek dinsizliği, arsızlığı irtikabla fezay-ı şenaatkarilerini setre medar olmakla beraber makamat-ı aliyyece de meseleyi pek adi göstererek ehemmiyetin düşürmek ve bunca mezalime ilaveten bizi ...ve hukuk-u hürriyetimizi payimal eylemek fikriyle sahte mühürle matbuata ıftiranameler yollamakta ve makamat-ı celileye de ise esasından tahrif edecek surette hafif ve ehemmiyetsiz olarak resmen bildirmekte oldukları kemal-i istigrah ve tesirle görülmüş ve anlaşılmıştır."

there were shocking allegations and criticisms against the Governor in these lines. The officers also shared their post-incident concerns and regional experiences that could provide guidance for further stages.

A letter sent by Major Reşid of Erbil Reserve Battalion (*Redif Taburu*) to the Ministry of War on January 10 is quite interesting in terms of seeing the diversity of perspectives on the incident within the army.⁵³⁴ As an Ottoman officer who knew the region well, Major Reşid reported that alarming thoughts and opinions prevailed in the region.⁵³⁵ He stated that the terror of the incident was rapidly echoed over the statements of those who returned from Mosul and the telegram correspondence made with Mosul, after the incident.⁵³⁶ He pointed out that the incident could have dire consequences especially in Sulaymaniyah, due to the wild temperament and extreme piety of the people of the region.⁵³⁷ These were legitimate concerns, and Major Reşid, like any patriotic soldier, was performing his duty by sharing his local experiences and observations. However, in the following part of the letter, the style changed considerably, and serious criticisms were directed against both the Provincial Administration and the local military formation. Reşid wrote that at the time of this dreadful incident, from the lieutenant to the division commander or even the Governor, none of them suffered the slightest damage, and that the fighting took place only between the common soldier and the people.⁵³⁸ According to Reşid, this disaster, which was compared with the Karbala Incident, seriously affected every patriot and every soldier in the Ottoman army.⁵³⁹ Reşid, strikingly claimed that the regular, senior,

⁵³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 4, 30 Kanunuevvel 1324- 12 January 1909

⁵³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

⁵³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

“Kari vesaire kıyafetlerle Musul’dan gelen Erbilli Kerküklü Süleymaniyeliler vakayı dehşetli surette söylemekte ve buradan ahali tarafından Musul’a çekilen telgraflara gelen cevablar dahi bunu teyid etmekte ve Musul ahalisinden buradaki Musullulara gelen telgraflar da tahaffuz üzere bulundu.”

⁵³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

“bu havalinin vahşet mizaç ve taassub-u diyanetleri nokta-i nazarından buraca endişeler ve hususuyla Süleymaniye’de lyd vakasının suret-i ihtimalatkarşı netayic-i vahime hususuna mülâhazalar hükümferma olmakda olduğu”

⁵³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

“ve bir jandarma neferine varıncaya kadar hükümetin tasavvur ve icraatına maddi ve manevi ve sürekli tesirleri mucib olan bu vaka-i müdhişenin esna-yı vukuunda mülazımdan fırka kumandanına ve valisine gelinceye kadar hiçbirinin bir parmağı bile acımayarak yalnız asker ve ahali arasında bu kıtalin”

⁵³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

and top-rank Ottoman military officers hid aside to protect their own lives during the incident; and for him, this had overwhelmingly tainted the Ottoman military history and the epic of the heroes who carried out the Constitutionalist revolution.⁵⁴⁰

Reşid also reported the extraordinary activity on the Sâdât front such as Sayyid Ahmed's departure in the direction of Sulaymaniyah yesterday and noted that and this move could lead to unpredictable threats.⁵⁴¹ According to him, the unpredictable consequences of this disaster were at a scale that could be regarded as one of the most sacred and important duties of both Sublime Porte and Ottoman Parliament.⁵⁴² Major Reşid's views on the commanders who were considered to be appointed as the Governor of Mosul were also noteworthy. Rather than appointing a character like Ferik Muhlis Pasha, one of the former Governors of Basra and known for his disregard for life and his hypocrisy, it was more appropriate to appoint the Marshal Abdullah Pasha known for his patriotism and honor.⁵⁴³ Reşid also underlined the acute need for more active, patriotic, capable, and brave commanders with sane and intelligent officials in Mosul.⁵⁴⁴ The Minister of War, Ali Rıza Pasha, thoroughly examined Reşid's letter from military aspects and shared it with the Ministry of Interior, drawing attention to the particular need for competent and intelligent civil servants in the region.⁵⁴⁵

Although it is not naturally seen in the correspondence whether Major Reşid is of Kurdish origin or not, what he wrote can be evaluated in terms of the ethnic or religious

"ve Süleymaniye Sâdât'ının rivayet sahih ise Kerbela vakasından daha dil-suz olan facialarında böylece vukuu her vatanperveri ve hususiyle her askeri cidden dağdar-ı tesir etti"

⁵⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

"Esnay-ı vakada zabitan ve ümera ve erkanın kari gibi bir tarafa saklandıklarına ve hayatlarını muazzez tuttuklarına hükmediliyor ki hakikaten tarih-i askerimize ve inkılab-ı mesudu istihsal eden kahramanların destanlarına bir leke koymuştur ki işte bu kadarla arz ve tasvir edebiliyorum"

⁵⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

"Sâdât'tan Seyyid Ahmed'in ve dünkü gün buralardan o cihetlere geçmesi ve bu ahbar-ı felaketin henüz Süleymaniye aksetmesi üzerinde ne gibi hadiseler vukua geleceği kestirilemez ise de"

⁵⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

"vakanın esası itibariyle her halin Bab-ı Alice ehemmiyetle bakılacak ve hatta Meclis-i Mebusanın en akdes ve ehemm vezaifinden ma'dud olacak bir mikyassa görüyorum."

⁵⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT. 2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

"Buralara Müşir Abdullah Paşa gibi hamiyet", "Basra vali-i esbak-ı ferikan-ı kiramdan Muhlis Paşa gibi istihkar-ı hayat ve münafakada şöhrat olan rical-i askeriye"

⁵⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

"Buralara taburlardan daha müessir iş görecektir vatanperver muktedir faal cesur kumandanlarla iffet....sahib-i akıl ve zeka memurin vücuduna eşedd-i ihtiyac bulunduğu"

⁵⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 4, 30 Kanunuevvel 1324- 12 January 1909

sensitivities of an ordinary Ottoman officer at first glance. However, considering the extent of the negligence, misconduct and atrocity described, it may seem more plausible that this reaction involves the views of a Constitutionalist officer and ‘responsible’ to his homeland. It should have been an idealist and humane reaction of an Ottoman officer concerned about the embrasive principles of new regime rather than whether the victim was such a prominent Kurdish leader or religious figure such as Said. Because similar sensitivities were observed in some other letters sent by different military members. However, it was interesting that an ordinary major made comments on matters such as determining the Governor to be appointed, that were far above his authority and responsibility.

The letter sent by First Lieutenant (*Mülazım-ı Evvel*) Mehmed Salim, who has been serving in Mosul, to Ibrahim Edhem, one of the 2nd Army officers, and which attracted the attention of the higher authorities is really worth a close look.⁵⁴⁶ The letter, written in a very friendly manner between two sincere friends, was telling the pain and anxiety of the days through the eyes of an officer who personally witnessed the events.

Mehmed Salim depicts the outbreak of the gunfight as follow:

*“That is to say, at about 8 o'clock on the third day of the feast, a drunk soldier of the mule cavalry somehow passes a word to a woman at Bab al Toub locality [not to mention the neatness and cleanliness of what they call a first-class recreation spot]. When the people of Mosul in the vicinity begin to beat this soldier, a few of his friends get involved with the idea of saving him. The fight, which started with a slap before, continues with wood when they see them. When the soldiers saw these, they said, "This infidel community will kill us!" and they pulled their handguns. As soon as they saw this, thousands of people attacked them and brought them into the mule cavalry stables with revolvers and pistols.”*⁵⁴⁷

Failure in the management of the crisis is stated in different expressions in the letter:

“Our pashas, who heard the gunshots, [that low-life Zeki Pasha, who is the Governor in Mosul today] sent a company of cavalry under the command of Colonel Enis Bey to

⁵⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

⁵⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

“Şöyle ki bayramın üçüncü günü saat sekiz raddelerinde ester süvar askerinden bir sarhoş nefer; Bab-ı Tub mevkiinde ve kendilerinin birinci mesire tabir ettikleri mahaldeki nezafet ve tahareti beyana hacet yok anlarsınız, her nasılsa kadının birine lakırdı atar. Civarda bulunan Musul ahalisi bu askeri dövmeye başlayınca arkadaşlarından birkaç kişi kurtarmak fikriyle ahali arasına girer. Evvelce tokatla olan kavga bunları görünce ağaçla başladı. Efrad bunu görünce bu kafir millet bizi öldürecek diye tehdid için tabancalarını çektiler. Bunu görür görmez binlerce ahali üzerlerine hücum edip revolver ve tabancalar ile bunları ester süvar tavlmasına doldurdular”

*the scene and then they retreated. Although the people calmed down when they saw the incoming soldiers, Enis Bey, under the influence of intoxication, ordered the soldier to attack and fire on the mule cavalry. As the incoming cavalry was of Mosul origin, they immediately started shooting at mule cavalries. When the people of Mosul saw this, they came to assist their own soldiers and they, too, started shooting at the mule cavalry. Oh brother, this is happening right around the mansion where I live. At that moment, our Governor came and gave advice to the people, regretting his order, but they drove him away by throwing stones. The incident lasted until 2 o'clock in the middle of the night and although it was stopped afterwards, both sides suffered too many casualties."*⁵⁴⁸

In the letter, Governor Zeki was depicted as a 'low-life' in an insulting manner. How could it possibly be that a young Ottoman officer hated the Governor of his own state so much? In addition, it is claimed that Colonel Enis Bey, who ordered fire on the Kirkuk cavalry hidden in the stables, was intoxicated. After this false move, it is observed that the engagement of Mosul cavalry on the Kirkuk cavalry increased the scale of events since these populations had an ancient hate towards each other. Mehmet Salim also writes that the next day's incident was ignited by the Ulema as in the other accounts.

*"In the morning, a few Sheikhs and Ulema went to the Governor and demanded the murder of Sheikh Said, who had been brought from Sulaymaniyah, with his aides and the remaining mule cavalry. And these Sheikhs and Ulema give the order to the public to 'take your weapons and come and do exactly what we say'. Thereupon, the Ulema called criers to the market to announce, 'it is permissible to kill them!' and everyone took their weapons and came."*⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

"Silah sedasını işiten paşalarımız, o alçak Zeki Paşa ki bugün Musul'da vali bulunur, Miralay Enis Bey saffında olarak bir bölük süvarî mahal-i vakaya gönderdi ve kendileri de birlik de çekildiler. Evvelce ahali askeri görünce ibraz-ı sükûnet ettiler ise de Enis Bey sarhoşluk saikiyle askere ester süvar üzerine hücum ve ateş emrini verdi. Zaten süvarî askerleri de Musullu olmak münasebetle derhal üzerlerinde ateş etmeye başladı. Musul ahalisi bu hali görünceaskerine imdat için gelmiş, bunlar da süvarilere birlikte ateş etmeye başladılar. Ah kardaşım tam bu vukuat benim oturduğum konak civarında cereyan ediyor. O sıradavalimiz geldi verdiği emre pişman olarak ahaliye nasihat etti ise de kendisini taş ile kovdular ki bu vukuat gece saat ikikadar devam edip hitam verdiler ise de tarafeynden bir çok maktul ve mecruh oldu."

⁵⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

"Sabahleyin şeyh ve Ulemalardan birkaç kişivali yanına giderek evvelce Süleymaniye'dengelen meşhur Şeyh Said kidir, avenesiyle mütebaki kalan ester süvarîların katlini talep eder.....ve el-hale kendilerine 'silahlarınızı alıp geliniz aynen dediğimizi yapınız' emrini verir. Bunun üzerine Ulemalar da 'bunların katli caizdir' diye alenen çarşıda tellal çağırdı. Bunun üzerine herkes silahlarını alıp geldiler."

The killing of Sheikh Said is quite dramatized in the letter:

“First of all, they plundered the mansion of Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Bey. After plundering a few more households, they attacked Sheikh Said's mansion. After firing many bullets, they started breaking the door. This man, a descendant of the Prophet, took the Quran in his hand with a wretched cry and wished for mercy. This savage crowd slaughtered this man like a sheep after this monstrous creature smashed the Quran into pieces. Then they slaughtered his sons, then his servants, and finally his visitors, and then they plundered all of their property, close to 10.000 liras. Of these, only the Baba Resul Sheikh Ahmed, Said's two sons and a few of his men survived. According to his son's testimony, 44 of 62 people were killed.”⁵⁵⁰

The looted amount, which was previously stated as 5.000 liras in Sâdât 's statement, was now strangely stated as almost 10.000 liras. In addition, Mehmed Salim claimed that both of Said's sons were survived. This makes us think that Sheikh Ahmed may have survived the incident seriously injured, but later died.

The brutality and chaos experienced in Mosul after the incident is narrated with horrible expressions:

“This incident continued until the evening. Public life is in great danger. What I mean by this public life is all the needy people of Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. Not even contented with this, they claim that they don't want any of the military officers and civil servants around. Let's see what God will do. The number of bullets fired so far has reached 10 thousand. Although they keep the number of dead and wounded confidential, we know that there are about 150 individuals, mostly ordinary people and soldiers, and even more estimated. Because they throw many of them into the river after they have killed them, they find three or four corpses from the forest and the river every day. They committed a wide variety of evil deeds, such as burning a few men alive in a furnace, throwing many into wells, cutting off the nose and ears of a few before killing, and skinning some alive. They claim that even if there are soldiers coming from around, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah will not let their soldiers go. In fact, three days after the incident, 100 mule cavalries were coming from Kirkuk. Upon hearing this, the people closed their shops and wanted to revolt, but the Governor ensured that no soldiers would come. And now these soldiers are being held in Erbil. Although soldiers are expected to come here from Damascus, Aleppo and Erzurum, there is no news yet. Now the ordinary people usually walk with guns. Nobody is sure

⁵⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

“Evvela Süvari Kaimakamı Mustafa Bey'in konağını yağma ettiler. Sonra diğer bir hane daha sonra birkaç.....hanelerini yağma ettiler. Sonra yukarıca arz olunan Şeyh Said'in konağına hücum ettiler. Birçok kurşun endahından sonra da kapıyı kırmaya başladılar. Biçare bir vaveylada resulden olan şu adam Kuran-ı Kerimi alarak dahalete geldi. Bu vahşi millet bu canavar mahluk kuranı kerimi parça parça ettikten sonra koyun gibi bu adamı kestiler. Sonra da evlatlarını ba'de hizmetlilerini en sonra da yanlarına ziyaret için gelmiş olanları katl ve umum malları ki on bin liraya yakın idi cümlesini nehbettiler. Bunların içlerinden yalnız Şeyh Ahmed Baba Resul ile iki oğlu ve birkaç adamı halas oldular. Ki oğlunun ifadesine nazaran altmışiki kişiden kırkdört kişi katl olunmuş.”

about his life. Let's see what the order of God is. I ask you to give your blessing of our brotherhood rights, as none of us will survive if there is any public agitation once again. I will not be able to give any more details because I would disturb you very much.

Your first-lieutenant brother Mehmed Salim ⁵⁵¹

The letter was truly remarkable, both for its content, its emotion, and its urgency. Although he is thought to be a loyal soldier to his homeland, it can be thought that Mehmed Salim exaggerated the events by including his personal feelings. However, it does not seem appropriate for Ibrahim Edhem, to whom such a critical letter was sent, to remain it in his personal possession. After reading the letter, he added a cover letter containing his comments and sent both letters directly to the Ministry of Interior by-passing the 2nd Army Command or the Ministry of War. The third letter we will examine is this cover letter by İbrahim Edhem. In his cover letter, Edhem mentioned the letter he received from his friend in Mosul Province, which has been a ‘human slaughterhouse’ (*mezbaha-i beşer*) through the ongoing killings in the last few months.⁵⁵² As most of the tragic content of the letter was related to the Ministry of Interior, he listened to the voice of his conscience and sent the letter directly to that Ministry.⁵⁵³ He began by reminding that he was aware of his profession, responsibility

⁵⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kanunusani 1324 -18 January 1909

“Bu vukuat akşama kadar devam etti. Hayat-ı umumiye büyük bir tehlike içerisinde bulunur. Bu hayat-ı umumiyeden maksadım ne kadar garib ve Süleymaniye Kerkük ahali var ise bunlardır. Bununla da iktifa etmeyip ne kadar garib zabitan ve mülkiye memurları var ise hiçbirini istemeyiz diye iddia ediyorlar. Bakalım cenab-ı hak ne yapar? Şimdi endah olunan kurşunların adedi on bine balığ oldu. Maktul ve Mecruhların adedini her ne kadar hafi tutuyorlarsa da ekserisi garib ve asker olmak üzere yüz elli kadar var belki de fazladır biliyoruz. Zira birçoğunu katlettikten sonra nehre atmış.....her gün nehir ve ormandan üç dört kişi buluyorlar ve birkaç adamı sağ olarak külhanda yaktıkları ve birçoklarını kuyulara atmak ve birkaç kişinin burun ve kulağını keserek sonra öldürmek derisini yüzmek gibi envar türlü hakaret yaptılar. Etraftan asker geliyor ise de Kerkük Süleymaniye askerini bırakmaz diye iddia ediyorlar. Hatta vukuattan üç gün sonra Kerkük’ten yüz ester süvar geliyordu. Bunu işitince ahali dükkanları kapayıp isyan yapmak istedilerse de vali askerin gelmemesi için temin etti. Ve şimdi Erbil’de bulunuyorlar. Buraya Şam, Haleb, Erzurum’dan asker gelecek ise de daha bir haber yoktur. Şimdi ahali umumiyetle silahlı geziniyorlar. Hiç kimse hayatından emin değil. Bakalım cenab-ı hakkın emri ne yoldadır. Eğer bir defa daha heyecan yaparlarsa hiçbirimiz halas olamayacağı, bunun için de eğer böyle bir şey olursa hukuk-u ihvanınızı helal etmenizi rica ederim. Daha ziyade tafsilat veremeyeceğim zira sizi çok tasdi’ ederim.”

Mülazım-ı Evvel Biraderiniz Mehmed Salim

⁵⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

“Bir seneden beribirkaç aydan beri adeta mukatele ve mezbaha-i beşer hali kesb eden Musul vilayetinden, orada bulunan arkadaşımın bu hafta aldığı mektubu”

⁵⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

and sense of duty.⁵⁵⁴ And as an army member, he had personally witnessed that making an unofficial statement to the Ministerial office, in violation of law and conditions, always entailed severe punishment.⁵⁵⁵ Nevertheless, his patriotism prevailed and he took all the risks and all the responsibility that could arise.⁵⁵⁶ He dared to send this letter, hoping to alarm the statesmen for the swift rescue of this homeland and nation dying in agony.⁵⁵⁷ Apparently, Ibrahim Edhem was well aware that he was violating bureaucratic tendencies as he by-passed the 2nd Army and the Ministry of War to which he was affiliated. But according to him he had to take risks, especially since the issue was tied on Governor Zeki.

Based on the letter from Mehmed Salim, Edhem claimed that Governor Zeki did not report the events as they were, he distorted them and misguided the Ministry.⁵⁵⁸ According to Edhem, Governor Zeki, who is considered as a co-perpetrator of a monstrous operation, showed the incident less important and ordinary to avoid the responsibility of the harmful consequences that may arise from the treacherous orders he gave.⁵⁵⁹ From his perspective, Zeki wanted to keep Sublime Porte's attention away from Mosul. Because, allegedly, he had abused his duty, had involved irregularities in a state-run operation and his misconduct had resulted in consequences that he had to hide from Istanbul. At the end of the letter, Edhem asked the Minister, who did not make concession on rights and justice even during the despotism regime, to investigate the case and to ensure the welfare of the people whose lives were in constant danger.⁵⁶⁰

"mündericat-ı müessifesinin kısm-i azimi mesuliyet-i devletleriyle daha ziyade münasebetdar olmak hasebiyle -- sevk-i himmetiyle leffen inzar-ı devletlerine arz etmeği vicdanımemretti"

⁵⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

⁵⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

"Evet, mesleğime, vazife-i mesuliyetime,olmak değil, makam-ı ali-i aidenize, ahval ve kanuna mugayir ve gayri resmi bir surette beyanatta bulunmak , daima mücazat-ı şedide olduğunu ayn-el yakinettiğim halde bu yüzden tertib edecek kaffe-i mesuliyete ağmaz-ul ayn ederek"

⁵⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

"hal-i ihtizarda bulunan vatan ve milletin tahlis-i giribanına şitab edecek rical-i devletin teyakkuzunu taleb edebilirim ümidiyle müracaat-ı vakaya cüret-yab oldum"

⁵⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

⁵⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

⁵⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

"Fakat bu hususda istihsal buyrulan malumat şüphesiz ki bir refik-i sadıkım Salim Efendinin mektubunda musavver hareket-ı sibâ'nenin fail-i müştereki sayılan Vali Paşa tarafından resmen makam-ı devletlerine arz olunmuş ve müşarünileyhin işarı vermiş olduğu emr-i hainanesinden mütevellid netice-i muzırranın mesuliyetini..... kalmak fikr-i hamile işi ehemmiyetini dun, daha ehven bir zeminde beyan etmiş olduğu varid-i hatr olduğu cihetle"

⁵⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

Apparently, the mismanagement of the crisis in Mosul and the allegations of misconduct created great unrest in the army and occupied the Central Authority in Istanbul for a while. Although the fate of the officers who wrote the letters is unknown, they may have been subjected to personal hatred by the Mosul Governor or Commander if these letters heard afterwards. In any case, to conduct such correspondence directly at the Ministerial level was a risky initiative for ordinary military personnel and a move that would endanger their careers. On the other hand, the fact that they were able to take this risk and displayed this courage could be a sign that the situation in Mosul has reached an unbearable level.

“zehabım kulunuzu hataya düşürmemiş ise-- tahkik vekeyfiyet buyurulmasını ve istirahat ve hayatları her an maruz-u tehlike bulunan vatan kurbanlarının istihsal-i refahetlerinin temini, eyyam-ı istibdadda bile icraat-ı hükümet hak ve adaletiharekat ittihaz etmiş bulunan zat-ı sami-i cenab-ı nezaretpenahileri kinazırlarınvatanperveranesinden ümid ve temenni eyleriz”

CHAPTER 4: REFLECTIONS OF THE MOSUL INCIDENT ON THE PARLIAMENT

4.1. Parliamentary Disaccord Regarding to the Incident

This section will focus on the disaccord and disagreement that the Mosul Incident caused in the parliament. Particularly, the discussions on the jurisdiction between the executive and the legislative power and on the legitimacy of the banishment practice marked the sessions. It was also discussed in terms of hierarchy and procedure that the Sheikhs bypassing the Governor and submitting their complaint directly to the parliament. In this section and in following two sections, all relevant parliamentary minutes have been examined and the opinions and motions of all deputies are included. Although the Turkish of some essential expressions are included in the footnotes additionally, the Turkish versions of the entire minutes were not included in the study. Because latinized versions of all the parliamentary minutes after 1908 can be easily accessed on the website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The issue now went beyond a provincial scope and took an imperial perspective that would even occupy the parliament of the state. 15th session of Ottoman Chamber of Deputies dated 20th of January is worth of analyze in terms of showing how the parliament is divided over the political attitude, bureaucratic procedure and judicial method to be followed towards Sheikh Said Barzanji.⁵⁶¹ The relevant agenda item in the parliamentary minutes was; “The Memorandum of Grand Vizirate (*Sadaret Tezkiresi*) regarding to the telegram (2 January 1909) received from Sulaymaniyah including the crimes such as killings, lootings, oppression and banditry committed by Sheikh Said and his affiliates resided there.”⁵⁶²

The first to speak was the Diyarbekir Deputy Arif Bey and he told that “*first of all Sheikh Said was the closest member of Sâdât (Sâdâtın en akrebidir) and was unfairly*

⁵⁶¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, "Devre 1, Cilt 1, İçtima senesi 1, İnikad 15, 7 Kanunusani 1324 Çarşamba/20 January 1909, Birinci Celse, " p. 251-261
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MECMEB/mmbd01ic01c001/mmbd01ic01c001ink016.pdf>

⁵⁶² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.249

“Süleymaniye'de meskûn Şeyh Said ve avenesinin katli nüfus, nehbi emval, icra-yı teaddi ve şekavet gibi ceraim irtikâp ettiklerine dair mahallinden mevрут telgraf hakkında Sadaret tezkiresi.”

*banished to Mosul through the ambitions of Sub-Governor and Commander.” According to him, “during the despotism regime Governors and Sub-Governors had always defamed and scandalized such individuals of religious background and even after the promulgation of Constitutional Monarchy this attitude still continued.”*⁵⁶³

Next deputy was Hızır Lütfi Bey from Zor and he was a bureaucrat who knew Mosul very well. He had served in Mosul as ‘Correspondence Secretary Examining Clerk’ (*Mektubi Mümeyyizi*) before 1900 and also took a temporary duty in the retinue of Governor Mustafa Yumni between November 1905 and March 1906.⁵⁶⁴ He stated that *“as I had already served ex-officio in Mosul, I knew these Sheikhs and their cohorts very well and the accusations regarding to their crimes were undeniable. Governor and provincial officers were extremely busy of corresponding and telegramming to prevent the oppression and banditry by these Sheikhs. Their actions reached a countless level and went beyond their intentions now.”* According to Hızır Lütfi, *“major violators of the provincial public order were these Sheikhs, and the order will not be restored as long as they resided there. Although the necessity of banishing them to a distant province was submitted to the Governorate, Sublime Porte and Imperial Chamberlain, these efforts had produced no effect so far and the previous regime had facilitated their ability to oppress community. Their numerous armed assaults on community, Government and each other were undeniable and evident with correspondence.”*⁵⁶⁵ Lütfi suggested a severe punishment on these Sheikhs to protect the province from complete chaos.⁵⁶⁶

Yusuf Kemal Bey from Sinop mentioned the bureaucratic procedure of the petition and brought a technical comment to the submitting process.⁵⁶⁷ According to him, *“accepting this petition was already disallowed by the constitution and parliamentary regulations since a complaint against the Sub-provincial Governor had to be reported to Governor first, who was his superior. Besides, the principle of ‘Separation of Powers’ (Tefrik-i Kuvva) as the essence of Constitutionalism should always be*

⁵⁶³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.252

⁵⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1012/31/Lef 1, 29 Ağustos 1315 – 10 Eylül 1899 ; Lef 18, 25 Nisan 1323 – 08 May 1907

⁵⁶⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.252

⁵⁶⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.252

⁵⁶⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

*remembered. If the Legislative Power (Kuvve-i Kanuniye) interferes in the functions of Executive (Kuvve-i İcraiye) and Judiciary Powers (Kuvve-i Adliye), that means violating their duties. If someone was banished from a location without appearing before a judge, exiled to another location, and arrested, Yusuf Kemal supposed the Provincial Authority to apply should be the Judicial Court not the Chamber of Deputies.”*⁵⁶⁸

Mustafa Arif Bey from Kırkkilise questioned; “*whether the exile and expulsion were occurred after he was summoned to the province and returned, or while he was in province.*”⁵⁶⁹ As he was agreed with Yusuf Kemal, he specified that “*even if they were involved into such crimes, the province has no jurisdiction to remove them without a decision by a judicial authority.*”⁵⁷⁰ It was understood that the case was not prosecuted within the limits of law since the province was in a judicial misconduct.⁵⁷¹ Then, the designated authority to apply was the Justice [and Judicial Courts], and the Chamber of Deputies had nothing to do but to entrust the investigation to the designated authority.”⁵⁷²

İsmail Pasha from Tokat strongly disagreed with them as their opinions were not suitable with situation, affairs, law and fairness according to him.⁵⁷³ He stated as; “*there are two types of crimes as is known. One is ordinary crimes (cerâim-i âdiye), and the other is political crimes (cerâim-i siyasiye). Code of Criminal Procedures (Usul-ü Muhakemat-ı Cezaiye Kanunu) is adequate and appropriate with the ordinary crimes. The crime is caught in the act (cürm-ü meşhut) or not (gayri meşhut). If not, the suspect is summoned and interrogated. Public prosecutor prosecutes and the trial*

⁵⁶⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

“Bir kimse bir mahkeme Hâkimine iktiran ettirilmeksizin bir yerden kaldırılmış, öbür mahalle nefy ve tagrip ve tevkif edilmiş ise, ayrı ayrı madde-i nizamiye ve oranın mahalli müracaatı, zannedersem, doğrudan doğruya Mahkeme-i Adliye’dir, Meclis-i Mebusân değil.”

⁵⁶⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

“Bir nokta tetkik ve izah edilsin. Kendilerinin Vilâyete celbedilip avdetten sonra mı nefy ve tagrip vukua gelmiş, yoksa sonra mı, yoksa Vilâyette mi vukua gelmiş.”

⁵⁷⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

“Yusuf Kemal Beyefendinin buyurdukları gibi, bir mercii kanunînin emri olmaksızın vilâyetin hakkı celbi yoktur.”

⁵⁷¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

“Vilâyet bu nüfuzu kanunîsini suiistimal etmiş, binaenaleyh vukuata sebebiyet vermek meselesinin, kanun dairesinde cereyan etmemiş olduğu anlaşılır.”

⁵⁷² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

⁵⁷³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

is heard in court. There are also political crimes which the Governors should take responsibility and are fully liable of taking an instant action both conscientiously and judicially. If Governors would prefer corresponding with designated authorities and receiving their response, the Provincial Administration becomes a mess when the telegraph communication is broken down by disconnections, disorders, or weather conditions. That is why the Governors are liable to take full responsibility according to the 'Procedures of Civilian Administration' (Usûl-ü İdare-i Mülkiye). However, since the Chamber of Deputies is superior to all judicial courts and composed of deputies representing the approval of entire society, it is appropriate and wise to submit all affairs to the Chamber of Deputies before submitting to any organ. The Chamber of Deputies should issue a decision for resolving the case and serve the notice to the Porte before enforcing the law. ”⁵⁷⁴

Müfit Bey from Ioannina said, “the Provincial Authority banished them for protecting their lives and properties since Sulaymaniyah community may inflict a damage on them. Then, they had victimized themselves by the turmoil they had caused at the festival and the divine justice was served. As the Government had suppressed the turmoil, had issued a decision to dismiss the Sub-Governor and a decision to appoint the commander to another location; no further Governmental action was needed. ”⁵⁷⁵

İsmail Bey from Komotini underlined the prominence of the case and defined as ‘a complaint by a man who tries to defend his individual rights and liberty before the parliament’. Adverse to some other opinions, İsmail Bey expressed that the “real issue with the legal right of the Chamber of Deputies is severely defending the public and individual law. For instance, if a man who is oppressed by a Sub-Governor files a complaint to the Governor and gets rejected, now the designated authority to apply is the Chamber of Deputies. Because it is not improbable to be oppressed by his superior as well. As the man was removed to the provincial center by the Governor and was not heard after his numerous complains, now it is his Constitutional right to complain to the Chamber of Deputies. And the responsibility of Chamber of Deputies is to decide

⁵⁷⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.253

⁵⁷⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.254

if he was right in his case, hear and defend his rights and punish the ones who broke the law.”⁵⁷⁶

Honeos Effendi from Salonika designated the case as an issue of “*what level of a custom or practice of the Executive Power may destroy and remove the individual liberty of the citizen entitled by the constitution? There are two points to investigate for answering this question. In the first place, the issue of whether to submit the case to the parliament or not. The other one is the legitimacy of the practice of Executive Power at this point. As the petition was duly forwarded to the Parliamentary Commission in the first place; the necessary information was received from the Ministry and presented to the Parliament accordingly. As the case was duly brought to the Parliament, the Parliament has an authority to conduct negotiations and take a resolution. In the second place, these individuals were banished from Sulaymaniyah in the name of restoring public order by the Executive Power, without invoking law or a judicial authority. These individuals were deprived of their civil liberties and were banished to another location under the pretext of protecting their own lives. In my opinion, this reason is not enough for our Parliament to accept such a practice since the Executive Power should be capable of protecting the lives, honors, and wealth of the citizens. I suppose, our parliament will not allow the Executive Power to sacrifice individual liberty, the most precious right granted, defended, and limited by the constitution. However, as the banishment of these men from their hometown through such customary practices and tricks is a clear act against to the constitution; our parliament should refuse the act and reprimand the perpetrating officials.*”⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.254

“Mesela, bir mutasarrıftan zulüm gören bir adamın Valiye şikâyeti üzerine Validen cevabı red alırsa, bunun müracaat edeceği daire, Meclis-i Mebusan’dır. Mafevki haberdar edilip mafevkinden şikâyet edilir. Mafevkinden de bu adamın zulüm görmesi müsteb’ad değildir. İşte o halde Meclisi Mebusana iltica eder.”

⁵⁷⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.255

“Kanun-i Esasi Hürriyet-i Şahsiye’yi her gûnâ taarruzdan masun tuttuğu halde ve madde-i sarihasında bir neferin hürriyeti şahsiyesi ne surette izale olunabilir olduğunu göstermiş olduğu halde, örfî bir muamele ile Kuvvei İcraiye’nin ve böyle desaisle bu adamları memleketlerinden teb’id etmesi Kanuni Esasi ahkâmına muhalif bir taarruzdan ibaret bir fiildir ve bunu Meclisimiz hiçbir vakitte kabul etmemelidir ve bundan dolayı da bunu tensip eden memurinin muaheze edilmesi lazım gelir.”

Pirinççizade* Arif Efendi from Diyarbekir re-emphasized the innocence of Said by voicing, “*Sheikh Said Effendi is a humble and straightforward person. It is possible that there are some evildoers among his relatives, but this is not our subject. Sub-Governor and Commander who bear a grudge against Said, allied, and slandered him. And the Governor had accepted their slander.*”⁵⁷⁸

Hızır Lütü Bey from Zor mentioned that “*the interpretation that the accusations against these Sheikhs stem from grudge is not true. Their criminal activities are well known. Judicial investigation regarding to the grudge of the Sub-Governor was necessitated by my colleague. I already mentioned that they were used to many types of banditry, and they were specified in the registries of Imperial Chamberlain. How the despotic regime favored them? Imperial Chamberlain disallowed to prosecute them despite numerous prosecutions were attempted by the Provincial Government. Hence, it is not appropriate to say that the Sub-Governor has a grudge against him. The necessity of their suppression is not about one single Sub-Governor and Governor. Each appointed Governor and Sub-Governor gave other reasons by themselves.*”⁵⁷⁹

After he agreed with Müfit Bey from Ioannina and İsmail Bey from Komotini, he over-emphasized that “*if the necessary precautions are not taken, I can absolutely assure you that there will be a great skirmish between the province and the people of Sulaymaniyah. Because I cannot describe the ‘insects’ (haşerat) behind them, but it is officially determined. Provincial officials are messaging all day along to impose the necessary punishments against their crimes and suppress them.*”⁵⁸⁰

Next deputy who took the floor was Mustafa Asım Effendi from Istanbul who started to his speech by disagreeing with Müfit Bey. In his opinion, “*as martial law has not yet been declared anywhere, this practice was not a nice move eventually. I cannot*

⁵⁷⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.255

*In his second turn of speech his family name ‘Pirinççizade’ is shown in the parliamentary minutes.

⁵⁷⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.255

“Bunların tenkilâtı hakkında gösterilen lüzum, bîr Mutasarrıf ile bir Validen değildir. Her giden vali, her giden mutasarrıf tarafından başka başka lüzum gösterilmiştir.”

⁵⁸⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.255

“Bunlar böyle ihtiyatsız kalacak olursa, Vilâyet ile Süleymaniye halkı arasında büyük bir mukatele olacağını katiyyen temin ederim. Zira, onların arkasındaki haşeratı bir türlü tarif edemem, resmen sabittir.”

directly confirm the statements of my colleagues that the crimes of these men are well known, are infamous and are undeniable. Because how much of the records in the previous regime can be put forward as evidence? Even these men are real murderers, insurgents, and mischief-makers; I am excused not to favor, acknowledge and approve such a practice took place in the first period of Constitution as if martial law was declared.”⁵⁸¹

Mehmet Rıza Efendi from Erzurum gave specific details of the bureaucratic process and approved the way the Government managed it. “*There were ongoing investigations regarding to the hostility and dispute between the families of Sheikh Said and Sheikh Nuri Effendis and their crimes were repeated over and over. It is well known that they had attacked some Government officials and had dared to fire upon to the Government Office. In addition to this, according to the memorandum and telegram received from the Ministry of Interior; their removal to Mosul was solely based on protecting their lives. Although it is claimed that they were removed to the provincial center by the conspiracy of Sub-Governor and Commander Mustafa Pasha, there is no such a Governmental conspiracy and the crimes committed in Mosul have no connection with this expulsion. Whereas the decision of their removal is based on the correspondence between Mosul Province and the Ministry of Interior as its designated authority. Then it is obviously understood out of communication that, the Ministry of Police (Zaptiye Nezareti) attempted to carry out the procedure on the Sub-Governor and Commander and the Ministry of War was also contacted. I suggest archiving the document as there is no relevancy with the parliament.*”⁵⁸²

President gave floor to Aristidi Pasha from İzmir and he approached to the matter in terms of provincial penetration of the imperial law. “*In the age of despotism, our law was not able to be enforced or penetrated in Kurdistan, like it was not able to elsewhere. If we assume that the order expected from the Constitutional Monarchy will*

⁵⁸¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.255

“Bu adamlar ihtimal kî, hakikaten mücrimdir, canidir, erbabı ihtilâldir, müfsiddir. Terviç ve tasdik ve tasvip etmemekte bendeniz mazurum. Kanunu Esasinin ilk devre-i hayatında şu gibi idare-i örfiye ilân olunmuşçasına yapılan bir muameleyi terviç ve tasdik etmemekte mazurum.”

⁵⁸² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.256

“Şikâyatı vakıa ise, esasen bunların Mutasarrıfla Kumandan Mustafa Paşa taraflarından merkezi vilâyete sevk olunmalarına müstenittir. Halbuki bunları celb edebilmeleri, Dahiliye Nezaretiyle cereyan eden muhabere neticesinde verilen karara müstenit olduğu anlaşılıyor.”

be established all over the state from the very beginning, we would be deceiving ourselves. Sheikh Said Effendi from the Barzanjiyah Sheikhs is a well-known oppressor in Sulaymaniyah, and their expulsion was deemed necessary by the Government as their stay there after an incident would cause a skirmish in there. As they say, if the Sheikh and his affiliates had stayed there, would the skirmish have occurred, or it would not have occurred? There is no doubt about this, because despite their expulsion, this skirmish took place in the provincial center where they were removed to. If they are still insistent that their relatives who were killed in Mosul were expelled unjustly from their homeland, there are authorities where they can notify the attacks, the usurpation of their law, or they can file a lawsuit to compensate their damages. I propose to return the document, as it has no relation with the parliament.”⁵⁸³

After the opinions were generally deemed adequate, the written motions started to be submitted. The variety of the motions regarding the case is important in understanding the composition of the parliament and the dimensions of the freedom of speech provided by the Constitutionalist environment. Salonika Deputy Honeos Efendi proposed that the practice of the Executive Power to be voted on whether it is in accordance with the constitution or not.⁵⁸⁴ Bolu Deputies Şerafettin, Mustafa Zeki, Abdülvahap and İpek Deputy Bedri proposed the documents to be forwarded to the Justice Department for prosecuting the criminals.⁵⁸⁵ Manastır Deputy Vasıf and İzmit Deputy Ahmet Müfit proposed the case to be forwarded to the Ministry of Interior for prosecuting these insurgents and restoring public order.⁵⁸⁶ According to them, the mentioned practice was suitable with the situation and cannot be categorized a martial practice as the victims were removed to Mosul solely for protection of their lives.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.256

“eğer bunda musır iseler, merciyyet vardır efendim, kendilerine taarruz olunmuş, hukukları gasbedilmiş mağdur olmuşlar. Onun tazmini için de devair-i mahsusa vardır, oraya müracaat ederler, dava ederler. Buraya hiçbir ciheti taalluku yoktur. Binaenaleyh, iadesini teklif ederim.”

⁵⁸⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.257

⁵⁸⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.257

⁵⁸⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.257

⁵⁸⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.257

“Maktullerin Musul'a celpleri, mücerret kendilerini muhafaza maksadına müstenit olduğu anlaşıldığına ve bu muamelenin örfi bir muamele addolunamayacağına binaen muamele-i vâkıa, muvafık-ı maslahat olmakla...”

Salonika Deputy Artas requested that these people, who were expelled from their residences and transferred to Sulaymaniyah without a court decision, should not be restrained in the place they were banished and should immediately be taken to the court.⁵⁸⁸ Yozgat Deputy Hayrullah proposed the Ministry of Interior should be liberated to be able to perform its duty by the limits of law as the case belongs to the Executive Power.⁵⁸⁹ Deputy Muhittin from Niğde justified the Governmental practice and claimed that if the Government had not intervened in the events by saying that the victims should go to court, now the Government would be held responsible.⁵⁹⁰ Now it was time for the allegations of the victims to be heard by the relevant authorities he added.⁵⁹¹ Arif as the Diyarbakir Deputy suggested that the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor, Commander and the Mosul Governor to be judged by the ‘Supreme Administrative Court of the Council of State’ (*Şûrâ-yı Devlet Muhakemat Dairesi*), since their practice is contrary to the constitution and meant a violation of civil liberties.⁵⁹² Deputy Arif from Komotini and Adil from Tekfurdağı stated that the practice by Sub-Governor and Governor carried on Sheikh Said is ‘nonlegalistic’ (*kanunşikenâne*) and they proposed to forward the documents to the Ministry of Interior for judicial investigations and prosecutions.⁵⁹³ According to them, unless martial law is declared on a clear ground, civil liberty and right of habitation protected by law cannot be violated in any respect.⁵⁹⁴ Sivas Deputy Şükrü particularly mentioned that, since this issue purely means a misconduct in civil service, a lawsuit must be filed against the Sub-Governor in the Provincial Administrative Court (*Vilayet İdare Mahkemesi*) and against the Governor in the Council of State.⁵⁹⁵ Deputy Seyfullah from Erzurum stated that the liberties of the Sheikhs were not violated; on the contrary, they were expelled from Sulaymaniyah in order to prevent the atrocities expected to happen to them in there, that is, to protect their lives.⁵⁹⁶ In his opinion, there is no need to deepen the situation by the parliament, as the freedom of the people of

⁵⁸⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁸⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

Sulaymaniyah was also preserved and the Sheikhs were subjected to the divine justice of their own unworthy actions.⁵⁹⁷ Those who have been harmed must apply to the relevant authorities he said.⁵⁹⁸

Nafi Pasha from Aleppo stated that this case is not about whether Said Effendi is a good person or a bad person; it is about the Governor who relied on a police tip-off and violated the individual liberty of Said that the constitution vouched for.⁵⁹⁹ Governors, God forbid, act above the law by taking all kinds of responsibilities when they see a sign of revolution.⁶⁰⁰ However, he added, if these actions are based on personal grudge and comes out to be unfounded, the responsibility naturally lies with them.⁶⁰¹ Consequently, Nafi Pasha wrote that the Council of State and legal authorities should file a lawsuit against the Governor and the Sub-Governor.⁶⁰² If these administrators cannot prove before the law that they had banished the Sheikhs under obligation, they should be penalized for violating the constitution.⁶⁰³

Aristidi Pasha also suggested that a lawsuit be filed by the Council of State and stated that if the court decision proves the unfair practice of the Governor, the punishment will be inevitable.⁶⁰⁴ Ahmet Nesimi Bey from Istanbul proposed that the investigation carried out on this important issue should be deepened, a particular commission should be elected and appointed through a 'report' (mazbata) containing a summary of the necessary reasons.⁶⁰⁵ Abdülmecit Zehravî from Hama reminded that there are two different aspects of this issue, the first is the expulsion and banishment carried out by

⁵⁹⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

"Süleymaniye ahalisinin de hürriyetleri muhafaza olunmuş, kendileri de harekâtı gayri lâîkalarının adl-i ilâhîsine duçar bulunmuş olduklarından, Meclisçe ta'mîki keyfiyete mahal olmadığından,"

⁵⁹⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.258

⁵⁹⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

"Sait Efendi iyi adam olsun, fena bulunsun, polisin jurnaliyle Valinin iş'ariyle Kanun-i Esasi ile mekfû'l hürriyet-i şahsiyesine taarruz eden, validir."

⁶⁰⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

"Vülât, maazallah, âsârı ihtilâl gördükleri zamanda, her türlü mesuliyeti deruhde ederek fevkalkanun muamele eder."

⁶⁰¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

"Lâkin bu muameleleri ayn-ı garaz görünür ve nabemehal olduğu anlaşılırsa, mesuliyetleri tabiidir."

⁶⁰² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶⁰³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶⁰⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶⁰⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

"Bu meseleyi mühimime hakkında icra olunan tetkikatın tamikiyle esbabı mucibei mücmeslesini havi bir mazbatanın tanzimi emrinde ayrıca bir komisyonun intihap ve tayini hakkı."

the Government acting on its own, and the other is that the Government did not prevent the mass attack against those who were murdered in Mosul.⁶⁰⁶ According to him, as the Government is wrong in both aspects and deserves to be reprimanded, should be strongly warned by the parliament not to engage in such nonlegalistic and irregular practices again.⁶⁰⁷ Mustafa Arif from Kırkkilise proposed the issue to be referred to the Ministry of Justice for judicial proceedings; as the province violated individual liberty contrary to law, transferred a person to another location without a legal decision, and consequently caused them to be killed with delay in intervention.⁶⁰⁸ Amasya Deputy Cudi Efendi reminded that the parliament is not a court where cases are heard, adding that the ‘courts’ can determine and judge whether such practices carried out within the framework of the law and whom the responsibility belongs.⁶⁰⁹ He stated that the issue should be sent to the Ministry of Interior to be referred to the Ministry of Justice.⁶¹⁰ As an addendum, Cudi Efendi stated that he felt an inconsistency in the memorandum of the Ministry of Interior.⁶¹¹ If the Sub-Governor, Governor and Commander communicated with the Ministry of Interior and acted upon their orders, why the Ministries attempted to replace them now? he asked.⁶¹² Mahmut Mazhar from Trabzon stated that it was appropriate to temporarily remove Sheikh Said and his companions to Mosul at a time when the public order and security were down.⁶¹³

Aleppo Deputy Ali Cenani highlighted that Sheikh Said declared a rebellion against the proclamation of the constitution.⁶¹⁴ In his opinion, since Said was connected to the Imperial Chamberlain staff via the ciphered telegram, the rebellion movement depended on their provocation.⁶¹⁵ Ali Cenani defended the Provincial Administration

⁶⁰⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶⁰⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶⁰⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶⁰⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶¹⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶¹¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶¹² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

“Zeyl: Dahiliye Nezaretinin tezkiresinde bir tenakkuz hiss olunuyor. Mutasarrıf ve Vali ve Kumandan, Dahiliye ile bilmuhabere, aldıkları emir üzerine hareket etmişler ise, ne için şimdi tebdillerine Dahiliye ve Hariciye Nezaretlerinde teşebbüs olunduğu beyan olunuyor.”

⁶¹³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.259

⁶¹⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶¹⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

and added that it is the most necessary and important measure for the Government to take this person from there to the center of Mosul.⁶¹⁶ At the same time, from his perspective, they committed the crime in Mosul which they decided in Sulaymaniyah and caused the Mosul Incident in fact.⁶¹⁷ Cenani proposed that the situation be duly investigated in its location, and the documents be archived as a result of the investigation.⁶¹⁸

Mahmut Mahir from Kırşehir stated that; the petitioners declared that they were subjected to disloyalty and oppression undeservedly; and the Government officials also declared that they fulfilled their duties to protect the security.⁶¹⁹ However, since the statements of both parties remain verbal, those who claim victimhood should be told to apply to judicial authorities, serving to public thanks to liberty.⁶²⁰ On the other hand, he mentioned that it should be ensured that the office of Public Prosecutor is activated through the Ministry of Justice in order to prosecute the allegations of crime and to take necessary measures.⁶²¹

Berat Deputies İsmail Kemal and Aziz, Debre Deputy Necip and Ergiri Deputy Müfit declared that if a violation occurs against a person or family for any reason whatsoever, it is one of the duties of the Local Administration to defeat it and to preserve the freedom of individuals.⁶²² These individuals were deprived of their individual liberty and were subjected to unlawful arbitrary treatment due to the protection practice by the Governor of Mosul and the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah.⁶²³ Deputies demanded that the administrators and those who favored their instructions be taken to the court.⁶²⁴

“Kendisi şifreli telgrafla Mâbeyn Erkânına erbut olduğundan, harekâtı isyanıyesi, onların tahrikatına matuftur.”

⁶¹⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶¹⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶¹⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶¹⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

“her iki tarafın da ifadesi kavli mücerrette kaldığı derkâr olup, mağduriyetini iddia edenlerin saye-i hürriyette meftuh olan mercii kanunîsine müracaat eylemeleri lüzumunun tefhimine”

⁶²¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

Deputies Mustafa from Tokad, Şevket from Erzurum, Fevzi from Karahisar-ı Şarki and Vehbi from Konya stated that if the claim of Said and his affiliates is correct, that means a blow to the constitution and an actual crime.⁶²⁵ Since it is essential for this case to be investigated and sentenced by the court, it must be entrusted to the Justice Department.⁶²⁶

Deputy Mustafa from Karahisar-ı Şarki declared that the responsibility of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor is understood from all the evidences and indications such as the complaint, his partial confession, some catastrophic murders in the form of an uprising and the demand of his replacement from the Ministry of Interior.⁶²⁷ Since it would not be appropriate to close the case by transferring the Sub-Governor's office to another location, the issue of taking him to court should be reported to the Ministry of Interior.⁶²⁸

Deputy Rıza Tevfik from Edirne summarized the discussion by suggesting prudence and stated that the opinions of his dear friends about these men reached two opposite conclusions.⁶²⁹ According to Tevfik, the majority of the parliament neither know these men nor the truth of this matter.⁶³⁰ One-way thinking always leads them and the public opinion to error, he mentioned.⁶³¹ And the Governors cannot take any absolute action against those who violate the public order through their influence on a territory.⁶³² Tevfik stated that this was a very 'detrimental paralysis of administration' and suggested contacting the Ministry of Interior to investigate the situation.⁶³³ In his

⁶²⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

"Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının mesuliyeti, şikâyet, kendilerinin kısmen itirafı ve birtakım cinâyâtı fecianın bir tarzı ihtilâlâranede hudûsu ve kendisinin oradan kaldırılmasının Dahiliye Nezareti celilesine iş'ar kılınması gibi delâil ve emârâtın vücûdu ile anlaşılıyor."

⁶²⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶²⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶³⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶³¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶³² Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

"Ve bir memlekette nüfuzu ile ihlâl-i asayişe sebebiyet verenler hakkında Valiler, hiçbir hareketi kat'iyede bulunamazlar."

⁶³³ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

"Bu ise çok muzır bir felc-i idaredir."

opinion, no conclusion could be reached with such contradictory claims, and even the unanimous voting could not result fair.⁶³⁴

Deputy Ali Haydar from Manisa wrote that they were not elected and sent to the parliament as advocates of common and individual rights by nation.⁶³⁵ He added that the law has appointed courts for such cases.⁶³⁶ His motion was quite ironic as “*either let's close the courts and declare that the nation should apply to the Chamber of Deputies in matters related to common and individual law or let us refuse such matters related to common law without wasting our time.*”⁶³⁷ Deputy Halil from Menteşe clearly stated that the removal of Sheikh Said to the province is based on the order given by the Ministry of Interior upon the necessity shown by the location.⁶³⁸ If the statements were not sufficient, he suggested that an ‘interpellation’ (*istizah*) to be decided against to the respective Minister.⁶³⁹ The final statement belonged to Deputy Taha from Hakkari, and he suggested that a particular investigation committee be formed and sent regarding to the case.⁶⁴⁰ At the end of the discussions and statements, the opinions on the issue were divided, but the majority of the parliament decided to refer the matter to the ‘Commission on Petitions’ (*Arzuhal Encümeni*) as the ‘Commission Report’ (*Encümen Mazbatası*) has not yet been prepared.⁶⁴¹

4.2. Shifting Views Between Executive and Legislative Powers

Apart from the procedural side of the case, we had a parliamentary composition divided into two main camps around two main issues. The first main discussion questioned the rightfulness and legitimacy of the executive power on the decision of

⁶³⁴ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶³⁵ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶³⁶ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260

⁶³⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.260,261

“Şu halde ya mahkemeleri sed ile hukuku umumiye ve şahsiyeden dolayı milletin Meclis-i Mebusan’a müracaat etmelerini ilân veyahut hukuk-u umumiyyeye taalluk eden bu gibi mesail ile izâa-i evkat etmeyerek red etmeliyiz ki”

⁶³⁸ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.261

⁶³⁹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.261

“İzahat kâfi değilse, istizaha karar verilecek.”

⁶⁴⁰ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.261

⁶⁴¹ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p.261

the banishment of Sheikh Said. Here, the Government [and particularly Ministry of Interior] was actually criticized over the responsibility of the Provincial Administration. The second main discussion was on whether the case was relevant with the parliament and whether the parliament had the authority on the case. The petition of the Sheikhs, bypassing the Governorship, Ministry, and judicial authorities, submitted directly to the parliament, and how justified was this procedurally?

In this section, the different opinions of the deputies are categorized and tabulated. Figure 1 below shows us which deputies consider the executive power to be legitimate and illegitimate, and which deputies consider the case as appropriate or inappropriate for a resolution in the parliamentary platform. The number of deputies who think that the Provincial Administration has conducted an illegitimate operation cannot be underestimated. Because, naturally, the emphasis on individual liberty and rights, which started to find a political and social base after the promulgation of Constitutional Monarchy, is also of great importance in this number. For this reason, many deputies in the parliament considered banishment of Sheikh Said as an arbitrary decision of the Provincial Government and clearly expressed it as a wrong initiative of the executive power. Even though the decision was taken with the knowledge and approval of the Ministry of Interior, the majority of the deputies reacted negatively. On the other hand, the number of those who reacted positively was not few and they argued that Governors should take the initiative in such situations without wasting time.

Provincial Administration (Executive Power) is Legitimate	Provincial Administration (Executive Power) is Illegitimate	Case Should Be Discussed and Resolved In The Parliament	Case is Not Relevant with The Parliament
<i>Hızır Lütfi / Zor</i>	<i>Arif / Diyarbekir</i>	<i>İsmail Pasha/Tokat</i>	<i>Yusuf Kemal/Sinop</i>
<i>İsmail Pasha/ Tokat</i>	<i>Mustafa Arif /Kırkkilise</i>	<i>İsmail /Komotini</i>	<i>Aristidi Pasha/İzmir</i>
<i>Müfit /Ioannina</i>	<i>İsmail / Komotini</i>	<i>Honeos/Salonika</i>	<i>Mehmet Rıza /Erzurum</i>
<i>Mehmet Rıza /Erzurum</i>	<i>Honeos / Salonika</i>		<i>Cudi/Amasya</i>
<i>Aristidi Pasha/İzmir</i>	<i>Mustafa Asım /İstanbul</i>		<i>Ali Haydar/Manisa</i>
<i>Vasıf / Manastır</i>	<i>Artas / Salonika</i>		
<i>Ahmet Müfit/ İzmit</i>	<i>Arif/Komotini</i>		
<i>Muhittin /Niğde</i>	<i>Adil/Tekfurdağı</i>		
<i>Seyfullah/ Erzurum</i>	<i>Şükrü/Sivas</i>		
<i>Mahmut Mazhar/Trabzon</i>	<i>Nafi Paşa / Aleppo</i>		
<i>Ali Cenani/Aleppo</i>	<i>Abdülmecit Zehravi/Hama</i>		
<i>Halil/Menteşe</i>	<i>İsmail Kemal/Berat</i>		
<i>Hayrullah / Yozgat</i>	<i>Aziz/Berat</i>		
	<i>Necip/Debre</i>		
	<i>Müfit/ Ergiri</i>		
	<i>Mustafa/Tokad</i>		
	<i>Şevket/Erzurum</i>		
	<i>Fevzi/ Karahisar-ı Şarki</i>		
	<i>Vehbi/Konya</i>		
	<i>Mustafa/Karahisar-ı Şarki</i>		
	<i>Rıza Tevfik/ Edirne</i>		
13	21	3	5

Table 1: The parliamentary composition on the legitimacy of the Executive Power and on the authority of the Legislative Power regarding to the Sheikh Said's case.

In this regard, we see that the greatest sensitivity towards Sâdât's religious background shown by Pirinççizade Arif Bey from Diyarbekir. In fact, by claiming that it is a common practice for local administrators to defame such powerful actors coming from a religious base, he put other local administrators under a great imputation. In his second turn of speech, he praised Said's modesty and honesty and openly declared that Said was victimized by an administrative conspiracy based on hatred. It is useful to briefly take a look at the background of Pirinççizade, as he is the only name in the parliament who defended Said unhesitatingly and accused the administrators directly.

Arif Pirinççizade (1853-1909), a landowner and notable of Kurdish origin, was one of the leading representatives of the Unionist elite in the region, as well as he took the leadership of a group that was classified as nationalist or proto-nationalist.⁶⁴² After his editorial career in Diyarbekir Newspaper, he had focused on agriculture and had become one of the richest and most influential landowners in the province, possessing almost thirty villages.⁶⁴³ The Hamidiye Commander İbrahim Pasha from Milli Tribe, shook the authority of Pirinççizade in Diyarbekir, by taking control of trade routes, putting pressure on land and villages, and urbanizing Viranşehir.⁶⁴⁴ When he was elected to the parliament as an independent candidate from the Diyarbekir district in 1908, he has been conducting a military operation against İbrahim Pasha.⁶⁴⁵ Arif Bey, who served in different bureaucratic and judicial positions such as Member of the 'Provincial Council' (*Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet*), Chairman of the 'Diyarbekir Chamber of Public Works and Trade' (*Nafia ve Ticaret Odası Riyasetleri*) and the provincial 'Court of Appeal' (*İstinaf Mahkemesi*) before becoming the Mayor and Deputy of Diyarbakır (1908), was also Ziya Gökalp's maternal uncle⁶⁴⁶ However, Arif Bey's duty in the Chamber of Deputies lasted less than a year, his obituary was declared in the parliament and his official funeral was organized with the cooperation of Kurdish Club (Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress).⁶⁴⁷

The dichotomy of Arif, which is based on being both from a Kurdish origin and a Unionist background, makes him really worth of studying. Having a common ethnic identity with Said Barzanji could be a major factor in supporting him against Zeki Pasha, a Unionist Governor representing the state authority. However, the Islamic references in his speech and the compliments of Said's character suggest a personal relationship between them rather than coming from the same ethnic background. Even

⁶⁴² Joost Jongerden, *Elite Encounters of a Violent Kind: Milli İbrahim Paşa, Ziya Gökalp and Political Struggle in Diyarbekir at the Turn of the 20th Century* in Joost Jongerden, Jelle Verheij (eds.), *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p.55,66

⁶⁴³ Joost Jongerden, *The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War*, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p.248

⁶⁴⁴ Jongerden, *The Settlement Issue...*, p.247

⁶⁴⁵ Jongerden, *Elite Encounters...*, p.66

⁶⁴⁶ Jongerden, *The Settlement Issue...*, p.248

⁶⁴⁷ Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, "Devre 1, Cilt 2, İçtima senesi 1, İnıkad 41, 2 Mart 1325 Pazartesi / 15 March 1909, Birinci Celse, " p.294
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MECMEB/mmbd01ic01c002/mmbd01ic01c002ink041.pdf>

so, it is still controversial why Arif, who does not hesitate to fight with the Kurdish tribes when it comes to his own regional influence, as we see in the example of the Milli tribe, favors the Barzanjiyah Clan in Mosul, which challenges both state authority and local notables.

Although not as much as Pirinçizade Arif, there were also deputies who found the practice illegitimate and defended Said's rights against the state authority. Honeos Efendi from Salonika also found the exercise of executive power illegitimate and questioned its Constitutionality. In addition, stating that the duty of the executive power is to protect the lives, property, and honor of individuals, he evaluated the practice of banishment for protection purposes as arbitrary, customary, and tricky. Mustafa Arif Bey from Kırkkilise also had the same tendency and stated that even if they were guilty, the Local Administration cannot remove these persons from anywhere without prosecution and decision by a legal authority. On the other hand, Mustafa Asım Efendi from Istanbul attributed the practice to the martial law regime and argued that people cannot be blamed by relying on the information reflected in the previous regime's records. Moreover, even if these people were guilty, such a martial law practice in the Constitutional Monarchy period is unacceptable. Abdulhamid Zehravi from Hama saw the Government as unfair in two aspects and accused the local authority of both making the decision of banishment on its own and not taking the necessary measures against the mass attack in Mosul.

The common platform where these views are based on, which make Said look innocent in the eyes of the state authority, may be the lack of a legal basis and the harshness of the practice. The reaction of some deputies to his banishment without a proper trial, whether Said is guilty or right, has references to the content of the constitution in the context of individual freedom and rights. In short, according to some of the views that justify Said, even if those who exercised executive power were right in their case, the illegality of their method would put them in an unfair position. Among the rest, there may be those who have considered the possibility of a conspiracy with ulterior motives, especially among those who demand the prosecution of administrators. However, there was no member other than Arif Bey who dared to declare that Said was the victim of a conspiracy with a completely ulterior motive or a different agenda.

On the opposite side of Pirinççizade Arif, there are the deputy of Ioannina Müfit and deputy of Erzurum Seyfullah, who emphasize the concept of "divine justice". These two deputies, who defended that Sheikh Said fell victim to the manifestation of divine justice because of his own fault, did not make long statements. But their antipathy towards Said was evident from their fatalism towards justice and their unwillingness to take action. Both considered the operation of the Local Administration legitimate and reasonable and did not seek any ulterior motives. The Zor Deputy Hızır Lütfi justified the expulsion of these elements, which the previous regime favored and directly tolerated through the Imperial Chamberlain channel. Based on his official experience in the province, Hızır Lütfi affirmed that these Sheikhs have consistently violated the public order and he attributed the restoration of security to their removal. He also fully claimed the legitimacy of the Local Government's operation and strongly opposed the notion that it was based on personal grudge. By calling for an urgent action towards the province, he marginalized the mass behind Said as "insects that he cannot describe". İsmail Pasha from Tokat justified the local administrators by arguing that the Local Administration cannot waste time with the bureaucracy and that the Governor should take initiative in accordance with the procedures if necessary. Aleppo Deputy Ali Cenani confronted us with a completely different claim, voicing that Said's rebellion against Constitutionalism was supported by the Imperial Chamberlain and was organized from there. Mehmet Rıza Efendi from Erzurum argued that the Local Government's practice was definitely not based on a conspiracy, reminding that these individuals were so extreme and reckless that they could fire on Government officials and buildings. Aristidi Pasha from Izmir reminded that Said was a known tyrant and argued that if he had not been banished, there would have been a great conflict in Sulaymaniyah. The proof of this was that this conflict occurred in the center of Mosul, where Said was banished to. He added that if they still had allegations of victimization, they could forward their complaints to the appropriate authorities.

The common point of these names, who found the practice against Said completely justified, was that they did not tolerate the threat posed by a character like him to internal security, despite the libertarian environment of the Constitutional period. According to them, even though Constitutionalism laid the foundations of freedom, the provincial influence of state authority in the face of such a character had to appear

firm. The conflict that was tried to be prevented in Sulaymaniyah took place in the center of Mosul province, where Said was banished to. And as a result, in the eyes of the state authority, Said became a factor that carried the trouble to where he went.

The second major controversy was over the relevance of such a case to parliament, based on the exercise of executive power. While the principle of ‘separation of powers’, as one of the pillars of the Constitutional doctrine, was emphasized in the discussions, the jurisdiction of the parliament was also a matter of debate. Emphasizing the separation of powers, Yusuf Kemal argued that a problem based on the executive power should be resolved through the judiciary and argued that this petition cannot be accepted by the parliament. According to İsmail Bey of Komotini, it was quite natural for an individual whose complaint originated from the Local Government to seek his justice in the parliament. Since this complaint could not be resolved by the superior local authority, the parliament had to resolve the case, both by protecting the victim's rights and by punishing the perpetrators. According to Honeos Effendi, the issue was very suitable for discussion in the parliament as it came before the parliament through following the correct procedures. İsmail Pasha from Tokat stated that the Parliament was above all courts and it was quite appropriate to present the case to the parliament before submitting it to another state organ.

On the contrary, Cudi Efendi from Amasya confronted us with a harsh rhetoric like “the assembly is not a courtroom”. According to him, the fairness of the practice and the responsible of the incident should be determined only by the courts. Ali Haydar from Manisa also argued that they were not sent to the parliament to defend common and personal law. If so, he made an ironic statement such as "let's close the courts and direct the people to the parliament for their cases." Mehmet Rıza Efendi from Erzurum added that as the Local Administration made this decision by contacting the Ministry of Interior and that the Ministries of War and Security followed the process; this issue had nothing to do with the Parliament.

It would not be wrong to say that those who wanted the issue to be resolved in the parliament were also those who found the practice of the Local Government towards Said unfair. However, İsmail Pasha from Tokat made a contrast here and argued that the Local Government had the right to take all kinds of initiative according to the

procedure, but still argued that the parliament should resolve the issue. In some opinions, it was emphasized that the parliament was an inclusive structure above all courts, while in some opinions we see that the parliament completely abstracted itself from the judicial power. In some opinions, the parliament was called to warn or vote the relevant Ministry or authorities, and the intervention power of the parliament was reduced to a control mechanism rather than judiciary. In any case, although the majority of the parliament favored forwarding the case to the necessary authorities, it is certain that the number of those who wanted to be involved in the case in one way or another was more than those who completely isolated themselves.

4.3. Categorization of Motions

When we look at the divergence in the measures to be taken, the number of deputies who considered the operation illegal and requested it to be referred to the justice authorities was high. However, the preference for referral to justice was divided into two main groups: those who wanted the issue to be referred to the Ministry of Justice and those who wanted local administrators to be tried directly in the superior courts. Among those who wanted to file a lawsuit against local administrators, there were those who sympathized with Said, such as Arif Pirinçizade. On the other hand, there were names such as Nafi Pasha, who approached the issue in terms of Constitutional violations whether Said was guilty or not and accused the Governor of acting on a police force tip off. A considerable number of the deputies proposed that the complainants should apply to the relevant authorities, stating that they were now in the Constitutional Monarchy and that there were the authorities they can apply to. Some of these may actually be done with an emphasis on Constitutionalism. However, it was possible that some of them were composed of those who do not want to extend the helping hand of the parliament to a controversial character like Sheikh Said Barzanji.

Forward to the Ministry of Justice/Judicial Authorities	Forward to the Ministry of Interior	Governors Should be Judged	Let the Complainants Apply to the Relevant Authorities
<i>Mustafa Arif /Kırkkilise</i>	<i>Vasıf / Manastır</i>	<i>Arif/Diyarbakir</i>	<i>Muhittin/Niğde</i>
<i>Şerafettin/Bolu</i>	<i>Ahmet Müfit/ İzmit</i>	<i>Şükrü/Sivas</i>	<i>Seyfullah/Erzurum</i>
<i>Mustafa Zeki/Bolu</i>	<i>Arif/Komotini</i>	<i>Nafi Paşa/Aleppo</i>	<i>Mahmut Mahir/Kırşehir</i>
<i>Abdülvahap/Bolu</i>	<i>Adil/Tekfurdağı</i>	<i>Aristidi Pasha/İzmir</i>	<i>Ali Haydar/Manisa</i>
<i>Bedri/İpek</i>	<i>Cudi/Amasya</i>	<i>İsmail Kemal/Berat</i>	<i>Yusuf Kemal/Sinop</i>
<i>Mahmut Mahir/Kırşehir</i>	<i>Rıza Tevfik/ Edirne</i>	<i>Aziz/Berat</i>	<i>Aristidi Pasha/İzmir</i>
<i>Mustafa/Tokad</i>		<i>Necip/Debre</i>	
<i>Şevket/Erzurum</i>		<i>Müfit/ Ergiri</i>	
<i>Fevzi/ Karahisar-ı Şarki</i>		<i>Mustafa/Karahisar-ı Şarki</i>	
<i>Vehbi/Konya</i>			
10	6	9	6

Table 2: Most voiced motions by the deputies

Complainants to be Judged	Governors Should be Warned by Parliament	Vote for The Practice of Executive Power	Interpellation for the Ministry (İstizah)
<i>Artas/Salonika</i>	<i>Abdülmecit Zehravi/Hama</i>	<i>Honeos/Salonika</i>	<i>Halil/Menteşe</i>
<i>Hızır Lütü / Zor</i>	<i>Honeos/Salonika</i>		
2	2	1	1
Ministry of Interior Should Be Liberated	Investigation Committee/ Particular Commission/ Further Investigation	Take Necessary Precautions in Location	No Further Action Needed
<i>Hayrullah / Yozgat</i>	<i>Ahmet Nesimi/İstanbul</i>	<i>Hızır Lütü / Zor</i>	<i>Müfit Bey /Ioannina</i>
	<i>Ali Cenani/Aleppo</i>		<i>Mehmet Rıza /Erzurum</i>
	<i>Taha/Hakkari</i>		
1	3	1	2

Table 3: Less voiced motions by the deputies

When we look at the third table, we see the motions voiced or written by a smaller number of deputies. In this group, there was a tendency of parliamentarians acting more cautiously and to investigate the issue in more depth. Especially the establishment of a particular commission or a committee of investigation, the parliamentary vote on the executive power, and the no-confidence motions against the Minister of Interior put the regulatory and supervisory principle of the parliament in

the foreground. At this point, Menteşe Deputy Halil defended the administrators by stating that they only obeyed the instructions of the Ministry of Interior, and he proposed an interpellation against the Minister. The only no-confidence motion against the Minister in the parliamentary group came from Halil. The motion of Honeos, who wanted to open the practice of the Executive Power to the parliamentary vote, was at least as unique as Halil's. Honeos was definitely in favor of resolving the case within parliament without forwarding it elsewhere and believed in the supervisory power of the legislature versus the executive power, that is, parliamentary activism.

While Rıza Tevfik was in favor of resolving the issue in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, Hayrullah from Yozgat claimed that the Ministry of Interior must be freed completely in its decision since the issue was a matter of executive power. However, while Rıza Tevfik did this with a supervisory motive and acted with the aim of receiving feedback from the Ministry, Hayrullah leaved the authority completely to the Ministry. There were also deputies who argued that the parliament should bypass Ministries and warn or reprimand the administrators directly. The direct pressure of parliamentary activism on the executive power was also encountered here, and it held the representatives of the nation above all powers.

Interestingly, a small number of deputies such as Artas from Salonika and Hızır Lütfi from Zor wanted the complainants to be judged. However, we see that they also differed at this point. Artas asked the Sheikhs to be taken to the court for justifying the accuracy of the banishment decision, while Hızır Lütfi demanded that they be tried and punished in order to prevent them from causing bigger events.

4.4. Full Disclosure by Sulaymaniyah Mufti Abdülaziz

One week after the 20th of January session, Ottoman Parliament discussed a very crucial and extensive petition reached from Müfti Abdülaziz and his companions of Sulaymaniyah. The document did not only disclose the damages Sheikh Said inflicted on sub-province, but also ended with a striking proposal from the Mufti to the Government. They addressed Said as ‘the inventor of ominous era’ (*devr-i menhusun*

mucidi) and ‘the traitor who was the informant of the realm and nation’ (*mülk ve milletin muhbiri hain*).⁶⁴⁸ According to the petition, Said was cherished, praised and appreciated by the former regime as he was allocated a 3.000 lira annual allowance.⁶⁴⁹ Said and his affiliates had caused some terrific incidents as Talabani and Koy Sanjaq (*Köysancak*) by exploiting the strength of some fugitive prisoners who were in obedience to them.⁶⁵⁰ From their perspective, Said’s affiliates were the ultimate reason of the murders of many innocent individuals, arsons of numerous villages and the lootings of properties and households.⁶⁵¹ Their investigation files regarding to their crime activities like murder, arson and looting were submitted to Kirkuk, Diyarbakir and Mosul courts through the verdict of Court of Cassation (*Mahkeme-i Temyiz*).⁶⁵² Court of Cassation which was located at the Ministry of Justice in Istanbul, was in charge of reviewing and resolving the legality of the decisions appealed from provincial judicial authorities.⁶⁵³ In other words, even if the provincial courts had appealed the decisions against Sheikhs, the Court of Cassation had passed their sentences and had served them to the provincial courts.

Unfortunately, the crimes they had committed up to that point were not limited to these and Abdülaziz’s petition submitted an exceedingly long list:

⁶⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10; No date on this telegram copy but it’s attached to DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 11, 13 Kanunusani 1324-26 January 1909 which was transmitted to the Ministry of Interior.

BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 1; The same telegram was to be sent by the same petitioners to Grand Vizirate on 26 Kanunusani 1324-8 February 1909

“Devri-i menhusun mucidi, mülk ve milletin muhbiri hain, izzet ve tahsininolub senevi 3 bin lira iradesineve muafiyete nailiyet ve ali rütbe ve nişanlar ihrazına muvafakkiyetle yedlerindeki mabeyn şifresi vasıtasıyla hafiyelik vezaife-i nameşruasiyla”

⁶⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“daire-i itaatlarına aldıkları bir takım mahkumin firarikuvvetiyle Talabani ve Köysancak hadise-i müdhışlerine ve birçok masumların katline ve müteaddid kuranın ihrakına ve emval ve eşyanın yağmasına sebebiyet vermiş”

⁶⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“..ve kendi beyinlerinde vukua getirdikleri katl ve ihrak nehb gibi mevad-ı cinaiyeye dair birçok evrak tahkikiyeleri Mahkeme-i Temyizin ilamıyla evvelce Kerkük Diyarbakir Musul mahkemelerine nakil edilmiş”

⁶⁵³ Avi Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p.36

- *Lately they had attacked on Hamawand tribe and local landlords; dared atrocities like slaughtering their population, looting and arsonism of their property. **
- *They had seized the properties of local notables like Fettah Bey, Hacı Hüseyin, Mülazım Cemil and had injured their sons and relatives.*
- *They had set Sulaymaniyah Market on fire many times.*
- *They had grabbed the money of a local notable named Kadir-i Necat.*
- *Since their despotic desires were not satisfied; they had opened fire on the Government office while the former Sub-Governor Osman Pasha was in there and they had repeatedly fired on the houses of some notables and officials with intent to kill.*
- *They had insulted municipal and administrative officials in their official posts.*
- *They had stolen Martin rifles worth of 60 or 70.000 liras.*
- *They had violated security and public order internally and externally though evacuating prisoners from the prison and imprisoning individuals in their own property.*
- *They had reduced the annual revenue of treasury from 50.000 to 19.000 lira.⁶⁵⁴*

Abdülaziz and his companions particularly emphasized that The Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Hass-ı Vükela*) had issued an imperial decree to banish them to Basrah in

⁶⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

"ve ahiren Hemvend ve ağavat-ı mahalliye üzerine hücumla itlaf-ı nüfus ve nehb ve ihrak gibi fazaya ictisar, Fettah Bey, Hacı Hüseyin, Mülazım Cemil efendilerin emlaklarını zabt, mahdum ve akrabalarını cerh, defaatle Süleymaniye Çarşısını ihrak, eşraf-ı beldeden Kadir-i Necat namıyla kilitli mebalığı cebren ahz ve hatta amal-i müstebidanelerinin adem-i is'afından naşi Mutasarrıf-ı esbak Osman Paşa'yla hükümet konağında ve bazı eşraf ve memurinin hanelerine katl kastıyla biddefaat yayılım ateşle icra ve makam-ı resmîyede belediye mülkiye memurlarını tahkir ve de altmış yetmiş binlik Martin tüfengi sirkat ve kalemin yazmaya haya edeceği enva-i ceraimi irtikab ve hapishaneden mahbus çıkarmak ve hanelerinde adam haps etmek suretiyle dahilen haricen emniyet ve asayiş ihlal, senevi elli bin raddesinde olan varidat-ı hazineyi on dokuz bin lira raddesine tenzil ve i'sal."

* This statement above on Hamawands may seem quite problematic since the relations between the Barzanjiyah clan and Hamawand tribe are known to be quite good. However, relations between Barzanjiyah and Hamawand were not always as good as in the Post-Constitutional Mosul. In 1905, Sheikh Said and his supporters had attacked the Hamawand villages and the situation was reported to the Sultan. Although the local authorities wanted to use force against Said and the Council of Ministers approved it, Abdulhamid refused to do so.

Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq...*, p.85

case of recidivism but even this ultimatum could not resolve the problem eventually.⁶⁵⁵ According to them, people were excessively tired and disgusted of their long-time atrocities and tyranny.⁶⁵⁶

They also expressed that the public peace was restored as these tyrants were banished to provincial center, but the community was still full of hate towards these exiles.⁶⁵⁷ At this point, the main purpose of the petition began to be understood more clearly. The petitioners were extremely uncomfortable over the possibility of Sheikh Said being sent back to Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah and wanted to rule out this possibility from the very beginning. Accordingly, the return of these Sheikhs to Sulaymaniyah would bring many deaths and would mean a terrific comeback of the former era.⁶⁵⁸ The petition interpreted the feelings of all residents of the sub-province as they had felt desperate and anxious because of this annoying possibility which was adverse to the religion and constitution by all means.⁶⁵⁹ Besides, they also accused the Sheikhs of being the bloodthirsty souls who had petitioned authorities with their fake sealed telegrams regarding to their so-called innocence.⁶⁶⁰ Allegedly, these attempts had also encouraged Sheikh Abdülkadir, as the president of Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress in Istanbul, to take some actions regarding to their wills.⁶⁶¹ Petitioners argued that Sheikh Abdülkadir had presented the wills of these ‘so-called Sheikhs’ (*müteşeyyihler*)* to the Grand Vizirate to produce a top-down effect on the Government and had also made published their good deeds in the newspaper to keep their real attitudes unaccounted.⁶⁶² In other words, Sheikhs in Sulaymaniyah have been

⁶⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“bu hunharların sahte mührileriyle masumiyetlerine dair makamata çektikleri telgraf ve istidaların ilkaat ve teşebbüsât üzerine darsaadetteki Kürd Teavün Cemiyeti reisi ayanından Şeyh Abdullah Efendizade Şeyh Kadir Efendi hazretleri tarafından makam-ı sadarete takdim ettirilib gazetede münderiç-i arifede mezkur Müteşeyyihlerin bilakis hüsn-i hallerinin bast ve beyan edilmiş olmasının esbabı..... ..merkumatin ahvallerinin hakaikine adem-i vukufunun eyletilmesidir.”

* In some official correspondence and even in the Parliamentary Minutes, instead of *Meşayih* (مشايخ), which means plural of Sheikh, the word *Müteşeyyih* (متشيع) with negative meaning is used, which means ‘those who pretend to be Sheikh’ or ‘so-called or phony Sheikhs’.

<http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=me%C5%9Fayih&t=%40>

lobbying political offices and conducting press campaigns through the access of Abdülkadir to different authorities and channels.

Abdülaziz and his companions also reminded that, as the Sulaymaniyah community, they had repeatedly informed the Grand Vizirate, Ministry of Interior, Mosul Governorate, Central Committee of Sulaymaniyah (CUP branch) and the Ottoman press as they had applied to the Imperial Chamberlain, Ministry of Justice and the Chief of Provincial Court Records.⁶⁶³ They asked, ‘*what if all the moans and screams of the people will not be paid attention as in the former regime?*’.⁶⁶⁴ In fact, if these roots of mischief and mutiny were going to be sent back to Sulaymaniyah, they would certainly be obliged to leave their positions as all the notables of sub-province with its peripheral area.⁶⁶⁵ Petitioners offered two options to the Government; either those evildoers were to be banished to another location through execution of a criminal sentence or all petitioners were to abandon their properties and entitled to have state-provided properties in another province in return.⁶⁶⁶ They were determined to get rid of those Sheikhs even if it would practically change their entire lives and they were even dareful to challenge the state for this purpose. The petition was signed as Abdülaziz and his companions, on behalf of twenty individuals as notables, gentry, religious leaders of the sub-province with all its tribes and community.⁶⁶⁷

Ahmed Rıza, The President of Chamber of Deputies, forwarded the telegram to the Ministry of Interior with a ‘memorandum 9’ (9 numaralı tezkire) notifying its crucial content and requesting for further action.⁶⁶⁸ The following week, the Ministry of

<http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=m%C3%BCte%C5%9Feyyih&t=%40> Access Date: 31.12.2020

⁶⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“velhasıl defaatle Sadaret-i Azamiye, Dahiliyeye, Musul Vilayetine, Süleymaniye Merkez-i Umumisiyle matbuat-ı Osmaniye maddeten ve.....arz idildiği vechle merkum şeyhlerin ta’dad olunan ceraim-i vakilerinden dolayı Mabeyn-i Hümayun kalemî ve Adliye Nezareti Celilesiyle Taşra Mehakimi Kuyud Reisine müracaat buyurulduğunun”

⁶⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“ahalinin bunca nale ve figanına devr-i sabıkta olduğu gibi iltifat olunmuyorsa”

⁶⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“badi-i fesad ve ihtilal azim olan merkumat-ı sahabete Süleymaniye’ye iadeleri halinde artık mamûlhakat terk-i erkana mecburiyetimiz muhakkak olmasına mebnî”

⁶⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

“ya merkumlar hakkında kanunenceza tertibiyle mahall-i ahraya te’bidleri yahud umumiyyetle terk edeceğimiz emlaka mukabil diğer vilayetin emlakın ihsanıyla naklimize müsaade ve teskin-i heyecan emrinde bir karar acil ittihaz ve tebliğ buyrulmasına”

⁶⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10

⁶⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 11, 13 Kanunusani 1324-26 January 1909

Interior responded to the Chamber of Deputies with a message explaining how the Government made the decision to return the Sheikhs to Kirkuk and which bureaucratic stages and judicial complications they have been through instead of mentioning local sensitivities.⁶⁶⁹

Obviously, state authority was much more concerned on maintaining the judicial procedures properly rather than resolving the problems of Sulaymaniyah community. We understand this from the fact that the Sheikhs were transferred to Kirkuk in any case, although all these petitions and complaints rejected the return of the Sheikhs. The issue of Sheikhs' further residence in Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah was considered on 'how to involve them to the investigation' rather than their possible damage they can furtherly inflict on the community. The brand-new parliament had also fallen into a dilemma within itself, shifting between what the libertarian Constitutional environment had recommended and the requirements of controlling a troubled province like Mosul. In problematic provinces such as Mosul, security concerns outweighed the libertarian principle of Constitutionalism.

⁶⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kanunusani 1324- 03 February 1909

CHAPTER 5: DEEPENING AND EXPANSION OF THE CRISIS

5.1. Sâdât's Seek of Justice

This section will examine the pressure policy of the Sâdât bloc in the tense environment immediately after the Mosul Incident and how the state authority responded to this pressure. Dismissal of Sub-Governor Tevfik and relegation of Commander Mustafa, in order to reduce the pressure were the primary precautions taken by the state. However, the crisis was to be deepened and expanded as the seek for justice was voiced by other religious orders and tribal groups beside Sâdât. During this process leading to the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, the state could not re-establish authority and the Barzanjiyah Sheikhs who were transferred to Kirkuk were consolidated with these religious orders and tribal elements.

February was to be more difficult than ever in every way. While Central Government pushed the Provincial Administration to restore the public order and pacify the community, Sâdât still expected justice to be served after the killing of Sheikh Said. The first and most important move of the Central Authority was to dismiss Tevfik, who was already consulted with the Mosul Governorate in December but received partial support from Zeki. According to Zeki, as Tevfik did not adopt any bad attitude and did not take any improper action, his dismissal was unfair, but now he could be assigned to a different location due to the existing conditions.⁶⁷⁰ Because, after the Mosul Incident, the public opinion of Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk completely turned against Tevfik due to the pressure and victimization Sâdât was subjected to.⁶⁷¹ According to Zeki, as long as the people thought that Tevfik was involved in Mosul

⁶⁷⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/80, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

“mumaunileyh bir guna su-i hali ve hareketi görülmediğine mebni azli muvafık-ı adalet değilse de ahval-i hazıraya nazaran bekası da mahzurdan salim olmayacağı anlaşılmış olduğundan başka bir mahale tahviliyle Süleymaniye’ye münasib bir mutasarrıfın tayini ve izamı”

⁶⁷¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/80, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik Paşa’nun işarı üzerine Sâdât ın vaka-i malumedenkalmalarından dolayı Süleymaniye ve Kerkük havalisi ahalisinin efkar-ı umumisi mutasarrıf mumaunileyhin aleyhine dönmüş”

Incident, it was not possible for him to serve there.⁶⁷² As a result, Zeki now waited for a suitable sub-Governor to be appointed and sent to Sulaymaniyah.⁶⁷³

Meanwhile, Sâdât also increased the pressure. A telegram dispatched by some Sâdât affiliates such as Ali, Derviş, Mufti Hasan and Servant of Sâdât (*Hadim-iil Seccade*) Emin from Kirkuk, accused Brigadier General Mustafa as the number one conspirator and cursed her personality.⁶⁷⁴ According to the message, Mustafa was a representative of the most brutal segment of society, and he had inflicted a brutal persecution that had not yet been written down on the pages of history.⁶⁷⁵ They claimed that Mustafa's opposition to Sâdât had been known for a long time, and that he intended to completely destroy the obedience of this vast land to Sâdât.⁶⁷⁶ Mustafa, who was later assigned to his new post in Kirkuk, was now requested to be appointed to a farther place for the homeland security, as it was obvious that he could violate the security and order from such a close distance.⁶⁷⁷ It was known that Mustafa had been complained about for a long time, but it was unknown why the Ministry of War had still assigned him in the immediate vicinity. Upon ongoing complaints about Mustafa, the 6th Army Command had removed him from his post in Sulaymaniyah but had appointed him as the Deputy Commander of a close unit like the 23rd Reserve Division (23. *Redif Fırkası*) in Kirkuk.⁶⁷⁸ However, the Minister of War Ali, who was overwhelmed by Sâdât's continuous demands, did not want to hear about Mustafa anymore.⁶⁷⁹ 12th Division was now ordered to complete the investigation on Mustafa, which had been initiated before,

⁶⁷² BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/80, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

⁶⁷³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/80, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

⁶⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 3, no date mentioned

⁶⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 3, no date mentioned

"Cemiyet-i beşeriyenin en gaddar taifesinden olub zulümleriyle tevarih sahifelerini lanetle işgal eden nemrud şiddet.....reva görülmediği bir suret"

⁶⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 3, no date mentioned

"Bir hıta-i azimenin Seyyidzade-i itaat ve intizamını toptan tahribe bais ve efkar-ı reddiyesi vaktiyle memleketimizce de anlaşılan"

⁶⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 3, no date mentioned

"ve bu kerre de livamıza iade ettirilen paşay-ı mumaunileyhin emniyet-i umumiye münselib ve devamı aile-i Marufazuhurunu badi olacağına diğer mahale aldırılması selamet-i vatan namına katiyyen matlubdur."

⁶⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 4, 19 Kanunusani 1324 – 01 February 1909

"Mustafa Paşa hakkında mukaddema vuku bulan şikayat üzerine Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümayun kumandanlığı vekaletine sebk iden tebligata cevaben varid olan telgrafnamede Redif 23. Fırka kumandanlığı vekaletini ifa eylemek üzere ahiren Kerkük'e aldırılmış olan mumaunileyh Mustafa Paşa'nın"

⁶⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 4, 19 Kanunusani 1324 – 01 February 1909

but remained pending after the rising tension in Sulaymaniyah due to the Mosul incident.⁶⁸⁰ While the calm was restored and the conditions were favorable, Minister Ali ordered Mustafa to be sent to the 6th Army in Baghdad and the investigation to be concluded swiftly by cooperating with the civil administration.⁶⁸¹ Apparently, although this investigation was conducted by the 12th Division in Kirkuk, the 6th Army also needed to be involved in the process, as the case would probably be heard by the military court in Baghdad. In addition, since the accusations against Mustafa and the incidents he was involved in were entirely related to the civilian population, Ali Rıza Pasha especially sought the cooperation of the civilian administration.

On 6th of February, a telegram signed by the ‘Sheikh of Naqshbandiyya Tariqah (*Tarikat-ı Nakşibendiyye Halifesi*) Ebubekir and his companions ‘Sheikhs of Qadiriyya and Khalidiyya Tariqahs’ (*Tarikat-ı Kadiriyye ve Halidiyye Hülefası*) with other major Ulema, Sâdât and notables was dispatched from Erbil directly to the Sultan.⁶⁸² They depicted the Sheikh Said incident with some disturbing details and sought justice through the Sultan.⁶⁸³ They portrayed the grandfather of Said, Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Effendi as the member of ‘Pure Dynasty of Prophethood’ (*Sülale-i Tahire-i Nebeviyye*) and the chief of all Iraqi Sâdât (*umum Sâdât-i İraqiyya*) as famous of being a ‘religious fortitude’ (*salabet-i diniyye*).⁶⁸⁴ More than 30 of his men and many people of Kirkuk, Erbil, Akre and Rawandiz were killed by thousands of coordinated and prepared aggressors of Mosul in such a brutal way as similar to a ‘second Karbala’ (*ikinci defa Kerbela’ya müşabih bir suret-i gaddaranede*).⁶⁸⁵ Sheikh Said himself who resided in his house located close to the Government office, was tragically and savagely killed by these aggressors with no mercy and no remorse.⁶⁸⁶ Since these

⁶⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 4, 19 Kanunusani 1324 – 01 February 1909

“oradan dahi kaldırılması Kerkük Meşayihî ve Sâdât’ı tarafından suret-i katiyyede taleb edilmekte olduğundan Bağdad’a celbi istizan ve Musul Hadisesinin Süleymaniye’ce mucib olduğu su-i tesir ve heyecan sebebiyle şimdiye kadar tehir etmiş olan tahkikatın”

⁶⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 4, 19 Kanunusani 1324 – 01 February 1909

“bu günlerde avdet etmiş olan sükunetten bil-istifade cihet-i mülkiye ile müttehiden sürat-i icra ve ikmalî için 12. Fırka kumandanlığı vekaletine emir verildiği ilaveten dermeyan edilmiş ve Mustafa Paşa’nın Bağdada celbi muvafık olmakla”

⁶⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

⁶⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

⁶⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

⁶⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

⁶⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

aggressors were so full of hate and unsatisfied, they had partially burnt the dead bodies after all.⁶⁸⁷ According to those religious leaders, this assault on the Mosul province of Iraqi line, generated an extraordinary importance, and caused a deep sorrow on both Turkish and Kurdish communities.⁶⁸⁸ In their conscience, everyone expected justice to be served through penalizing these faithless murderers since the negligence will cause further evil most probably.⁶⁸⁹ Immediately after, the Mosul Governorate was telegraphed for further action and relevant investigation with aforementioned message attached.⁶⁹⁰

In a correspondence regarding to the Sulaymaniyah CUP branch, Zeki stated that, after the incident, the tribal chiefs in Sulaymaniyah tended towards the Sheikhs and eventually the townspeople were left alone against the Sheikhs.⁶⁹¹ At this point where the branch was questioned by the superior authorities, it was quite possible that Zeki might think that the Sulaymaniyah cadre of the CUP as a guardian of the balance of power in the town. Because when the tribes took the side of the Sheikhs, the balance of power and local dynamics have changed considerably and the struggle between the provincial cliques and the Unionist authority had surfaced obviously.

In order to relieve the authorities stressed by the intelligence from the French Consulate, Zeki reported that "there is no need for concern here", referring to the entire province.⁶⁹² However, in the same message, Zeki stated that the false rumors about that 'Mosul residents in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah would be killed', caused a little excitement.⁶⁹³ Zeki added that because of this excitement, foreigners and officials across the province were also afraid.⁶⁹⁴ However, the excitement was calmed by the

⁶⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

⁶⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

"Hıttı-i Irakiyede mütemekkin umum Elli Binden mütecaviz Türk ve Kürd kavimlence bir ehemmiyet-i fevkaladeyi ihraz ve bu yüzden bir beis-i azim"

⁶⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kanunusani 1324 – 06 February 1909

⁶⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 17, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

⁶⁹¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/162, 26 Kanunusani 1324- 08 February 1909

"vaka-i malumeden sonra aşair şeyhler tarafına temayül ederek muhalifleri kasaba ahalisine münhasır kaldığı cihetle"

⁶⁹² BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/161, 26 Kanunusani 1324 – 08 February 1909

"buraca mucib-i endişeye bir hal yoktur"

⁶⁹³ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/161, 26 Kanunusani 1324 – 08 February 1909

"Kerkük ve Süleymaniye'de bulunan Musullulların katl olacağı şayia-i kazibesi üzerine biraz heyecan hasıl olmuş ve buradaki memurin ve yabancılar da korkmuş iseler de"

⁶⁹⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/161, 26 Kanunusani 1324 – 08 February 1909

communication established with sub-divisions and effective advices given.⁶⁹⁵ Although he meant "no worries" between the lines, this ambivalent attitude of Zeki was a signal that great troubles could arise, especially in sub-divisions. The fact that the partial deployment of Joint Task Force still did not relieve Zeki, can be explained by his concerns about sub-divisions that are not in sight, unlike the provincial center. Because the judicial infrastructure was still not established and the delay in the Government action increased the concerns.⁶⁹⁶ Upon Zeki's hesitant reply, the information flow between the Grand Vizirate, Ministries of Interior and Justice resumed and accelerated.⁶⁹⁷ Although serious measures were taken and a constant effort was made by the Provincial Administration, the people wanted to see action and results.⁶⁹⁸ According to the letter of the Ministry of Interior, this action and results depended on the establishment of the judicial organization in Mosul as soon as possible, which was decided by the Council of Ministers.⁶⁹⁹

In addition to religious formations, local elements such as tribes started to put pressure on Istanbul. The leaders of the Talabani tribe, led by Sheikh Abdulhamid, gave a tacit ultimatum in the telegram they sent to the Chamber of Deputies and declared that if the provocateurs and perpetrators of such a disaster that plagued the whole Islamic world were not found and punished, this issue could never be passed on in silence.⁷⁰⁰ Leaders stated that almost two months have passed since the incident, no action has been taken against the perpetrators by the Government and they have been waiting for a quick justice from the Parliament.⁷⁰¹

⁶⁹⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/161, 26 Kanunusani 1324 – 08 February 1909

"mülhakatlara cereyan eden muhabere ve icra kılınan vesaya-i müessire üzerine heyecan teskin edilmiş"

⁶⁹⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/161, 26 Kanunusani 1324 – 08 February 1909

"ve askerin de bir kısmı gelmiş ise de her taraf icraat-ı hükümet intizar etmekte olup meclis-i mahsus-i vükela kararıyla tebliğ buyurulan teşkilat-ı adliye de henüz icra buyurulmamış ve icraat-ı hükümetin uzaması mahzurdan gayri salim bulunmuş olduğu"

⁶⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2735/98/Lef 2, 29 Kanunusani 1324- 11 February 1909

⁶⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2735/98/Lef 2, 29 Kanunusani 1324- 11 February 1909

⁶⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2735/98/Lef 2, 29 Kanunusani 1324- 11 February 1909

⁷⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 59, 31 Kanunusani 1324- 13 February 1909

"Bütün alem-i İslamiyeti dağdar eden böyle bir mesele-i faciada bu derece iltizam-ıbadi esefdar bu babda hükümetçe bir mülahaza ve tereddüd var ise muharrik ve faillerin tedib ve mücazatını itadatemin ederiz ki bu madde hiçbir vakit sükut ile geçirilemez"

⁷⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 59, 31 Kanunusani 1324- 13 February 1909

In these days when a breaking point was expected for Sulaymaniyah, the message traffic between the town and Istanbul was again accelerated. Under the leadership of Ayşe and Emine, the wives of all Sâdât Sheikhs sent a message to the Grand Vizirate and complained of Tevfik Pasha's grudge, false allegations, provocations, and bloodshed treatment towards themselves.⁷⁰² According to the message, Tevfik has been working for the destruction of the 700-year-old sayyid dynasty in Iran, Iraq and Kurdistan, and there was no need to explain the possible religious and political consequences this might have.⁷⁰³ Even if the news of Tevfik's dismissal had relieved them partially; they literally begged for Tevfik to be sent as soon as possible and to appoint a deputy in his place until the arrival of his successor.⁷⁰⁴ So that the blood shedding incidents that took place with Tevfik's constant falsifications would be stopped, and innocent orphans and women would be saved from these terrible pains.⁷⁰⁵ Apparently, although Tevfik was dismissed at the beginning of the February and Ziya Pasha was appointed to his place, the change of duty did not take place yet and Sâdât's wives had run out of patience. Ongoing messages and applications have achieved their goal and the Ministry asked the Mosul Province to quickly appoint a deputy in place of Tevfik Pasha until his successor arrives.⁷⁰⁶

As events unfold, tribal chiefs in Sulaymaniyah dispatched a threatening telegram to the Ministries of War and Interior. The message dispatched from Chamchamal was signed by five chieftains including Chief of Tribe Sheikh Yusuf *, Chief of Tribe Reşid, Chief Hamza, Chief of Faction (*Reis-i Fırka*) Tevfik and Chief (other) Reşid.⁷⁰⁷

⁷⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 1, 5 Şubat 1324 – 18 February 1909

“Kan içinde askerimiz püryan , tasviri nakabil kalbimizin perişan olduğuna, teskin-i gazez etmeyen Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa, tezvirat, tahrikat , muamelat-ı hunrizanesi her anda tecdid-i hatim, tezyid-i azab ve elem etmektedir.”

⁷⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 1, 5 Şubat 1324 – 18 February 1909

“Yedi yüz seneden beri İran Kürdistan Irakda müştahir hanedan-ı Ulema ve siyadetin imhası yolundaki tasaddiyatına karşı diyaneten hükûmeten ne derecelerde tesirat vereceği müstağni-i izahtır.”

⁷⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 1, 5 Şubat 1324 – 18 February 1909

“acilen vüruduna değin bir vekilin tayin ve mutasarrıf mumaunileyhin hareket-ı azabından istihlasımızı kemal-i tazarru ve sabırsızlıkla istirham eyleriz”

⁷⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 1, 5 Şubat 1324 – 18 February 1909

“Mumaunileyhin tezvirat-ı mütevelliyesinden melhuz bulunan birçok sefk-i dima-i muhatara-i azimenin itfası, eytam ve nisvan-ı masumenin yorulmakta olan elem-i müthişten reha buyurulmaları”

⁷⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 8, 10 Şubat 1324 – 23 Şubat 1909

⁷⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 36, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 February 1909

That was a clear message voicing that they were not going to tolerate or respond humanely after such a heinous crime against Sheikh Said [as such a virtuous, pious and righteous man], his family, his congregation and Kurdish community.⁷⁰⁸ It was directly expressed that their tragic martyrdom which shattered the hearts of entire humanity was not going to be tolerated.⁷⁰⁹ If the perpetrators were not going to be severely punished soon, they were sworn to fight to the last drop of blood in the name of revenging the souls of this ‘custodian dynasty’ and blessing the soul of the glorious prophet Muhammed of both universes.⁷¹⁰ That day, another assertive message with a similar content also dispatched by different tribal chiefs such as Hamawand Kerim of Begzada (*Begzade*- بڭزادة), Chief Mahmud of Rashwand (*Reşvend*- رشوند), Chief Ahmed of Khizirvand (*Hızırvend*- خضروند), Chief Mahmud of Ramawand (*Remavend*- رموند) and Chief Ali of Hamail (*Hemail*- همایل) from Chamchamal.⁷¹¹ As Yusuf did, they too, claimed that Said fell victim to the personal interests and ambitions of the Sulaymaniyah officials and the Government remained silent after the incident.⁷¹² According to the chiefs, the level of brutality of the Mosul residents exceeded even the devil’s, and if the state did not secure the justice, they would do so.⁷¹³

* No village or tribe named *Teberini* (تبرینی) or *Tebrini* was found in available sources. It can be a family name or a nickname. Although their tribal names were not mentioned in the message, these chieftains were probably affiliated to the Chamchamal-based Hamawand Confederacy.

⁷⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 36, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 February 1909

“Yezid’in bile nefretine layık Musullar tarafından saadet fazilet şeyhuhet salah ve zühdüne ilaveten hafızı bulunduğu kıraatı şefi etmiş olan Şeyh Said ve oğlu Ahmed ve kırkdan mütecaviz müridi ve itbaatın ve iki yüzmahal-i muhtelifeden Kürd Urbanın katilleri ve beşbin lira eşya ve nükud ve mevaşlarının nehi ulya uslub-u hakiyane ile savuşturacak değiliz”

⁷⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 36, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 February 1909

“kaffe-i beşeri dilhun eden facia-ı şهادetlerini bir türlü hazim edemeyeceğimizden”

⁷¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 36, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 February 1909

“müsebbibleri hakkında kariben mücazaat-ı şedide icra olunmazsa”

“bu ‘hanedan-ı müzahir’ hakkında vuku bulan tecavüz ve hakaret uğurunda kanımızın son katresini akıtmak suretiyle ruh-u pür fütuh Seyyid-ül Kevneyn’i şad edeceğimizebillahi arzederiz”

⁷¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 5-6, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

Begzade Aşireti Hemvend Kerim, Reis-i Reşvend Mahmud ,Reis-i Hızırvend Ahmed, Reis-i Remavend Mahmud,Reis-i Hemail Ali. All of these tribes, except Khizirvand, belonged to the Hamawand Confederacy, while the Khizirvand belonged to the Pahla (Fayli) Confederacy.

For a successful categorization of Arabian, Kurdish and Assyrian tribes in Iraq please see: Charlotte Hille, *Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq*, International Comparative Social Studies, Volume: 43 (Leiden: Brill, 2020) p.238-243

⁷¹² BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 5-6, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

“Kutb-ül arifin Şeyh Ahmed Kan hazretlerinin hafid ve canişin Şeyh Said Efendi hazretleriyle birader mahadim akrabalarının, memuriyet ve menfaatlerini temin fikrinden başka bir esbab-ı kanunu olmayan Süleymaniye memurları tarafından Musul’a tebidlerinde haksızlığa sükun eden hükümetimiz”

⁷¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 5-6, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

On the same day, another telegram sent by major Sheikhs of Sâdât in Sulaymaniyah, headed by Said's son Seyyid Mahmud (*Şehid Şeyh Said Efendizade*)*, again sought justice, but this time the target was clear.⁷¹⁴ In the message they stated that the dismissed Sub-Governor Tevfik was ready to depart, but it would not be enough and fair to just dismiss him.⁷¹⁵ As Tevfik victimized not only Sâdât but the entire Islamic world, they requested him to be judged in the Kirkuk courthouse and that justice to be served.⁷¹⁶ According to Sâdât, before moving in a different route and before covering up his crimes he was supposed to be brought to the Kirkuk and held in there until the day of the trial.⁷¹⁷ The message arrived a few days after the caravan attack, but it seems from the content that it was written before Tevfik departed. With this last move, it can be thought that Sheikhs tried to punish Tevfik through legal means without the need for illegal and fatal means such as a caravan attack. Perhaps sheiks evaded responsibility for the caravan attack by showing that they tried all legal ways to get justice. In any case, it was obvious that Sâdât would try to take revenge on Tevfik somehow, whether legal or not. Because, even though Tevfik was dismissed of his duty, he was still seen as one of the major responsible for the Mosul conspiracy, and all the steps he took were closely followed by both the Sheikhs and the tribes.

5.1.1. Seek of Justice in the Manifest of Sâdât

In the February Manifest, Sâdât wrote about the fact that they could no longer control the power depending on their doctrine and that if justice is not served, different

"İblisin bile lanetine layık Musullular canibinden"

⁷¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 4, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

* Here too, although it is written almost like Muhammed or Mehmed, it is most likely that the signer was Said's son Mahmud.

⁷¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 4, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

"Mutasarrıf Mumaunileyh munfasılan mütehey-i harekettir. Mücerred infisaliyle Sâdât değil bilumum millet-i İslamiyeye tesir eden mağduriyetimize karşı Kerkük Sancağı mehakimesi huzurunda icra-yı muhakememizle ihkak-ı hakkımız zımında"

⁷¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 4, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

⁷¹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2747/94/ Lef 4, 09 Şubat 1324 – 22 February 1909

"mumaunileyhin başka tarikle hareket ve ihtifa-yı müfside meydan verilmemesiyle muhakeme neticesine kadar Kerkük'e aldırılmasıyla muhakemenin icrasına ve bu yüzden bilcümle ehl-i beyt reis-i şad ve şeyhi olan efkar-ı umumiyyeye sükunet verdirilmesi istikmal-i delalet"

consequences could occur. According to them, even they were in a complete obedience to the Constitutional authority and Governmental ordinance; they were expelled from their hometown and families in contrary to the current laws and practices.⁷¹⁸ Some of them who were miraculously escaped and fortunately survived from Mosul tragedy, were subjugated to be resided in Kirkuk by a following provincial order.⁷¹⁹ They mentioned that, as they followed the state instructions strictly and remained calm, their undeniable obedience and silence were at the utmost degree for sure.⁷²⁰ And it was obvious without any doubt that, the virtue which these qualities will result and require, cannot be tainted with any disgrace.⁷²¹

Consequently, they summarized as they were expelled from their hometown unjustly, they were forced to live in Mosul, their Sheikh, his son, 42 relatives and affiliates were slaughtered in a cruel way resembling Genghis Khan's era.⁷²² Furthermore, they had suffered a loss more than 5.000 liras and some of them were forcibly resided in Kirkuk in such a captivity regardless of law.⁷²³ From their perspective, they were tragically tyrannized in three different ways [mentioned above] as cannot be enforced on anyone in anywhere ruled by a just Government.⁷²⁴ In addition to their houses and families despotically and unjustly devastated, their remaining sons and relatives in

⁷¹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Bizlere Kanun-i Esasi ahkâmına ve evamir-i sadariye kemal-i itaatimizi evvelen : ahkam-ı kavanin-i adliye ve usul-u mer'iyeye muhalif olarak hanmanımızdan, ehl-i iyalimizden derbeder ve teb'id edildiğimiz bir zamanda"

⁷¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"saniyen: bazımızın kaderan-ı harikan ve hamdaniyetin mucizet bahiresiyle Musul Faciasından firar suretiyle tahlis-i cana muvaffak olduktan sonra ve yine o mucize vakiyesiyle ile facia-i mezkure içerisinde katilden masun kalanlarımız vilayetten bir emir ile Kerkükde ikamete gerden-dade olmakla"

⁷²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

⁷²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"inkarı nakabil bir surette isbat ve fevkinde tasavvur olunamayacak bu mutavaat ve sekinetin intac ve istilzam eyleyeceği fazileti hiçbir rezaletiyle telvis etmeyeceğini her şüpheden azade bir surette tezahür etmişken"

⁷²² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"İmdi hanelerimizden beldemizden bi gayri hak tebid edilmek, Musul'da sürurumuzla oğlunun ve kırk iki nefer ekarib ve mutaallukattımız mezalim-i Çengizaneyi aratmayacak bir surette katliam"

⁷²³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"beşbin liralıktan ziyade mutazarrır olmak, Kerkük'de bila hükm ve sebep bir suret-i esirane de ikamete mecbur bulunmak"

⁷²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"hükümet-i adileyle idare olunur hiçbir yerde hiçbir kimse hakkında ika olunamaz üç suretle dağdar mezalim"

Sulaymaniyah were forced to abandon their houses as a result of an obvious slander.⁷²⁵ They reminded, that's why they were not able to understand how come these various major calamities which were absolutely incompatible with constitution and justice, were allowed to be happened.⁷²⁶

At the end of the manifest, there was the crucial part where Sâdât wrote about the crowd that they can no longer control. They particularly remarked that they had restrained thousands of agitated and revengeful people who were sworn an oath to sacrifice their lives and properties.⁷²⁷ Since Sâdât Sheikhs considered themselves properly obedient to law and justice, they claimed that they had restrained their mass from taking all kinds of unreasonable actions by using all its strength.⁷²⁸ However, from their angle, even though a period of months had passed since the incident, hopelessly no actions were taken and agitative events that disturbed the grace, patience, steadiness and peace were not ceased.⁷²⁹ They expected to be paid attention by the authorities and they claimed that each article of their manifest was based on numerous official documents, reliable evidences and witnesses.⁷³⁰

As can be seen, the The Manifest of Sâdât was built on some notions and conveyed its messages based on these notions very clearly. The first notion was *holiness*. A dynasty of hundreds of years was rhetorically glorified, sanctified, and idolized before the state

⁷²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"hane harab istibdad ve itisaf bulunduğumuza.....olmak üzere bir de iftira olduğu güneşten izhar bir surette müsbet bulunan bir husus içinde Süleymaniye'de kalan evlad ve ekaribimizin terk-i hanmana mecbur kalacak muamelata maruz bulundurulmuş"

⁷²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"bu yüzden mahazir-i müdhîse-i mütenevvianın serzeden hudus olmasına sebebiyet verilmesini meşrutiyet ve adaletle ne yolda kabil-i telif ve tevfiğ görüldüğünü tecvîz edilmekte bulunduğunu bir türlü anlayamıyoruz"

⁷²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"hal-i heyecanda bulunan ve intikam uğrunda feday-ı mal ve cana ahd-ü peyman eyleyen binlerce efradı"

⁷²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"havf bari ve kanun ve hükmüne karşı beslediğimiz hüsn-i itaatkarı saikesiyle her türlü hareket-ı gayri ma'kuleden bütün kuvvetimizin harfiyle men' ettikte ise"

⁷²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"ancak vukuat üzerinden aylarca müddet geçtiği halde icraattan bir eser görülemediğini ve ol babda bir ümid bile hasıl olamadığını ve bir taraftan husulen hayır ve tahammülü yakacak , metanet ve sükunet-i harikayı eşecek hadisat-ı şeniya ve teheyüce ardı arkası kesilemediğine mebni"

⁷³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"her fıkrası müteaddid vesâik-i resmîyeye , berahin ve delail-i mutebereye müstenid bulunan maruzatımızın nazar-ı itina ve ehemmiyet alınmasıyla"

authority. The second notion was *victimization*. Sâdât claimed they had been the victims of a conspiracy, their constitutional rights had been violated, and they had suffered intense persecution. The third notion was *innocence*, and Sheikh Said, who was praised in the manifest was an absolutely innocent, sinless man according to the discourse. They manifested that as innocent people, they were subjected to very unfair sanctions, unfounded accusations, and unlawful practices. The fourth notion, however, was different from all of them and showed how Sâdât's power would turn into a weapon against state authority. This notion was a veiled *threat*. Sâdât declared that if justice was not served, they would no longer be able to control the mass devoted to them and would no longer be able to stop thousands of individuals motivated by revenge. This would be the breaking point where the seek for justice turned into a seek for revenge.

5.2. Sâdât's Seek of Revenge

Having lost hope in the pursuit of justice, Sâdât would now turn to different paths, or violence in its full expression. Sâdât's seek for revenge caused a serious devastation that is rare in the history of Sulaymaniyah and left the region in complete chaos for a certain period of time. The process that started with the ambush and attack on Tevfik Pasha's caravan was to be resulted in the siege of the whole town. But how did the chaos created by the Sâdât bloc in Sulaymaniyah almost turned into a civil war? What were the weaknesses and mistakes of the Local Administration at this point? And most importantly, how true were the allegations that army weapons were distributed to the civilian population by the Local Administration? The next three chapters will first examine the caravan's ambush and try to give tactical details and results of this attack. The operational response of the Local Administration and military units towards the ambush will also be observed. Sâdât's objection and self-assertion against the caravan ambush allegations will also be included in this section. Subsequently, subjects such as the tactical formation of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, the religious and tribal leaders of the operation, and the villages where the forces were mobilized will be analyzed. The measures taken by the Local Administration in the face of the siege, the tactical

details of the defense operation and the view of İstanbul on the developments will also be examined. In the final part, the 6th Army's course of action in the face of siege, its supervision towards the Sulaymaniyah Administration and the staff changes in the command posts will be covered.

5.2.1. Ambush on Tevfik's Caravan

On February 19, the fear came true and the caravan of Tevfik, who left Sulaymaniyah after his dismissal, was ambushed by Hamawand horsemen at a close distance. Three hours away from Sulaymaniyah, a Kurdish force of 700 people, made up of individuals from the Sulaymaniyah Sâdât and tribes such as Hamawand had blocked the caravan's way.⁷³¹ According to the messages by Zeki, the force consisted of about 300 cavalry and 400 infantries, stormed the caravan and opened fire with the intention of killing the passengers.⁷³² Four soldiers and Tevfik's assistant Hasan were injured in the armed conflict between the attackers and the army and gendarmerie platoons.⁷³³ Two military mules, two Mausers and three Martin rifles, and the cash, belongings and clothes of Medical Senior Captain (*Doktor Kolağası*) Ziya and Captain Fehmi Efendi among the passengers were looted.⁷³⁴ Thanks to the 60-man detachment sent from Sulaymaniyah to their aid, the Sub-Governor was rescued, sent back to Sulaymaniyah safely and was able to start his duty.⁷³⁵ However, all his belongings and possessions were plundered

⁷³¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909; DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

"Süleymaniye'den üç saat kadar ayrıldıktan sonra 700 kadar süvari piyade müsella Ekrad müşarünileyhin katl kastıyla kurşuna tuttukları"

⁷³² BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909; DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

"Süleymaniye'ye üç saatlik mesafede Süleymaniye Sâdât'ına mensub bulunan kesan ile Hemvend vesaire aşairden mürekkeb 300 atlı ve 400 kadar piyade üzerlerine hücumla"

⁷³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

"beraberinde bulunan Nizamiye ve Jandarma müfrezeleriyle aralarında vuku bulan müsademede müfrezelerden 4 neferle hizmetçisi Hasan nam kimesne cerh"

⁷³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

"askerin rükuba mahsus esterlerden iki resle ve iki mavzer ve üç martini tüfenk ve kendileriyle refakatında bulunan Doktor Kolağası Ziya, ve Yüzbaşı Fehmi Efendilerin nü kud ve eşya ve elbiselerini nehb ve garan olunduğu cihetle"

⁷³⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909; DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

by the attackers.⁷³⁶ Primary objectives were to arrest and punish the perpetrators, to ensure a safe travel of the sub-Governor back to town, to recover his seized items and to calm the agitation around Sulaymaniyah.⁷³⁷ Governor Zeki asked the Army Command to be contacted and detachments to be sent from Chamchamal and other adjacent garrisons.⁷³⁸ In addition, effective advices should be given to the necessary tribal chiefs and Sheikhs by contacting the Sub-Governorates of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah.⁷³⁹ Meanwhile, since Tevfik left the town, the office of sub-Governor was handed over to Lt. Colonel Zeki as a deputy.⁷⁴⁰ Governor Zeki asked whether it was permissible to reinstate Tevfik in deputation, who had returned to the town after the attack.⁷⁴¹ As a result, the Ministry had approved Tevfik's continuation of his duty for now.⁷⁴² Meanwhile, the issue had risen to the inter-Ministerial level, the Ministry of War was informed in detail about the ambush and attack and the necessary military reinforcement was requested for the capture and punishment of the Hamawands who were involved in the crime.⁷⁴³

A telegram containing the signatures of more than one hundred Sulaymaniyah notables and led by the Deputy Accountant (*Muhasebeci Vekili*) Maruf, is important both in terms of the details of the Caravan Ambush and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, and in

“Süleymaniye’den gönderilen 60 mevcutlu müfrezenin muavenetiyle Süleymaniye’ye avdetle vekaleten ifa-yı vazifeye mübaşeret olunduğu Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Sabık-ı Tevfik Paşadan alınan telgrafnamede”

⁷³⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı vekaletinden haber alınarak imdadlarına gönderilen müfreze-i askerinin muavenetiyle Mutasarrıf salimen Süleymaniye’ye avdet edebilmiş ise de bütün eşya ve emvalinin muhacimler tarafından yağma olunduğu 12. Fırka Kumandanlığından bildirilmesiyle”

⁷³⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909

“mütecasirlerin derdest ve tedipleriyle Mutasarrıfın selamet-i imrariyle eşya-yı magsubenin istirdadı ve bu sebeble Süleymaniye etrafında heyecana gelen ahalinin teskini için”

⁷³⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909

“Çemçemal ve mahal-i saireden müfrezeler tertibi alınmasını ordu kumandanlığıyla kararlaştırılarak mahalleri kumandanlığına tebligat ifa edilmesi

⁷³⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324- 20 February 1909

“ve tedabir-i lazimenin ittihaz ve icrasıyla muhal-i asayiş ahvalin tekrarına meydan verilmemesi için de Kerkük ve Süleymaniye mutasarrıflıklarıyla icab eden aşaire ve Kerkük’de bulundurulmuş Şeyhlere de tebligat-ı müessire icra kılınması”

⁷⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

⁷⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909

“Emniyet ve Asaışın iade ve temin-i zabıtası da ordu kumandanlığıyla bil-muhabere mutasarrıflık vekaleti Miralay Zeki Beye tevdi olunmuş iken Tevfik Paşa Süleymaniye’ye avdetle vekaleten ifa-yı vazifeye devam etmesi caiz olup olmayacağına emir buyurulması müsterhamdır”

⁷⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 3, 11 Şubat 1324- 24 February 1909

⁷⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 4, 12 Şubat 1324 – 25 February 1909

terms of showing the notables' endorsement for Sub-Governor Tevfik.⁷⁴⁴ This comprehensive telegram will be referred as the message of the Deputy Accountant Maruf in the following sections. The message also included some details about the Caravan Ambush that were not included in the Governor's correspondence. After three hours of their sad farewell to Tevfik Pasha, his caravan on the road to Baghdad was ambushed around the village of Kozaraqa (*Kozereka* - گوزر قه) by a group of bandits whom the Sheikhs in Kirkuk summoned in correspondence and gave verbal instructions and tactics.⁷⁴⁵ The passengers were Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha, Senior Captain Abdülvahab who was routed to his office as the Deputy District Governor of Gulanbar, Medical Senior Captain Ziya, Deputy Battalion Commander Fehmi and School Teacher Captain Said.⁷⁴⁶ They were guarded by First Lieutenant (*Mülazım-ı Evvel*) Maruf and escorted by a force of 45 Muslim individuals under the command of Gendarme Commanders and Mule Cavalry Officers Osman Agha and Ali Effendi.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

The telegram was dispatched to the Grand Vizirate directly, signed by more than a hundred Sulaymaniyah notables headed by Deputy Accountant (*Muhasebeci Vekili*) Maruf and included the names such as Deputy Mufti (*Müfti Vekili*) Mahmud, Correspondence Director (*Müdür-i Tahrirat*) Nureddin, Mayor (*Belediye Reisi*) Abdülğafur, Councilman (*Aza*) Abdurrahman, Councilman (*Aza*) Said, Administrative Councilman (*Meclis-i İdare Azası*) Abdurrahman, Court Clerk (*Zabıt Katibi*) Ahmed, Accountance Expense Clerk (*Muhasebe Masraf Katibi*) Emin, Councilman (*Aza*) Fettah, Councilman (*Aza*) Ahmed, Court Bailiff (*İcra Memuru*) Necib, Accountance Head Clerk (*Muhasebe Baş Katibi*) Derviş, Court Clerk (*Zabıt Katibi*) Mehmed, Clerk (*Katib*) Emin, Head of Penal Chamber (*Ceza Reisi*) Ref'et, Councilman (*Aza*) Kerim, Councilman Assistant (*Aza Mülazımı*) Abdullah, Collection Officer (*Tahsil Memuru*) Tahir, Bank Clerk (*Bank Katibi*) Abdurrahman, Taxation Head Clerk (*Vergi Baş Katibi*) Ali, Registrar (*Nüfus Memuru*) Azmi and Quarantine Clerk (*Karantina Katibi*) Reşid

⁷⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"hüzn ve teessüfle bilteşyi kasabaya avdetimizden üç saat sonra o müddet baid mesafede kain Kozereka karyesi karibinde Musul vak'asından sonra Kerkük'e iade kılınan müteşeyyihlerin tahriren nezdlerine celb ettirdikleri adamlara şifaen verdikleri talimat ve tertibi"

⁷⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

"Mutasarrıf Müşarunileyh ve mahal-i memuriyetine izam olunan Gülanber Kaimakam Vekili Kolağası Abdülvahab ve Doktor Ziya ve Mekteb/Mekatib Muallimlerinden Yüzbaşı Said"

BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909 – Major signers were Deputy Mufti Mahmud, Deputy Accountant Maruf, Administrative Councilman Abdurrahman, Said, Member Abdurrahman, Mayor Abdülğafur, Clerk Emin, Member Cemil and Abdülfettah

"Süleymaniye'den Bağdad'a gönderilen karbanımızdahareket eden Mutasarrıf Sabık-ı Tevfik Paşa, Gülanber Kaimakam Vekili Kolağası Abdülvahab, ve Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Doktor Kolağası Ziya Efendilerin"

⁷⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

After they were ambushed and suddenly fired upon on their way, Hasan the aide of Tevfik Pasha, three gendarmes and one mule cavalry, total five were injured to death, five to ten animals were killed (or looted), two Mauser and three Martin rifles were looted and all personal belongings including their clothes and all cash of the passengers were extorted⁷⁴⁸ Passengers were barely survived by the arrival of reinforcement dispatched from center.⁷⁴⁹ Although slightly different casualty reports reached from different sources, the truth was that the caravan was badly damaged and passengers barely saved their lives. Sulaymaniyah notables in their next message remarked that the Sheikhs in Kirkuk had provoked, seduced and operated the Hamawand bandits through granting a written and an oral password.⁷⁵⁰ Hamawands who were in banditry for the last hundred years were encouraged to ambush, attack and loot their caravan.⁷⁵¹ Notables particularly emphasized that attackers stormed the caravan with the intention of killing and the gunfight took three hours almost.⁷⁵²

However, in the Sâdât Manifest of February, the connection of the Sayyids with the caravan attack was evidently denied and it was claimed that these accusations were completely relied on the setup of Tevfik Pasha:

“However, shameless, evil minded and despicable Tevfik Pasha had attributed the caravan attack which happened on his way from Sulaymaniyah to Baghdad, to Sâdât. It was possible that the attackers were someone who were necessarily obliged to do so

“Mülazım-ı Evvel Maruf efendilerin muhafazasıyla ve Jandarma Kumandan ve Ester Süvar Zabitan Osman Ağa ve Ali Efendinin ma’iyetinde kırkbeş nefer efrad-ı Müslüm bulunduğu halde”

⁷⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“yollarında pusuya yatarak üzerlerine defa’ten yaylım ateş icrasıyla paşayı müşarünileyhin hizmetçilerinden Hasan ve Jandarma efradından üç ve ester süvardan bir ki cem’en beş neferi mülhik surette cerh ve beş on hayvanlarını itlaf ve iki mavzer üç martin ile müşar ve mumaunileyhin üzerlerindeki elbiselerinden başka nükud ve eşyayı zatilerinin umumunu/tamamını gasb ve nehb ettikleri”

BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“müfrezenin kalanı ve atların nekz-i kuvveti vasıtasıyla umumlarını selb (soymak) ve kitlû emval ve eşya ve hayvanımızı nehb vedört beş nefer ester süvar ve zabtiyeyi mühlik derecede cerh ve beş aded mavzer ve martin tüfenklerini nehb ederek”

⁷⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

⁷⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁷⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“yüz seneden beri hal-i şekavette bulunan Hemvend eşkıyalarına tahriren ve şifaen verdikleri parola üzerine kendilerini yağmagirliğe itma’ ve iğfal ile”

⁷⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“katl kastiyle üzerlerine çıkarak üç saat devam eden müsademede”

just because of they had suffered so long under the tyranny of Tevfik and his cohorts. Even he had accused Seyyid Abdülkerim the son of Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed and Seyyid Muhammed in Sulaymaniyah; it was evidently proven and testified that these two men were in their residence with hundreds of their guests including notables, administrative and military officers on the day of incident. In addition to this, Fehmi and Salih had closed down the market by force in the name of deceiving and irritating public opinion; confusing and agitating public minds. On the other hand, after they had apprehended Seyyid Abdülkerim and Muhammed; they had deployed platoons in their houses for pushing them into a maelstrom of calamities and disasters. Eventually, they were obliged to leave their hometown to protect their pride.*”⁷⁵³

Except Soane's travel book, no information has been found in any of the sources in the literature regarding the ambush laid on Tevfik's caravan. Soane approaches the case from a completely different angle and makes the following claims on the caravan ambush:

“The Vali of Mosul was now ordered to proceed to Sulaimania for two reasons. To attempt an investigation of the troubles there, was one; and to punish the robbers of the Mutasarrif, who had left the town and had been assaulted by the shaikhs' horsemen, nearly losing his life, was the other. The shaikhs were, of course, the delinquents; but there was no possibility of fixing the crime upon them, for the people were too much intimidated to utter any complaint openly, and the few Government officials remaining in the town were bought.”⁷⁵⁴

According to Soane, the Sheikhs were guilty, but these accusations could not be expressed openly since people were intimidated and few Government officials were silenced with bribes. However, no details about these allegations of bribery were found in archival sources.

⁷⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

* Could be Seyyid Muhammed as the son of Former Mufti (Sabık Muftizade).

“dünyada hiçbir şeyden utanmak şanlarından olmayan bedhah ve leamet ... Süleymaniye mutasarrıf-ı sabıkı Tevfik Paşanın Bağdada gitmek üzere Süleymaniye’den hareketle esnay-ı rahda, belki yine müşarünileyhin ve avanesinin mezaliminden herçi-bad-abad azmine mecbur edilen mazlumin tarafından hakkında vukubulan taarruz meselesini Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed Efendinin Süleymaniyedeki mahdumu Seyyid Abdülkerim ve Seyyid Muhammed Efendiye atfetmişler ise de mumaunileyhin vaka günü hanelerinde eşraf-ı belde ve.....memurin ve zabitan-ı askeriyeden yüzlerce misafirlerle bulundukları o zevat-ışehadetiyle sabit bulunmuş ve şu halle beraber merhum Fehmi ve Salih efendiler efkar-ı umumiyeyi taglit ve tahdiş ve ezhanı teşevvüş ve teheyhüc etmek fikriyle bir taraftan çarşuyu cebren kapatmış, bir canıbden mumaunileyha Seyyid Kerim ve Seyyid Muhammed Efendileri derdest ve bizim gibi girdab-ı mesaib ve felakete ilka etmek üzere hanelerine müfrezeler sevk eylediklerinden bilgurun onlar dahi terk-i mevaya mecbur olmuşlardır.”

⁷⁵⁴ Ely Bannister Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise*, p.193

5.2.2. The Siege of Sulaymaniyah

The caravan's ambush was only the first part of Sâdât's operation plan. As it is clearly seen in the telegrams sent from Sulaymaniyah, a very intense and coordinated force has been gathering around the town. The Sheikhs in Kirkuk mobilized some tribes particularly Hamawand, religious order elements within the Sâdât bloc, villagers in the Sâdât-dominated villages; and accumulated them around the town. When different data from different telegrams are compiled, it is thought that the ringleaders who coordinated and commanded the siege consist of the following names such as: Baba Resul of Jeshana, Sheikh Said of Goktappa, Abdülkadir Serzi, Sheikh Reşid of Sarzal, Seyyid Ahmed, Seyyid Kerim, Sheikh Kadir and Ahmed, Seyyid Muhammed, Gözi (or Nuri), Sheikh Ali of Dermene/Derehmiyan/Remiyan, Sheikh Mahmud (Garib), infamous Hamawand bandits Zehrab, Rahim Ahmed Nevres, Rahim Ahmed Serşi, Devletyar and Rahim Haydar.

Ringleader	Affiliation or Domain
Baba Resul	'Infamous bandit' (<i>şaki-i meşhur</i>) of Jeshana Village (<i>Çişane Köyü</i> جیشانة)
Sheikh Said	Goktappa Sub-district (<i>Göktepe Nahiyesi</i> / گوكتپه),
Abdülkadir Serzi	Brother of Sheikh Said from Goktappa
Sheikh Reşid	Sarzal Village (<i>شرزل قريه لی</i>)*
Seyyid Ahmed	
Seyyid Kerim	The son of Baba Resul (<i>Baba Resulzade</i>)
Sheikh Kadir and Ahmed	The sons of Mufti (<i>Muftizade</i>)
Seyyid Muhammed	The son of Former Mufti (<i>Sabık Muftizade</i>)
Kozi/Gözi (گوزی) or Nuri (نوری) **	The son of Naqib (<i>Nakibzade</i>)
Sheikh Ali with his brother and his son	Dermene (درمانة لی)- Derehmian (دره میانلی) Remiyan/Rehiyan (رهیانلی / رمیانلی) ***
Sheikh Mahmud (Garib)	He was the son-in-law of deceased Sheikh Said and he was appointed as Qaradag Sub-District Administrator (<i>Karadağ Nahiye Müdürü</i> / قره طاغ) by an imperial decree
Zehrab, Rahim Ahmed Nevres (نورس), Rahim Ahmed Serşi (ثرشی)****, Devletyar and Rahim Haydar (حیدر)	Infamous Hamawand bandits (<i>Hemvend eşkıya-ı meşhurasından</i>)*****

Table 4: Ringleaders who coordinated and commanded the Siege of Sulaymaniyah ⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

According to the petitioners, these ringleaders commanded a force consisting of 300 cavalries plus a 500-600 cavalries and riflemen mobilized from the villages such as Kozaraq (Kozereka / گوزرهقه), Kharajyan (Haracyan / حراجيان), Kharaba (Haraba / حرابه), Arbat (غربت), Weladar (Viledar / ويلعدر)*, Jehanliq (Cihanlık / جهانلق)** , Qaratughan (Karadoğan / قرطوغان) and Yakhimali (Yahimali / يخیمالی).⁷⁵⁶ They claimed that in despotism era, the land tenures of these villages were awarded to the

Although there are complicated statements in different sources, it is thought that Sheikh Mahmud was also one of the ringleaders in the siege. He was to be referred in some messages as well.

*This person, who was identified as 'Serzel Karyeli Sheikh Reşid' (سرزل قریه لی) in Deputy Accountant Maruf's telegram sent on February 25, was written as 'Şerzel Karyeli Sheikh Reşid' (شرزل قریه لی) in the telegram sent on February 23. In Tefvik's telegram, the same person was referred as 'Serzi (سرزی) Sheikh Reşid'. Although not known for sure, this place may be the village of Serzel (Sarzal) in Sulaymaniyah.

** The same person was mentioned as 'Nuri (نوری) as the son of Nakib' in the February 23 version of the telegram.

***This place is mentioned as Derehman (دره میانلی) in Maruf's February 23 telegram, while in the February 25 version of same telegram it is mentioned as Dermene (درمانه لی). While it is mentioned as Rehmiyane (ره میانه لی) in Tefvik's telegram, it was written as Remiyan/Rehiyan (رهمیانی / رهیانی) in Zeki's telegram. Although not certain, it may be Daraman village of Kirkuk. Other possibilities might be Rummana in Hawija, Rahmaniya in Mosul, Rahmaniya near Dohuk and Ruhaiya in Tilkaef. However, another possibility is the Darmian County of Iran (Dermiyan Şehristanı- شهرستان درمیان) from which the Sheikh's elders might have migrated.

****It is not known whether *Rahim Ahmed Nevres* in Maruf's telegram and *Rahim Ahmed Serşi* in Zeki's telegram are the same person. If he is the same person, one may have his name and the other his nickname. Since the word *Serşi* cannot be read clearly in the rika handwriting, the other two reading possibilities may be as *Sersi* or *Şerşi* (شرشی / ثرشی).

***** For the Hamawand tribesmen, the terms 'bandit' (*şaki, eşkıya*) or 'bandit gangs' are very common in state correspondence, in reference to the damage they have inflicted on state and society.

⁷⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

All villages and districts (except Jehanliq), are spotted in the maps below:

1) Northern Iraq Sulaymaniyah Area SHS01 prepared by JHIC United Nations Joint Humanitarian Information Centre, UNOHCI, Erbil, Northern Iraq , August 2002

2) Sulaymaniyah Humanitarian Programme Sector prepared by JHIC United Nations Joint Humanitarian Information Centre , UNOHCI, Erbil, Northern Iraq, October 2002

3) Iraq: Kurdistan Region prepared by UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, March 2020

* It was written as Viyareden (ویاریدن) in Maruf's other telegram. No such place could be found in the Ottoman or Modern Iraqi geography. However, the use of Viledar in the other telegram evokes the village of Weladar in Süleymaniye.

** It is written as Jehartan/Cehartan (جهارتان) in Deputy Accountant Maruf's other telegram. However, neither Cihanlık /Cihatlık, nor Cehartan has been found anywhere in the Ottoman or Modern Iraqi geography. It may be a village whose name has been changed later, or a settlement with a different name in the official geographical records.

so called Sheikhs as tax collection units.⁷⁵⁷ Apparently, they could easily mobilize warriors from these villages through their previous feudal relations.

However, the caravan attack was just at the beginning of this painful process, and much darker days awaited the people of Sulaymaniyah. The irregular forces that started to accumulate outside the town began to worry both the state authorities and the community. 14th of February became quite an unfortunate day when extremely urgent telegrams from Sulaymaniyah and Mosul reached and alarmed the Ministry of Interior. The first telegram dispatched by Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha reported the Siege of Sulaymaniyah and named the ‘real besiegers’ (*muhasarın-ı hakikiye*).⁷⁵⁸ According to Tevfik, although the principal force under the command of those leaders was consisted of 300 or maximum 400 men of ‘bandit gangs’, it was reached to a thousand men after the additional forces were adjoined.⁷⁵⁹ These additional forces were 300 or 400 riders and cohorts of Hamawand ‘bandits’ in highlands and encouraged or enforced by Sheikh Maruf, Sheikh Mahmud, Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed and Sheikh Salih who were somehow returned to Kirkuk Sanjak after the Mosul incident.⁷⁶⁰ These Sheikhs had instructed and driven the highland elements into Kirkuk at first.⁷⁶¹ Tevfik reported that they also had communicated with their relatives and affiliates in Sulaymaniyah to arrange a force out of both Sâdât controlled villages and some other villages as well.⁷⁶² It was possible that these villages, listed in the message of Accountant Maruf, had connections with Sâdât Sheikhs through blood ties as well as their feudal connections. Responding to this commitment, these elements were willing to subordinate to Barzanji clan with a divine devotion, even if they were against the state authority. The

⁷⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

⁷⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“her nasılsa Kerkük Sancağına iade olunan müteveffanın biraderi Şeyh Maruf oğlu Şeyh Mahmud akrabalarından Baba Resulzade Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Salih namların”

⁷⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“bâlâda eşhas Kerkük’e celbiyle verdikleri talimat”

⁷⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Süleymaniye’de bulunan akraba ve taallukat-ı saireleriyle bilmuhabere kararlaştırılan tertibat üzerine Sâdât ve şeyhlere aid kura ile kura-i saire”

Sheikhs seemed to quickly coordinate and subordinate all groups that they could religiously influence or tactically enforce.

Other telegram of the day received from Governor Zeki was classified as extremely urgent and provided valuable information regarding to the Sulaymaniyah siege. Hamawand tribe leaders-with their 50 or 60 tribesmen, Baba Resul from the ‘so- called Sheikhs’, people of villages in obedience to Sâdât, poor people enforced or encouraged from other villages, Barzanji family, their Sheikhs in villages, Sheikh Ali, his son, brother and Barzanji village people were all gathered in the outskirts of Sulaymaniyah, reaching almost a thousand men.⁷⁶³ Zeki re-emphasized that if a force under the command of an ‘active commander’ (*faal kumandan*) starts pursuing, the villagers will naturally leave and for sure the Sheikh, his cohorts and nearly 200 men will remain.⁷⁶⁴ However, at present conditions, they did not hesitate to make mischief and tried to mobilize the villagers by force.⁷⁶⁵

According to Tevfik’s message, their ultimate intention was to kill and extort the possessions of the Sulaymaniyah administrative and military officials, merchants, notables who were known as the causatives of the killing of Sheikh Said in Mosul.⁷⁶⁶ He reported that the besiegers had threatened to loot the market and burn the territory for intimidating and dispersing the administrative officials.⁷⁶⁷ So, they could bring the Sâdât from Kirkuk back to Sulaymaniyah, restore the despotism regime, and devastate the rule of constitution.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Süleymaniye etrafında tecmi eden aşair-i Hemvendlilerden Zehrab Rahim Ahmed Serşi ve Devletyar ve Haydar ve elli altmış kadar avaneleri ve müteşeyihlerden Baba Resul vesaire isimleri evvelce arz kılınan eşkiyalar, Sâdât’a müntesib kurra ahalisi ve cebren diğer kuradan iltihak ettirdikleri fukara-i ahaliden ve Berzenciye ve kurradaki şeyhleriyle keza kerhen ve cebren köylerden topladıkları ahali ve Dermiyan’lı Şehy Ali ve mahdumu ve biraderiyle Berzenciye Şeyhi kariyesi ahalisinden mürekkeb takriben bin kişi kadar tahmin olunmaktadır.”

⁷⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ancak bir faal kumandanın idaresinde bir kuvve-itakibata başlarsa köylüler bittabi ayrılacaklar ve ancak..... Şeyh ve avaneleriyle iki yüz kişiye karib kuvvetler kalacağı muhakkaktır”

⁷⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“maksadları Şeyh Said’in Musul’daki maktuliyetinin müsebbibleri olan Süleymaniye memurin-i mülkiye ve askeriyesiyle tüccaran ve muteberanını katl ve mallarını gasb”

⁷⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ve çarşığı yağma memleketi ihrakla tehdid edilip bu yolda bir iki vukuatı yaparak me’murini dağıtıp”

⁷⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

Tevfik reported that the existing military force was composed of 300 infantries from regular army, two cannons, 120 riders, 30 gendarmerie cavalries and almost 20 infantry gendarmeries.⁷⁶⁹ Military casualties were expected, each side of the town was exposed and available to attacks and major part of the community was agitated.⁷⁷⁰ Compulsorily, the Regular Army Command and Sub-Governorship cooperated and armed the civilians with 100 Martin and 500 Snider rifles delivered from the Gendarmerie and Reserve Army depots.⁷⁷¹ The army sought to replace its casualties with civilians who were armed with official army rifles and took an active part in the defense alongside the regular forces.⁷⁷² Besides, chiefs of the Jaf and Pishder (*Pişder*) tribes were requested to rush with sufficient forces as a reserve, but not arrived yet.⁷⁷³

Communication with the provincial center was mostly disconnected since the telegram line was frequently broken by the bandits.⁷⁷⁴ According to the telegram Tevfik had received at midnight, an infantry battalion of 250 men, four cannons and almost 100 riders prompted from Kirkuk were expected to arrive the day after tomorrow.⁷⁷⁵ Defeat of these bandits and the restoration of public order were strongly expected with the appointment of a capable commander in charge of the deployed military forces.⁷⁷⁶ The results of all operations were going to be reported without losing a minute if the telegram line was not broken.⁷⁷⁷

“Kerkük’de bulunan Sâdâtı Süleymaniye’ye celb ve istibdad-ı sabıkı iade ve Kanun-i Esasiyenin hükmünü mavi etmekten”

⁷⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Hal-i hazırdeki kuvve-i mevcude, nizamiyeden üç yüz piyade iki top yüz yirmi rakibe otuz jandarma süvarisi, yirmi kadar piyade jandarmasından ibarettir.”

⁷⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Askerin katli ve kasabanın her bir tarafı tecavüze maruz ve müsaid bulunması ve ahalinin umumu heyecana geldiğinden bilmeccuriyet Nizamiye Kumandanıyla müttetikan Jandarma ve Redif depolarından mevcut olan yüz kadar Martin beş yüz kadar Snayderle teslih ve askerle beraber hal-i tedafide bulundurulmuş”

⁷⁷² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Kerkük’den ikiyüz elli mevcudlu bir tabur piyade ile dört top ve yüz kadar rakibe tahrik ettirildiği anlaşıldığından yarından sonra buraya muvassalatları memuldür”

⁷⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“mezkur kuvvetlerin muvassalatında muktedir bir kumandanın tayin buyrulmasıyla bi’avnillahi teala eşkıya-yı maruzı def’ ve tenkil ve asayişin takriri kaviyyen memuldür”

⁷⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

Zeki's message also contained valuable information on military maneuvers and tactical mobility. He reported that the mule cavalries in Chamchamal was arrived.⁷⁷⁸ The part of the force in Jaf tax collection belonging to the infantry battalion in Sulaymaniyah and the 30 mule cavalry had arrived.⁷⁷⁹ The caravan returning from Baghdad was escorted by the force returned from Jaf.⁷⁸⁰ Since the caravan was attacked, they were to be completely destroyed if the Chamchamal mule cavalries could not come to their rescue.⁷⁸¹ The forces prompted from Kirkuk and Salahiyah (*Salahiye*) were not arrived yet.⁷⁸² Even the chain of order and command will be granted to Lieutenant Colonel (*Kaimakam*) Zeki Bey at the arrival of these forces, no activity can be carried out under his command according to the Governor.⁷⁸³ Because according to him, Zeki Bey's command will also have bad consequences contrarily.⁷⁸⁴ That's why the Governor and Sub-Governor both requested a much more capable and active commander to command this critical operation. The distrust of both the Governor and the Sub-Governor towards Lt. Colonel Zeki was interesting. The phrase "an active commander" that was constantly mentioned in the messages was also noteworthy as it suggested that Lt. Colonel Zeki might be passive or incompetent. Both administrators demanded another officer to take command, and even Governor Zeki personally requested an appointment from the 6th Army through reporting the cruciality of the case.⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"Çemçemal'deki ester süvar geldi"

⁷⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"Caf tahsilatındaki kuvvetin Süleymaniye'de bulunan tabura ait piyade ve otuz ester süvar geldi."

⁷⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"ve Bağdaddan avdet iden kervan Cafdan avdet iden askerin muhafazasıyla dönüyor idi"

⁷⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"Çünkü vukuat bunlarla vuku bulduğu ve Çemçemalden gelen ester süvar imdadlarına yetişmemiş olsa idi bitevi mahvolacaklardı"

⁷⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"Kerkük'den ve Salahiye'den tahrik ettirilen kuvvet henüz gelmedi"

⁷⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"gelmesiyle emir ve kumanda burada bulunan kumandan Kaimakam Zeki Beye tevdi olunacak ise de bir icraat olunamaz"

⁷⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

"bilakis bu yüzden de fenalık çıkacaktır zira"

⁷⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

Neither the community nor the military were safe according to Zeki.⁷⁸⁶ He clearly stated that “If the public agitation was secretly intensified and if the military and community have been requesting more armament rather than the delivered ones, it became impossible to persuade both the community and military”.⁷⁸⁷ From this statement, we understand that even the civilians were distributed weapons due to the size of the threat and it was even insufficient. Zeki concluded his message by expressing that he considered the situation very desperate even he has been trying so hard to maintain moderation.⁷⁸⁸

According to Zeki, the ultimate reason of this siege that started with the caravan attack, was based on the dispute between Sheikhs and townspeople.⁷⁸⁹ And their intention was to threat and take revenge on townspeople for the banishment of Sheikhs from Sulaymaniyah.⁷⁹⁰ Through communication with the army and division commands, necessary measures were to be taken and performed, public order was to be restored and further incidents were to be prevented.⁷⁹¹ In addition to an available regular army battalion in Sulaymaniyah, Salahiyah and Bazian towns were also instructed for deploying reinforcements promptly.⁷⁹² Regular army platoons in charge of Jaf tax collection and more than 200 mule cavalries were also prompted.⁷⁹³ An infantry battalion and a mountain artillery battery from Erbil were also expected to be deployed

⁷⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Ne Ahalinin ve ne de askerin emniyeti kalmamıştır. Toplanacak olan bu kuvvet faalen bir kumandana hakkıyla verilir ise kafidir”

⁷⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ahalinin heyecanı gizlice teşeddüd ediyorsa ve bilmeceburiyet verilen eslihadan başka daha silah istiyorsa ve hakikatı ahaliye ve asakire söz anlatamayacak bir hale gelmiştir”

⁷⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“bendeniz her ne kadar itidalin muhafazasına cehd ediyor isem de hali pek vahim görüyorum”

⁷⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“esbabı ise şeyhlerle kasaba ahalisinin beynlerindeki ihtilafdan ileri geldiği”

⁷⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ve maksadları kasaba ahalisini tehdid ve şeyhlerin Süleymaniye’den çıkarılmalarına karşı ahz-ı sardan ibaret olduğu”

⁷⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Süleymaniye’de mevcut bir tabur nizamiyeye ilaveten Salahiye ve Bazyan kazalarıyla Caf tahsilatında bulunan nizamiye müfrezeleriyle iki yüzü mütecaviz ester süvarin ve Erbil’de bulunan piyade taburuyla bir cebel bataryasının Süleymaniye’ye kemal-i süratle sevklerine ibtidar olunmuş idi.”

⁷⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

as soon as possible.⁷⁹⁴ Erbil battalion was not arrived, but 100 riders expected from Salahiyyah were about to arrive.⁷⁹⁵

There was critical information about the siege in the previous message sent by the notables of Sulaymaniyah. Their lives were endangered since the town was besieged, passage through the town was blocked and the commercial activity was suspended.⁷⁹⁶ After two thousand rifles were distributed to the civilian community as an active countermeasure, regular military force was reinforced to maintain the safety of life and property day and night.⁷⁹⁷ However, the transportation route was still unsafe, and another caravan routed from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah was attacked as well.⁷⁹⁸ Ten soldiers and five to six civilians were injured and killed, 40 loaded animals were stolen.⁷⁹⁹ The message was particularly urged that a possible escape of the so-called Sheikhs in Kirkuk should be prevented so that they would not join their cohorts in Sulaymaniyah.⁸⁰⁰ Actually that was going to be better to transfer them to a different location with their families.⁸⁰¹

On February 28, the telegram that Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said sent from Baghdad to the Grand Vizirate raised the level of alarm more than ever. Said wrote that the Sheikhs who somehow managed to be taken to Kirkuk did not even remain calm in there, and they revolted the tribes with a desire for revenge and an incentive to plunder.⁸⁰² In Sulaymaniyah, which was exposed to a deadly attack, people were shot dead, property

⁷⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

⁷⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Bunlardan Erbil taburu henüz oraya vasil olamadı. Salahiye’deki yüz mevcutlu rakibe de varmak üzeredir.”

⁷⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“altı günden beri.....memleketi abluka ile übur ve mürur kıt’a ve ticaretimizi sedd ile hayatımızın tehlikeye ilkası”

⁷⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“umum ahaliye hasıl olan heyecan ve havf-ı canından dolayı çarşı dükkanlarımızı kapadan hükümet-i seniyyenin icab-ıdehaletin bil-mecburiye vuku müracaat üzerine tedabir müessire olmak üzere ahaliye tevzi edilen iki bintüfenk ile kuvvet-i cünüdiyeye.....geceli gündüzlü silahmuhafaza-ı can ve mal.....ve”

⁷⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁷⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2754/40/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1324 – 28 February 1909

“Orada dahi rahat durmadılar ve her nasılsa Kerküke iadelerinde intikam sevdasıyla buğz.....dolan aşairi yağma tamağıyla ayaklandırıp Süleymaniye etrafına saldırdılar”

was looted, and the people started to migrate.⁸⁰³ Said definitely did not find it appropriate for the Sheikhs to be left in Kirkuk from now on and called for the executive power to ensure the security.⁸⁰⁴ Apparently, the divergence between the parliament and the Government on the subject has been growing and the legislative body would now have to warn the executive power. Deputy Said was not the only person who thought this way about the threat posed by the transfer of Sheikhs to Kirkuk. According to the aforementioned telegram dated 28 February signed by 31 major officials, notables and merchants of Sulaymaniyah; all the complaints and falsified statements of so-called Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah were disguised by their fake innocence and still favored in the newspapers despite of the houses they had burnt and the families they had destroyed.⁸⁰⁵ They had managed to be transferred from Mosul to Kirkuk, which means a district of Sulaymaniyah, through the reflections of these falsified statements⁸⁰⁶ Besides, that vicinity had enabled them to contact some of their relatives who were bandits and prison escapees.⁸⁰⁷

The state was skeptical about the scale of the threat and the incoming numbers of the aggressive group. Even the message by sub-Governorate had clearly stated that the tribes gathered there were almost a thousand people, it was considered a little exaggerated by the Ministry of Interior.⁸⁰⁸ At the same time, the deployed force in Sulaymaniyah should be highly enough to defeat and suppress them.⁸⁰⁹ However, since the Governor and deputy sub-Governor had a common distrust in Lt. Colonel Zeki Bey; the Governor was particularly instructed to monitor the case in a continuous communication with regional command, deputy sub-Governorate and when required

⁸⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2754/40/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1324 – 28 February 1909

“Fukaralar vuruldu, canlar telef , emval nehb olundu. Memleket muhacerettedir.”

⁸⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2754/40/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1324 – 28 February 1909

“Bunların Kerkük’de bekaları mahzurdan salim olamadığı gibi kuvve-i icraiye faaliyet göstermedikçe takrir-i asayiş dahi mümkün olamayacağı maruzdur”

⁸⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 34, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“orada toplanan aşairin ...bin kişi kadar olduğu beyan olunmakda ise de bu miktar biraz mübalağalı görülmüştür”

⁸⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 34, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“ma haza Süleymaniye’de bulunan ve sevk edildiği bildirilmiş kuvvet bunları def’ ve tenkile maaziya detin kafi olmak icab eder”

the Army Command.⁸¹⁰ In the name of a proper defeat, drawing the attention of military has deserved a great importance.⁸¹¹ Ministry also urged the reports on whether the Joint Task Force fully deployed, ‘which forces from where’ were deployed in Sulaymaniyah up to now and when the remaining elements will be arrived.⁸¹² Immediately after the Ministry had dispatched these issues to the province, questioned the status of the Joint Task Force from Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate through a second telegram.⁸¹³ Ministry also requested a prompt reply on whether the tribal formation was dispersed or not and which measures were taken.⁸¹⁴

Sub-Governor Tevfik also reported the tactical status of the deployment and the actions taken to ensure public order. The total deployment reached to the level of 800, as an infantry battalion of 240 men, two artillery units and 30 riders (*rakibe*) had joined to the available force at hand.⁸¹⁵ 12th division command had prompted a force from Salahiyah and ordered the return of the crew which was commissioned of Jaf tax collection.⁸¹⁶ Riders and infantry (*rakibe ve racile*) consisting 120 men were reported from the division command, but had not arrived yet.⁸¹⁷ The bandits were retreated around the Hamawand villages located in Bazian (*Bazyan*).⁸¹⁸ Public agitation was quelled as much as possible, market and bazaar were re-opened and everyone was busy with their business and earnings.⁸¹⁹ Besides, all sub-provincial community was

⁸¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 34, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“ancak Mutasarrıf vekili orada bulunan kumandan Kaimakam Zeki Beye karşı adem-i itimat göstermekde olmasına nazaran kumandanlıkla ve mutasarrıf vekaletiyle ve lede-l icab ordu kumandanlığıyla bil-muhabere takibat”

⁸¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 34, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“tenkilatın hüsn-i icrası için cihet-i askeriye'nin celb-i nazar-ı dikkati şayan-ı ehemmiyettir”

⁸¹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 34, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“şimdiye kadar Süleymaniye’ye nerelerden tertip olunan hangi kuvvetlerin vasıl olduklarının ve diğerleri ne vakit vasıl olabileceğinin”

⁸¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 35, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 35, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

⁸¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324 – 02 March 1909

“muvassalat iden iki yüz kırk mevcudlu bir tabur piyade iki top otuz rakibe ile mevcudu hazır mevcudu sabıkla beraber sekiz yüz raddesine baliğ olmuştur”

⁸¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324 – 02 March 1909

“Salahiye’den hareket ve Caf tahsilatı mürettebatının avdetine emir verildiği on ikinci fırka kumandanlığından bildirilen yüzyirmi mevcudlu rakibe ve racile henüz muvassalat etmemiştir”

⁸¹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324 – 02 March 1909

⁸¹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324 – 02 March 1909

“Eşkiya Bazyan’da meskun Hemvend kuraları civarına çekilmiştir”

⁸¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324 – 02 March 1909

announced and warned through peripheral districts and municipalities of Sulaymaniyah for not to affiliate to the bandits.⁸²⁰

While this announcement was very comprehensive and explicit on the issue of harboring the bandits, it also accepted that the banditry activities in the region could not be neutralized without the support of the people. According to the announcement, the military operations launched by the regular army against bandit formations, especially in positions such as Sakrama (*Sekreme*), Kharajyan (*Haracyan*) and Kahriz (*Kehriz*), had frightened the community.⁸²¹ First of all, Tevfik assured that those community people who were not involved in the aforementioned bandit-oriented incidents until now, would not need to be offended in any way.⁸²² However, those civilians who aided and harbored the bandits during the military pursuit had jeopardized and obstructed the state action so far.⁸²³ Thus, Tevfik gave these civilians another chance to correct what they had done and summoned them to the court to apply for their testimony and knowledge on banditry activities.⁸²⁴ However, from now on, those who insist on not coming to court to conceal what they know, those who abstained from coming to testify, and those who continued to help the bandits by supplying food and necessities, would be accused of disobedience to law and order.⁸²⁵ Until now, those who were compulsorily involved in the above-mentioned activities out of fear of the bandits would be exempted from this as long as they came to judicial

“Heyecan-ı umumi mehma-emken teskin olunarak çarşı ve pazar açtırılmış ve herkes kâr ü kesb ile meşgul olub”

⁸²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324 – 02 March 1909

“eşkiyaya iltihak etmemeleri için de kaza ve liva hatt-ı mülhakaya tebligat ve belediye vasıtasıyla ilan ettirilmiştir”

⁸²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“Bugünlerde Sekreme, Haracyan Kehriz nam mevkilerde serzde-i zuhur olan vukuat failleri ile sair erbab-ı ceraim ve cinayet hükümetçe tahkik ve teşhis edildiğinden derdest icra bulunan takibat te’dibat onlara aid olacağı haldeahalisinin düçar-ı havf oldukları anlaşıldığı ve halbuki mezkur vukuatlarda zi medhal olmayanların hiçbir suretle rencide olunamayacakları derkar”

⁸²² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

⁸²³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

⁸²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

⁸²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“şu kadar ki esna-yı takibde mütecasirin ve esbab-ı ceraimi barındırmak ve ihfa etmek isteyenleri ve icraat-ı hükümeti işkâl edeceklerinden bu gibi hallere cesaret edenlere de hükümetçe malumatlarına müracaat olunmak üzere mahkemece alel-usul celbname ile talep olundukları halde ketm-i malumat maksadıyla gelmeyen ve gelmekte istinkaf ve adem-i itaat gösterenlere ve eşkiyaya yem ve yiyecek ihsası suretiyle cezai ve külli muavenet edenlere evamir-i hükümet ve kanuna itaat etmemiş nazarıyla bakılıp”

authorities and cooperated with the state.⁸²⁶ Tevfik Pasha also declared that he guaranteed the freedom of travel and safety of those who were not involved in such activities and envisaged to minimize the involvement of the people in banditry activities.⁸²⁷ As he stated at the end, since the aim of the state was to ensure the welfare and security of the obedient people, by neutralizing this crowd of crime, the regular people would be protected from all kinds of damage, violence and attack.⁸²⁸

Also Minister of War Ali Rıza Pasha had found the statement of the Local Government that “the bandit force gathered around Sulaymaniyah reached almost a thousand people” somewhat exaggerated.⁸²⁹ However, he particularly emphasized the importance of preventing other irregular and troubled elements in the region from adjoining them.⁸³⁰ Telegrams were dispatched from the Istanbul to some local tribal leaders through Seyyid Abdülkadir Efendi, as a member of the Senate (*Meclis-i Ayan*) and the founder of the KSCP, and some of them had good results.⁸³¹ Apparently, Ottoman Government engaged in lobbying activities that could have a positive impact on the Kurds and tried to use prominent Kurdish figures. Minister Ali Rıza Pasha, knowing the loyalty of some tribes to the Hamawands, was also in favor of the effective use of important figures in the region, such as the head of Jaf tribe Mahmud

⁸²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“ancak bundan evelleri eşkiyadan korkarak zaruri ve mecburi olarak ahval-i mesrudedde bulunanlar,, mezkur iki vakada bulunmayanlar tahkik ve tefrik edildikten sonra saireleri hakkında icabat-ı nizamiyenin icra ve işbu cezaya çarptırılmakla mukarrer bulunacağı cihetle”

⁸²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“bu gibi ahvalden zinhar tevakki ve mücanebet olunmasına ve medhaldar olmayan kura ahalisinin kema kane kemal-i emin ve serbesti ile her tarafa amed-ü şüd edilmek hiçbir tarafda kendilerinevukuuna meydan verilmeyeceğinde”

⁸²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“ve zaten maksad-ı aslı ve umumisi ehl-i mutinin istihsal-ı refahı ve selameti için eşkiyagüruhun tedibiyle reayanın her halde her türlü zarar ve ziyandan vikayesi ve tecavüz ve taarruzdan masun olunmasının lüzumu veçhiyle bilumum ahali ve kuraya talim ve ilanı lüzumu tavsiye olunur.”

⁸²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“Tecmi eden eşkiyanın tahminen bin kişi raddesini bulduğu evvelce işar olundu ve bu tahminin biraz mübalağalı olması menut bulunmasına nazaran”

⁸³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“mahallinde mevcut bulunan ve bunlara kariben iltihak edecek olan kuvvet-i eşkiyayı takib ve tenkile kafi demek ise de eşkiya-ı merkumeye diğer bazı aşairin iltihak etmelerine meydan verilmemesi şayan-ı ehemmiyettir”

⁸³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

“Toplanan eşhasın dağıtılması zımında ayandan Seyyid Abdülkadir Efendi tarafından bazı rüesaya telgraflar çekdirilmiş idi. Bunlardan tesirat-ı hüsne hasıl olmuş olduğu”

Pasha.⁸³² At this point, the Minister of War continued with the same diplomatic attitude he had displayed towards Sâdât from the beginning and favored the negotiation rather than the use of excessive force.

Sâdât, who obviously intended to intimidate the central authority with the Caravan Attack and attempted against the life of a Sub-Governor and his entourage vindictively, denied the responsibility for the Caravan Attack in the Manifest. Nevertheless, the Sheikhs continued to create a perception of implicit threat by making hints in the Manifest and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah had maximized the extent of this threat. It was a clear challenge to the state authority when a town was besieged and disconnected from the outside world, the local administration was abolished, and life was interrupted in all aspects. The Sheikhs, who could not achieve results with their diplomatic efforts in the pursuit of justice, wanted to show the central authority that they could take control at any time and at any place.

5.2.3. 6th Army's Supervision Over Sulaymaniyah

All military units located in the Mosul territory were subordinated to the 6th Army which was headquartered in Baghdad and commanded by Lieutenant General (*Birinci Ferik*) Mehmed Fazıl Pasha. Aside from such hierarchical reasons, the supervision of the 6th Army over Sulaymaniyah was extremely critical due to the personal experiences of Mehmed Fazıl Pasha gained against the tribes in Iraqi lands since 1880. Following the moderate policy of the Ministry of War, he also tried to maintain the same diplomatic attitude towards Sâdât. But when he could not get effective results through diplomacy channels, he tended to military solutions.

The 6th army's report over the locality had stated that the necessary and sufficient units were dispatched to Sulaymaniyah in the fastest way to suppress the disorder.⁸³³ In

⁸³² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

"ve bazı aşairin Hemvendlere iltihak-ı menut bulunduğ u halin Caf reisi Mahmud Paşa ve sair icab idenlerebüyük vesaya ifa ettirilebilir."

⁸³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

"Süleymaniye cihetindeki iğtişâşın teskini zımında dakika fevt edilmeyerek meselenin ehemmiyetine münasib kuvve-i lazıme sevk ve tertib edilmiş"

addition, all religious order Sheikhs and tribal chiefs were advised in order not to repeat the events, and Kirkuk Postnishin was also contacted due to its influence over sectarian and tribal formations.⁸³⁴ Postnishin's correspondence of 27 February was also attached to the telegram sent by 6th Army Commander Mehmed Fazıl Pasha; but no sect, religious order or Sheikh name was specified.⁸³⁵ Postnishin reported that he gave necessary and effective advice to many tribes based in Kirkuk such as Talabani and Şivan in line with the orders from the state; and even tried to persuade the Sâdât in Kirkuk with many different advice and warnings.⁸³⁶ However, according to Postnishin's contacts, the regional tribes and clans complained of the slanderous accusations and mis-treatment of the Local Government against them.⁸³⁷ Although, the stay of Fehmi, Salih and Ziya in Sulaymaniyah would be extremely risky and would pose dire inconveniences; these individuals were still not wanted by authorities despite numerous orders were issued about them.⁸³⁸ Postnishin claimed that these people had dared to dominate and occupy former sub-Governor's office, who was their major collaborator, as an instrument of their malicious interests.⁸³⁹ According to Fazıl Pasha, the uprising of the local elements was based on the politics of Sâdât who was brought to a such a close locality as Kirkuk.⁸⁴⁰ And although the military had fulfilled its duty

⁸³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“ve icraat-ı hükümete intizara bir guna hadisenin tekrar ve ifaından mücanebet olunması hakkında bilcümle meşayih ve aşaire vesaya-i müessire ifa ve her türlü tedabir-i askeriye icra edildiği evvelce arz olunmuş ve gerek Postnişinden cevaben gelen telgrafname aynen zire nakledilmiştir.”

⁸³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

⁸³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“Mamafi emr-i telgraf-ı devletlerine imtisalen Kerkük livasına aid Talabani ve Şivan ve sair aşaire vesait-i seria ile neh hac-ı müessire icra kılınmış ve faalen mukteziyyat-ı muadelet şu iki iki aylık tehirden kurtarılıyor.”

“Süleymaniye ahvaline gelince gerek Kerkük'deki Sâdât'a gelen emr-i telgrafileri ve gerek canib-i daiyanemden vuku bulan müracaat üzerine bu kerre de muharrerat-ı mahsusa ile her türlü neh hac ve ihtarat ifa kılınmış”

⁸³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“ve ancak burada aşairden pek ziyade halat-ı mühimmeye maruz buluan kabail ve saireye atfedilen isnadatın pek çoğu müfteriyat-ı.....olmasına ihtimal verilenhükümet-i mahalliye'nin muamelat ve hareketine iftiralarından”

⁸³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“ve bekalarında mahazir-ü mütenevvia-ı müdhîşe isbat edilen ve Süleymaniye'den aldırılmaları evamir-i müteaddide iktizasından iken hala aranılmayan Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Salih ve Doktor Ziya efendilerin”

⁸³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“fesad ve melanetlerine cevelangah bir aleminden ve bahusus azl edilmiş olan Mutasarrıf-ı sabıkın adeta makamını tagallüb ve işgaliye almaya kadar cüretiyab olması gibi keyfiyetten ileri geldiği cihetle”

⁸⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

properly, the Government was also required to maintain calm with its actions.⁸⁴¹ On the other hand, Fehmi, who was the Deputy Major of the Gendarmerie in Sulaymaniyah, was summoned to Kirkuk to be sent to his next unit since his successor reached his place of duty.⁸⁴² Senior Captain Salih was also ordered to be sent to Baghdad.⁸⁴³ Fazıl reminded that the decision on the Sub-Governor Tefvik was already followed by the Provincial Administration and the Central Government.⁸⁴⁴ And according to Fazıl, the most important thing was to take maximum care to preserve peace and order and to prevent this disorder from spreading further.⁸⁴⁵ And in line with these priorities, both the Sulaymaniyah Command and the new Governor who had just arrived in Mosul had to be contacted quickly.⁸⁴⁶

The 6th Army Command has been watching the situation in Sulaymaniyah with a great concern and Mehmed Fazıl Pasha considered Tefvik, still serving his duty in Sulaymaniyah, extremely dangerous in terms of the peace and public order of the town.⁸⁴⁷ According to the intelligence received from Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk Commands, Tefvik again formed an alliance with some civilians and some military officers in order to take revenge on Sâdât and re-started to occupy the authorities with false submissions.⁸⁴⁸ Although all precautions were taken against the critical situation

“takibat ve icraat-ı hükümetinmüddet tehiri yeniden bir fenalığın zuhurunu intaç edeceğinden ve Kerkük’deki Sâdât ile Kerkük civarındaki aşair ve meşayihin kıyamı, Sâdât’ın tekrar Süleymaniye’ye iadeleri değil hatta Kerkük’de bulundurulmaları maksadına mübteni bulunmuş ve cihet-i askeriye tevcih eden vazife vaktiyle hakkıyla ifa edilmiştir.”

⁸⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

⁸⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“Süleymaniye Jandarma Binbaşılığı Vekaletinde bulunup Binbaşının vürudundan dolayı bundan akdem kitasına sevkı tebliğ olunan yüzbaşı Fehmi Efendinin de Kerkük’e celbı”

⁸⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“ve Kolağası Salih Efendinin de Bağdad’a izamı mahalline bildirilmiş”

⁸⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“ve Mutasarrıf-ı Sabık Tefvik Paşa hakkında da icab-ı halin icrası için de Musul vilayetine ve hükümetin bu babda vereceği karar dairesinde ifa-yı muamele edilmek üzere”

⁸⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

“şimdilik yalnız sükunet ve asayişin muhafazasına son derece dikkat ve itina olunması hususunda Süleymaniye Kumandanlığı vekaletine yazılmış olmakla ehemmiyeti müstağni arz ve tasvir bulunan bu meselenin daha ziyade tevessüne meydan ve imkan bırakılmamak için bu babda lazım gelen tedabir ve icraatın bir an evvel ittihaz ve ifası için Musula muvasallat ettiği anlaşılan Vali-i lahika emr-i seri-i itası esbabının istikmaline”

⁸⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324 – 03 March 1909

⁸⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

⁸⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

“Süleymaniye ve Kerkük kumandanlıkları vekaletinden mevzud telgrafnamelerde ma’zul olduğu halde hodbehote mutasarrıflık vazifesini ifa etmekte olan Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı sabıkı Tefvik Paşa ahz-ı

in Sulaymaniyah and all the necessary elements were quickly dispatched, Tevfik's ongoing incentives and unwarranted actions could cause irreparable problems in the future.⁸⁴⁹ The Governor, who was currently in Kirkuk, was asked to resolve this issue as soon as possible and the Division Command was asked to take the necessary military measures under the Governor's supervision in order to ensure full order in the region.⁸⁵⁰ In addition, Senior Captain Salih, Medical Captain Ziya, Captain Fehmi and Reserve Captain Reşid, who antagonized the people against Sâdât, were asked to be sent swiftly to the 6th Army headquarters in Baghdad.⁸⁵¹ Apparently, Fehmi, who was previously summoned to Kirkuk to be sent to his new post, would also be sent to Baghdad for investigation. It was absolutely not permissible for Tevfik, who was not content with making people attack each other and almost started 'a society of rebellion' in Sulaymaniyah, to stay there anymore.⁸⁵² Next day, Fazıl Pasha declared that Zeki Pasha, who was assigned to the Kirkuk Reserve Brigade (*Kerkük Redif Livalığı*), was ready to depart.⁸⁵³ And Major General Yusuf Pasha, who was called to Baghdad from Basra after his appointment to the 12th Division Command, would be sent to Kirkuk without delay.⁸⁵⁴ Brigadier General Izzet Pasha was also going to be swiftly called to

intikam sevdasıyla Süleymaniye ahalisiyle oradaki zabitanı daireten ittifakına alarak Süleymaniye vukuatının tekrar ve tecdidini mucib bir takım ahvalin zuhuruna sebebiyet vermekte, ve daireten ittifakına aldığı arz olunan zabitan ve ahali vasıtasıyla hilaf-ı hakikat maruzat ile makamâtı tasdi ve işgal ettirmekte olduğu işar olunmuş”

⁸⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

“ve vali-i lahikin vüruduna değin tebeyyün edecek hal ve hakikata göre her guna tedabir-i lazime ve seria ifası icab ve zamanıyla Süleymaniye sevk edildiği halde mumaunileyh Tevfik Paşanın temadi etmekte olan teşvikat ve hareket-ı na-becasının önü alınmadığı takdirde atiyen telafisi gayrikabil ahvalin ve vaka-i müteessife zuhuru melhuz olduğu cihetle”

⁸⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

“bu işin bir an evvel neticelenmesi her neye mütevakıf ise icabının icrası lüzumu Kerkük’de bulunan Musul valisine yazılmış ve oralar asayişinin tamamıyla temin-i muhafazasına ve vali-i müşarünileyhin def-i şuriş ve fesad için ittihaz buyuracakları tedabire nazaran tevli-i mahzur etmeyecek suretin tertibat-ı askeriye icrası lüzumu da fırka kumandanlığı vekaletine bildirilmiş”

⁸⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

“ve ahaliyle Sâdâtı yekdiğerine tasalluttan hali kalmadığı cihetle merkez orduya aldırılması hakkında emr-i telgraf-ı nezaretpenahileri bulunan Kolağası Salih Efendi ile Doktor Kolağası Ziya, Yüzbaşı Fehmi ve Redif Yüzbaşlarından Reşid Efendilerin bir mahzur yok ise serian Bağdad’a izamları icab edenlere tebliğ kılınmıştır”

⁸⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

“Gelen işarata nazaran ahaliyi yekdiğerine saldırmakla iktifa etmeyen ve adeta Süleymaniye’de bir isyan cemiyeti teşkil eyleyen mumaunileyh Tevfik Paşa’nın artık Süleymaniye’de bekası caiz olmadığından mumaunileyhin hemen oradan aldırılması ”

⁸⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef2, 21 Şubat 1324 - 6 March 1909

“Kerkük Redif Livalığına tayin buyurulan Zeki Paşa müteheyy-i azimet olduğu misüllü”

⁸⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef2, 21 Şubat 1324 - 6 March 1909

take the service of Kirkuk Deputy Command; however in a short time he was going to be the subject of some certain complaints such as favoring and protecting the Sheikhs in the locality.⁸⁵⁵

Apparently, even though the Ministry of War chose to renew the top ranked commanders of Kirkuk Command due to the increasing tension in the district, the problems related to the cadres would continue. Meanwhile, the report of the 6th Army on Tevfik had reached the relevant Ministries and the Mosul Governorate was asked to remove Tevfik from there immediately, on the grounds that his presence there would cause sad events again.⁸⁵⁶

5.3. Appointment of Reşid as the Governor of Mosul

In this section, Reşid's takeover of the Governor's office, the serious allegations he made to the previous Local Administration, the current situation in Sulaymaniyah and his relations with Sâdât will be examined. In the next subsection, the striking allegations made against Reşid and the process leading to his dismissal will be detailed. It was quite remarkable that Reşid's short term of 8 months in Mosul between February and September 1909 was so eventful, complex and turbulent. Assigned immediately after the Mosul Incident, Reşid had chosen to calm and pacify Sâdât by displaying an image and policy that was the opposite of the previous administration. However, it could not be said that he was successful in this policy, as he was dismissed under controversial circumstances in a short time.

At the end of January, a Fortress Commander (*Kal'a Kumandanı*) with the necessary qualifications and conditions had to be appointed to Edirne.⁸⁵⁷ According to the

"Onikinci Fırka kumandanlığını deruhde eylemek üzere Basra'dan celbi evvelce arz olunan ve Bağdad'a gelmek üzere bulunan Ferik Yusuf Paşanın bila ifate-i vakit Kerkük'e izamına"

⁸⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef2, 21 Şubat 1324 - 6 March 1909; DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"ve izzet Paşanın da celbine müsaraaat kılınacağı maruzdur"

⁸⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef 3, 22 Şubat 1324 - 7 March 1909; DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef 4, 24 Şubat 1324- 9 March 1909

⁸⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 1, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

Ministry of War, Major General Zeki from the General Staff (*Erkan-ı Harb Feriki*) had both the qualifications of a fortress commander and was thought to be capable of such a task based on his previous experience.⁸⁵⁸ Therefore, the Ministry of Interior was asked to quickly appoint another person to replace Zeki and to run the provincial affairs by a deputy until the new Governor arrived.⁸⁵⁹ At this point, rather than the urgent need in Edirne, Zeki's position which has become controversial after his resignation by the Mosul Incident seems to have been effective. It seemed that Zeki eventually had what he wanted and somehow managed to free himself from a troubled position like the Governorship of Mosul. However, the Ministry of Interior would not allow Zeki to leave Mosul immediately. In the statement sent to the Grand Vizirate, it was written that the public order in Mosul has not yet been established, Sâdât constantly made applications, false rumors occasionally spread and those involved in the Mosul Incident could not be captured because the expected force had not yet reached.⁸⁶⁰ Therefore, for the time being, it was inappropriate for Zeki to transfer his office to one of the local officials by deputation and leave Mosul.⁸⁶¹ Until the new Governor was elected and appointed, it was absolutely necessary to continue his duty.⁸⁶²

Meanwhile, a positive response was already received from Bitlis Governor Reşid for his next office as the Mosul Governor.⁸⁶³ The Ministry of Interior stated that since Reşid was formerly the Sub-Governor of Zor, he was familiar with the local situations and the characters of the tribes.⁸⁶⁴ In addition, according to the existing conditions,

⁸⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 1, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

⁸⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 1, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909

⁸⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 3, 19 Kanunusani 1324- 01 February 1909

“Musulca el haletü'l hazihi emn ve asayiş suret-i tekarrür etmiş addolunamayıp Sâdât-ı mahalliye mütemadiyen müracaat etmekte ve ara sıra bir takım rivayat-ı kazibe intişar etmekte.....ve kuvve-i mürettebe Musula henüz vasıl olmayarak vaka-i mezkurede zi-medhal olanları da ele geçirmemesine nazaranmuşarunileyhin memuriyet-i mahalliyeden birine tevd-i vekalet ile oradan intikal etmesi gayr-i caiz bulunduğundan valiliğe intihab ve tayin olacak zatın vusulüne kadar müşarünileyhin ifa-yı vazifeye devam etmesi labüdd bulunduğu nezaret-i müşarünileyheişar edilmiştir.”

⁸⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 3, 19 Kanunusani 1324- 01 February 1909

⁸⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 3, 19 Kanunusani 1324- 01 February 1909

⁸⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 2, 4 Kanunusani 1324- 17 January 1909

⁸⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 3, 19 Kanunusani 1324- 01 February 1909

“Reşid Paşa hazretleri mukaddema Zor Mutassarıflığında bulunduğu cihetle ahval-i mahalliyyeye, emzice-i aşaire vakıf olduğu”

Reşid has been displaying a very successful and appropriate Provincial Administration in Bitlis.⁸⁶⁵

From a telegram sent by the Commander of Mosul Zühdü Pasha on March 6, we understand that shortly after the Governor Reşid reached Mosul, he went to Sulaymaniyah for a while to solve the crisis with Sâdât.⁸⁶⁶ In one of his later messages, he was going to base this decision on two reasons. First, it was thought that the setup of Mosul Incident was carried out in Sulaymaniyah.⁸⁶⁷ The second, he stated that at the beginning of the incident, judicial, police, and gendarmerie officers in Mosul did not fulfill their duties regarding to the primary investigations and proceedings.⁸⁶⁸ Going to Sulaymaniyah and conducting the investigation from there seemed more reasonable and efficient to Reşid under those circumstances.

The Siege of Sulaymaniyah, which started during the term of Governor Zeki, continued during Reşid's term as well. In the telegram he sent as deputy Governor to the Ministry of Interior, Zühdü shared the latest news from the Sulaymaniyah Command regarding the siege and public order.⁸⁶⁹ The Ministry of War had found the figure of thousand exaggerated regarding the irregular force gathered around Sulaymaniyah, but now the figure was more frightening. In the telegram sent by Sulaymaniyah Platoon Commander Ömer Bey from Şehirpazar on March 2, it was reported that the force under the control of the 'Sâdât of Barzanjiyah' (*Berzenci Sâdâtı*) reached 1500 horsemen and infantry.⁸⁷⁰ The bazaar was never besieged, and although the Sulaymaniyah market was closed for three days after February 18, it was partially opened afterwards and was now fully open.⁸⁷¹ However, the town was completely

⁸⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 3, 19 Kanunusani 1324- 01 February 1909

"muhaberat-ı cariyeye nazaran Bitlis'te hüsn-i idareye muvafık-ı maslahat bulunduğundan"

⁸⁶⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

⁸⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325 – 02 June 1909

"mukatele-i hunharanenin tertibatının Süleymaniye'de yapıldığı"

⁸⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325 – 02 June 1909

"bidayet-i meselede Musul adliye ve polis ve zabıta memurları vazifelerine aid tahkikat ve muamelatı ifa etmeyerek işin meskun-u anı bırakıldığı anlaşılmasıyla bizzat Süleymaniye'ye azimet olunarak"

⁸⁶⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

⁸⁷⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

"Süleymaniye Kumandanlığının 17 Şubat 1324 tarihli telgrafnamesinde Berzenci-i Sâdât'ın kuvveti 1500 atlı ve piyade raddesinde bulunduğu Şehirpazar'dan çekilen telgrafnamede beyan olunuyor."

⁸⁷¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

blockaded, and the Sheikhs were also protected by irregular forces.⁸⁷² Upon the notice of the Local Administration on the night of February 19, the necessary preparations were made by the military and the forces waited until morning.⁸⁷³ Afterwards, the excitement of the people elevated and 400 Snider rifles and pistols from the Sulaymaniyah and Qaradag reserve battalions were distributed to the public imperatively by the decision of the local administrative council.⁸⁷⁴ However, the town and its vicinity were now safe, and military operation had been launched to capture and punish the perpetrators.⁸⁷⁵ In previous messages, it was observed that the Siege of Sulaymaniyah took place a few days after the Caravan Ambush on February 19th. Because the Provincial Administration reported the Caravan Attack on February 20th and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah on February 27th. However, Commander Ömer's message states that the town was already besieged as of February 18th and weapons were distributed to the civilian population on February 19th. This means that either the Siege of Sulaymaniyah had already begun when Tevfik's Caravan was ambushed or there were inconsistencies in the correspondence. Another low possibility could be that the Provincial Administration deliberately delayed reporting the incident and tried to buy time. Moreover, although the numbers are different from the previous correspondence, we see that the military sources also confirm that the official weapons were distributed to the civilians by the Ottoman army. However, the decision was not taken arbitrarily and was based on a memorandum issued by the local administrative council for an extraordinary security concern.

"Müfreze kumandanı Ömer Bey'den gelen telgrafnamede hiç pazarın muhasara edilmediği ve 5 Şubat tarihinden itibaren 3 gün kadar Süleymaniye çarşısı kapandı ise de muahharen kısmen ve bugünlerde kamilen açık bulunduğ"

⁸⁷² BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

"Süleymaniye kasabası abluka altında bulunduğ, Şeyhlerin.....etrafı tamamiyle emniyet tahtında bulunduğ"

⁸⁷³ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

"ve Şubatin Altıncı gecesi hükümeti mahalliye tarafından vuku bulan ihbar üzerine askeriyece istihzarat-ı lazime icra ve sabaha kadar intizar edildiğ"

⁸⁷⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324- 06 March 1909

"ahali de ol vakit heyecana gelerek kuvvetin kalanına binaen meclis-i idare-i livadan verilen mazbatalar üzerine bizzarureberaber Süleymaniye ve Karadağ redif taburlarından 400 Şnayder tüfenk ve tabancasının tevzii olunduğ"

⁸⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324 - 5 March 1909

"ve şimdiki halde kasaba ve civarı emniyette , hareket- askeriyetedib ve derdestleri, meclis-i idare-i liva mazbatası üzerine derdest-i icra bulunduğ"

After taking office in Mosul, Governor Reşid quickly alleged that there was a hostility between Sâdât and local administrators; and sent a detailed report to the Ministry of Interior explaining how the current crisis developed. Reşid's allegation was partially based on the content of Ali Said's seized letters* and begun with the striking expression of 'there was no public agitation against Sâdât or no tendency to attack the lives of Sheikhs in Sulaymaniyah'.⁸⁷⁶ Acting in accordance with the content of Ali Said Bey's letter, Tevfik Pasha, together with the former Commander Mustafa Pasha, who was known for her intense hatred of Sâdât, provoked the community to expel the Sheikhs from Sulaymaniyah.⁸⁷⁷ Otherwise, these conspirators would accuse Sâdât of intending to attack them, and if these Sheikhs were not removed from Sulaymaniyah, they would abandon their offices and come to the provincial center of Mosul.⁸⁷⁸ Reşid's report alleged that Tevfik eventually misguided the Provincial Administration, through collective (with Mustafa Pasha) and individual false denunciations, and obtained the expulsion order of the Sheikhs from Sulaymaniyah.⁸⁷⁹ However, the rest of the report turned into an increasingly disturbing shape and allegedly showed how the expulsion process of the Sheikhs evolved into a complete chaos. The Sheikhs were summoned to the Government building and the building was guarded with armed soldiers.⁸⁸⁰ Captain Fehmi Efendi*, one of Mustafa Pasha's allies, closed the bazaar and the shops in the market and gathered the people as spectators in front of the Government building.⁸⁸¹ Immediately afterwards, they went to the telegraph office with Jaf Chief

⁸⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

*Please see the section of "Prosecution of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik"

⁸⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

⁸⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"Hükümete müracaatla şeyhlerin Süleymaniye'den çıkarılması ısrarında ve aksi halde nefslerine taarruz kasdında göstermeleri ve şayet bunlar aldırılmazsa kendüleri terk-i memuriyetle merkez vilayete geleceklerinden bahisle"

⁸⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"bazen Mustafa Paşa ile müştereken ve bazen de münferiden işaret-ı kazibeyle vilayeti iğfal ve nihayet merkez vilayete gönderilmeleri emrini istihsal ettikten sonra"

⁸⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"şeyhlardan dört beş zatı tahsilenhükümete celb ve taht-ı nezarete alarak asker-i nizamiyeyle hükümetin etrafı muhafazaya aldırılması üzerine"

⁸⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"seyirci suretiyle gelmiş olan ahaliye mutasarrıf ve kumandanın hemfikirlerinden jandarma taburu kumandanı vekili redif yüzbaşısı Fehmi Efendi ile diğer hempaları çarşı ve pazarda dağılıp ahaliye cebren dükkanlarını kapattırıp hükümet pişegahına celb ve cem' ettikten sonra"

* In the report signed by the Deputy Governor on 22 August, he was referred as Reserve Captain Fehmi Efendi 'Deputy Commander of Gendarmerie Battallion' [Jandarma Tabur Kumandan Vekili Redif Yüzbaşısı Fehmi Efendi]

Mahmud Pasha, the known dissident of the Sheikhs, and informed the Mosul Governorate that the people were in an uprising.⁸⁸² In addition, they implied that if the Sheikhs were not expelled from Sulaymaniyah, there would be an assassination attempt.⁸⁸³ With their false denunciations, they violated and distorted the policy of Provincial Administration and ensured the banishment of the Sheikhs to Mosul in accordance with their hateful ambitions.⁸⁸⁴ However, according to Reşid's narrative, the crucial part started after that. Because, after the Sheikhs were transferred to Mosul, these administrators intensified their personal grudges and manipulated the clash that took place between the mule cavalry and the locals in Mosul, for their personal intentions.⁸⁸⁵ Sheikh Said, who had not even been exposed to any disrespect by the public until now, was brutally murdered with his 17 men, some of his other men were injured and all their goods and belongings were plundered.⁸⁸⁶ Relying on some certain circumstances and evidences, Governor Reşid argued that the incident was the product of Ali Said's secret and devious guidance and that the Sub-Governor Tevfik and Captain Fehmi *later* realized that there would be an armed collision.⁸⁸⁷

Reşid also gave information about the dismissal of Tevfik, the interim administration of Kaimakam Zeki and the possible reasons of the caravan ambush that occurred during this time. Although Tevfik's exaggerated actions caught the attention of Bab-ı Ali and he was summoned to the provincial center, the execution of his dismissal order was delayed and the sub-Governor was even more pampered.⁸⁸⁸ During the

DH.MKT.2876/57, 09 Ağustos 1325- 22 August 1909

⁸⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“şeyhlerin muhalifievvelce merkez livaya getimiş oldukları Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşa da beraber olduğu halde müctemian telgrafhaneye gidip ahali hal-i içtima ve isyanda olarak”

⁸⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“ve şeyhlerin herhalde Süleymaniye’den çıkarılması fikrinde musırr ve aksi halde su-i kasde hazır oldukları suretini ima ederek”

⁸⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“işarat-ı kazibeyle vilayetin muvazene-yi fikriyesini bil-ihlal amal-i garazkaranelerine temine muvafık olarak şeyhleri Musula sevk ettikten”

⁸⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

⁸⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

In the report signed by the Deputy Governor on 22 August, it was stated that their livestock (mevaşi) were also plundered

⁸⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“mumaunileyh Ali Said Bey’in telkinat-ı hafiye-i mefsedetkaranesi eseri olduğu ve mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa ile yüzbaşı Fehmi Efendi’nin mukatelenin vukua geleceğine malumatları lahik olduğu bazı ahval ve delaletiyle anlaşılmaktadır”

⁸⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

implementation of the dismissal order and the handover of the office, Tevfik handed over the administrative affairs to Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Zeki without complying with the confidentiality and precautionary measures specifically stated in the encrypted messages of the Provincial Center.⁸⁸⁹ Thus, since his departure from town is no longer a secret, when he left Sulaymaniyah, he became vulnerable to threats and was attacked by tribes on the way.⁸⁹⁰ Afterwards, Tevfik, who returned to Sulaymaniyah again, took back his office from Deputy Sub-Governor Zeki Bey, unauthorized and arbitrarily, and started to perform his duty again.⁸⁹¹ According to Reşid, after Tevfik returned to office, he continued to stir up the town with his misguidance, to threat local officials with his cohorts, and to disturb superior authorities with false denunciations.⁸⁹² By showing the town in great danger, he summoned artillery units to the town, positioned the guns towards Sâdât's neighborhood and houses by means of his fellow military officers, and almost attempted a civil war by distributing official weapons and ammunition to the public from the warehouses.⁸⁹³ Nearly causing an incident in Sulaymaniyah, the Ministry of interior and the 6th Army Command seized the situation and expelled the officers who were instrumental in Tevfik's personal grudges from Sulaymaniyah, regardless of their excuses or resistance.⁸⁹⁴ Fortunately, the public opinion was relieved and sobriety prevailed in this location, which had been provoked against the Mosul people after

⁸⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“nihayet azl-i emrinin tebliğinde Süleymaniye kumandan vekili Kaimakam Zeki Beyi bit-tevki hareketi şifre ile kendisine tebliğ ve ihtiyatlı bulunması telkin edilmiş olduğu halde kayd-ı ihtiraza hacet görmeyip umur-u livayı Zeki Bey’e terk ile azimet eylemiş ise de”

⁸⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

⁸⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“Mutasarrıf Mumaunileyh Süleymaniye’ye avdetle bila-selahiyet ve hodbeghot Zeki Bey’den vekaleti alıp icra-yı vazifeye başlamış”

⁸⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“sabıkına inzıam eden tesirat-ı saikesiyle livayı herc-ü merc edecek esbab-ı muzırraya hempalarıyla beraber çalışıp memurin-i mevcudeye varınaca kadar umumunu tehdiden yalan yanlış işaretli makamat-ı alıyyeyi iz’âç”

⁸⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“memleketi bir muhatara-i azime içinde göstererek topçu askeri celbi ve topları hemfikiri bulunan zabitanın vasıtasıyla Sâdât’ın mahalle ve hanelerine doğru vaz’ ve ahaliye de depodan Esliha-ı Amire ve cephane tevzi’ ettirmek gibi ihtilalcuyane muamelata tasaddi”

⁸⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

“Süleymaniye’de bir vukuat çıkarmağa ramak kalmış iken 24 Şubat 1324 tarihli telgrafname-i daverileri ve Altıncı Ordu-yı kumandanlığının işarı üzerine kendisiyle alet-i igras olan zabitanın ta’lil ve temerrüdlerine bakılmayarak Süleymaniye’den çıkarılmaları üzerine”

Sheikh Said's murder.⁸⁹⁵ Sâdât who were survived from the Mosul disaster and resided in Kirkuk, were now returning to Sulaymaniyah.⁸⁹⁶ In addition, the part that left Sulaymaniyah, fearing the cannons positioned towards their houses, gradually returned to the town and peace was established between Sâdât and their opponents.⁸⁹⁷ Once the investigation led by Kirkuk Sub-Governor Hüseyin Bey and the Major of the 31st Cavalry Regiment, İbrahim Efendi was completed and peace was fully prevailed, the results would be added to the current judicial investigation in Mosul and possibly determine its fate.⁸⁹⁸

A month after the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, the Grand Vizirate interestingly by-passed the Ministry of Interior and requested a report directly from the Mosul Province.⁸⁹⁹ The Grand Vizirate questioned the Governor's attempts and wanted to learn the stages and results of his actions in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk sanjaks until now.⁹⁰⁰ Sublime Porte waited for precise and direct information from the Governorate phase by phase from now on.⁹⁰¹ One week after this message, it was stated in inter-Ministerial correspondence that Sheikhs were allowed to return from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah.⁹⁰² The Mosul Governorate had notified the Kirkuk Sub-Governorate regarding to the Sâdât's permission to return to their hometown and the 12th Division had subsequently reported that the Sâdât group had departed for Sulaymaniyah.⁹⁰³

Meanwhile, serious allegations and accusations were brought against the Mosul Provincial Administration. The most important of these were the allegations against

⁸⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"efkar-ı umumiye li-elhamd bir sükun ve Şeyh Saidin katlinden dolayı Musul ahalisine karşı hiddetleri tahrik edilmiş olan bu havali aşairinde mekinet hasıl olduğunun"

⁸⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"Musul faciasından kurtarılıp Kerkük'de ikamet ettirilmekte bulunmuş olan Sâdât ile"

⁸⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"hanelerine karşı topların vaz'ından havf ile terk-i büyut iden ve peyderpey avdet etmekte bulunan Sâdât'ın muarızlarıyla miyaneleri tesalüh"

⁸⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"Kerkük mutasarrıfı Hüseyin Bey Efendi ve cihet-i askeriyeden Süvari Otuzbirinci Alayın Binbaşısı İbrahim efendi marifetiyle icra edilmekte olan tahkikat tekmlil ve istirahat-ı umumiye tamamen takarrür ettikten sonra Musulca icra olunmakta bulunan tahkikat-ı adliyyeye pek büyük esası olan evrak-ı tahkikiyeyi bi-l-istishâb avdet edileceği"

⁸⁹⁹ BOA, BEO.3516/263667, 08 Mart 1325- 21 March 1909

⁹⁰⁰ BOA, BEO.3516/263667, 08 Mart 1325- 21 March 1909

⁹⁰¹ BOA, BEO.3516/263667, 08 Mart 1325- 21 March 1909

⁹⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2783/29/Lef 1, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

⁹⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2783/29/Lef 1, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

Reşid, which will be examined in detail in the next subsection. However, in addition to Reşid, some serious accusations against Zühdü Pasha, who had been the Provincial Commander of Mosul since the time of Governor Zeki, also reached the Grand Vizirate. Said, a notable of Rawandiz who was known for his loyal services to the state, accused Zühdü Pasha of nurturing grudge and slandering against him and manipulating his duty as the deputy Governor of Mosul.⁹⁰⁴ He also accused Zühdü of embezzling 600.000 kuruş from the state treasury, provoking the Government and the people against each other in the case of Sheikh Said, making financial irregularities in army purchases and employing violent individuals for personal purposes.⁹⁰⁵ Although the issue was quickly conveyed from the Ministry to the Governorate, Said also had to send messages to the Chamber of Deputies since there was no result.⁹⁰⁶ Zühdü Pasha's bad behavior and the risk of his possible damages to the Provincial Administration were reported both to the Ministries of Interior and War.⁹⁰⁷ However, no correspondence of investigation or prosecution against Zühdü Pasha were found in the state archive. Couple of months later, the former Akre District Governor Fuad, sent a message to the Ministry of Interior and demanded the execution of former Governor Zeki Pasha.⁹⁰⁸ He accused Zeki Pasha of mismanaging the crisis in Mosul, causing the incident to escalate throughout the province, and causing material and moral damage to both the state and the nation.⁹⁰⁹ According to Fuad, if so many important figures could have been dismissed without relying on any document, Zeki Pasha should have

⁹⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2800/21/Lef 1, 4 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

⁹⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2800/21/Lef 2, 4 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

“Zühdü Paşa’nın uhde ve hıyanetlerine metruk fırkadan maada hiçbir vazife ile mükellef olmaksızın tahsilat-ı nizamiye içinde hazine-i milletten yağma ettiği 600 bin Guruştan mütecavir mehuzatın ve tahrir-i nüfusu Şeyh Said meselelerinde ahali ile hükümeti yekdiğeri aleyhinde tahrik-i fesad-ı ahlaki ta’min, Peşve havalisinde karlı yağmurlar altında sürünen Asakir-i Osmaniye namına Musul’dan fahiş fiyatla mübayaa ettirdiği erzak-ı mağşuşa mukabil kunduratçılardan menafi-i rezilesini temin, maret-i şahsiye ile eşhas-ı şedideyi iltizam etmek gibi seyyiatla vilayet vekaletinin de uhdesine terkinden mütevellid mahzuratin tedkikini arz ve ihbar eylerim”

⁹⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2800/21/Lef 3, 20 Nisan 1325 - 03 May 1909; DH.MKT.2841/59/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 - 06 June 1909

⁹⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2841/59/ Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 - 06 June 1909; Lef 2, 30 Mayıs 1325-12 June 1909

⁹⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2886/63/Lef 1, 12 Temmuz 1325 - 25 July 1909

“Bir vesikaya müstenid olmayan şu mühim isimlerin azli intaç edildiğine kıyasen bu yolda işarda bulunan Vali-i Sabık Zeki Paşanın su-i idaresinde Musul’da tahaddüs eden ve mevkiiden vilayete sirayet eden asayiş-i ihlale sebebiyet vermiş hadise-i malumenin devlet ve milletiettiği mazarrat-ı maddiye ve maneviyeye binaen muşarunileyhin idamı lazım gelir.”

⁹⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2886/63/Lef 1, 12 Temmuz 1325 - 25 July 1909

been executed for these obvious crimes.⁹¹⁰ Although the message was questioned from Mosul Governorate, no further correspondence were observed in the archives.⁹¹¹ It should be noted that some allegations and complaint messages against Government officials may also have been written with motivations such as personal animosity, ambition or revenge.

As we will see in the next subsection, although it was claimed that Reşid has been protecting and favoring Sâdât, the Sâdât bloc's seek for justice and complaints against administration did not end during Reşid's tenure as well. As the manifestation of justice was delayed, vitriolic statements continued to come from the Sâdât front. Naqib Maruf expressed that; in the name of fractionizing the nation, the trio of Sub-Governor Tevfik, Commander Mustafa and Jaf Chief Mahmud resorted to tricks and plans that would even amaze the devil.⁹¹² Because of the vile, fabricated, and false accusations of this clique, Sheikhs were disgraced and banished from their families in violation of law and justice.⁹¹³ Maruf emphasized that if the demands for the proper punishment of the perpetrators of so many murders and crimes were not met, they would put the full responsibility on those who delayed the execution of justice.⁹¹⁴ Apparently, even though Reşid disclosed the alleged involvement and conspiracy of the previous administration in the Mosul Incident; Sâdât had pressured Reşid after Zeki as no convictions had ever taken place.

While the investigations were still in progress, the public disorder, which had been evident for a long time in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah Sanjaks, re-emerged. Merchants from Baghdad complained that they could not transport goods to these sanjaks due to the disorder created by the local despots and the fear of the bandits.⁹¹⁵ Commercial

⁹¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2886/63/Lef 1, 12 Temmuz 1325 - 25 July 1909

⁹¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2886/63/Lef 2, 15 Temmuz 1325 - 28 July 1909

⁹¹² BOA, DH.MKT.2813/91, 29 Nisan 1325 – 12 May 1909

⁹¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.2813/91, 29 Nisan 1325 – 12 May 1909

⁹¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2813/91, 29 Nisan 1325 – 12 May 1909

“bunca cinayatin ceraimin mütecasirleri hakkında mücazaat-ı lazıminin icrasına irade buyurulmasına istima’ aksi halde bütün mesuliyet-i lazime-i muadeletin infazını tehire badi olanlara tahmil eyleriz.”

⁹¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2826/40/Lef 1, 12 Mayıs 1325- 25 May 1909

“Süleymaniye ve Kerkük sancaklarının müstebidleri vasıtasıyla muhtel olan asayiş dolasıyla muvaredat-ı ticaret münkatı bulunduğundan ve eşkıyanın tasallutu havfiyle Süleymaniyeye mal gönderemediklerinden bahisle mezkur sancakların iade-i asayiş esbabının istihsali Bağdad tüccarlarından bir çoğunun imzasıyla Bağdad merkezinden keşide kılınan telgrafnamede bildirilmesi üzerine”

transportation was completely disrupted, and merchants demanded the restoration of order in these sanjaks.⁹¹⁶ The Minister of War, Salih Hulusi Pasha, quickly coordinated with the Minister of Interior and assigned the 6th Army to take the necessary measures to restore the public order.⁹¹⁷ According to Reşid, security and order were excellent throughout the province, but Hamawands, who had always been a habit of banditry, occasionally created problems in rural areas.⁹¹⁸ He expressed that, rather than the tribes in general, there was a specific threat from the unsettled Hamawands.⁹¹⁹ Hamawands who could not be properly suppressed so far, have been particularly targeting and attacking travelers.⁹²⁰ However, the button was already pushed for a suppressive operation after the 6th Army had decided to dispatch five battalions of regular soldiers and as many cavalymen as needed.⁹²¹

Sâdât's messages, which were gradually expanded in scope and contained new ultimatums, also continued to reach the Grand Vizirate. According to Sheikh Maruf and his comrades, the people whom Major Ali Said persuaded and motivated by funneling 2.000 TL sent from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul were the "Executioners of the Inquisition" (*Engizisyon Cellatları*).⁹²² They claimed that the evil centers in Baghdad, composed of defeatist notables and officers were still encouraged by the lack of justice.⁹²³ These personalities allegedly covered up the positive truth and rejected the victimization of Sâdât by frightening the supporters of the righteousness.⁹²⁴ According

⁹¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2826/40/Lef 1, 12 Mayıs 1325- 25 May 1909

⁹¹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2826/40/Lef 1, 12 Mayıs 1325- 25 May 1909

⁹¹⁸ BOA, BEO.3561/267060/Lef 2, 17 Mayıs 1325 - 30 May 1909

"Vilayetin her tarafında emn ve asayiş pek mükemmel olub yalnız öteden beri şekaveti itiyad edinmiş olan Hemvendlerin ara sıra Kerkük ve Süleymaniye sancakları dahilinde mesarih ve..... isal dest-i hasar ettikleri vaki ise de"

⁹¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325- 02 June 1909

"Kerkük ve Süleymaniye sancaklarında öteden beri ru-nümün olan muhal-i asayiş ahvalin dahl-i vilayetteki aşairin umumundan ziyade ebna-yı sebile taaruz ve tevacüzden hali kalmayan Hemvend eşkiyasının layık-ı veçhiyle tedib ve terbiye edilememelerinden münbais olduğu"

⁹²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325- 02 June 1909

⁹²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325- 02 June 1909

⁹²² BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

"Süleymaniye'den toplayıp Musul'a gönderdikleri İki Bine karib lira kuvvetiyle Ali Said Bey ve rüfekası tarafından itma' ikna edilen Engizisyon Cellatları"

*The original amount in the promissory note was 1500 Lira.

⁹²³ BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

"hala ihkak-ı hakk edilmemesinden cesaret alan Bağdad'daki erkanı müfsidin, zabitan-ı mücrimin"

⁹²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

"hakaik-i müsbeteyi ihtifa, hakkaniyet tarafdarını bil-ihafe mağduriyetimizi redd"

to Sheikh Maruf, these people have been influencing the newspapers such as Baghdad and El Reşad to provoke some circles of Sulaymaniyah against Sâdât.⁹²⁵ And these circles consisted of those who were unaware of the truth, some certain characters known for their factionalism and some state officials who had gained influence through their authority.⁹²⁶ If they had the chance to realize their goals, it would mean that Sâdât was completely destroyed and buried alive.⁹²⁷ Ultimately, they demanded that they be rescued from this terrible end with the manifestation of justice, or that they be allowed to migrate to another location, with their formation close to thousands of households.⁹²⁸

5.3.1. Allegations Against Reşid and His Dismissal

The first collective allegation in the process leading to the dismissal of Reşid came from Sulaymaniyah circles and claimed that Reşid formed an alliance with Sâdât, neglected the people of Sulaymaniyah and favored Sâdât against them. At the end of March, Sulaymaniyah merchants, clergy and military officers dispatched a telegram from Baghdad to the Grand Vizirate and complained about the Governor Reşid.⁹²⁹ According to the allegations, the Governor of the Constitutional Government who was sent to Mosul on a sacred duty; went to Kirkuk and took a lesson in politics from

⁹²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

“bila haysiyet ve şeref , zatı ve hanümanımızı payimal ve hakaik-i ahvalden bi-haber olanların efkarını ezhanı aleyhimize imale etmek üzere her nasılsa Bağdad ve El-Reşad nam cerideleri elde ederek evsah-ı dimağlarıyla mayalanmış isnadat fikriyat-ı şu’m müteheyyice neşretmekte”

⁹²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

“ve meftuh-ül amel heva heşker iclasına bu hallerine Süleymaniye ahalisinden hırs-ı nifak ve şikakla malum olanları yine fesad kavmiyeleri teşkiline; hasb-el memuriyet nafiz-ül emr olanları igvaya teşebbüsata ferhatyab ile mertebeye ulaştırması”

⁹²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

“mahvımızı iftamızı ,diri diri mezara defnimizi istilzam edeceği de şüphe bırakmamış olduğundan”

⁹²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909

“ya hakkımızda muktezay-ı adaletin hakkaniyetin ilgasıyla mazlumin-i mütenevvia-i fecia-i teessürat edilmesinden vikayemize tedabir-i müessire-i seriasının ittihazı yahud binlerce hane ekarib mütaalakatımızla diyar-ı ahire hicrete terhisimizi istirhama müsaraat ederiz”

⁹²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

Signers of the telegram were Ali, Hasan, Abdülkerim, Çader, Abdülrahim, İbrahim, Abdülfettah, Mustafa, Mehmed, Reşid from merchants; Abdullah and Said from Ulema; and Major Ahmed, Senior Captain Zeki, Lieutenant Reşid, Lieutenant Osman from the army.

Commander İzzet Pasha and had a pleasant conversation with the Sheikhs.⁹³⁰ After Reşid arrived to Sulaymaniyah, he did not find it necessary to investigate the reasons for the incidents and to listen to the grievances of those who had been moaning under Sâdât's yoke for years.⁹³¹ Petitioners claimed that the Governor made some promises to Sâdât during his visit to Kirkuk and then kept these promises by allowing the Sheikhs to return to Sulaymaniyah.⁹³² Allegedly, Reşid had reported to the Army and the Porte that the public order and security of Mosul was intact, but the real situation was not like this.⁹³³ It was still unclear whether the Sheikhs, whose criminal acts could be attested both in official correspondence and publicly, surrendered to the grip of justice.⁹³⁴ In other words, the criminal prosecution of the crimes committed by Sâdât and its cohorts should have been declared by the Governor and questioned from the higher authorities.⁹³⁵ According to the petitioners, these so-called Sheikhs who had the honor of a despotic Governor, were allowed to return to Sulaymaniyah, which meant they were permitted to devastate the Sulaymaniyah people completely.⁹³⁶ Finally, the petitioners who stated that they were troubled by Sâdât again; sought protection from the Government or asked for the facilitation of their immigration elsewhere.⁹³⁷

⁹³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“Memalik-i Osmaniye’nin Aksa-i Şarkdaki şu bedbaht livanın mavhı ...ve evliya-i umurca (iş başına bulunanlar, vazifeliler) matlub ise Hükümet-i Meşruta-i Osmaniye tarafından mukaddes bir vazife ile Musul’a gönderilen Vali Kerkük’de İzzet Paşadan ders-i siyaseti ve şeyhlerle tatlı bir görüşmenin lezzetini alarak”

⁹³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“Süleymaniye’ye hareket ve muvasalatını müteakib vukuatın esbabını araştırmağa ...Sâdât’ın boyunduruğu altında senelerce inleyen zuafanın derdini dinlemeye katiyen lüzum görmeksizin”

⁹³² BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“Kerkük’deki vaadlerini incazen hemen mütegalibeye avdet her telgrafını ita ve vusullerinde parlak resim istikbal icra eyledi.”

⁹³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“Ordu-u hümayuna yazıldığı gibi takrir-i asayişe muvaffakiyetini şüphesiz Makamat-ı Aliyeye de arz eylemiştir.”

⁹³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“Fakat bizzat Sâdât ve avaneleri tarafından ika edildiği muharrerat-ı resmiyece sabit ve alemce musaddık olan sefk-i dima’ ve nehb-i emval müsebbiblerinin pençe-i adaletle teslim olub olmadığı Vali tarafından izah ve makamatça istizah olunmak lazımdır”

⁹³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

⁹³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“İşte müstebid bir valinin şeref-i iltizamına nail olarak biz zavallıları büsbütün mahv etmeğe mezuniyeti olan müteşeyyihler feryadlarımıza rağmen bu kerre yine bize tasallut ettiler.”

⁹³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

“Vediatullah olan bizi himaye ediniz.....halk olan havzayı artık iltizam etmeyiniz veya bize birgöstererek hicretimizi teshil ediniz.”

Otherwise, they would be the victims of heedlessness and would call them to account for their victimization on the Day of Judgment.⁹³⁸

They were not the only ones who complained that Reşid has been protecting Sâdât. Former Head Clerk of the Sharia Court of Sulaymaniyah (*Sabık Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkatibi*) Abdülfettah had also made serious accusations against the local authorities.⁹³⁹ He mentioned that the Sheikhs and their allied bandits, who were given arrest warrants for many crimes such as the murder of Ottoman soldiers and attack on caravans, were still on the run.⁹⁴⁰ Besides, they returned to Sulaymaniyah with a full liberty thanks to the support of Mosul Governor Reşid and Kirkuk Commander Izzet, and wandered the streets shouting "Long Live Despotism!".⁹⁴¹ According to Abdülfettah, Governor Reşid devoted all his strength and time to the protection of these despotic bandits and tried to revive the old regime.⁹⁴² At this point, Abdülfettah increased the dose of his accusations. He claimed that Reşid and his despotic affiliates had tried to undermine all the investigation documents regarding the committed crimes of these perpetrators, had deceived the justice in order to protect them and to enslave the innocent people.⁹⁴³ Abdülfettah obviously alleged that Governor Reşid has been trying to cover up Sâdât's criminal records. Therefore, the violation of personal and public law to such extent and betrayal of the blood of martyred soldiers and innocent people caused a deep sorrow in Sulaymaniyah.⁹⁴⁴

⁹³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909

"Binlerce mazlumini tegafüllüğünüze kurban etmeyiniz. Yarın huzur-u safta kanlı kefenleriyle karşınıza dikilecek mazlumlara cevap vereceksiniz."

⁹³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

⁹⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"asker-i şahane efradının katlinden, kervanlarımızın nehbinden dolayı mahkemece haklarında ihzar ve tevkif müzekkereleri verilerek şimdiye kadar vadi-i firarda bulunan şeyhler ile eşkiya avaneleri"

⁹⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"icraata memur Musul Valisi Reşid, Kerkük Kumandanı İzzet Paşaların ikdamatları sayesinde kemal-i sürur ve serbestiyle memleket derununa avdet ve lisan-ı hal ile 'Yaşasın İstibdad' diyerek çarşı sokaklarda gezmeye başladılar"

⁹⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"Muşarunileyh Vali Paşa her bir icraatını var kuvvetini müstakbele-i müstebide-i şakilerin himayesine hasır ile ahval-i sabıkanın ihyasını deruhte etmişçesine"

⁹⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

"kendi refakatinde götürdüğü eşkiya hamisi bazı istibdadları vasıtasıyla bilakis mücrimlerin haklarında evvelce tutulan bütün cürmlerine medar-ı tahkiken evrak-ı merbuteyi çürütmek ile fukara-i milleti bir daha açılmayacak surette zincir-i esarete bağlamak fikriyle"

⁹⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

Based on his legal background, he warned that this situation would cause a major disorder and reminded that the necessary measures should be taken quickly.⁹⁴⁵ Abdülfettah had sent the telegram to the Grand Vizirate, the Ministry of Justice and the Chamber of Deputies and the issue kept these authorities busy for a while. However, Reşid's plead was written in a very short and calm fashion. According to the inquiry of Reşid, Abdülfettah had resigned from his office due to his own situation and his complaints were caused by the provocations of the opponents of Sâdât before these opponents reconciled with Sâdât.⁹⁴⁶ But this was more like a circumlocution or a diversion rather than a satisfying explanation.

During this period, rumors about Reşid's patronage over Sâdât even reached Baghdad newspapers. At the end of March, a grave telegram from the Baghdad-based İrşad newspaper reached the parliament. The message particularly mentioned that the lives of Basrah, Amarah and Sulaymaniyah peoples were in great danger since the Governors of Basrah and Mosul misguided the Central Authority with false information.⁹⁴⁷ According to the message, the Governor of Mosul deviated from his policy during his visit to Kirkuk and caused an unavoidable trouble by allowing the Sheikhs to return to Sulaymaniyah.⁹⁴⁸ İrşad also reported the incidents of disorder such as the murders in Basrah and ship attacks in Amarah, that the Basrah Governor left his office without waiting for his successor and that this disorder could spread to Baghdad at any moment.⁹⁴⁹ As can be seen, the south of Iraq was in disorder as well as in the north, and after this notification by İrşad, the Basrah and Mosul provinces were also to be warned of any incident that could endanger the security.⁹⁵⁰

"hürriyet men' tahkikata müsteniden hatalarını setre ve bunca hukuk-u şahsiye ve umumiyyeyi ihma ve lasiyyema şüheda-yı askeriyye ve ahalinin kanlarını hedere alenen çalışmakta bulunmuş olması büsbütün ahali- ...mazlumenin meyusiyetine sebebiyet verdi"

⁹⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

⁹⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 12, 3 Nisan 1325- 16 April 1909

⁹⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2808/60/Lef 1, 14 Mart 1325- 27 March 1909

"Basra, Amare, Süleymaniye ahalişi muhafaza-i hayat edemiyor"

"Musul, Basra valileri işarat-ı kazibe ile merkezi iğfal mesleğinden feragat etmeyerek hakimiyet-i milliyeyi ihlale cüretleriyle bildiğimiz neticeyi merkezin anlamadığına zahib oluyoruz."

⁹⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2808/60/Lef 1, 14 Mart 1325- 27 March 1909

"Emniyet mefkud Musul valisi Musuldan yazdığı hakikatı Kerkükden tekzip iletedabir-i ma'kulesine rağmen mazhar-ı hayatı olan müteşeyyihleri irca suretiyle önü alınması müşkül-i fitne katl esbabını ihzar etti."

⁹⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2808/60/Lef 1, 14 Mart 1325- 27 March 1909

⁹⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2808/60/Lef 3, 27 Nisan 1325- 10 May 1909

Other allegations against Governor Reşid were made by Reşid el-Ömeri, who was judged as one of the main suspects and instigators of the Mosul Incident. As we will see in the next section of ‘Investigation, Arrests and Trial’, Ömeri contacted the 3rd Action Army (3. *Hareket Ordusu*) and complained about Governor Reşid to Commander Mahmud Şevket Pasha.⁹⁵¹ He also contacted the parliament and accused the Governor of his despotic practices, partisan viewpoints, and baseless charges he brought against him.⁹⁵² According to Ömeri, the despotic administration of the Governor Reşid and the judicial officers he dominated, had fabricated crimes and evidence against him.⁹⁵³ Eventually, he attributed his victimization to the fact that the success of the Society of Mohammedan Union he founded, attracted the attention of the Provincial Administration and the Governor.⁹⁵⁴ It was a possible expectation that Governor Reşid, who was allegedly a Pro-Sâdât bureaucrat, wanted one of the major instigators of such an incident to be severely punished. However, fabricating crimes and evidence were very serious allegations, and it was more or less predictable what kind of impression it created in the Central Authority. Nevertheless, after these striking allegations by Ömeri, no correspondence regarding to an official investigation on Reşid was observed in the archive documents. It was also possible that Ömeri, knowing Reşid's Pro-Sâdât reputation, tried to manipulate this as an advantage to justify himself.

At the end of June, the Ministry took a new decision on the Mosul Governorate and decided to remove Reşid. His successor was going to be Mehmed Fazıl Pasha, Deputy Governor of Baghdad and Commander of the 6th Army.⁹⁵⁵ In the message sent to Mehmed Fazıl from the Ministry on 22 of June, it was mentioned that the perpetrators of the Mosul Incident were still not subject to criminal proceedings.⁹⁵⁶ And that the security of the province was worryingly damaged by the Hamawand bandits as they constantly attacked merchant groups and army elements.⁹⁵⁷ The reestablishment of

⁹⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 1, 14 Mayıs 1325-27 May 1909;

⁹⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.2837/39/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325- 06 June 1909

⁹⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.2837/39/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 - 06 June 1909

⁹⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

⁹⁵⁵ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909

⁹⁵⁶ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909

“Çend mah evvel Musul şehrinde zuhur eden hadise üzerine mütecasirler hakkında henüz bir guna muamelat-ı cezaiye icra olunamamasından”

⁹⁵⁷ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909

security and order depended on the presence of a heroic and competent person such as Mehmed Fazıl in Mosul.⁹⁵⁸ Therefore, the Mosul provincial command and Governorship was going to be combined and this critical task was going to be delegated to Mehmed Fazıl.⁹⁵⁹ He was expected to make the necessary preparations until the arrival of succeeding Baghdad Governor and 6th Army Commander.⁹⁶⁰ However, as the announcement of the appointment might cause Reşid's complacency in provincial affairs, Fazıl was expected to keep it confidential for now.⁹⁶¹ The appointment, which would not take place until August, was planned to be kept secret from Reşid until then.⁹⁶² However, after a while, as some rumors reached him, an official statement was now required.⁹⁶³ Reşid also tried to justify himself in a message that he questioned whether the appointment was real or not.⁹⁶⁴ His services in the province were known to everyone, and he had informed all the necessary authorities to suppress the centuries-old Hamawand banditry.⁹⁶⁵ According to Reşid, the main responsibility and initiative should have belonged to the Sub-Governors and the military commands of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, with the fact that the original location of Hamawand groups was between these two sanjaks.⁹⁶⁶ However Reşid claimed that, they transferred all responsibility to the Governorate on the contrary and

"ve ahiren Hemvend eşkyasının tüccar kafilelerine ve asker-i şahaneye mükerreren taarruz etmelerinden dolayı asayiş-i vilayet mucib-i endişe olacak surette haleldar olmuştur"

⁹⁵⁸ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909

"Vilayet-i mezkurede inzibatın iadesiyle ciddi bir intizamın husulü zat-ı valaları gibi şeci' ve sahib-i kifayet bir zatın Musul'da bulunmasına mütevakkıf olduğundan"

⁹⁵⁹ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909

"Musul ve havalisi kumandanlığı inzimamıyla Musul Valiliği uhde-i valalarına tevcih buyurulmuştur"

⁹⁶⁰ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909

⁹⁶¹ BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 Haziran 1909

"ve memuriyet-i cedidenin valalarına şimdiden ilanı, Musul Vali-i sabıkı Reşid Paşanın tedvire umurca rehavetkarane hareketine badi olabileceğinden keyfiyet-i tevcihenin şu aralık işar buyurulmaması tavsiye olunur."

⁹⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

⁹⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

⁹⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

⁹⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

"Acizlerinin bu vilayete olan hidematı hazretullah ve muamelesi şahid ve herkez de vakıfdır..Ancak Hemvendlilerin şekaveti ise asırlarca devam eden bir şey olub bidayet-i memuriyeti acizanemde nazar-ı dikkatimi celb eylemiş olduğundan tedibi hususubab-ı ali ve orduyu hümayun kumandanlığına yazıldıktan ve tahkikat talebinden hali kalmadım"

⁹⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

"Bunlar Kerkük ve Süleymaniye arasında olub her iki mutasarrıfın bu babda ciddi teşebbüsü lazım ve oldukça asker mevcut iken"

they caused inappropriate situations for the sake of populist policies.⁹⁶⁷ In addition, they have spread rumors for his dismissal, and caused panic by ignoring the incidents that were successfully calmed down in other parts of the province.⁹⁶⁸ Reşid thought that the expulsion of the persons mentioned in the promissory note of Tefvik Pasha and of the officers who attempted to start a second incident in Sulaymaniyah, strengthened the opposition to him.⁹⁶⁹ At the end of the same message, Reşid questioned the accuracy of the rumors that Fazıl Pasha had been appointed as the Governor of Mosul and that he had departed from Baghdad.⁹⁷⁰ Even if he was dismissed or transferred, he had naturally demanded to be officially notified without leaving no room for hesitation and suspicion.⁹⁷¹ The following week, Reşid stated that he had read the appointment in the Baghdad newspaper of August 3 and had complained that there was still no official notification on the issue.⁹⁷² Finally, the next day, he was officially notified of Fazıl Pasha's appointment and he was asked to continue his duty as before, until his successor reached Mosul.⁹⁷³ After Fazıl reached Mosul, Reşid continued to serve as a deputy Governor in the provincial center for almost a month and assisted Fazıl, who was busy with important works throughout the province.⁹⁷⁴ Ahmed Reşid Pasha was not going to take any other official duty until he was appointed as the Governor of Erzurum on 22 August 1912.⁹⁷⁵

⁹⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

“işî bütün bütün vilayete tahmil ederek ve avampesendane ahalinin önüne düşerek amiyane ahvale tecasürleri”

⁹⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

“ve telaşlı telaşlı işarları vilayetin şimdiye kadar diğer taraflarda zaruri labüdd olup teskine muvafık olduğu fenalıklar hakkındaki ikdamı hiç sayarak nihayet azlim hususunda birçok aydır şayanın devranına sebep olmuştur”

⁹⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

“Esasen Musul Hadisesinin esaslarını teşkil eden Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tefvik Paşanın mührüyle elde edilen 1500 liralık senette isimleri muharrer eşhası ile Musul hadisesine mümasil Süleymaniye’de bir hadise daha çıkarmaya yeltenenlerden birkaç zabitin oradan çıkarılması aleyhimde.....arttırmış olmuştur”

⁹⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

⁹⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1-2, 26 Temmuz 1325- 08 August 1909

⁹⁷² BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 4, 2 Ağustos 1325- 15 August 1909

⁹⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 5, 3 Ağustos 1325- 16 August 1909

⁹⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.8/49/Lef 3, 01 Eylül 1325- 14 September 1909

In this message, Reşid stated that his presence there was putting Fazıl in a loss in terms of salary and asked for permission to leave Mosul as soon as possible.

Hut also states that Reşid served in Mosul until October. Hut, *Musul Vilayeti’nin ...*, p.179

For an overview of Reşid Pasha’s Mosul Governorate please see: Hut, *Musul Vilayeti’nin* p.178-184

⁹⁷⁵ BOA, İ..DH..1494/85, 09 Ağustos 1328- 22 August 1912

The fact that the dismissal of Reşid had been concealed from him until the last minute could be perceived as the Ministry did not trust him anymore. However, under any circumstances, it had been an unusual and unethical situation for the official Governor of the state to hear from rumors or read from newspapers that someone else was appointed in his place. In addition, despite all these allegations, no detail has been observed in the archive that Reşid has undergone any investigation or prosecution. If he had lost the total trust of the state, he would not have been asked to support Fazıl during his transfer of duty and he would not have been given the task of Governor again.

5.4. Prosecution of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik

In this section, allegations of Tevfik's involvement in the Mosul Conspiracy, other allegations of his misconduct and improper connections, and his administrative prosecution process will be examined. In addition, his effort to take back his properties

For the civil administration career of Ahmed Reşid (Tokçaer) Pasha, see: Dr. Kazım Kartal, Serpil Sevim Kartal, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Geçişte Bir Devlet Adamı: Tokatlı Ahmet Reşid (Tokçaer) Paşa -Türk Tarihine Yenilikçi Yaklaşımlar* (Ankara: İksad Publishing House, 2019) p.3-16

In many ways, this study may be the most detailed source available on Ahmet Reşid Tokçaer. However, in this source, 21 June 1909, which is given as the date of dismissal of Reşid from his duty as the Governor of Mosul, is the date on which Mehmed Fazıl Pasha was originally offered the post. The dismissal and replacement were going to be officially notified to Reşid almost two months later on August 16, 1909.

Kuneralp stated that Reşid remained in office until August 1912 and that Mehmed Fazıl Pasha took over the office at that time. However, we can see from archive records that Fazıl was officially appointed as the Governor and Commander of Mosul as of August 1909 and started his active duty. Kuneralp also stated that Ahmet Reşit Paşa was appointed as the Governor of Mosul for the second time between December 1914 and March 1915. However, it is just a name resemblance. The person appointed as the Governor of Mosul in December 1914 was Reşid Bey, who was the Deputy Governor of Baghdad and proposed by Basrah Governor and Commander Süleyman Askeri.

Hut also referred to Kuneralp and stated that Ahmed Reşid was appointed as the Governor of Mosul for the second time. He even named the part he devoted to Reşid Pasha as "*Ahmet Reşid (Tokçaer) Pasha's First Governorship...*".

However, Ahmed Reşid, who was the Governor of Erzurum between August 1912 and July 1914, did not take another position until he took the same office again in July 1919.

Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922)*, p.36,60

Hut, *Musul Vilayeti'nin ...*, p.178,179 footnote 901

BOA, DH.ŞFR.454/128, 9 Kanunuevvel 1330- 22 December 1914; MV. 237/210, 15 Kanunuevvel 1330 - 28 December 1914

Kartal,Kartal, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Geçişte...*p.12,13

seized in the caravan ambush, the accusations he made against Reşid and his application for unemployment stipend after his dismissal will also be covered. The next subsection is quite remarkable in terms of showing that there are those who endorse Tevfik as well as those who accuse. In brief, the part will scrutinize the period before and after the dismissal of a local administrator accused of irregularity and misconduct.

The dispute between Sheikhs residing in Sulaymaniyah and Sub-Governor Tevfik resulted in his dismissal at the end of January.⁹⁷⁶ The Governorate, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Grand Vizier eventually all agreed on this point, and action was taken before this deepened conflict had worse consequences.⁹⁷⁷ The person considered instead was the former Dersim Sub-Governor Ziya Pasha and was described as 'competent' (*erbab-ı ehliyyet*) by the authorities.⁹⁷⁸ Finally, Ziya Pasha was approved by all authorities and was officially appointed as the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah on 3 February.⁹⁷⁹ However, Tevfik's dismissal also meant the beginning of his prosecution process, and this process was quite controversial and turbulent.

5.4.1. The Letters of Major Ali Said

In order to grasp the judicial process against Tevfik Pasha, it is necessary to review the first accusation made by Sâdât against Major Ali Said who was a close relative of Tevfik. At the beginning of February, a telegram signed by Nakib Maruf and Seyyid Mahmud claimed that Ali Said was the sole promoter and motivator of the disaster

⁹⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2724/54/Lef 1, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909; Lef 2 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

⁹⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2724/54/Lef 1, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909; Lef 2 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

“Sâdât ve Meşayih ile beynlerinde mütehaddis ihtilafattan dolayı Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik Paşa’nın devam-ı memuriyeti caiz olamayacağından bahisle lüzum-u tebdili Musul Vilayetinden izbar olunmasına binaen muşarunileyhin bervec-i işar-ı azliyle mezkur mutasarrıflığa erbab-ı ehliyet Dersim Mutasarrıf-ı sabıkı Ziya Paşa’nın tayini”

⁹⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2724/54/Lef 1, 15 Kanunusani 1324- 28 January 1909; Lef 2 18 Kanunusani 1324- 31 January 1909

⁹⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2732/70/Lef 3, 25 Kanunusani 1324 – 07 February 1909

from beginning to end.⁹⁸⁰ According to the message, the incident took place under the pressure and provocation of Ali Said.⁹⁸¹ The Ministry of Interior took the message into consideration immediately and asked the Mosul Governor for further information and his opinion on the Major.⁹⁸² However, Zeki's response stated the complete irrelevance of Ali Said with the removal of the Sheikhs to Mosul or with the conspiracy that led to the Mosul Incident.⁹⁸³ Zeki expressed that the banishment of the Sheikhs to Mosul was a purely legitimate act based entirely on the needs of the Local Administration and the approval of the Ministry.⁹⁸⁴ According to him, Ali Said was in Mosul coincidentally when the incident took place, and the incident took place suddenly and unexpectedly.⁹⁸⁵ In his statement to the Mosul and 6th Army Commands, Zeki had already declared that Ali Said had nothing to do with this issue from beginning to end, but if there was a problem, the court gates were wide open.⁹⁸⁶ He claimed that Ali Said was a political victim, and like similar examples, he was discharged from the army and sent to Istanbul.⁹⁸⁷ According to him, the bad suspicions and misunderstandings of the complainants were probably based on Ali Said's being a relative of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor.⁹⁸⁸ Ultimately, the Mosul Command had informed the complainants that they had the right to apply to the ordinary courts.⁹⁸⁹

⁹⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 1, 22 Kanunusani 1324- 04 February 1909

"Hadise-i fecianın evvel ve ahir yegane muharriki ve müsebbibi olan Binbaşı Ali Said Bey'in"

⁹⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 1, 22 Kanunusani 1324- 04 February 1909

"netice-i tazyikat ve tahrikatında Musul'da ikası kanun namına müsted'adır"

⁹⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 1, 22 Kanunusani 1324- 04 February 1909

⁹⁸³ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

⁹⁸⁴ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

"Şeyhlerin Musula aldırılmaları Süleymaniye ahalisinin bunlar aleyhindeki heyecanı üzerine hükümet-i mahalliyece gösterilen icab ve nezaret-i celilelerinin ol babdaki mezuniyetine müstenid idi."

⁹⁸⁵ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

"Ol vakit Binbaşı Said Bey Musul'da idi. Vaka-i malume ise nagehani zuhur etmiştir."

⁹⁸⁶ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

"Mumaunileyh Binbaşının evvel ve ahir bu meselede bir medhali olmadığı ve ebvab-ı mehakimin daima küşade bulunduğu vaki olan istilama cevaben Ordu kumandanlığı Musul kumandanlığıyla müştereken yazılmıştır"

⁹⁸⁷ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

"ve mağduriyet-i siyasiyeden olduğu mebni emsali misüllü Dersaadet'e terhis edilmiştir"

⁹⁸⁸ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

"Müştekilerin sui-zan ve zehabları Said Bey'in Süleymaniye mutasarrıfının akrabası olmasından münbais olması muhtemeldir."

⁹⁸⁹ BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324- 14 February 1909

In March 1909, a shocking telegram declaring Major Ali Said Bey's alleged connection with the Mosul Incident was reached to Ministry of Interior.⁹⁹⁰ According to the telegram sent by the Mosul Governor Reşid; two letters written by Ali Said and addressed to Tevfik's nephew Nuh Bey were obtained.⁹⁹¹ These letters, handwritten, signed and sealed by Ali Said as one of the close connections of the Sub-Governor Tevfik Bey, included his plans for the removal of the Sulaymaniyah Sheikhs to Mosul and the designation of the site of the massacre.⁹⁹² According to Reşid, it was strongly possible that Ali Said Bey, who is currently on leave in Istanbul, might have other critical documents with him that could reveal the truth.⁹⁹³ Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice was also informed on the grounds that the issue may contain sound evidence especially on the motivation of the Mosul Incident.⁹⁹⁴

5.4.2. The Promissory Note Sealed by Tevfik

Towards the end of March, a document that was allegedly stamped with the official seal of Tevfik and proving that he was involved in the Mosul Incident was seized.⁹⁹⁵ This shocking news quickly echoed in the authorities and the Ministry of Interior immediately started to pursue Tevfik. Because the evidence linking him to the Mosul Incident were no longer limited to Major Ali Said's handwritten letters. As we will see later in the indictment against Tevfik, this was a promissory note (*sened*) dated

⁹⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 56, 26 Şubat 1324 – 11 March 1909

⁹⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 56, 26 Şubat 1324 – 11 March 1909

⁹⁹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 56, 26 Şubat 1324 – 11 March 1909

“Süleymaniye Sâdâtının Musul’a aldırılmasını ve makatili-i fecianın kendisi tarafından tertib ve tasni” edildiğini musavver Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tevfik Paşa’nın taallukatından olub 18 Şubat 1324 tarihinde me’zunen Musul’dan İstanbul’a azimet etmiş olan Erkan-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey’in hattı destiyle muharrer imzalı re’sen ve cevaben Mutasarrıf mumaunileyhin nezdinde bulunan yeğeni Nuh Beye hitaben yazılmış iki mektub elde edilmiş”

⁹⁹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 56, 26 Şubat 1324 – 11 March 1909

“ve mumauileyh Ali Said Bey’in nezdinde de izhar-ı hakka medar olacak muhabere evrakı bulunması kaviyyen melhuz bulunmuş olmakla”

⁹⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 57, 3 Mart 1325- 16 March 1909

⁹⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2779/14, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tevfik Paşa’nın Musul Vakasında zi-medhal bulunduğunu gösterir mühr-i resmiyesiyle mahtum bir varaka elde edilmiştir”

December 4, 1908 and worth a large sum of 1.500 Lira.⁹⁹⁶ According to Reşid, this evidence left no room for doubt that these people were the organizers of the incident.⁹⁹⁷ However, Tevfik was in Baghdad for a while and Ministry of Interior tried to reach him through Baghdad Governorate.⁹⁹⁸ The Governor of Baghdad was asked to create a suitable excuse and to check whether Tevfik was with the seal when he arrived in Baghdad, if possible, to see the seal for himself and report the result.⁹⁹⁹ The Central Authority intended to compare the seal on the alleged document with the one that Tevfik carried with him. However, Baghdad Governor Necmeddin* reported that Tevfik departed for Aleppo four days ago and suggested the Ministry to contact with Zor Sub-Governorate (*Zor Mutasarrıflığı*) on his route or with Aleppo Governorate as his final destination.¹⁰⁰⁰ As he was still on his way, Ministry immediately informed Zor Sub-Governorate that Tevfik Pasha, as the former Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah, might have been involved in the Mosul incident.¹⁰⁰¹ Because a document stamped with his official seal was obtained and accepted as a substantial evidence.¹⁰⁰² Since some of his belongings were looted or lost during the caravan attack in February, Tevfik could have claimed that his official stamp was seized by the bandits and such a document was fabricated afterwards.¹⁰⁰³ Before he would have asserted such a claim, Zor Sub-Governor was instructed to check Tevfik in a suitable

⁹⁹⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 411/83, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

“Bu kerre de Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tevfik Paşanın Mutasarrıf-ı Liva Mehmed Tevfik namına muharrer büyük mührüyle memhur elde edilen balası defterli ve 21 Teşrin-i Sani 1324 tarihli 1500 lirayı natık bir kita senedinin mündericatı pek ziyade şayan-ı dikkat olmakla beraber”

⁹⁹⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 411/83, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

“mukatele-i malumenin müsebbib ve de mürettibleri bunlar olduğuna ıstibah kalmamak olduğundan zikrolunan senedber-vech-i zir maruzdur”

⁹⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2779/14, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

⁹⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2779/14, 15 Mart 1325- 28 March 1909

¹⁰⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 1, 17 Mart 1325- 30 March 1909

Bagdad Governor Necmeddin was the same person as Necmeddin Mullah (Kocataş), who was the Minister of Justice between May 1909 and October 1911.

Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922)*, p.113

¹⁰⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 2, 17 Mart 1325- 30 March 1909

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tevfik Paşa’nın Musul vak’asında dahi medhali olduğu görülmüştür.”

¹⁰⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 2, 17 Mart 1325- 30 March 1909

“Mühr-i resmiyesiyle mahtum bir varaka elde edilmiştir”

¹⁰⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 2, 17 Mart 1325- 30 March 1909

“Müşarunileyhe evvelce Süleymaniye’den hareketinde eşkiya taaruz etmiş ve bazı eşyası gaybedilmiş olmasıyla mühr-ü resmiyesinin bu eşkiya eline geçip öyle bir varakanın bilahare tasni’ edilmiş olduğuna iddia etmesine mahal kalmamak üzere”

manner and on a favorable occasion at his arrival in Zor, for finding out whether he has his official stamp with him or not.¹⁰⁰⁴ Sub-Governor was also instructed to see the stamp for himself if possible and report his finding as well.¹⁰⁰⁵

Another important directive given to the Zor Sub-Governorate was to hold Tevfik in there for a couple of days.¹⁰⁰⁶ Sub-Governor was instructed to notify Tevfik about his enforced stay in Zor until the correspondence process between the Ministry of Interior and Mosul Governorate was finalized.¹⁰⁰⁷ The Central Authority was concerned about losing sight of him since the evidence against him seemed substantial.¹⁰⁰⁸ Thus, in case of his possible escape, re-apprehending him would have been difficult and proving the elements of his crime would have been very delayed.¹⁰⁰⁹ For avoiding such drawbacks, Mosul Governor who was in Sulaymaniyah at that time, was pushed for using the advantage of Tevfik's absence and instructed to submit relevant file to Justice department immediately.¹⁰¹⁰

The knowledge and opinion of Tevfik was crucial for the investigation due to his good grasp of the Sulaymaniyah phase of the Mosul Incident.¹⁰¹¹ For this reason, Ministry was in a continuous communication with Zor Sub-Governorate and requested to be notified instantly when Tevfik arrived.¹⁰¹² If his custody or detainment becomes a necessity, relevant decree was to be issued and submitted to Zor Sub-Governorate in

¹⁰⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 2, 17 Mart 1325- 30 March 1909

"müşarünileyhin Zor'a vusulünde bir münasebetle ve düsturiyle mühr-i resmiyenin nezdinde olup olmadığının anlaşılması ve mümkünse mührün görülmesi ve neticesinin inbası muntazırdır"

¹⁰⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 2, 17 Mart 1325- 30 March 1909

¹⁰⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

¹⁰⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

¹⁰⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"mumaunileyh aleyhindeolunan delail şayan-ı ehemmiyet göründüğünden"

¹⁰⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"kendisi şayet savuşacak olursa ele geçmesinin müşkülata tesadüf edilmesi belki asar-ı cürmün bilahare kabil-i isbat olacak bir şekle girmesi melhuz bulunduğundan"

¹⁰¹⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"bu gibi mahzurlarakalmamak üzere mumaunileyhin Zor'da tevakkuf ideceği birkaç günden bil'istifade bu babdaki evrankın hemen cihet-i adliyyeye tevdiyle"

¹⁰¹¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"Süleymaniye Hadisesinden dolayı Musul vilayetiyle muhabere edilmekte olup vukufu hasebiyle Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tevfik Paşa'nın malumat ve mütalaatına müracaat edilmek lazım geldiğinden"

¹⁰¹² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"te'hirata mahal kalmamak üzere mumaunileyhin Zor'a muvassalatında keyfiyet işarı"

these couple of days.¹⁰¹³ Ministry added that the relevant notification regarding to the allegations on Major Ali Said was served to Ministry of Justice as well.¹⁰¹⁴ While the Ministry of Interior pursued Tevfik and added his arrest warrant among its further options, it also conducted the process regarding to the allegations against Ali Said.

On April 6, the Zor Sub-Governor Mahmud reported that Tevfik had arrived there and the telegram ordering his hold in Zor by the Ministry was shown to him.¹⁰¹⁵ However, Tevfik had stated that he did not have time to be held in there as all his property and belongings were seized.¹⁰¹⁶ Besides, he would submit the requested information and explanations to the higher authorities in Istanbul by himself.¹⁰¹⁷ Tevfik would definitely leave tomorrow morning, and according to Mahmud, the possible means and persuasions for facilitating his temporary hold in there were not effective.¹⁰¹⁸ In his following telegram, Mahmud reported that Tevfik's official seal was checked without noticing him and an official seal with the inscription of his name and office was seen in his possession.¹⁰¹⁹ Even a sample of the seal was secretly taken to be properly applied and tested.¹⁰²⁰ It was stated that Tevfik intended to go to Istanbul rapidly via the Aleppo and Beirut routes; but according to Mahmud, there was no feeling or evidence that he would flee.¹⁰²¹ The next day, the Ministry informed the Governorate

¹⁰¹³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"kanunen kendisinin tevkifi yahudzabtı lazım geldiği halde cihet-i adliyece bu babda tanzim olacak kararnamenin şu bir iki gün zarfında telgrafla Zor Mutasarrıflığına tebliğ ettirilmesi"

¹⁰¹⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325- 31 March 1909

"Binbaşı Ali Said Bey'in hakkında da adliye nezaretine tebligat-ı lazıme icra edilmiştir"

¹⁰¹⁵ DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 3, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik Paşa bu akşam vasil oldu. Telgrafname-ikendisine irae edildi."

¹⁰¹⁶ DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 3, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"Emval ve eşyası tamamıyla gasb edildiği cihetle yolda tevkif-i hali müsaade olmadığını"

¹⁰¹⁷ DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 3, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"ve nebaile istenilen malumat ve izahatı İstanbul'da vermek üzere yarın ale's sabah buradan hareket edeceğini beyan ettiği maruzdur"

¹⁰¹⁸ DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 1, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"Tevfik Paşa behemehal yarın ale's-sabah hareket edecektir. Buraca bir müddet tevkifi için istimal olunan vesait ve iknaat kargir-i tesir olamamıştır."

¹⁰¹⁹ DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 2, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"Kendisine asla sezdirilmeksizin Tevfik Paşanın Mutasarrıf-ı Liva Mahmud Tevfik ibaresiyle mümkün-i nezdinde mahfuz bir kıta mühür-i resmiyesi görüldü"

¹⁰²⁰ DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 2, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"Ve an'il iktiza tatbik edilmek üzere bir suret-i numunesi de yine kendisini şüphelendirmeyecek surette hafiyen ahz-u hıfz olundu."

¹⁰²¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 2, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909

"Muşarunileyh sūratle Haleb Beyrut tarikiyle Dersaadete gitmek niyetinde olduğu ifade ediliyor. Firara tasdi eylemesi gibi bir hiss ve istidlal edilemediği maruzdur"

that Tevfik Pasha had departed from Zor possessing his seal with him, and questioned what judicial decision had been taken against him.¹⁰²²

5.4.3. Allegations of Nepotism and Misconduct

Apart from these allegations regarding to his possible connection with Major Ali Said and the amount they funneled for the Mosul Incident, different allegations against Tevfik had previously reached the central authorities but were not thoroughly investigated. The Sub-district Administrator of Western Sarchinar (*Müdür-i Serçınar-ı Garbi*) Mehmed Said, claimed that Tevfik made arbitrary appointments to the subdivisions of Sulaymaniyah in line with his own personal interests and his network of nepotism.¹⁰²³ According to the accusation, he had appointed Nuh Bey, the son of his brother who he used as an instrument of bribery during his office, as the administrator to the Sangaw Sub-district (*Sengav Nahiyesi*) of Bazian.¹⁰²⁴ However, it was well known that Nuh Bey had not even see his place of duty in the sub-district.¹⁰²⁵ In addition, recently he made an arbitrary appointment to please Abdurrahman Ağa, as one of the products of the despotism period and his partner in falsification and corruption.¹⁰²⁶ According to his allegation, Tevfik appointed Mehmed, one of Abdurrahman's despotic men, as the administrator of West Sarchinar in replacement of Mehmed Said and appointed Mehmed Said as the administrator of Sangaw.¹⁰²⁷ Mehmed Said, who was unjustly relocated of duty, sought refuge in law and justice,

¹⁰²² BOA, DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 4, 25 Mart 1325 – 7 April 1909

¹⁰²³ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324 – 24 February 1909

The entire message was as follows:

“Su-i tedbir ve irtikabından dolayı infisal eden Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa zaman-ı memuriyetinde vasıta-i irtışası olan biraderzadesi Nuh Beyi Sengav müdirliğine tayin etmiş ise de katiyyen nahiye yüzünü görmeyerek mümass olmakla merkezden çıktığını cümlece malumdur. Mutasarrıfın irtikab-ı hiyanetine ve devr-i istibdadın mahsulünden idare azası Abdurrahman Ağaya bir latife-i mahsus ve fidyeye necat olarak ayağı üzengide olduğu halde müstebidi adamı Mehmed Ağayı taltifen yerime müdir tayin, çakerlerinin Sengav’a tahvil kararını vermiş olduğundan istinadgah-ı umum olan kanun adalete ilticaen mağduriyetten vikayeme müsterhamdır. Ferman”

¹⁰²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324 – 24 February 1909

¹⁰²⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324 – 24 February 1909

¹⁰²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324 – 24 February 1909

¹⁰²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324 – 24 February 1909

and asked for a remedy of this unjust treatment.¹⁰²⁸ Although the Ministry of Interior quickly questioned the issue from Mosul Province, but no further correspondence was found in the archive regarding to this accusation of nepotism.¹⁰²⁹

5.4.4. Submittal of Indictment

On April 4, a very detailed report on the prosecution process of Sub-Governor Tevfik reached to the Ministry from Governor Reşid. The indictment containing the charges against Tevfik was prepared by the Investigating Judge of Central Mosul Court of First Instance (*Merkez Vilayet Bidayet Mahkemesi Müstantıklığı*) after the preliminary investigation.¹⁰³⁰ However, the major investigation and judicial proceedings were entrusted to the Investigating Judge of Sulaymaniyah Court of First Instance (*Süleymaniye Bidayet Mahkemesi Müstantıklığı*) since the place where the crimes were committed was Sulaymaniyah.¹⁰³¹ Nonetheless, Governor Reşid warned that due to the known conditions in Sulaymaniyah, it was inconvenient for the case to be heard there.¹⁰³² In addition, since the issues related to Tevfik's prosecution were directly linked to the Mosul Incident trial, his case was requested to be transferred to the Investigating Judge of Central Mosul Court.¹⁰³³ And on May 15, the Ministry of Justice transferred the prosecution and case to the Mosul Provincial Court of Appeal.¹⁰³⁴

Reşid listed the charges in Tevfik's indictment as follows:

¹⁰²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324 – 24 February 1909

¹⁰²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 2, 15 Şubat 1324 – 28 February 1909

¹⁰³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

¹⁰³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

“Merkez Vilayet Bidayet Mahkemesi Müstantıklığında alelusul lede’l tevdi ceraim-i mezkurenin mahal-i vukuu itibariyle tahkikat ve muamelat-ı kanuniyenin ifası Süleymaniye Bidayet Mahkemesi müstantıklığına aid olduğuna karar verildiği haber alınmış”

¹⁰³² BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

“mezkur deavi tahkikatının zat-ı sami-i cenab-ı nezaretpenahileri dahi malum olan ahvale nazaran Süleymaniye müstantıklığını icrasında bil-vahide mahzur olmakla”

¹⁰³³ BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

“esasen mesail-i maruzanın hadise-i mezkureye taalluk ve irtibatından dolayı tahkikatın merkez vilayet müstantıklığıınca icrası esbabının istikmaline müsaade-i asafaneleri maruzdur”

¹⁰³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2817/53/Lef 1, 2 Mayıs 1325 – 15 May 1909

- 1) *Deceiving the Governorate with false statements in order to expulse Sheikh Said and his companions from Sulaymaniyah*
- 2) *Forcing the community to close their shops, directing them in front of the Government building, and encouraging them to demonstrate against Sheikh Said and his companions.*
- 3) *Provoking the people with false rumors that the Kurdish tribes would secretly enter Sulaymaniyah, attack the town, dare looting and massacre.*
- 4) *Distributing weapons and guns in the Army and Gendarmerie depots to some certain civilians.*
- 5) *Removing the cannons from their hidden positions in the army barracks at night, pointing the cannons to Said's family and relative's neighborhood, and causing Said's family and relatives to flee from Sulaymaniyah.*
- 6) *Communicating with Major Ali Said who was in Mosul, through the intermediacy of his nephew Nuh Bey before the outbreak of Mosul Incident.*
- 7) *Collecting a large sum of 1.500 Lira from the Sheikh Said opponents in Sulaymaniyah for masterminding the incident in Mosul, as evidenced by an obtained promissory note.*¹⁰³⁵

The investigation file of Tevfik and his affiliates was sent from Mosul Governorate.¹⁰³⁶

In addition, the petition (*arzuhal*) given by Tevfik and the notification (*ihbarname*)

¹⁰³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325- 17 April 1909

“Süleymaniye mutasarrıfı sabık-ı Tevfik Paşa ile rüfekasının:

1-Süleymaniye Sâdâttan merhum Şeyh Said efendi ile rüfekası hakkında hilaf-ı hakikat bir takım işaret ile vilayeti iğfal ederek Süleymaniye'den bil-ihrac Musul'a izam

2- Bu esnada ahalinin cebren dükkanlarını kapattırıp hükümet konağına sevk ile Mumaunileyh Said Efendi ile rüfekası aleyhlerinde nümayiş vukua getirmelerine delalet ve ihtimam

3- Aşair-i ekradın bil-ihtiba' Süleymaniye üzerine duhum ve hücum ile nehb-i emval ve katli-i nüfusa cüret edecekleri yolunda bir şayia-i kazibe tertib edip ve ahaliyi galeyana getirip

4- Asker ve jandarma depolarındaki esliha ve tabancayı bazı eşhasa tevzi etmek

5- Geceleyin kışla-i hümayundaki topları mahfuz bulundukları mahalden çıkararak mumaunileyh Said efendiyle akraba ve taallukatının hanelerinin kain olduğu mahalleye hakim bir noktaya vech ile mumaunileyh Said efendinin akraba ve tallaukatının Süleymaniye'den gaybubet ve firarlarına bais olmak

6- Musul'da bulunmuş olan Erkan-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey ile Musul Hadisesi'nin vukuundan evvel mezkureye müteallik yeğeni Nuh beyi bit-tevsit muhaberede bulunmak

7- Süleymaniye ahalisinden mumaunileyh Said Efendiyle rüfekası aleyhlerinde husul-u maksad için 1500 Lira-i Osmani gibi cesim bir meblağı elde edilip 11 Mart 1325 tarihli şifre ile arz olunan sened mucibince mumaunileyh Said efendi akraba ve taallukatının muhaliflerinden toplamak cürmlerinden dolayı ettirilen tahkikat-ı ibtidaiyyeyi havi evrak”

¹⁰³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2816/46, 05 Mayıs 1325- 18 May 1909

submitted to Grand Vizirate were also attached to this file and all of them were submitted to the Ministry of Justice.¹⁰³⁷ Since Tefvik was claimed to have too many accomplices from the ordinary people, it was found more appropriate for the case to be heard by the Civil (*Nizamiye*) Court.¹⁰³⁸ Due to the importance and urgency of the matter, it was expected from the Ministry of Justice to execute the necessary procedure in a swift manner.¹⁰³⁹

5.4.5. Tefvik's Allegations Against Reşid: Document Forgery and Confiscated Properties

Something very unexpected happened while the prosecution was in progress, and it was revealed that Sub-Governor Tefvik made some accusations against Governor Reşid in his petition.¹⁰⁴⁰ He accused Reşid of 'forging documents against him' (*aleyhinde evrak-ı müzevvere tasni' /hakkında evrak-ı müzevvere tertib ve tasni*) and not returning his belongings taken back from the bandits who ambushed his caravan.¹⁰⁴¹ Tefvik publicly accused Reşid of forgery of documents and confiscation of his property but not any records found in the archive regarding to a possible investigation into Reşid on these allegations. Somehow, in a detailed report that the new Mosul Governor Mehmet Fazıl sent in August 1909, it was stated that a document

¹⁰³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2816/46, 05 Mayıs 1325- 18 May 1909

¹⁰³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2816/46, 05 Mayıs 1325- 18 May 1909

"Mutasarrıf müşarünileyhin efrad-ı ahaliden bir çok şerik-i cürmü bulunmasına nazaran mahkemesinin mehakim-i nizamiyece rü'yeti tabii"

¹⁰³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2816/46, 05 Mayıs 1325- 18 May 1909

¹⁰⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2828/36, 20 Mayıs 1325- 02 June 1909; DH.MKT.2873/52, 29 Haziran 1325-12 July 1909

¹⁰⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2828/36, 20 Mayıs 1325- 02 June 1909; DH.MKT.2873/52, 29 Haziran 1325-12 July 1909

"Aleyhinde evrak-ı müzevvere tasni' etmesinden ve eşkıya yedine geçen emvalini istirdad edeceği halde iade etmeyip zamanını geçirmesinden dolayı Musul Valisi Reşid Paşa hazretleriyle muhakeme talebini ve evvelce vuku bulan müracaatı üzerine Süleymaniye Bidayet Mahkemesince kayd ve tahrir edilmiş olan nukud ve eşya-i magsubesinin kendisine irsal ve teslimi istidasına dair Süleymaniye mutasarrıf-ı sabıkı Tefvik Paşa tarafından verilen arzuhal-ı aidine"

"Süleymaniye'denhareketinde eşkıya tarafından gasb edilmiş olan, nukud ve eşyası ahzile yed-i ketminde bırakmasından ve hakkında evrak-ı müzevvere tertib ve tasni' ...etmesinden dolayı Musul Valisi Reşid Paşa ile muhakemesinin icrasını müsteda Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Sabıkı Mehmed Tefvik Paşanın"

regarding Tevfik's prosecution process might have been forged during Reşid's governorship. At this point, it will be useful to look at the motivation and content of this report in some detail.

Since July, the Ministry of Interior has been questioning some certain allegations against Mosul Governorate.¹⁰⁴² These allegations included that the Sheikhs were taken under the protection of some state officials, their crimes were covered up and no legal action was taken against them.¹⁰⁴³ In one month, Mehmed Fazıl who succeeded Reşid, sent a very detailed report describing the processes of Mosul Incident from beginning to end.¹⁰⁴⁴ Major part of the report was almost the same as the previous narratives and included the details of the alleged conspiracy against Sâdât.¹⁰⁴⁵ However, at the end of the report, there were some interesting details regarding to the forgery of a document.¹⁰⁴⁶ Relying on some correspondence, Fazıl stated that some of the persons whose names were written on the promissory note of Tevfik were removed to Gulanbar and a document was turned out to be forged.¹⁰⁴⁷ According to Fazıl, the content of this document was far from reality and originated from hate.¹⁰⁴⁸ However, it is not understood from these expressions that which document this was, who prepared it and for what purpose it was prepared. In addition, it can be thought that these people who were sent to Gulanbar were already the same people Reşid expelled from Sulaymaniyah.¹⁰⁴⁹ Perhaps the document Fazıl reported could have been about their removal to Gulanbar without any justification. However, this is no more than an assumption and no further evidence has been observed in the archive records regarding to this allegation of forgery.

¹⁰⁴²BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 2, 2 Temmuz 1325-15 July 1909

¹⁰⁴³BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 2, 2 Temmuz 1325-15 July 1909

"bazı memurinin himayen himayetkaranesiyle setr-i seyyiatları cihetine gidilerek haklarında bir guna muamele-i kanuniye icra olunmadığından bahis ile"

¹⁰⁴⁴BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 1, 09 Ağustos 1325- 22 August 1909

¹⁰⁴⁵BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 1, 09 Ağustos 1325- 22 August 1909

¹⁰⁴⁶BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 1, 09 Ağustos 1325- 22 August 1909

¹⁰⁴⁷BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 1, 09 Ağustos 1325- 22 August 1909

"Süleymaniye mutasarrıf-ı sabıkı Tevfik Paşa'nın elde edilmiş senedin balasında muharrer zevatın bazıı Gulanbar gönderilerek mersul varakayı tertib ve tasni' ettikleri anlaşılan, tarihi ve numaraları arz olunan arızalar ile telgrafnameler meşmul-u nîğah-ı devletleri buyurulduğu halde"

¹⁰⁴⁸BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 1, 09 Ağustos 1325- 22 August 1909

"varaka mündericâtı hakikatden ari ve ağrazdan hali olduğu bedihi bulunmuş olmakla"

¹⁰⁴⁹ See page 180 footnote 947 in the subsection of 'Allegations Against Reşid and His Dismissal'

On the other hand, Tevfik accused Reşid of arbitrarily confiscating his property taken back from the Hamawand bandits. Tevfik had previously registered the details of his seized goods and cash in the Sulaymaniyah Court, but he wanted to appear in court with Reşid since he could not get them back under normal conditions.¹⁰⁵⁰ We see that the issue of retrieving Tevfik's goods has continued for a long time and was not easily resolved. Even a year after his request, Tevfik petitioned that those who seized his property and cash were still imprisoned in Sulaymaniyah and that's why he could not get his stuff back.¹⁰⁵¹ In addition, Tevfik still had not give up his request to prosecute the former Governor Reşid and his application processes were now followed by the new Governor Mehmed Fazıl.¹⁰⁵² In August 1910, Tevfik sent a petition to the Ministry of Interior and stated that his goods and cash worth 1.000 liras, which were registered in the records of the Local Administration and the Court Martial, were still not compensated.¹⁰⁵³ Tevfik had received the information that the horses belonging to the imprisoned bandits were confiscated, that these horses were sold and the injured parties would be compensated through this allowance.¹⁰⁵⁴ He claimed that the greatest damage belonged to him, and demanded that a fee on account of his loss be handed over to the Baghdad Provincial officials from this allowance for the injured parties.¹⁰⁵⁵ A month later after this correspondence, Baghdad Governor and Commander Nazim Pasha reported the Ministry that the cost of the Hamawands' confiscated and sold animals reached 84.000 kuruş.¹⁰⁵⁶ According to the Sulaymaniyah sub-Governorate, if

¹⁰⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2828/36, 20 Mayıs 1325- 02 June 1909

¹⁰⁵¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.79/43, 18 Mart 1326-31 March 1910

¹⁰⁵² BOA, DH.MUİ.2/8/Lef 1, 26 Teşrinievvel 1325- 08 November 1909; Lef 2, 9 Kanunusani 1325- 22 January 1910

¹⁰⁵³ BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 2, 20 Temmuz 1326- 02 August 1910

¹⁰⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 2, 20 Temmuz 1326- 02 August 1910

¹⁰⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 2, 20 Temmuz 1326- 02 August 1910

Tevfik had specifically mentioned these officials as 'Baghdad Provincial Aide Senior Captain Mehmed Ali' (*Bağdad Vilayeti Celilesi Makam-ı Yaveri Kolağası*) and 'Telegraph Officer Ahmed' (*Telgraf Muhabere Memuru*), but we do not know why he specifically asked for the compensation to be handed over to these names. It is possible that they were civil servants who had personal relationships with Tevfik. Perhaps they were officers who would go to Istanbul on duty, and they would be asked to hand over the money to Tevfik.

¹⁰⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 3, 22 Ağustos 1326- 04 September 1910

"Hemvendlilerden bil-müsadere satılan mevaşi vesaire esmanı 84.000 kūsūr kuruşa baliğ olup saire -i müddiler gibi Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Esbakı Tevfik Paşanın da asalet-i veya vekalet-i mahkeme-i şeriada isbatı hukukla mebaliği mezkurdan para alabileceği Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından işarı üzerine maruzdur."

Tevfik Pasha proved his damages in court like the other injured parties, he could benefit from this allowance.¹⁰⁵⁷ Afterwards, no further correspondence was found on this issue, but after many different accusations and prosecutions against him, it was obvious that Tevfik Pasha could not easily compensate for his own damage. In addition, his allegations on Reşid produced no results and were not brought into an investigation or prosecution.

From the correspondence between the Civil Service Pension Fund (*Mülkiye Tekaiüd Sandığı*) and the Ministry of Interior on 28 June, we understand that an ‘unemployment stipend’ (*mazuliyet maaşı*) has been requested to be allocated to Tevfik.¹⁰⁵⁸ According to the message by the Ministry, Tevfik Pasha, who was appointed as the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah on February 3, 1907, was dismissed from his office on February 4, 1909 due to the dispute between him and Sâdât Sheikhs.¹⁰⁵⁹ He was still on the ‘waiting list’ (*mülazımın defteri*) to be appointed to another post, but during this time he had requested unemployment stipend in order to maintain his life.¹⁰⁶⁰ The Commission of Personnel Records (*Sicil-i Ahval Komisyonu*) had already justified Tevfik's request and on July 22, with the decision of the Council of State, a monthly unemployment stipend of 2.250 Kuruş was allocated to Tevfik.¹⁰⁶¹

Tevfik's prosecution was in progress, but he denied the allegations against him. He firmly denied that he received 1.500 liras from the merchants and notables of Sulaymaniyah for the murder of Sheikh Said.¹⁰⁶² He also claimed that he was always ready to prove the forgery of the promissory note and of the seal on it.¹⁰⁶³ Moreover,

¹⁰⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 3, 22 Ağustos 1326- 04 September 1910

¹⁰⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2859/4/Lef 2, 15 Haziran 1325 -28 June 1909

¹⁰⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2859/4/Lef 2, 15 Haziran 1325 -28 June 1909

“Mazuliyet maaşı tahsisi istidasında bulunanTevfik Paşa hazretlerinin 21 Kanunusani 1322 tarihinde Süleymaniye sancağı mutasarrıflığına ba-tayın, Sâdât ve meşayih ile beynlerinde tahaddüs eden ihtilafattan dolayı lüzum-u tebdili Musul vilayetinden işar olunması üzerine 22 Kanunusani 1324 tarihinde azledilerek”

¹⁰⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2859/4/Lef 2, 15 Haziran 1325 -28 June 1909

¹⁰⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2859/4/Lef 2, 15 Haziran 1325 -28 June 1909; BOA, BEO.3605/270356, 12 Temmuz 1325- 25 July 1909

“Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı Tevfik Paşa hazretlerine kararname hususu ahkamına tevfiikan şehri 2250 gurus mazuliyet maaşı tahsis hususuna şura-i devlet kararıyla9 Temmuz 1325 tarihinde irade-i seniyye...”

¹⁰⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.2877/32, 02 Temmuz 1325 – 15 July 1909

¹⁰⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.2877/32, 02 Temmuz 1325 – 15 July 1909

he stated that the investigation by judicial officers under the influence and pressure of the Governor in Mosul would not be straight and reliable.¹⁰⁶⁴ Therefore, in terms of the safety of the investigation, he requested that his file be sent to Istanbul and his prosecution be continued there.¹⁰⁶⁵ However, no documents were found in the archive regarding the aftermath of his prosecution. Since he was entitled to an unemployment stipend after his request, it can be considered that he was not convicted or not served a sentence, even if he was judged after his prosecution.

5.4.6. Endorsement of Tevfik by the Sulaymaniyah Notables

In addition to the telegrams that disgraced Tevfik Pasha while criticizing him, there were also telegrams praised him and asked his reinstatement. The telegram bearing the signatures of more than hundred notables led by the Deputy Accountant Maruf also justified Tevfik Pasha.¹⁰⁶⁶ For two years, he has done nothing but to render good services with full honesty and integrity, has protected the law of the treasury and ensured the increase of the treasury.¹⁰⁶⁷ Even though he was dismissed from his office unlawfully during the Constitutional period, he was still in full obedience to the Government and had departed from Sulaymaniyah following the Governmental orders.¹⁰⁶⁸ The petitioners were now hopeful that this sorrowful situation was a strong

“Şeyh Said’in Musulda esbab-ı katlini ihzar ettirmek için Süleymaniye tüccar ve muteberanından Bin Beşyüz lira ahz eylediğine dair olan senedle mevzu’-u mührün sahteliğini her zaman isbata hazır bulunduğunu”

¹⁰⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2877/32, 02 Temmuz 1325 – 15 July 1909

“vali-i vilayetin taht-ı nüfuz ve tazyikinde bulunan memurin-i adliyenin oraca icra eyleyecekleri tahkikat şayan-ı vüsuk ve itimad olamayacağından bahs ile”

¹⁰⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2877/32, 02 Temmuz 1325 – 15 July 1909

“muamelatın selamet-i cereyanı temin edilmiş olmak için bu babdaki evrak -ı tahkikatın Dersaadet-i celileye ve tedkikat-ı lazımenin buraca icrası istidasına”

¹⁰⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

See the part of " Ambush on Tevfik's Caravan" for the list of petitioners

¹⁰⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“iki seneden beri kemal-i sıdk ve istikametle hidemat-ı hüsn ve hukuk-u hazine ve iyadın muhafazasından başka zerre kadar bir kabahatı olmayan Mutasarrıf-ı Liva Tevfik Paşa’nın”

¹⁰⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“bu zaman-ı Meşrutiyette hilaf-ı kanun azline de hükümete itaat ve infaz-ı hareket eylemesiyle”

evidence for the truth of their oppressed cries which has been ignored until now.¹⁰⁶⁹ Finally they requested the suppression of provokers and perpetrators, and the banishment of so-called Sheikhs in Kirkuk to a place outside the province for avoiding their mischief and calamity.¹⁰⁷⁰ 20 thousand households should not have been sacrificed to five households and the Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha should have been reinstated.¹⁰⁷¹

The message transmitted by 24 notables of Sulaymaniyah to the Ministry of Interior during the Sulaymaniyah Siege, is also worth to zoom in. It was signed by Mayor Abdülgafur at first, Sub-provincial Administrative Councilman Abdurrahman, other Councilmen Abdurrahman and Said, major notables and merchants like Azmi, Sadır, Fethullah, Said and Şerif.¹⁰⁷² According to them, Tevfik Pasha who was the Sub-Governor for the last two years, was fully achieved in restoring security, defeating tyranny, protecting justice and rising sub-provincial treasury.¹⁰⁷³ He had the honor, direction and action which were demanded and expected from an official for the progressive endeavor especially required in promulgation of constitution, maintenance and practice of public order.¹⁰⁷⁴ Thus, each social class which admired justice and liberty was satisfied with his judicious governance, and grateful of law and justice.¹⁰⁷⁵

¹⁰⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“şu ahval-i müteessife-i maruzu şimdiye kadar nazar-ı itibara alınmayan feryad-ı mazlumanenin sıdkına delil-i kavi olduğuna ümidvar olduğumuza”

¹⁰⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“muharrik ve mütecasirlerin acilen te’dibleri ve Musul Vakasından sonra Kerkük’e iade edilen Müteşeyyihlerin emsal-i musibet ve melanetlerine mahal kalmamak üzere vilayet haricinde bir yere kaldırılmaları”

¹⁰⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324- 25 February 1909

“yirmi bin hane ahalinin beş haneye feda edilmemesi ve Mutasarrıf müşarünileyhin ika-yı devam-ı memuriyetini”

¹⁰⁷² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

¹⁰⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“iki seneden beri livamız mutasarrıflığında bulunan Tevfik Paşa hazretlerinin iade-i inzibat, def-i mezalim, muhafaza-i hukuk ve beytülmal ve iyad”

¹⁰⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“bahusus kanun-i esasinin ilanındaidame-i asayiş ve tatbikatındaki sa’y ve ikdam cihetlerinde velhasıl bir memurdan matlub ve muntazır olan iffet ve istikamet ve faaliyet misüllü evsafı haiz bulunmasıyle”

¹⁰⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“meftun-u adalet ve hürriyet olan bilumum sunuf-u muhtelif-i ahalisi icra-yı adaletkarisinden hoşnud ve kanun-u adaletle minnetdar”

Besides, Tevfik had restored the public order and increased the treasury revenue more than demanded.¹⁰⁷⁶ Just then, a pack of murderous cohorts with the armed bandits of three thousands households, who oppressed the community and devoured the treasury through their privileges by despotism era, had appeared with their false and fabricated statements.¹⁰⁷⁷ According to the Sulaymaniyah notables, Tevfik was victimized as he was dismissed from his office in violation of the Constitutional regime.¹⁰⁷⁸ The allegation at this point was very grave and alarming. Petitioners claimed that Tevfik was dismissed without an investigation and just by the attestation of Sheikh Abdülkadir, the president of Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress.¹⁰⁷⁹ However, they wrote that the people of Sulaymaniyah were also taking action now. Even they were civilians, they were in both armed and unarmed resistance against the bandits for their aggressive attitude and possible distressing situations they may cause.¹⁰⁸⁰ These aggressors had forcibly blocked the entrance and exit of the city, had gathered some fools around them forcibly or voluntarily and had imprisoned the civilians in town.¹⁰⁸¹ Finally, petitioners requested the reinstatement of Tevfik Pasha and dispatch of a sufficient military force for restoring public order and peace.¹⁰⁸² Next telegram of Abdülgafur in the same day was quite short, imperative and result oriented. He messaged that the Sulaymaniyah town was besieged, entrance and exit of the town were blocked, governance and commerce were suspended, the market was closed down and the population was in fear of death.¹⁰⁸³

¹⁰⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ve livada asayış-i umumiye esasını takrir eylemiş ve varidat-ı hazineyi fevk-i matlub mikdarda tezyid ettirmiş”

¹⁰⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“zaman-ı istibdadın kendülerine verdiği müsaadeyi büsbütün suistimal ile ahaliyi ezmiş varidat-ı devleti tahrib ve meakil eylemiş olan üç bin hane halkından ibaret mütesellih şakilerin bir şerzime-i kalil teşkil iden cani avanelerinin sahte mahzurlar tertibiyle müracaat-ı kâzibeleri”

¹⁰⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

¹⁰⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Kürd Teavün Cemiyeti reisi Şeyh Abdülkadir efendinin delaletiyle meşrutiyet-i idareye muhalif olarak bila tahkik azliyle mağdur edildiği”

¹⁰⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ahval-i esef iştimaleri ve halet-i tecavüzkaraneleri yüzünden el yevm silah ve dest olarak mukavemet-i eşkiya ile meşgul bulunduğumuzdan”

¹⁰⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“amed ü şüd münkatı’ cebren ve tav’an başlarına biriktirmiş oldukları bir takım sebükmağzan üsera ile kasabamıza mahsur olduğumuzdan”

¹⁰⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

¹⁰⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 40, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

It seems that the notables of Sulaymaniyah, some of whom were CUP members, endorsed Tevfik under all circumstances and demanded his reinstatement. It is noticed that this support increased, and this demand was expressed more, especially when the Siege of Sulaymaniyah started. The notables of Sulaymaniyah, who made up a part of the CUP branch, considered the dismissal of Tevfik and the transfer of the Sheikhs to Kirkuk as part of the same cooperative plan with KSCP. Although not explicitly stated in these messages, there was also a reproach against the state about the dismissal of Tevfik without even conducting an investigation and transferring the Sheikhs to Kirkuk despite all the risks. According to the implications of the Sulaymaniyah bloc, the wishes of the Sheikhs were fulfilled by means of the state and Sulaymaniyah was eventually besieged due to the negligence of the state. However, even they were civilians, now they also participated in the armed and unarmed resistance and waged war against the Sâdât front. Besides, they needed the reinstatement of a Sub-Governor like Tevfik, whose loyalty, dedication and integrity were allegedly undisputable. Somehow, the tendency of Sulaymaniyah CUP members to claim and endorse local administrators continued afterwards. In May 1909, the names who signed with the title of ‘CUP member’ in another message endorsing Sub-Governor Ziya Pasha, firmly have displayed this notion.¹⁰⁸⁴

“Süleymaniye kasabasının etrafı mahsurdur. Hariçte amed ü şüd mesdud, hükümet ticaret ta’tildir. Çarşı kapanmıştır. Ahali heyecan havf-ı can içindedir”

¹⁰⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2822/51/Lef 1, 6 Mayıs 1325-19 May 1909

Petitioners included the names such as Members of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Azasından*) Müfti Abdülaziz, Mayor (*Reis-i Belediye*) Abdülgafur, Administrative Member of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti İdare Azası*) Abdurrahman and Financier (*Maliyeci*) Salim, Director of Correspondance (*Tahrirat Müdürü*) Nureddin, Gendarmerie Commander (*Jandarma Kumandanı*) Mirza, Head of Penal Chamber (*Ceza Reisi*) Ref’et

CHAPTER 6: JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCING

6.1. Configuration of the Post-incident Judicial Infrastructure

The establishment of the judicial infrastructure in Mosul after the Mosul Incident was an issue that had both civilian and military dimensions. While the renewal of the judicial staff constituted one aspect of the issue, the security of the trial, the control of the detainees and the preparation for the worst-case scenarios after the trial constituted the other aspects of the issue. In this section, it will be examined how the judicial infrastructure of the province was configured after the Mosul Incident and how the right candidates were determined and appointed. In addition, it will be covered how the security infrastructure, which is necessary for the proper conduct of the investigation, prosecution, and judgement stages of the case, was formed by the Ottoman military. At this point, we observe that the Governors made a lot of effort especially for the deployment and the permanence of the Task Force in Mosul. Because this was not an ordinary case and, as we shall see, security concerns were at an extreme level.

6.1.1. Accurate and Reliable Staff Selection for the Prosecution

Post-incident correspondence traffic had accelerated considerably. While the primary investigation was in process and the developments were reported on a regular basis, Zeki also evaluated the criminal probabilities and the judicial infrastructure. It was a conceivable possibility that Sheikh Said and his affiliates might have been murdered by Mahmud Pasha's men in the center of Mosul.¹⁰⁸⁵ However, according to preliminary findings, the perpetrators were originally from Mosul and it was stated that the person who killed the Sheikh himself was a Mosul native of Arab origin.¹⁰⁸⁶ Therefore, the

¹⁰⁸⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/78, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“Şeyh Said Efendi ile taallukatının katli Mahmud Paşanın buradaki adamları tarafından vuku bulmak ihmali de varid-i hatır olur ise”

¹⁰⁸⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/78, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

truth was only dependent on the outcome of the investigation and prosecution, which would deepen with the arrival of the expected military force.¹⁰⁸⁷ However, for the time being, the provincial center did not have an appointed public prosecutor (*müdde-i umumi*) and his assistant (*muavini*), and the fact that their deputies were locals, threatened the veracity of the prosecution.¹⁰⁸⁸ Zeki requested the appointment of a highly capable prosecutor to Mosul due to the magnitude and severity of the case, and reminded that the assistant prosecutor, who had been appointed to the post but had not yet arrived, should be sent swiftly.¹⁰⁸⁹

In the meantime, suitable candidates for the office of the Prosecutor of Appeal (*İstinâf Müdde-i Umumisi*) and his assistant were determined and appointees were selected.¹⁰⁹⁰ However, as it will take time for them to reach Mosul, it was more appropriate for a suitable Prosecutor of Appeal and an Investigating Judge (*Müstantık*) to be assigned to Mosul for now, among the available judicial officers from adjacent localities.¹⁰⁹¹ The Central Authority asked the Governorship to conduct a quick research and identify suitable candidates from the surrounding settlements.¹⁰⁹² Accordingly, Zeki nominated Abdullah Hilmi, Baghdad Prosecutor of Appeal with Şevket Efendi, Bitlis Assistant Prosecutor and also requested two competent investigating judges from Diyarbakir and Mamuretülaziz provinces.¹⁰⁹³ However, Grand Vizirate did not leave this critical

“müşarünileyhin ikamet ettiği haneyi saatlerce şiddetli ateşe tutarak kendilerini katl cerh ve elbiselerine kadar nehb ve yağma edenlerin Musullu olmasına ve bizzat Şeyhi katleden şahsın da Evlad-ı Arabiden ve Musul ahalisinden bulunduğuş”

¹⁰⁸⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/78, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

¹⁰⁸⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/78, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“ma haza elyevm merkez vilayetin müddei-umumi ve muavini olmayub vekillerinin yerli bulunmasıyla ketm-i hakikata hidmet edileceğı cihetle”

¹⁰⁸⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/78, 27 Kanunuevvel 1324- 09 January 1909

“vukuatın cesamet ve ehemmiyeti nisbetinde takibat-ı kanuniye ifası için gayet muktedir bir müdde-i umumi ile muvanliğe tayin olunub henüz gelmemiş olan zatın sürat-i izamları esbabının istikmalî kemal-i ehemmiyetiyle müsterhamdır”

¹⁰⁹⁰ DH.MKT.2703/76/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

¹⁰⁹¹ DH.MKT.2703/76/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

“İstinâf Müddei Umumiliğı ile muavinliğine adliye nezaretince münasibleri intihab olunmuş ise de bunların oraya vusulleri vakte muhtaç olduğundan civar mahallerdeki memurin-i adliye meyanında müdde-i umumilerle müstantıklardan münasiblerinin Musul’a celb ve istihdam edilmeleri”

¹⁰⁹² DH.MKT.2703/76/Lef 3, 28 Kanunuevvel 1324- 10 January 1909

¹⁰⁹³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/101, 29 Kanunuevvel 1324- 11 January 1909

“Buracabir hali bulunan muamelat-ı adliyenin icrası için Bağdad İstinâf Müdde-i Umumisi Abdullah Hilmi, Bitlis Merkez Müdde-i Umumi Muavini Şevket Efendilerle Diyarbekir ve Mamuretülaziz vilayetlerinden iki muktedir Müstantıkın celbleri temini maksada kafi olacağı bittahkik anlaşılmasına mebni”

appointment to Zeki's initiative and, in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, started to negotiate other competent and appropriate candidates.¹⁰⁹⁴

During this process, as the judicial appointments were delayed, the pressure on Governorate increased day by day. Under those circumstances Governor Zeki was often obliged to articulate that it was a vital and urgent need to sentence those who caused, encouraged, and perpetrated this disastrous crime.¹⁰⁹⁵ According to him, although the Kurds are in a temporary state of calm for now, this tranquility could suddenly be broken after the court decisions were announced and bloody incidents could occur between the judicial authorities and the Kurds in the region.¹⁰⁹⁶ Even if the case was heard by the local judicial committee, as the whole delegation consisted of local officials and members, it would not be possible for the procedure to proceed in a healthy way and it would be really difficult for the judges to reach a verdict and to execute the sentences.¹⁰⁹⁷ Therefore, instead of waiting for the appointments, Zeki proposed a quick interim solution and demanded that a 'Special Judicial Delegation' (*heyet-i mahsusa-i adliye*) be formed and sent from Istanbul or another province.¹⁰⁹⁸ According to Zeki's suggestion, this special delegation would undertake the prosecution and reach verdicts in cooperation with the local chiefs of justice.¹⁰⁹⁹ Finally, Zeki suggested that encouragers and perpetrators should be sentenced with the death penalty in order to set a deterrent precedent for the safety of the homeland.¹¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁹⁴ BOA, BEO.3471/260307/Lef 1, 03 Kanunusani 1324- 16 January 1909

¹⁰⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kanunusani 1324 – 24 January 1909

¹⁰⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kanunusani 1324 – 24 January 1909

"Zira galeyana gelmiş olan umum Kürdler icraat-ı hükümete intizaren şimdilik her ne kadar bir sükun-u muvakkat içinde bulunuyorlar ise de icraat-ı hükümet derecat-ı mehakimin netice-i kararına taalluk edilecek olursa bu sükun birden bire halelpezir olarak bu havalice adliye ile Kürtler arasında pek büyük sefk-i dimayı intaç edeceği ve hükümet de müşkil bir mevkide kalacağı muhakkaktır."

¹⁰⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kanunusani 1324 – 24 January 1909

"bura adliye heyetiyle ru'yeti farz olursa bile dava-i adliyenin mehakim kısmında bulunan azalarıyla memurinin kısm-i küllisi yerli olduklarından muamelenin selamet-i cereyanı gayri mümkün ve rüesa-yı adliyenin dahi hükm-i kanunun icra ve tatbikatında duçar-ı müşkülât olacakları bedihi olduğundan"

¹⁰⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kanunusani 1324 – 24 January 1909

"Dördüncü Ordudan gelmekte bulunan kuvve-i askeriye'nin vüruduna kadar ya Dersaadetten ve yahud başka vilayetten bir "heyet-i mahsusa-ı adliye" izamıyla buradaki rüesa-yı adliye dahi dahil oldukları halde takibat-ı kanuniye icra ettirilerek istihsal olacak neticeye göre"

¹⁰⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kanunusani 1324 – 24 January 1909

¹¹⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kanunusani 1324 – 24 January 1909

"emsallerine gayret-i müessire olmak üzere müşevvik ve müsebbib olanların idam cezasıyla tecrim ettirilmesi lüzumu selamet-i vatan ve memleket için lazım ve labüdd olacağı"

The Council of Ministers decision of January 27 ruled that transferring the trial to another court would bring difficulties and sending a special judicial delegation would be inappropriate.¹¹⁰¹ A staff arrangement was envisaged upon the selection and appointments of members of the provincial courts from those who were pro-state.¹¹⁰² If this envisagement was implemented, there would be no drawbacks in the prosecution and judgment being carried out by local judicial officials and court members.¹¹⁰³ The relevant Ministries were ordered to quickly re-organize the judicial staff in the Mosul provincial center and to prosecute and punish those involved in the Mosul Incident.¹¹⁰⁴ In short, Sublime Porte planned to solve the problem with the re-arrangement of existing local staff instead of the re-location of the court or the creation of a mobile delegation. The impact of the Mosul disaster among tribes and clans should have been repaired as soon as possible.¹¹⁰⁵

As already mentioned, the trial of this case was unavailable to proceed in Mosul courts where local judicial officials were present.¹¹⁰⁶ It could have clearly violated the neutrality principle of the case and could have taken a decision in favor of one part. That is why the present judicial officials were not able to proceed with the investigation.¹¹⁰⁷ Apparently, Zeki expected an impartial justice department to be activated in Mosul provincial center for the proper progress of this case. Under these circumstances, he asked whether it was convenient to delay the investigation and prosecution until such a justice department was activated.¹¹⁰⁸ If not, he requested the

¹¹⁰¹ BOA, MV.124/19, 05 Muharrem 1327- 27 January 1909

“Bu hususda nakl-i muhakemesi cihetine gidilmesi müşkülâtı mucib ve mahaline bir heyet-i mahsusai adliyye izamı da gayr-i münasib olduğundan”

¹¹⁰² BOA, MV.124/19, 05 Muharrem 1327- 27 January 1909

“taşra mehakimi azasının taraf-ı devlete mensub ve muvazzaf olmak üzere tensiki mutasavver olub”

¹¹⁰³ BOA, MV.124/19, 05 Muharrem 1327- 27 January 1909

“bu tasavvurun mevki-i faale iktiranı haline takibat ve muhakematın yerliden bulunan aza ve memurin-i mahalliye marifetiyle icrasında vilayetçe mülahaza olunan mahzura mahal kalmayacağından”

¹¹⁰⁴ BOA, BEO.3483/261159/Lef 1, 20 Kanunusani 1324 – 02 February 1909

¹¹⁰⁵ BOA, BEO.3483/261159/Lef 1, 20 Kanunusani 1324 – 02 February 1909

“Musul vaka-i faciasının aşair ve kabail beyninde hasıl ettiği tesiratin izalesi zımında”

¹¹⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

“evvelce de arzolunduğu vechiyle yerli memurin-i adliyyenin mevcut olduğu Musul mehakiminde bu meselenin ru’yeti gayrimümkün bulunduğundan memurin-i adliyye olan tahkikata ibtidar edememiştir.”

¹¹⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

¹¹⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

“Hal bu merkezde iken teşkilat-ı adliyyeye intizaren tahkikat ve takibat-ı kanuniyenin tehiri muvafık ise o yolda”

existing judicial officials to be notified to proceed with the investigation.¹¹⁰⁹ Because the waste of time was against them in every way.

Finally, the Ministry of Justice nominated the suitable candidates, and the expected appointments for the justice department of Mosul Province took place. According to the memorandum by Minister of Justice Manyasizade Refik; Ömer Lütü, Head of the Penal Chamber of the Central Mosul Court of First Instance (*Merkez Vilayet Bidayet Mahkemesi Ceza Reisi*), was appointed as the Prosecutor of Appeal in Mosul province.¹¹¹⁰ Mustafa Nuri Effendi, Assistant Public Prosecutor of Central Baghdad (*Bağdad Merkez Müdde-i Umumi Muavini*) was appointed to the Head of Central Mosul Penal Chamber (*Merkez Ceza Riyaseti*).¹¹¹¹ And Edib Effendi, Head of Hama Penal Chamber (*Hama Ceza Reisi*) was appointed as the Assistant Prosecutor of Mosul.¹¹¹² The newly appointed officers had been notified to go to their posts as soon as possible to start their duties immediately.¹¹¹³ In addition, to support the interrogation process, the Investigating Judges of Central Diyarbakir and Mardin (*Diyarbakir Merkez Müstantıkıyla Mardin Müstantıkı*) were expected to reach Mosul within two to three days via the river.¹¹¹⁴ However, these appointments consisted of the bureaucratic part of the judicial process based on investigation and prosecution. In addition, it was necessary to ensure the security of the judicial process of this critical case, to pacify the groups that could cause incidents, and to replace the local military formation of Mosul with impartial units out of 4th Army garrisons.

¹¹⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

“değil ise tahkikat ibtidar idilmek için memurin-i adliyyeye tebligat-ı ifa olunmak üzere mukteza-yı halin emir buyrulması”

¹¹¹⁰ BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324- 16 February 1909

“Vilayetten evvelce bu babda keşide olub dahiliye nezaret-i celilesinden tevdi edilen 29 Kanunusani 1324 tarihli telgrafname üzerine vilayet-i mezkure istinaf müdde-i umumiliğine merkez vilayet Bidayet Mahkemesi Ceza Reisi Ömer Lütü ve Merkez Ceza Riyasetiyle Müdde-i Umumi Muavinliğine Bağdad Merkez Müdde-i Umumi Muavini Mustafa ve Hama Ceza Reisi Edib Efendilerin memuriyetleri tasdik-i aliye iktida ederek hemen işe mübaşeret-i Ömer Lütü Efendiye ve mahal-i mezkura sürat-i azimetleri mumaunileyh Mustafa ve Edib Efendilere bildirildiği gibi”

¹¹¹¹ BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324- 16 February 1909

¹¹¹² BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324- 16 February 1909

¹¹¹³ BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324- 16 February 1909

¹¹¹⁴ BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324- 16 February 1909

“tahkikat-ı istintakiyyeye muavenet etmek üzere Diyarbakir’den nehr tarikiyle iki üç gün zarfında Musul’a azimet-i mümkün olacağı anlaşılmasına binaen Diyarbakir merkez Mustantıkıyla Mardin Mustantıkının serian Musul’a izamları lüzumu da Diyarbakir vilayetiyle istinaf müdde-i umumiliğine tebliğ olunarak cümlesinin Musul’a müteveccihen hareket ettikleri”

6.1.2 Ensuring the Tactical Security of the Judicial Process

While the Deputy Governor Zeki tried to eliminate the Siege of Sulaymaniyah on the one hand, he tried to establish the judicial and military infrastructure for the Mosul Incident trial on the other. In a short while, he reported that the infantry and cavalry units of the 4th Army were partially deployed in Mosul.¹¹¹⁵ A field artillery battery from the 6th Army was expected to be arrived in a few days as well.¹¹¹⁶ After the Joint Task Force, composed of three different branches, was gathered and mustered in the provincial center, it was going to be convenient to initiate the investigation and prosecution of the encouragers and perpetrators of the incident.¹¹¹⁷ There was no remaining obstacle to serve the justice on Kurds who were in a temporary peace while standing by for Government's action.¹¹¹⁸ It was obviously indicated that, if there was no legal action taken against those encouragers and perpetrators, Kurds will rebel and organize an attack by taking advantage of this comfort.¹¹¹⁹ However, the justice department which was previously instructed by the Government to be established in Mosul, has not yet been operational in the district.¹¹²⁰

The provincial drawbacks naturally existed and Zeki gradually transformed the city into a garrison as Mosul residents were expected to show strong opposition during the investigation and trial. Since the presence of the two battalions sent from the 4th army was greatly reduced on the way due to illness, it was expected that either additional two battalions would be sent, or they would be raised to their full level.¹¹²¹ Zeki's

¹¹¹⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

¹¹¹⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

¹¹¹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

"sunuf-i sülaseden mürekkeb kuvva-i askeriyye merkezde cem' ve tahaşşüd edildikten sonra vak'a-i malumenin müsebbib ve mütecasirleri haklarında tahkikat ve takibatın"

¹¹¹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

"icraat-ı hükümete intizaren bir sükunet-i muvakkat tahtında bulunan Kürdlerde mukteza-yı adaletin icrasına artık bir mani kalmadığından"

¹¹¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

"müsebbib ve mütecasirlerin katil olanları hakkında bir an evvel muamele-i muktezi icra olunmadığı takdirde bilistifade ahz-ı sare kıyam edecekleribeyan ve işar ve tecavüzkaraneyle ihtiyar edecekleri bedidardır "

¹¹²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324 – 15 February 1909

"22 Kanunusani 324 telgrafname-i fehmanelerinde tebliğ buyurulan adliye teşkilatı buraca henüz icra buyurulmamıştır."

¹¹²¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

"Dördüncü Ordudan gönderilen iki taburun dört tabura ilavesi veyahut mevcudlarının tam tertib-i seferiye iblağı Harbiye Nezareti Celilesiyle Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına yazılmış ise de henüz cevabın alınmadığı"

telegram of February 22 on incoming forces reported that two understrength battalions expected from the 4th Army had reached Mosul.¹¹²² A mountain artillery battery, three cavalry companies totaling 150 soldiers including their officers, and a field battery consisted of 140 regular mule cavalry from Baghdad were still expected to arrive.¹¹²³ Apart from the 4th Army units, the elements of the 6th Army were also present in the provincial center.¹¹²⁴ There were the 3rd Battalion of the 46th Regiment and almost two companies of the 33rd Cavalry Regiment, but as Zeki previously stated, they did more harm than good during the Mosul Incident.¹¹²⁵ Since these elements consisted of local soldiers of Mosul origin, Zeki was worried that if an incident occurred during the investigation and trial, these forces would attack the Kurds most likely.¹¹²⁶ Zeki who was afraid of things getting out of control, wrote as ‘God forbid, if such a situation occurs, it is obvious that the force at hand would be insufficient’.¹¹²⁷ According to him, this is exactly why the 6th army units had to be moved to another location and the 4th army units had to be completed quickly.¹¹²⁸

Unfortunately, the investigation procedure could not be initiated with the existing military elements while the judicial infrastructure was expected to be organized. The discomfort of the Central Authority with this uncertainty was obviously seen in the correspondence. Even though the Governorate had already stated that it was possible to initiate the investigation with the deployed part of the Joint Task Force, right after that, insufficiency of force was mentioned and two additional battalions were

¹¹²² BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

¹¹²³ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

“ve elyevm merkez vilayetin mevcud dördüncü ordunun iki taburuyla yolda bulunan cebel bataryası ve ma-Zabitan mevcudları 150 nefer raddesinde bulunan üç bölük süvari ve Bağdad’dan gelmekte bulunan Sahra Bataryasının efradı da 140 Nizamiye Ester Süvarından ibaret olup”

¹¹²⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

¹¹²⁵ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

“Gerçi bunlardan başka Altıncı orduya mensup 46. Alayın 3. Taburuyla 33. Süvari alayının iki bölük kadar efradı var ise de vukuat esnasında kendilerinden zerre kadar istifade olunamayıp bilakis mazarratları görüldüğü”

¹¹²⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

“tahkikat icrası sırasında bir hadise zuhur edecek olur ise nazarlarını Musul’a dikmiş olan Ekrada karşı hücum etmeleri baid-ül ihtimâl olduğu”

¹¹²⁷ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

“mazallahu teala öyle bir muhaceme vukuatında eldeki kuvvetin adem-i kifayesi derkar bulunduğu dermeyan olunmuş”

¹¹²⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324- 22 Şubat 1909

requested.¹¹²⁹ However, since reorganization and redeployment of a new force required extra time and could delay the investigation, Governorate was instructed for an ‘in-depth deliberation’ (*biletraf teemmül*) on how to handle the situation but no response was received yet.¹¹³⁰ Ministry also questioned, how much of the Joint Task Force was deployed so far, where was the remaining part today and when will they be deployed.¹¹³¹ Finally, Ministry thoroughly asked was the available force sufficient to proceed with the investigation and requested a prompt and detailed response.¹¹³²

Out of four infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment and one mountain artillery unit, which were expected to be deployed from the 4th army, only two infantry battalions and three cavalry companies had reached Mosul so far.¹¹³³ Zeki Pasha initially stated that, there was no longer any obstacle for conducting the investigation and prosecution.¹¹³⁴ However, as he later agreed with the Mosul Commander, the available force consisting of ‘three classes’ (*sunuf-u sülase*) could be insufficient in all probability.¹¹³⁵ Governor and Commander have already requested extra two battalions from the 6th Army that may be required at this point, however no response received yet.¹¹³⁶ Meanwhile, correspondence regarding the establishment of the Mosul public

¹¹²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 23, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“Kuvve-i Mürettebenin Musul’a vasıl olan kısmıyla tahkikata başlanmak imkanı izhar buyrulmuş iken müteakiben..... kuvve-i mürettebenin adem-i kifayetinden ve iki taburun daha ilave sevki bahs olunmasına”

¹¹³⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 23, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“yeniden kuvvet tertib ve sevki vakte muhtaç ve tahkikatın tehiri mahzuru dahi olacağına nazaran elhalet hazihi ne yapmak lazım geleceğinin biletraf teemmül ve inbası tebliğ kılınacağı halde henüz cevap alınamadı.”

¹¹³¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 23, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

“ve kuvve-i mürettebenin ne kadarı vasıl olduğunun ve bakiyesi elyevm nerelerde olub ne vakit vasıl olacaklarının ilaveten izbar ve inbasına”

¹¹³² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 23, 15 Şubat 1324- 28 February 1909

¹¹³³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 47, 16 Şubat 1324 – 01 March 1909

“Vaka-i fecia-i malumenin ehemmiyeti dairesinde icraat-ı mukteziye icrası için bidayet emirde dört tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ile bir cebel bataryasının dördüncü ordudan tertib ve sevkiarz edilmişti. Gelen iki tabur ile üç bölük süvari tam tertibolduğu ve dördüncü ve altıncı ordulardan Cebel ve Sahra bataryalarının efradı da o tesbitte bulunduğunu zannıyla”

¹¹³⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 47, 16 Şubat 1324 – 01 March 1909

“müsebbib ve mütecasir-i vukuat olanlar haklarında artık tahkikat ve takibat icrasına mani kalmadığı arz kılınmış ise de”

¹¹³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 47, 16 Şubat 1324 – 01 March 1909

“halbuki sunuf-u sülaseinin maruz mevcut-u hazıranın her türlü ihtimale karşı kifayetsizliği ahiren kumandanla bilmüzakere anlaşılması üzerine”

¹¹³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 47, 16 Şubat 1324 – 01 March 1909

“iki taburun daha sevkikumandanlıkla müştereken altıncı ordu kumandanlığına yazılarak henüz cevap alınamamıştır”

order and the conduct of the judicial investigation continued at the Ministerial level.¹¹³⁷ Minister of War Ali Rıza stated that the expected artillery battery from Bitlis could only move on the first of February due to seasonal conditions.¹¹³⁸ In addition, many soldiers of the two regular army battalions that reached Mosul were devastated by disease on the roads and the integrity of the forces was disrupted.¹¹³⁹ Since the transfer of reserve troops to increase the capacity of these two battalions deployed in Mosul would take a long time, the 4th army was requested to transfer of an extra regular army battalion to Mosul from the nearest point.¹¹⁴⁰ The 1st battalion of the 32nd Regiment in Bitlis was ordered to move to Mosul, and the soldiers of the other battalions, who were remained on the road due to health conditions, were gradually sent to Mosul as well.¹¹⁴¹ Ali Rıza Pasha particularly reminded the ongoing complaints from the Sheikhs and tribes in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, and recommended that the necessary action to be taken soon.¹¹⁴²

On the other hand, the Ministry of Interior was concerned about the negative outcomes in Sulaymaniyah relevant with the delay in the judicial procedure of the Mosul Incident.¹¹⁴³ According to the Ministry, even the Siege of Sulaymaniyah was one of the consequences of this detrimental effect.¹¹⁴⁴ Continuous demand for extra forces from the province; complications experienced during the finance, mobilization and

¹¹³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

¹¹³⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Musul Vakasından dolayı asayişin takrir ve tahkikat-ı adliyenin temini maksadıyla evvelce Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümayundan oraya tertib ve tesrib edilen kuvvetlerin topçu bataryası mevsimin müsaadesizliğinden dolayı ancak Şubatın birinde Bitlis’den hareket edebilmiş”

¹¹³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“ve Musul’a vasil olan iki nizamiye taburunun birçok efradı da hastalık ve diğer guna avarız sebebiyle yollarda perakende bir halde kalmış olmasından”

¹¹⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“tahkikatın kemaliyle icrasımezkur iki taburun tezyid-i mevcudu Musul Kumandanlığından iştir edilmiş ise de şu sırada tezyid-i mevcud için efrad-ı ihtiyatiye celb ve sevki zaman muhtaç olduğundan en yakın mevkiden bir nizamiye taburunun daha Musula sevki Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümayun Müşiriyeti Vekaletine iştir edilmişti.”

¹¹⁴¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

“Bitlisteki 32. Alayın Birinci Taburunun Musul’a hareketine emir verildiği izbar ve diğer taburlardan yolda kalan efradın da peyderpey sevkine gayret edilmekte olduğundan”

¹¹⁴² BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324- 27 February 1909

¹¹⁴³ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 2 March 1909

“Musul Vakasının mütecasirleri hakkında lazım gelen takibat-ı kanuniyenin tehiri oralarca pek ziyade su-i tesirati.....olmakda bulunduğu iştirat-ı vakadan anlaşılmaktadır.”

¹¹⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 2 March 1909

“Hatta Süleymaniye Vakası da bu sui tesiratin müstetbeatındandır.”

deployment of these forces have also put the Ministry in a difficult position.¹¹⁴⁵ The Ministry emphasized that the current military force in Mosul was sufficient to ensure public order and to conduct the judicial investigation.¹¹⁴⁶ And the Ministry expected for the necessary convictions to be carried out and the environment to calm down as soon as possible.¹¹⁴⁷ However, the sensitivity and vulnerability in the provincial center increased so much that even the Ottoman Bank (*Bank-i Osmani*) branch served under the guardianship of the gendarmes.¹¹⁴⁸

At the end of March, Governor Reşid wrote that the sentencing of criminals in Mosul depended on the completion of the investigation in Sulaymaniyah, which continued at full speed.¹¹⁴⁹ The Sulaymaniyah investigation would be completed within a week, and then all findings and conclusions would be integrated into the major case in the provincial center.¹¹⁵⁰ The scope of the case regarding the Mosul Incident had widened and the investigations had spread to sub-divisions as well. Since the alleged conspiracy was staged in Sulaymaniyah and the incident took place in Mosul, it could not be expected that the investigation would be restricted in a single location. Superior authorities were under severe pressure due to the unrest, tension and possible dire consequences expected in the region due to the delay in the judicial process.¹¹⁵¹ The Chamber of Deputies was subjected to many telegrams reaching from centers such as Kirkuk and Köprü which demanded the punishment of the perpetrators and soothing of the public opinion as soon as possible.¹¹⁵² This pressure naturally reflected on the Governorate through the Ministry and the Governorate was warned that if the judicial

¹¹⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 2 March 1909

¹¹⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 2 March 1909

¹¹⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324- 2 March 1909

¹¹⁴⁸ BOA, İ..ML..84/8/Lef 1, 17 Şubat 1324- 02 March 1909

¹¹⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 1, 17 Mart 1325 30 March 1909

“Musulca erbab-ı ceraimin tertib-i mücazaatı Süleymaniyede kemal-i germi ile icra edilmekte bulunan tahkikatın ikmaline vabeste olub bu da bir haftaya kadar hatm bularak merkez vilayete avdet edileceğinden evvelce icab-ı hallin sürat-i ifasına ibtidar olunacağı ve peyderpey malumat verileceği”

¹¹⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 1, 17 Mart 1325 30 March 1909

¹¹⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 2, 19 Mart 1325- 01 April 1909

“Şeyh Said’in katli ahali ve aşair arasında fevkalade mucib-i heyecan olduğu halde bu işe bu hale hükümet-i mahalliyeye ehemmiyet verilmediğinden ve tehirat-ı vakıadan bilahare netayic-i vahime zuhuru muhtemel bulunduğundan bahisle”

¹¹⁵² BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 2, 19 Mart 1325- 01 April 1909

“vaka-i mezkure mütecasir ve müsebbiblerinin bir an evvel tedipleriyle efkar-ı umumiyenin teskin lüzumu Kerkük ve Köprü merkezlerinden müteaddid imzalarla makam-ı alilerine çekilib tevcib buyurulan iki kıta telgrafnamede gösterilmiş”

process is delayed further, it will have unavoidable negative effects and even cause new incidents.¹¹⁵³

6.2. Investigation, Arrests and Trial

In this section, the initial arrests regarding to the incident, the expansion of the investigation and the effects of the trial process on both the Mosul Ulema and the Sâdât will be examined. The organizational background and strategic moves of Reşid el-Ömeri, who was alleged to be one of the instigators and ringleaders of the incident, will particularly be covered. The concerns caused by the decision of the 4th Army to withdraw from Mosul, the ongoing allegations about Governor Reşid and the relations of Mosuli judicial officials with the Central Authority will also be mentioned. This section is of great importance in understanding the evolution of the judicial process in the case of Mosul Incident.

6.2.1. Reşid el-Ömeri as a Prime Suspect and His Political Affiliations

While Istanbul was in complete turmoil with the outbreak of the ‘31 March Incident’ (13 April 1909), the first news of the arrests regarding to the Mosul Incident reached from Mosul on the very same day. 14 individuals, among the most prominent of the perpetrators, were arrested by the judicial authorities.¹¹⁵⁴ Among them, a particular name stood out and kept the authorities busy for a long time afterwards. This person was Reşid el-Ömeri, the founder of the Mosul branch of the ‘Society / Party of Mohammedan Union’ (*İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti / Fırkası* or *Cemiyet-i / Fırka-i Muhammediye*)* based in İstanbul, and he was to be accused of instigating the turmoil through his organization.¹¹⁵⁵ He was the same person referred as "Ömeri Reşid of the

¹¹⁵³ BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 2, 19 Mart 1325- 01 April 1909

¹¹⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2794/67/Lef 1, 31 Mart 1325- 13 April 1909

“Musul hadise-i feciasını ika edenlerin ileri gelenlerinden 14 şahsın bugün cihet-i adliyece taht-ı tevkife alınmak”

¹¹⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2794/67/Lef 1, 31 Mart 1325- 13 April 1909

Mosul notables" and who was accused of leading the group that raided Sheikh Said's house in the narrative of Sâdât's manifest. The investigation was in full swing, and the Ministry asked Governor Reşid to pay extreme attention to the work while expected an even greater effort from him to maintain order.¹¹⁵⁶

At the end of May, Reşid el-Ömeri sent a telegram to the 3rd Action Army (3. *Hareket Ordusu*) Command in Istanbul, complaining about the despotic persecution of the Governor.¹¹⁵⁷ He mentioned that his previous applications to the authorities were unanswered.¹¹⁵⁸ Besides, he warned that if his statements were not taken into account, even unjust executions would take place in Mosul due to the false accusations.¹¹⁵⁹ Governor Reşid quickly contacted the Public Prosecutor of Court of Appeal and obtained the charges against Ömeri.¹¹⁶⁰ Within a few days, the Governor reported that Ömeri's involvement in the Mosul Incident and his actions of disturbing order were based on solid evidences and reliable denunciations and that's why he was permanently arrested.¹¹⁶¹ In addition, Ömeri had taken some instructions from the

"ve bunların içinde ahiren bir karışıklık emeliyle Cemiyet-i Muhammediye namıyla bir cemiyet teşkil etmiş olan Reşid Efendi Ömeri nam şahıs da dahil bulunmuş"

* Hut mentions two different Cemiyet-i Muhammediye based in Mosul and states that the first was an independent organization established against CUP in Mosul in August 1908. He also states that the second one was established in Mosul at the very beginning of April 1909, a few days before the "İttihad-i Muhammediye" society founded by Derviş Vahdeti in Istanbul (5 April 1909). However, he also underlines that the second one was not a brand-new society but an extension of one of the existing societies in Istanbul.

Hut, *Musul Vilayeti'nin ...*, p.171,172

For the most comprehensive research available on the İttihad-ı Muhammediye Fırkası / Cemiyeti (*Fırka-i/ Cemiyet-i Muhammediye*) and its affiliated formations, please see: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler Cilt 1: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları,1988) p.182-205

Tunaya points out Reşid el-Ömeri as a prominent character in the organization of the İttihad-ı Muhammediye and its branching in Mosul. He even refers to a telegram of Ömeri published in Volkan newspaper on 31 March.

Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler...*p.195, footnote 48

¹¹⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2794/67/Lef 3, 02 Nisan 1325-15 April 1909

¹¹⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 1, 14 Mayıs 1325-27 May 1909

"Valimizin zulemat-ı istibdadında necat-ı abidanem hakkında 7 Mayıs 1325 tarihli istirham-ı telgrafnameden eser görünmediğinden meyusiyetim tahaccümdedir."

¹¹⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 1, 14 Mayıs 1325-27 May 1909

¹¹⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 1, 14 Mayıs 1325-27 May 1909

"maruzatım hilaf-ı hakikiyet tebeyyün ediliyor ise ibret-i lil-kazibin idamlar dahi olacağını din ve mezheb ve namusla temin eylerim"

¹¹⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

¹¹⁶¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

Society of Mohammedan Union in Istanbul, established a society with the same name in Mosul and started its activities.¹¹⁶² However, the main accusation was that Ömeri invited Ulema and religious leaders to his society and put posters on street corners to provoke the people and violate peace.¹¹⁶³ On the other hand, a message sent by Ömeri to the dethroned Sultan Abdülhamid, the Grand Vizirate and the Istanbul headquarters of Society of Mohammedan Union on 19 April 1909 was also attached to the correspondence by Governor Reşid.¹¹⁶⁴ In this message, Ömeri mentioned that he started the Mosul branch with the instructions and motivation he received from the Istanbul headquarters of the Society.¹¹⁶⁵ However, Ömeri claimed that their joy and success drew the Provincial Administration's backlash.¹¹⁶⁶ For this reason, they were subjected to unwarranted accusations of disrupting order due to the threats and persistence by the Governor imposed on judicial officials.¹¹⁶⁷ According to Ömeri, the ultimate aim of the Local Administration was to destroy their society.¹¹⁶⁸ However even in prison, they told the true nature of the events to the prisoners and continued to pray to the dethroned Sultan Abdulhamid II.¹¹⁶⁹ It seems that Ömeri's unconditional loyalty to Abdülhamid II was revived after the 31 March Incident and continued to

"mevkuf Reşid'in geçen bayramda zuhur edip kemal-i ehemmiyetle tahkik edilmekte bulunan Musul hadiselerinde zi-medhal ve muhtell-i asayiş-i harekatta bulunduğu delail-i kanuniye ve ihbarat.....mevcud olmasından dolayı gayr-i muvakkit suretiyle tevkif edildiği"

¹¹⁶² BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

"bundan başka merhumun İstanbuldaki Cemiyet-i Muhammediye ile bilmuhabere aldığı talimat üzerine de mevkufiyetinden evvel buradaki o nam altında bir cemiyet teşkil ederek mührü altında makam-ı vilayete tebliğ-i keyfiyet edildiği"

¹¹⁶³ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

"cemiyetine Ulema ve rüesa-yı ruhaniyeyi davet ettiği ve köşe başlarına yaftalar yapıştırılmak suretiyle de ahaliyi ihlal ve sükun-u umumiyi ihlale çalıştığı cihetle bundan dolayı maznun bulunduğu"

¹¹⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

¹¹⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

"Saire-i hazret-i reşatpenahide ve hüsn-ü tevcihat-ı hilafetpenahide Dersaadet'te teşkil olunan İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyet-i Muazzamasında Musulca şube teşkili hakkında 16 Mart 1325 tarihli aldığım mezuniyetin telgrafları üzerine ettiğim nesayih ve tergibata karşı cism-i cemiyeti teşkil ettim"

¹¹⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

¹¹⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

"Tebessüm ettikçe hükümetin infialini mucib olub, valinin mahkeme-i memuriyetlerine edilen tehdidat ve ısrar üzerine ihlal-i asayiş diye kullarına ve efrad-ı cemiyetin bazılarına isnad ettirip"

¹¹⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

"hilafet şariat ve kanun olarak ihtilatta habishanede yine maksadları cemiyetimizi tehdid ile dağıtmakta"

¹¹⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325- 08 June 1909

"hukuk-u meşrutiyet devamını dahi mübeşşer-i avatıf-ı padişahi bulunduğum habishanede bulunan milel-i saireden mevcut mahbuslara ba-tercüme kendilerine tefhim ettikçe Allah....Saltanata Abdülhamid'e dualarını 3 a'laya kadar isal ile devam-ı ömr-ü hilafetpenaha tezkar etmişlerdir."

praise him in his messages even in the Constitutional Monarchy. Besides, it was noteworthy that Ömeri attributed his prayers to Abdülhamid II for the association he was able to establish freely by means of the Constitutionalism. This unconditional devotion embodied in the messages naturally caught the attention of the Unionist Government and probably facilitated the indictment of Ömeri.

Ömeri's next telegram was dispatched to the parliament and again included direct accusations against the Governor.¹¹⁷⁰ He declared that he had been charged with a fabricated crime because of the Governor's despotic and partisan views, and because of his domination on the judicial officials.¹¹⁷¹ Even though these allegations of Ömeri against Governor Reşid did not trigger any investigation, it could be thought that it increased the doubts on such a controversial Governor and accelerated his dismissal process. Since the beginning of the Mosul Incident, allegations of conspiracy have been frequently voiced from different fronts, and this time it was Reşid el-Ömeri who claimed that a conspiracy had been set up against him.

In the meantime, the transfer of Ömeri's trial from Mosul Court to the 'Second Court Martial' (*İkinci Divan-ı Örfi*) was a matter of debate and the authorities were asked to arrange his travel expenses.¹¹⁷² However, Ömeri, who was charged and detained for violating the public order, was also taken into consideration with his involvement in the reactionary movement and it was decided to continue his trial in Mosul.¹¹⁷³ Naturally, it was more appropriate to carry out the trial on-site in terms of investigating Ömeri's local connections and the extension of the Society of Mohammedan Union in Mosul. The motives for the transfer of the Ömeri trial to the Second Court Martial could not be observed in the documents. However, this failed transfer attempt may

¹¹⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2837/39/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 - 06 June 1909

¹¹⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2837/39/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 - 06 June 1909

"Valinin fikr-i müstebidane ve tarafgiranesinden ve adliye memurlarının da valinin esir-i tagallübü olmalarından dolayı kendisine bir cürm atf ile ...tevkif edildiğinden"

¹¹⁷² BOA, DH.MKT.2850/4/Lef 1, 6 Haziran 1325- 19 June 1909

"Reşid el-Ömeri'nin gönderilmek üzere masarifi seferiyesinin suret-i tesviyesi için emir verdirilmesi İkinci Divan-ı Örfi'ye cevaben yazılmış ve keyfiyeti de nezaret-i celilelerinden istizan kılınmış"

¹¹⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT.2850/4/Lef 1, 6 Haziran 1325- 19 June 1909; DH.MKT.2850/4/Lef 2, 7 Haziran 1325- 20 June 1909

"muhtel-i asayiş-i harekatta bulunmak maddelerinden dolayı maznun ve mevkuf bulunan merkumatın hareket-ı irticaiyeye olan dahl ve iştiraki nazar-ı itibara alınarak tahkikat muhakeme-i mahalliyece devam olunması işar buyurulduğundan"

have a connection with the martial law declared throughout Istanbul after the March 31 Incident and the court martials where the suspects of March 31 were tried.¹¹⁷⁴ Perhaps Istanbul wanted to combine a critical trial such as the Ömeri's with the major trial in Istanbul and planned to have him tried alongside leading criminals.

6.2.2. The Anti-Constitutional Tendency in the 4th Army

Some army units also had their share from the empire-wide repercussions of the March 31 Incident. An unfortunate incident took place in a 4th Army garrison located in immediate vicinity of Mosul provincial borders, has shown how insidious the threat from the inside is. Although this isolated incident did not take place within the borders of the Mosul Province, it raised the level of alarm throughout the entire Iraqi geography. Because Mosul was now included into the 4th Army precinct since all the public security and policing were entrusted to 4th Army units after the Mosul Incident. Thus, this kind of an Anti-Constitutionalist mutiny within the same Army could easily spill over to other garrisons. In addition to the 4th Army which was of critical importance due to the ongoing Mosul Incident investigation, the 6th Army which controlled the entire Iraqi geography, was even more critical.

According to the report of 4th Army Commander Marshall İbrahim, the religious feelings of the soldiers were provoked, the idea of reactionism was awakened and the soldiers were revolted against constitutionalism.¹¹⁷⁵ 2nd Battalion of the 30th Regular Regiment, deployed on the Iranian frontier, was in an uprising.¹¹⁷⁶ The unit was in Saray locality, a strategic border position connected to the Hakkari sanjak of Van

¹¹⁷⁴ Zekeriya Türkmen, *Dîvânîharp, Osmanlılar'da XIX. yüzyılda kurulan askerî ceza mahkemelerinin genel adı*, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/divaniharp> Access Date: 29.05.2021

¹¹⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

“Bertafsil arz ve tesir kılındığı vechle askeri iğfal suretiyle bir fikr-i irtica uyandırmak ve fetret ve hicran tevliid eylemek hususunda dermeyan olanve müfsidat şimdi dahi göçte ve hicra mevaki ve nikatda bulunan kıtaat-i askeriye varıncaya kadar teşmil-i tevsiilatla efradın hissiyat-ı diniyyelerini tahrik ve Meşrutiyet-i Meşrua aleyhinde kıyama teşvik suretiyle iğfalat-ı fetretkaraneye başlamıştır”

¹¹⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

“Ezcümle Van Vilayetine Hakkari Sancağına muzaf ve İran hududuna karib ve sahiliden 180 saat baid olan Seray mevakiinde muhteşid nizamiye 30. Alayın 2. Taburu efradının dahi tesvilat-ı mümaseleye kapılarak ve müsellehan telgrafhanede içtima ederek bir vaz-ı itaatşikenane ile müddeayat-ı mesrude bir kıyıamları”

Province and was 180 hours from the coast.¹¹⁷⁷ Soldiers who were engaged in some provocations; gathered in the telegraph office in an armed fashion, raided the coffee house in disobedience, tore the printed materials, attacked the CUP club and heavily damaged it.¹¹⁷⁸ In particular, the attack on the CUP office displayed that the movement was certainly carried out with Anti-Constitutional or reactionary motivations. Marshal İbrahim reported that the necessary measures were taken quickly, agitation was controlled, and the growth of events was prevented.¹¹⁷⁹ However, he was worried that the events would spread to the 6th Army which already has a discipline issue, and to the wider Iraqi geography.¹¹⁸⁰ Ibrahim emphasized the possibility that some people in the guise of the ulema might provoke religious feelings by 6th army officers and soldiers and cause much greater confusion.¹¹⁸¹ According to him, preventive measures had to be taken already and some of these provocateurs had to be captured by Local Governments and punished in an exemplary manner.¹¹⁸² The Minister of War, Salih Hulusi, immediately took the matter into consideration and issued a notification intended for all civil administrations and civil servants in the 6th Army sectors.¹¹⁸³ The 6th Army Command was also called upon to cooperate with the civil administrations.¹¹⁸⁴ On May 6, necessary warnings and instructions were notified to Baghdad, Basra, Mosul provinces and Zor Sub-governorate by the Ministry of

¹¹⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

¹¹⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

“ve....kıraathanesine giderek evrak-ı matbuayı şakk ve ittihad ve Terakki kulübüne hücum ederek cam ve eşya-i mevcudeyi şikest eylemeleri telkinat-ımaruzanın derece-i şümül ve tevsini göstermiştir”

¹¹⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

“Gerçi müsaaraten ittihaz olunan tedabir semeresiyle oraca da teskin -i hicran ve galeyan daire-i imkana idhal edildi”

¹¹⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

“Ancak tesvilat-ı vakinin ümera min mütevellîye gibi sürat-i sirayetine ve erbab-ıtelkinat-ı şifahiden başka bezl-i nükud ve hususunda da fedakarlık gösterdikleri anlaşılmasına binaen zaten inzibatı pek yolunda olmayan Altıncı Orduca ve havalî-i Irakiyece müşkil-ül iftihar bir iğtişâş vahim-ül encam husule getirmeleri istib’ad olunamamakta”

¹¹⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

¹¹⁸² BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325- 01 May 1909

“ve bu babda şimdiden tedabir-i manî’a ittihazı ve müfsidin ve ...men’i mefasidiyle beraber ulema zi-kıyafetinde olacağı şüphesiz bulunan eşhas-ı merkumeden bir kaçının olsun hükümetlerce ele geçirilerek emsaline ibret-i müessire gösterilmesi selamet-i atabe-i meşrutiyet ve memleketi için mukteziyat-ı umurdan zannedilmekte bulunduğu maruzdur”

¹¹⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 2, 21 Nisan 1325- 04 May 1909

“Hülasa: bazı müfsidin-i meşrutiyet aleyhindeki tesvilatın önü alınak için 6. Ordu mıntıkasındaki memurin-i mülkiyeye tebligat icra buyurulmasına dair”

¹¹⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 2, 21 Nisan 1325- 04 May 1909

Interior.¹¹⁸⁵ After the March 31 incident, the Iraqi geography was also affected by the provocations within the military, and a new risk arose for the Mosul Administration, which could not erase the traces of the Mosul Incident yet. However, what was expected did not happen and it was not seen that the soldiers in the Mosul sector were involved in such turmoil and riots.

6.2.3. The Expanding Investigation and the Withdrawing 4th Army

By June 1909, the investigation had expanded, and 92 individuals including 80 men and 12 women had been arrested.¹¹⁸⁶ Governor Reşid reported that the investigation was conducted according to the existing situation, temporal and spatial conditions, and the Public Prosecutor of Court of Appeal could not set a deadline for when it would be concluded¹¹⁸⁷ Governor Reşid was also worried that the 4th Army would be withdrawn from Mosul and that such a premature military withdrawal would jeopardize both the investigation and public order. He particularly stated that the current investigation had been conducted and expanded thanks to the strength and size of the 4th Army.¹¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, at such a critical time when the investigation was expanding day by day and the number of suspects and arrests were gradually increasing, the presence of the 4th army was sorely needed.¹¹⁸⁹ The provincial prosecutor's office had claimed that the

¹¹⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 3, 23 Nisan 1325- 06 May 1909

“Bağdad, Basra, Musul Vilayetlerine, Zor Mutasarrıflığına Cihet-i askeriye ile bil-müzakere müttehiden ittihaz-ı tedabir ve takayyüdat-ı müsaraatle teşebbüsât-ımeydan verilmemesi ve bu gibi mefaside cüret edenler olur ise hemen derdest edilerek haklarında tahkikat ve takibat-ı kanuniye icrası lüzumu”

¹¹⁸⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR.414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909; BEO.3570/267697/Lef 2, 19 Mayıs 1325 -01 June 1909

“Musul Hadisesinin tahkikatına Dördüncü Ordu taburlarının vürudundan sonra başlanılabilmiş ve şimdiye kadar erkek kadın 92 şahıs taht-ı tevkife alınmış”

“Hadise-i malumeden dolayı şimdiye kadar 80 zükur 12 inas taht-ı tevkife alındığı”

¹¹⁸⁷ BOA, BEO.3570/267697/Lef 2, 19 Mayıs 1325 -01 June 1909

“ve tahkikatın ikmalı için hal ve zaman ve isti’dad-ı mevkii ve mekana göre çalışılmakta ise de tahkikat-ı mezkurenin hitamı için şimdilik tayin-i müddet edilemeyeceği lede-l istifsar istinaf müdde-i umumiliğinden ifade olunduğu maruzdur”

¹¹⁸⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR.414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909

“Musul Hadisesinin tahkikatına Dördüncü Ordu taburlarının vürudundan sonra başlanılabilmiş”

¹¹⁸⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909

withdrawal of the military would disrupt the investigation that has been brought to this level with so much effort.¹¹⁹⁰ The Governorate was also concerned that the withdrawal of even a part of the army would lead to a further violation of the public order, which was not yet fully established throughout the province.¹¹⁹¹ Reşid particularly and strongly demanded that the cavalry and infantry in Mosul not be shifted to another side until the investigation and trial was concluded.¹¹⁹² Against the signals of withdrawal, Reşid drew attention to the vital need for the Joint Task Force's presence in Mosul, and emphasized that the military withdrawal at this point would be a major strategic mistake.

However, the Grand Vizirate warned that it was a great responsibility that the investigation of the Mosul Incident had not been concluded until now due to reasons such as existing situation, temporal and spatial conditions.¹¹⁹³ The Grand Vizier who stated that such reasons could not prevent the functioning of the law, also added that those who prevent the functioning of the process should be punished in the most severe way.¹¹⁹⁴ At the right time, a sufficient force had been sent for the safety of the investigation, but this force could not be left idle in Mosul for a long time and would therefore be returned to its original location.¹¹⁹⁵ The Grand Vizier ordered the prosecution and the trial to be concluded swiftly and warned that, if necessary, martial

“tahkikat-ı hazıra gün be gün tevsi ve maznunar da tayin eylediğinden satvet ve mehabet-i askeriyeden bil-istifade eşhas-ı matlubenin peyderpey derdest edilmekte oldukları bir sırada askerin Musuldan kaldırılması”

¹¹⁹⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR.414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909

“bunca emek sarfıyla ileri götürülmüş olan tahkikatın akim kalmasını intac edeceği vilayet istinaf müdde-i umumiliğinden ifade olunmuş”

¹¹⁹¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR.414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909

“ve fil-hakika asakir-i mevcudenin velev bir kısm-ı cüziyesinin de olsun buradan kaldırılmasını henüz kuvvetiyle.....olan vilayet ve mülhakatı asayişinin de yeniden ihlali gibi ahval-i müessife vukuuna bais olacağı”

¹¹⁹² BOA, DH.ŞFR.414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909

“her halde tahkikatın neticesine kadar buradaki süvari ve piyade asker-i şahanenin bir tarafa sevk edilmemesi icab edenlere emr-ü ita buyurulması ehemmiyetle istirham olunur”

¹¹⁹³ BOA, BEO.3570/267697/Lef 1, 21 Mayıs 1325 – 03 June 1909

“Musul hadisesinden maznun-aleyh olanlar haklarındaki tahkikatın hal ve zaman ve isti’dad-ı mekan-ı gadr ile şimdiye kadar ikmal edilmemesi mucib-i mesuliyettir”

¹¹⁹⁴ BOA, BEO.3570/267697/Lef 1, 21 Mayıs 1325 – 03 June 1909

“Hal ve zaman ve mekan ahkam-ı kanuniyenin tamam-i cereyanına katiyyen mani olamaz. Ahkam-ı kanuniyenin cereyanına hail olacaklar hakkında en şiddetli mücazaatın icrası lazım gelir”

¹¹⁹⁵ BOA, BEO.3570/267697/Lef 1, 21 Mayıs 1325 – 03 June 1909

“Vaktiyle kuvve-i kafiye gönderilmiş idiye bu kuvvetin tul-i müddet hal-i atalette bırakılması tecviz olamayıp mevki-i asliyelerine iade edilecektir.”

law (*İrade-i Örfiye*) could be declared in Mosul and extraordinary measures could be taken.¹¹⁹⁶ This harsh response from the Grand Vizier is very important in terms of showing the determination and direction of the Central Authority. Because now Istanbul began to get impatient and even included the declaration of martial law among its options.

By July 1909, two of the three infantry battalions deployed in Mosul by the 4th Army, and the entire mounted troops including the gendarmerie and mule cavalry, had been assigned to the pursuit and suppression of the Hamawand bandits.¹¹⁹⁷ Governor Reşid reported that only one battalion remained in the central town of Mosul and 120 soldiers from this battalion were sent to suppress the tribal attacks in Akre.¹¹⁹⁸ With the remaining troops, it would be very difficult to control the prisons where major criminals such as the Mosul Incident prisoners were detained, and to maintain internal and external public order.¹¹⁹⁹ Reşid had agreed with the Mosul Command to recruit one of the Mosul Reserve (*Redif*) Battalions, and the decision was also approved by the Army Command.¹²⁰⁰ A few days later, the Ministry of Interior reported the situation to Grand Vizirate and stated that even if such a measure would be necessary, it would be more appropriate for the succeeding Governor Fazıl Pasha to file this request when he arrived.¹²⁰¹ However, due to the course of the events and the opinion of the

¹¹⁹⁶ BOA, BEO.3570/267697/Lef 1, 21 Mayıs 1325 – 03 June 1909

“Takibat ve muhakemat da serian ikmalî lüzumu te’kid ve lede’l-icab orada dahi irade-i örfiye ilanıyla tedbir-i fevkalade ittihaz olunacağı ihtar olunur.”

¹¹⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 1, 1 Temmuz 1325-14 July 1909

“Musul Hadisesi üzerine 4. Ordu-u Hümayun buraya muvasalatından 3 tabur piyadenin 2 taburuyla kuvve-i rakibenin umumu ve Jandarma Süvari ve Ester Süvarı Hemvendlilerin takibine memur edilerek”

¹¹⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 1, 1 Temmuz 1325-14 July 1909

“merkez vilayette yalnız bir piyade taburu kalmış idi. Akra Kazası dahilinde bazı aşairin kasaba ahalisine tecavüzleri vaki olduğu ve bunların men’i zımında askere ihtiyaç bulunması kaymakamlıktan bildirilmesi cihetle mezkur bir taburdan 120 neferi oraya sevk edilmiş”

¹¹⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 1, 1 Temmuz 1325-14 July 1909

“bakiyye-i mevcudla Musul Hadisesi mevkufiyetinin vesair erbab-ı cinayatin bulundukları hapishanelerin ve alel-husus dahil ve hariç intizam altında bulunan asayişin idamesi müşkil görülmüş olmakla”

¹²⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 1, 1 Temmuz 1325-14 July 1909

“Musul kumandanlığıyla bil-müzakere Musul Redif taburlarından birinin silah altına alınması münasib görülerek keyfiyet ordu-u hümayun kumandanlığına yazılmış ve oraca da münasib görülmüş olduğu beray-ı muamelat maruzdur”

¹²⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 2, 5 Temmuz 1325-18 July 1909

“böyle bir tedbirin ittihazı muktezi ise Musul vali-i lahiki Fazıl Paşa hazretlerinin merkez vilayete muvasalatında vuku bulacak müracaat üzerine icra-i icabı daha muvafık olacağı derkar ise de”

Governor, the initiative was taken by the Army Command and the order was given ex officio in order to prevent a possible crisis.¹²⁰² For this reason, the Ministry of Interior asked the Grand Vizier not put any pressure on the Ministry of War on this issue.¹²⁰³ Apparently, during the transition period of the Governorship from Reşid to Mehmet Fazıl, Reşid's decisions and initiative were under the constant surveillance of Istanbul. Naturally, this was due to the fact that the Central Authority's trust in Reşid has decreased considerably. Although Istanbul made an exception in the above example due to the urgency of the situation, it obviously wanted to leave such critical decisions to Mehmed Fazıl. During this transition period, the Ministry of Interior persistently kept asking the Governor's office about the status of the investigation. As Mehmed Fazıl reached Mosul in August, he had contacted the public prosecutor and was responded that the investigation which was continuing at full speed will soon be legally determined.¹²⁰⁴ However, in one month the Ministry had to remind once again that the investigation should be accelerated and concluded as soon as possible.¹²⁰⁵

6.2.4. The Telegram of Mosul Prosecutor Lütü

Although the investigation seemed to be progressing, the complaints of some judicial personnel have started to reach Istanbul. Lütü, the 'Prosecutor of the Mosul Court of Appeal' (*İstinaf Müdde-i Umumisi*), sent a lengthy message to the Ministry of Justice in October 1909.¹²⁰⁶ He started his message by stating that they had been dealing with the Mosul Incident for almost a year and that the Central Authorities were also in a very difficult situation because of this.¹²⁰⁷ He claimed that, on the occasion of the

¹²⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 2, 5 Temmuz 1325-18 July 1909

"siyak-ı işara nazaran mezkur taburun cem' ve teslihi ordu-u hümayundaiktidar etmiş bir emr-i vaki hükmünü aldığı cihetle nezaretpenaha karşı bi-tabii bir şey denilmemesi olduğunun beray-ı malumat arzibtidar kılındı"

¹²⁰³ BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 2, 5 Temmuz 1325-18 July 1909

¹²⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.1/25/Lef 2, 31 Temmuz 1325- 13 August 1909

"Musul hadise-i malumesinden dolayı kemal-i germi ile icra olunmakda olan tahkikatın istintak dairesince karar-ı kanuniye rabt edebilecek zamanı takrib etmekte olduğu bil-havale..... İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliği ifadesiyle arz olunur"

¹²⁰⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.1/25/Lef 1, 25 Ağustos 1325-07 September 1909

¹²⁰⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

¹²⁰⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

religious feast, situations that would provoke the feelings of people were allowed and there were also some intrigues against the municipal officials, the police and the gendarmerie.¹²⁰⁸ Lütfi seemed to be referring of a reactionary and conspiratorial movement trying to revive the old regime.¹²⁰⁹ He had tried so hard to explain this situation to the Deputy Governor, but eventually he was not successful.¹²¹⁰ Although he tried to use all his authority and responsibility to prevent an extraordinarily dangerous situation that was expected to happen, he could not do more.¹²¹¹ According to Lütfi, such problems were always experienced in the provinces due to negligence and thoughtlessness of the administrators, and in the end, the responsibility of solution was always burdened on the prosecutor's office.¹²¹²

Lütfi wanted the issue to be raised to the inter-Ministerial level and the necessary precautions to be taken before it was too late.¹²¹³ However, the Ministry of Interior, which quickly questioned the issue from the Governorship, stated that the allegations consisted of the prosecutor's anxieties and imaginations.¹²¹⁴ For this reason, the

“Geçen Kurban Bayramı hadise-i malumesi ile bir seneye karibdir uğraşıyoruz. Makamat-ı Aliyye de bu yüzden iyice müşkülata uğradığı cihetle”

¹²⁰⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909; BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 3, 19 Teşrinievvel 1325- 01 November 1909

“Bayram münasebetiyle halkın hissiyatını tahrik edecek ahvale meydan verilmekte olduğuna dair Musul İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliğinden Nezaret-i Celilelerine çekilip...”

“beledi ve zabıta ve polis re’y-i mütaalararı hilafında şimdiden yine fırladıklar çevrilmeye başladığını görerek eski yaraların acısı henüz unutulmamış bir zaman ve böyle bir mevkiide bunların...”

¹²⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

“hazele-i zükur inasın içtima’ ve bu vesileyle yekdiğeri hakkında kavlen ve fiilen enva-i ceraim ve fazai ikainda cevelengah açmak adeta sabıkı tanzire kalkışmak demek olan dolablar salıncıklar daha bilmem neler”

¹²¹⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

“ve Vali vekili Naib Efendi etrafıyla her bir dakaikle anlatayım diyerek sıyam halinde çok nefes sarf ettim. Muvaffak olamadığıma teessüf eyledim”

¹²¹¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

“Böyle umum erbab vicdanında fikr-i hilafette göz göre göre üzerimize gelen kazanın ta içine atılmaktan ise imtina veçhiyle an-ı nağıhanı zuhuru melhuz olan bir hadise-i fevkaladenin kabl-el vuku önünü almak esbabının istikmali husus-u inzibat noktasından bakılınca vazife-i müştereke-i kanuniyemden ma’dud isem de hal ve zaman icabı daha ileri varmadım.”

¹²¹² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

“Taşralarda bizim ahvalimize hep böyle noksan-ı teemmül ve tedbirden ve su-i idare-i mülkiyeden asayışı ihlal ettikten sonra gel bu pirincin taşını ayıklayarak tepsiyi önümüze sürmektedirler”

¹²¹³ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909

“Acilen bu dolaplarıntaraf-ı sami-i nezaretpenahilerinden , diğer nezaret-i celilelerden telgrafla vekaletle emr istihsali ve hangilerince ne derece müdahale lazım ise ferman.”

¹²¹⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 3, 19 Teşrinievvel 1325- 01 November 1909

“İstinaf müdde-i umumiliği mütaalatı evham ve hayalattan ibaret olduğu”

Ministry of Justice was asked to warn the prosecutor not to interfere in administrative and civil affairs beyond his duty and authority.¹²¹⁵ It was remarkable and disturbing for the Sublime Porte that a District Prosecutor bypassed the Governor and got involved in inter-Ministerial dialogue in such a tumultuous time. Judging by his comments, Prosecutor Lütü seemed to emphasize a scheme in which the local administration was subjected with all its agencies. In fact, he implied that all the provincial authorities were deceived, and he could not show them the truth even though he tried so hard to reveal this illusion. Although it was not clear what kind of a conspiracy it was from these ambiguous statements, we see in the archive that Lütü's allegations drew the negative reaction of the authorities rather than their attention. Although it is not known how much of Prosecutor Lütü's concerns were true and justified, it is understood that the internal unrest between the authorities in Mosul did not end even after Mehmed Fazıl took office.

6.2.5. Request by Sâdât to Transfer the Case to Another Court

By November 1909, Former Sulaymaniyah Mufti Seyyid Mehmed, Seyyid Maruf and their companions stated that neither they nor the witnesses dared to go to the courthouse in Mosul.¹²¹⁶ In addition, they had been informed that some attempts were being made in favor of the criminals and, on these two grounds, they requested the transfer of the trial to another location.¹²¹⁷ They complained that the perpetrators of such a terrible massacre still have not been convicted even after a year.¹²¹⁸ Besides, since the Sâdât could not be present at the Mosul court and could not testify to support their case, the evil circles in Sulaymaniyah had the opportunity to justify and

¹²¹⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 3, 19 Teşrinievvel 1325- 01 November 1909

“ve vazife ve salahiyeti haricinde işlere medhal etmekte bulunduğü beyanıyla kendisine tebligat ifasını”

¹²¹⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.30/8/Lef 1, 24 Teşrinievvel 1325- 06 November 1909

“muhakeme elyevm Musul İstinaf Mahkemesinde derdest-i icra ise de ne kendileri de şahidler mahkemeye gitmeye cesaret edemediklerinden”

¹²¹⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.30/8/Lef 1, 24 Teşrinievvel 1325- 06 November 1909

“mücrimin lehinde bazı teşebbüsâtın bulunduğünü istihbar eylediğinden bahisle davanın Musul ve Süleymaniyeden maada bir mahale nakli istidasını”

¹²¹⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 14,21 Teşrinievvel 1325- 03 November 1909

“aradan bir sene geçtiğü halde henüz o cinayet-i müdhşe-i azime faileri hakkında bir guna icraat-ı faile görülmediğü”

strengthen their attacks, slander and defeatist acts.¹²¹⁹ And while they suffered such injustice and victimization, they also heard the rumor that the perpetrators of the massacre would be pardoned.¹²²⁰ Attempting to pardon the perpetrators of this level of victimization would be rewarding and encouraging Sâdât's enemies and allowing the destruction of a 1300-year-old dynasty with thousands of households.¹²²¹ In order to avoid such dangers, to eliminate the slanders of their absence and to expose the oppressor and the oppressed in a fair way, they demanded that the trial be heard in a neutral place other than Mosul or Sulaymaniyah.¹²²²

We know from archive records that the trial took place between 28 February and 14 July 1910 and lasted an average of 5 months. However, although it was November 1909, there were requests by the Sâdât front to move the trial to an elsewhere court. In the message of Deputy Governor Muhiddin at the end of March 1910, it was reported that the 'public trial' (*muhakeme-i aleniyye*) was in progress.¹²²³ Although there are no technical details of the stages of the trial in the archive, it was possible that the trial consisted of two periods as closed and public hearings. This statement of Muhiddin and the Sâdât's request make us think that the previous stage of the trial may have been heard as closed sessions before February. Otherwise, Sâdât's drawbacks about coming to the courtroom in November 1909 and their request to move the trial to another court at that time would be meaningless. However, on February 21 of 1910, in a message he sent a week before the public trial, Reşid el-Ömeri was going to complain that the court

¹²¹⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 14,21 Teşrinievvel 1325- 03 November 1909

"mesele Musul istinafinda ru'yet edilmekte olduğundan ne daileri ve ne de şahidleri gelmeye cesaret edememek yüzünden mağdur ve icraatın tehirinden dolayı Süleymaniye erbab-ı fesadı tecavüzatını, müftereyatını , hareket-ı ifsadiyeti arındırmakta, mahvımıza iknamıza yürümekte olmaları cihetinde tehlike-i azimeye maruz bulunmaktayız"

¹²²⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 14,21 Teşrinievvel 1325- 03 November 1909

¹²²¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 14,21 Teşrinievvel 1325- 03 November 1909

"bu misli mağduriyet-i fazihenin failleri hakkında afva teşebbüs, mesbuk olduğu gibi bu hal diğer hasmanımızı taltif ve aleyhimize tergibimhamızı tecviz demek olduğu şüphesizdir"

"bu mertebe-i mazlumin-i fazihanın maruziyeti yüzünden binlerce haneden mürekkeb 1300 senelik bir hanedanın teessürat-ı zulmle hanelerini garib, efradını tagrib ve tağrik, şan ve medlul-u adaletle kabil-i telif olacağından"

¹²²² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 14,21 Teşrinievvel 1325- 03 November 1909

"maruzu bulunduğumuz tehlike-iiftiradan vikayemizi ve ma-adalet meşrutiye-i mazhariyetimiz ve zalimle mazlumin tezahürleri zımında Musul'dan Süleymaniye'den başka bi-taraf bir mahalde mağduriyet-i maruzamızın müsebbib ve failleriyle icra-yı muhakememize müsaade buyurulması müsterhamdır"

¹²²³ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 3, 16 Mart 1326- 29 March 1910

was still not established.¹²²⁴ This makes us think that what Sâdât requested to move to another court in November might be the investigation not the trial. Perhaps Sâdât meant their contribution to the ongoing investigation by means of appearing in court and giving testimonies. Nevertheless, the technical process of the trial remains ambiguous, as Sâdât and authorities particularly used the terms ‘trial’ (*muhakeme*) with ‘stand trial’ or ‘hearing the case’ (*derdest-i icra, ru’yet*) in their request by November.

6.3. Amnesty Requests by Reşid el-Ömeri

In October 1909, while the investigation was in full swing, the amnesty requests of detainees began to reach the Ottoman authorities. As we will see in the following messages, Reşid el-Ömeri was the spokesperson of these detainees and he often led these requests. It is observed that Ömeri built these requests on many different arguments, such as the inclusiveness of the Constitutional Monarchy, the victimization of Arabs against Kurds, and previous amnesties that even pardoned banditry. In other words, Ömeri used many different sensitivities such as the embracive character of the regime, ethnic marginalization and the comparison of different crimes, to create an amnesty dialogue with the state. These amnesty requests occupied the Central Authority for a while, created a debate between the Ministries of Justice and Interior, and although they were not accepted in the end, they exceedingly disturbed the Sâdât front.

In the first message they sent to the Grand Vizirate, the Ministry of Interior and the Sheikh’ul-Islam on 17 October, Ömeri congratulated their first anniversary of ‘23 July National Day’ (*10 Temmuz İyd-i Milli*) and requested that they be included in the general amnesty declared in honor of this day.¹²²⁵ According to them, this pardon

¹²²⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910 *see the section of ‘Amnesty Requests by Reşid el-Ömeri’

¹²²⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 4, 4 Teşrinievvel 1325- 17 October 1909

“Yevm-i eman, mağfirete nişan olan ıyd-ihakk-ı azim-i hilafetpenah ve bütün millet-i necibeye bahş ve mesud buyurulmasına ve meşrutiyet-i mukaddesetarih-i teyidi itibarıyla ilk bayramı olması münasebetiyle atabe-i felekmertebe-i şehriyariyi arz-ı tebrik ve bu vesileyle nişan-ı sadakat ve

would be in line with the embrative and forgiving character of the Constitutional Monarchy, which delighted all Ottoman nations.¹²²⁶ Obviously, a general amnesty was declared in honor of the Constitutional Monarchy, but the Mosul Incident detainees were not included in this amnesty. The exclusion of these detainees from the general amnesty could be explained by the state's emphasis on ethnic, territorial, and political sensitivities. Because the case had not been heard yet and pardoning the non-convicted detainees of a public incident at this scale was likely to spark a larger conflict between the two ethnic elements.

On November 9, Ömeri's group sent another new and longer message. They expressed that, more than a thousand people from both sides were found suspects in the Feast Incident, which broke out between Arab and Kurdish elements due to the mismanagement of the previous Local Administration.¹²²⁷ According to Ömeri, most of them, including the perpetrators and instigators of the incident, had insisted on disobeying the law.¹²²⁸ However, as a 120-member group including obedient men and women, only they had been detained for seven months on false accusations.¹²²⁹ According to Ömeri, they have been falsely accused of not obeying the law even though they have never committed any crimes.¹²³⁰ They have been repeating their demands for pardon in a miserable manner; but they felt that the response was especially delayed by the influence of some vindictive individuals who also caused

..... 10 Temmuz 1324 İyd-i Millinin şerefine ihsan buyurulan afv-ı aliye'nin mazlum olan kullarına adem-i şumulunun”

Telegram signers were names like: Reşid el-Ömeri, Şeyh İbrahim, Ed-Dai Ömer, Bahaeddin, Nuri, Abdullah, Ali, Muhammed, Latif, Süleyman, Hamid, Casim, Hasan, Mehmed, Casim, Yunus, Necmi, Said and Eyüb. It is possible that one of the two Casims mentioned here is Ebu Casim, one of the major ringleaders mentioned several times in Hut's study.

Hut, *Musul Vilayeti'nin ...*, p.176,177,180

¹²²⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 4, 4 Teşrinievvel 1325- 17 October 1909

“işbu İyd-i mukaddes-i revhanimizin şerefine de afv-ı ali-i hilafetpehaniyi buyurulmaklığımızı ve bu vasıta ile bilumum millet-i Osmaniyeye talim-i meserret ve teyid-i erkan-ı meşrutiyet için yekzeban ile da'vat-ı hayriyenin isticlabına erzan-ı merhamet buyurulması”

¹²²⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“hükümet-i sabıkanın kusurundan naşi Arab ile Ekrad arasında vukua gelen Bayram vukuatında tarafeynde bin kişiyi mütecaviz maznun bulunarak”

¹²²⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“bunların kısm-i azimi ve fail ve müsebbibleri kanuna itaat etmeyip iddia-i kararda kalmış”

¹²²⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“ve yalnız muti olarak yüz yirmi kişiden ibaret olan zükür ve inas çakerleriniz katiyen bir cürüm yok iken mahaza kanuna gerdendade bulunmadığımız hasebiyle taarruz isnadat müzvevirane ile yedi mahdan beri mevkuf”

¹²³⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

their victimization.¹²³¹ Even the primary investigation of such a wide ranging case between two ethnicities and involving so many suspects took almost a year, and naturally more time was needed for its judgement.¹²³² Suspects had been separated from their families for a long time due to the prolonged detention period, and their spouses and children were also victimized.¹²³³ In addition, according to Ömeri, this situation would fuel and prolong the ancient enmity between the communities of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah and the community of Mosul central town, which was already impossible to establish a proper relationship between them until now.¹²³⁴ Besides, it was a necessary policy to eliminate this hostility between the regional elements and to reconcile all the people of the region.¹²³⁵ Despite the declaration written by all the local Ulema and prominent figures that these people were worthy of pardon, their grief was deepened by the fact that they still received no reaction.¹²³⁶ Since insisting on the destruction of so many people is against all existing laws of Constitutionalism and justice; they were asking to be pardoned without a further application and to be released immediately in the name of reviving the whole country and confirming Constitutionalism.¹²³⁷ Apparently, Ömeri meant that this amnesty

¹²³¹BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“tevali eden müracaatımız üzerine şayan-ı afv olub olmadığımızın istilamını havi Dahiliye Nezareti Celilesinden vilayete gelen telgrafnamenin sürat-i cevab-ı lazımeden iken yine evvelce mağduriyetimize sebep olan bazı gazezlerin ilkaatıyla cevabın tehirine sebebiyet verilmekte olduğu anlaşılıyor”

¹²³² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“Müsaade-i mezkure iki anasır arasında tekevvün ederek tarafeynde maznunların kesreti hasebiyle tahkikat-ı ibtidaiesi bir seneye karib sürdüğü gibi muhakemesi dahi tul-u zamana ihtiyac-ı tabiisi bulunmakla bu yüzden çok mağdurların evail ve etfalleri beraber imtidat-ı mevkufiyetten mahv-ı perişaniyetlerimizi müstelzim olub”

¹²³³ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

¹²³⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“bu vasıtaıyla yekdiğeriyle kati alaka ve münasebatı gayr-i kabil olan Kerkük Süleymaniye ve Musul ahalisinden aralarında la-yenkati bir adavetin devamına badi olacağı ve bu ise bütün memleketin harabiyetini müeddi bulunacağı tabiidir”

¹²³⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“beyne-l anasır mevcut bulunan adavetin bu vasıtaıyla def ve izalesiyle umum memleket ahalisinin te’lif-i beyn ve ihyası siyaset-i lazımeden bulunduğ”

¹²³⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“bu kimselerin afva şayan bulunduklarına dair eşraf ve ulema-ı mahalliyeden vilayete takdim kılınan mazbatada beyan edildiği halde yine henüz cevap yazılmadığı anlaşıldığından meyusiyet-iartık derecesini tecavüz etmiştir”

¹²³⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325- 09 November 1909

“mazbatanın kesr-i kulubleriyle bu suretle tazyik ve mahvlarını ısrar etmek , meşrutiyet ve adaletin bil-mevcude ahkamına mugayir idiğinden başka türlü müracaata mahal kalmamak üzere afv ile hemen

could have made a great contribution to the reconciliation of the regional elements, but one thing he overlooked was what the Kurdish Sâdât's post-amnesty reactions would be.

In another message he sent on November 27, Ömeri mentioned that their misery, grievances, and victimization exceeded even the Cretan Muslims.¹²³⁸ According to Ömeri, even prisoners who were convicted of all kinds of serious crimes such as murder, rape, extortion, and arson, and who insisted to disobey the law, were pardoned without hesitation.¹²³⁹ In addition, they claimed that no information was requested from the sub-divisional authorities about whether these criminals were eligible for amnesty and they were definitely pardoned ex officio.¹²⁴⁰ However, people like Ömeri were victimized for obeying the law and had been imprisoned for eight months because of the concocted Feast Incident.¹²⁴¹ They were worried that their trials would not be resolved for years, and they received no response to their applications regarding whether they were eligible for amnesty.¹²⁴² He also mentioned that the people who caused their arrest had delayed their requests for amnesty, disrupted the flow of information, and tried to ruin themselves with actions that did not comply with justice and Constitutionalism.¹²⁴³ According to Ömeri, new Governor could be excused for not having much knowledge of the prisoners' situation, but some elements have been particularly trying to prevent their pardon and mislead state authorities from the

tahtiyemizle umum memleketin ihyası ve bu yüzden teyid-i meşrutiyete rağbet ve da'vet-i hayriyenin isticlabına müsaade buyurulması ehemmiyetle müsterhamdır"

¹²³⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

"Girit Müslimlerinin mağduriyet ve sefaletlerini geçen mağduriyetimizden bahsetmek artık tadı kalmamış ve perişanîyetimiz haddini tecavüz etmiştir"

¹²³⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

"Katl-i nüfus, hetk-i ıraz, gasb-ı emval fiil-i şeni, ihrak gibi feza-i mütenevia cinayatile müttehem mevkuf ve mahkum kanuna adem-i itaatla kararda kalanlar tereddüdsüz afv olundukları halde"

¹²⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

"aciben bunlar afva şayan olub olmadıklarına bir vilayet veya liva ve kazadan istilam olunmamıştır. Yoksa re'sen afv olunmuşlardır. Re'sen afv olundukları muhakkaktır"

¹²⁴¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

"Ya bizim gibi mahaza kanuna itaatımızdan dolayı mağdur mazlum , ilkaat-ı müzevveri' ile bayram vukuatından dolayı Sekiz Mahdan beri mevkuf ve muhakemeleri senelerce neticelenmeyeceği tabii bulunan mazlumlarımızın tekrardan müracaatımız üzerine en nihayet afva şayan olub olmadığımıza dair bundan akdem Dahiliye nezaretinden telgrafen vilayetten istilam edilmiş iken henüz cevap verilmediği gibi"

¹²⁴² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

¹²⁴³ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

"mevkufumuza sebep olan muterizlerin de ilkaatlerine aksi cevap verileceği memul ve ihtimalin de verilmiştir"

beginning.¹²⁴⁴ At the end of the message, they demanded their unwavering pardon in the name of Constitutional justice, or demanded their execution if their innocence was to be denied.¹²⁴⁵

Ömeri's next message on December 7 was dispatched to both the Ministry of Interior and Sultan himself and emphasized Arabism and the victimization of Arabs.¹²⁴⁶ According to Reşid, the Ministry had been questioning the province for two months whether they were eligible for amnesty, but the Governorship, under the influence of some despotic opponents, still did not give the necessary answer.¹²⁴⁷ He claimed that the regional hatred and insult towards Arab elements were fueled, Arabs were particularly deprived of Constitutional rights and he underlined that this was totally against the Constitutional justice.¹²⁴⁸ Emphasizing God's inclusiveness of Arab, Persian and Turkish communities and referring to the hadith of “When Arabs are abominated, Islam becomes abominated” (*Iza zelle'l Arabu zelle'l Islam*), he demanded their pardon in the name of equality, reconciliation and in the honor of the following feast.¹²⁴⁹ As it is obviously seen, Ömeri argued the embrative character of the

¹²⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

“Valimiz yeni sandığı ahval-i umumiyemize adem-i vukufu hasebiyle bu hususdanitse bile mazurdur. Fakat evvelce şu mağduriyet-i azimemize tasaddi iden müfsidler vasıtasıyla aksi cevabın itasıyla işimizi tehire uğratmakla, işar ve istişara ve hilaf-ı adalet ve meşrutiyet ve müstelzim-i mavh ve perişanı”

¹²⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisani 1325 – 27 November 1909

“tereddüdsüz affımızla adalet-i meşrutiyetin isbatı yahud mazlumen mahbusta olmaduk ise ilan-ı mazlumin-i Osmaniyan için idamımıza emr-i itası”

¹²⁴⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisani 1325- 07 December 1909

¹²⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisani 1325- 07 December 1909

“Cürümleri sabit şakiler afv buyruldukları halde mağdur ve kanuna muti çakerleriniz afva şayan olub olmadığımıza dair iki maha karib nezaretpenahilerinden telgrafname-i dahiliyeden telgrafen vilayetten sorulduğu halde muarızların baki kalan müstebidane nüfuzlarıyla henüz cevab-ı lazıme verilmemiştir”

¹²⁴⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisani 1325- 07 December 1909

“Bu ise mahaza şimdilik menfur olan Arab anasır-ı müstahkariyle icra-yı garaz adilmekte ise de hilaf-ı adalet-i meşrutiyettir. Zavallı Arablar adalet-i meşrutiyetden mahrumiyetleri müstelzim-i meyusiyettir.”

¹²⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisani 1325- 07 December 1909

“Halbuki fahr-i kainat beni'l Arab ve'l Acem ve'l-Etrak efendimiz hazretleri buyurmuşlar ki “İza zelle'l Arabu zelle'l İslam” (Araplar zelil olduğu zaman İslam da zelil olur). Şu hadisi şerifin meal-i mana'ına riayeten ve müsavaat ve te'lif beyn-i nokta-i nazarından önümüzdeki İy-d-i Kebirin şerefine afvımızla beyne'l anasırın mütekevvini saire-i ihtilafın itfasıyla”

According to what is reported from Jabir, The Prophet stated the following: “When Arabs are abominated, Islam becomes abominated” ‘Araplar zelil olduğu zaman İslam da zelil olur’ إذا ذلت العرب (İbn Ebî Hâtim, İlel, c.2, s.376) : Abu Hâtim is confined with saying, "It is a false hadith, it has no origins" for this narration. Undoubtedly, the reason that led Abu Hâtim to this opinion is that Islam is not dependent on the honor or abomination of the Arabs.

Constitutional Monarchy and claimed that the Arab sub-identity under the Ottoman supra-identity was marginalized. However, it was also felt that Ömeri glorified the Arabs among other Islamic communities and made a discrimination by not including the Kurds among the Islamic communities he counted. Considering the reactionary and Monarchist profile of Ömeri in the eyes of the state, it is quite confusing that he attacked a clique like Sâdât, which is extremely prominent, respected and decisive in Islamic doctrine. However, this conflict could also be read as the struggle of Arab and Kurdish Ulema to seize the religious leadership in the region, and the Mosul Incident could be associated with both religious motives and anti-Kurdish sentiment of Arab elements in this respect. Although such a sentiment in the Islamic context contradicts the ummah tradition, the emphasis on religious leadership may have been decisive here and triggered ethnic discrimination within the same religion. However, the ethnic conflict between these two elements went beyond the religious leadership struggle after the First World War, spread to the whole country and continued until the recognition of the Kurdish Regional Government in 2005.

The message on December 10 was signed by Ömerizade Reşid, Ali the Preacher of the Prophet Sheth Mosque (*İmam-ı Nebi Şit*) and Mullah Mehmed and was transmitted directly to the Minister of Interior Talat Pasha.¹²⁵⁰ Imam Ali, who stated his name only as Ali or ‘Ali the Detainee’ (*mevkuf*) in the previous requests of amnesty, was one of leaders of the group that raided Sheikh Said's house in Sâdât's narrative. They stated that if it was impossible to enforce equality through their applications and requests, they were going to allocate the next telegram fees to the oppressed ones in prison instead of sending telegrams for nothing.¹²⁵¹ Telegraphing was a costly service in the conditions of that time. Besides, it must have been even more difficult for the detainees to telegraph frequently to the authorities, as they had no regular income. However, they may have particularly written it to gain the sympathy of the authorities.

Muhittin Düzenli, The Hidden Defect Works from Point of Text Critique in the Context of Ibn Ebi Hatim's İlâl, Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 2010, Issue:29, pp.225-250

¹²⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MÜ.24/6/Lef 19, 27 Teşrinisani 1325- 10 December 1909

¹²⁵¹ BOA, DH.MÜ.24/6/Lef 19, 27 Teşrinisani 1325- 10 December 1909

“İs’af-ı müsted’ayâtımızla icra-i müsavat muhal ise telgraf-ı ahirlerine verilecek akçe ile mahbusda mazluma tayin etmek”

Next day, Ömeri's group wrote that the new Governor responded negatively to the inquiry of the Central Authority about whether these individuals were worth of pardoning.¹²⁵² However, they claimed that the inquiry referred to the local administrative council has not been officially resolved and finalized yet.¹²⁵³ Thus, the situation had to be formally clarified and confirmed through the seal of the council.¹²⁵⁴ Apparently, the Governor gave an arbitrary response before the inquiry forwarded to the local council was concluded. We observe that Ömeri successfully followed the administrative and legal process even during his imprisonment. At this point, questioning the approval of the local council, in particular, can be interpreted as Ömeri's maneuver to get support from his personal connections among the local councilmen.

Ömeri sent his next message to the Palace and Grand Vizirate on December 21 and signed it as "Reşid el-Ömeri on behalf of 150 suspects".¹²⁵⁵ He mentioned that tomorrow everyone was going to be happy with their family until one o'clock.¹²⁵⁶ He particularly demanded that they should not be deprived of this opportunity of happiness in the name of favoring the Kurds.¹²⁵⁷ However, it is not clear whether this message is related to the visiting conditions in prison or the happiness of people outside for a special occasion, such as a feast. In any case, the most important thing to note is that the ethnic emphasis in Ömeri's messages was getting stronger day by day. He clearly claimed that they were deprived of some rights, and they were discriminated in order to please the Kurds.

¹²⁵² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 20, 28 Teşrinisani 1325- 11 December 1909

"Afva şayan olub olmadığımıza dair sebk iden istilam-i meşrutiyetperverilerimize vali-i cedidaksi cevap yazıldığı anlaşılmıştır."

¹²⁵³ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 20, 28 Teşrinisani 1325- 11 December 1909

"Halbuki istilamları meclis-i idareye bil-havale henüz taht-ı karara aldırılmadığından meclisin zat-ı mührüyle te'kiden keyfiyetin istizası müsterhamdır"

¹²⁵⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 20, 28 Teşrinisani 1325- 11 December 1909

¹²⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 22-23, 8 Kanunuevvel 1325- 21 December 1909

"150 Maznun namına Reşid el-Ömeri"

¹²⁵⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 22-23, 8 Kanunuevvel 1325- 21 December 1909

"Yarın bire kadar herkes ehl-ü iyaliyle mesud olacaktır."

¹²⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 22-23, 8 Kanunuevvel 1325- 21 December 1909

"Kürtlere riayete bizim gibi garip mazlumlari böyle günlerde mesud buyurulmadığımız takdirde adalet ve vicdan-ı devletleri kanaati gününe saklayacağımızın li-eclit-tesliye iradesi"

6.3.1. The Reluctant Attitude of Minister of Justice Towards Amnesty

On December 20, the Ministry of Interior reported the situation to the Ministry of Justice, since it was unable to withstand the ongoing applications and pressures of the Mosul Ulema, Sheikhs and notables for amnesty.¹²⁵⁸ The Ministry considered it problematic to accuse only one party in this incident, since both the people of Mosul and the Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah were considered to be collectively involved.¹²⁵⁹ In order to prevent the recurrence of the incidents, the possibility of pardoning them under public law and continuing their trial in terms of personal law might be a possible solution.¹²⁶⁰ Obviously, at this point the Ministry of Interior thought that the criminals should be separated and convicted individually, rather than being convicted of a public incident for all the group. The Minister of Justice, Necmeddin Mullah, stated that the general amnesty was created and declared on the basis of personal reasons and political needs.¹²⁶¹ Since it was an extraordinary legal remedy, even the perpetrators of this incident could have been included in the scope of amnesty for such a reasonable and precise reason.¹²⁶² However, the issue was now referred to the relevant court by the Ministry of Justice and was not at the discretion of local political needs and interests.¹²⁶³ Thus, the issue would be shaped exclusively through the outcome of the investigation and trial.¹²⁶⁴ Minister Necmeddin Mullah added that he could no longer give an opinion, he could not intervene in an ongoing judicial process and left the issue

¹²⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 25, 7 Kanunuevvel 1325 - 20 December 1909

“Musul’da vuku bulan hadise-i malumeden dolayı müttehim olanların afv-ı aliye mazhariyetleri için umum Musul ulema ve meşayih ve eşrafı müracaattan hali kalmadıklarına”

¹²⁵⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 25, 7 Kanunuevvel 1325 - 20 December 1909

“ve bu işte Musul ahalisiyle Süleymaniye Sâdât’ı müşterek bulunduklarına”

¹²⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 25, 7 Kanunuevvel 1325 - 20 December 1909

“tarafeynin afvı aynen fenalığın men-i zuhuruna medar olacağı mülahazasına mebni hukuk-u şahsiye baki kalmak üzere hukuk-u umumiyyeden afvları hakkında”

¹²⁶¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 27, 9 Kanunuevvel 1325- 22 December 1909

“Afv-ı Ali esbab-ı şahsiye ve icabat-ı siyasiyeye mebni vaz’ ve tesis edilmiştir”

¹²⁶² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 27, 9 Kanunuevvel 1325- 22 December 1909

“Fevkalade bir tarik-i kanuni olmasına göre işbu hadise faillerinin dahi böyle bir sebep-i makul ve muhakkakdan dolayı afv-ı aliye mazhariyetleri muvafık-ı hal ve maslahat olabilir ise de...”

¹²⁶³ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 27, 9 Kanunuevvel 1325- 22 December 1909

“husus-udolayı nezaret-i acizane mevcut malumat-ı tahkikatı istintakiyenin bil-ikmal-i keyfiyet beray-ı muhakeme-i aidesine tevdi edildiğine münhasır vealiye icabat-ı siyasiye-i mahalliyeinin takdirine gayri müsaid edildiğinden”

¹²⁶⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 27, 9 Kanunuevvel 1325- 22 December 1909

to the discretion and determination of the state.¹²⁶⁵ The attitude of the Minister of Justice on this issue is important in terms of showing the sensitivity of the Constitutional regime on the judicial independence and the superiority of law. Even if he was the Minister of Justice, he did not intervene in a process that was submitted to the court and kept the independence of the judiciary above regional or political priorities.

Thereafter, the Ministry of Interior informed the Mosul Province that these individuals, who were still under legal proceedings, were not eligible for amnesty since they did not have a material or political reason that would require them to be pardoned.¹²⁶⁶ In addition, the Ministry asked to be notified if there was a strong justification based on real reasons that would require them to be released without prosecution in terms of state and politics.¹²⁶⁷ However, afterwards, Ministry stated that the amnesty of these individuals depends on the finalization of the judgments to be given by the court and demanded that the judicial proceedings be accelerated.¹²⁶⁸ Apparently, the Ministry of Interior which did not receive a positive response from the Ministry of Justice, emphasized the priority of law to the province and sought a solid basis for amnesty. For this reason, it was understood that the Ministry still left the door open as a political maneuver and did not completely remove the possibility of amnesty until the court was concluded. As a result, the Ministry complied with the legal guidelines, entrusted the justification of the amnesty to the Provincial Administration and at one point discarded the responsibility.

¹²⁶⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 27, 9 Kanunuevvel 1325- 22 December 1909

“ol babda nezaret-i acizanem tarafından beyan-ı mütalaaya imkan olamayıpdevletçe icab-ı takdir ve tayin edilmek lazım gelineceği mülâhaza olunmakta ise de ol babda emr-ü ferman hazret-i lehül emrindir.”

¹²⁶⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 26, 16 Kanunuevvel 1325- 29 December 1909

“Eşhas-ı malumenin geçen sene irtikab ettikleri cinayattan dolayı el-yevm haklarında cihet-i adliyece takibat-ı kanuniye icra edilmekte iken bunların mazhar-ı afva olmalarını icab ettirecek ortada bir sebeb-i maddi veya siyasi mevcut olmamasına göre afvımuvafık görülmemiştir”

¹²⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 26, 16 Kanunuevvel 1325- 29 December 1909

“Takibat-ı adliyesiz vareste kalmaları mülken ve siyaseten lüzum gösterecek esbab-ı hakikiye bir lüzum-u kavi var ise inbası lazım gelir.”

¹²⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 28, 30 Kanunuevvel 1325 - 12 January 1910

“Musul vakasından dolayı mevkuf bulunan eşhas hakkında afv-ı ali istihsalhaklarında mahkemede sadır olacak hükümlerin derecat-ı muhakemeden geçerek kesb-i katiyyet etmesine vabeste olduğundan muamelat-ı adliyenin tesriiyle neticesinin inbası”

Reaction from the Reşid el-Ömeri front reached both the Ministry of Interior and the parliament on the same day. The fact that the release of 150 people was linked to the conclusion of the trial or was based on a political justification and the Ministry of Justice did not express a positive opinion on their amnesty caused great sadness in these people.¹²⁶⁹ They warned that the current situation could lead to the general destruction of their homeland, and they asked their repeated demands to be taken into consideration now.¹²⁷⁰ The Ministry of Justice option which was considered as a last resort, was also eliminated and this was a major disappointment for Ömeri. In his next telegram to Grand Vizirate, Ömeri complained that he was tired of applying to the authorities and still could not make his problem heard.¹²⁷¹ Now he begged for God's sake and wanted either a remedy for his problem or a sentence of his execution.¹²⁷² Ömeri seemed to be running out of patience and he has begun to lose his hope, even choosing to be executed rather than imprisoned.

In his other message to Grand Vizirate on January 22, Ömeri re-emphasized the conciliatory and unifying effect of the Constitutionalism on the Ottoman nation.¹²⁷³ However, the unjust conviction of sinless people without showing mercy for their cries, harmed the spirit of Constitutionalism and would fractionize the elements within the Ottoman society.¹²⁷⁴ The emphasis on the Constitutional inclusiveness was a phenomenon that we saw even in Sâdât's messages, and it reflected the spirit of the period in a full sense. All the elements in the Ottoman society referred to the embracing

¹²⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 30-31, 30 Kanunuevvel 1325 - 12 January 1910

"Hükümet-i sabıkanın kusurundan münbais bayram hadisesinden dolayı 150 kişi kadar zükur ve inas malum mevkufinin müsaadeleri bil-muhakeme neticeleneceği ve böyle bir müsaade-i muhtelifenin ancak afvile kal-ü hal ve mevad-ı siyasiyeden bulunduğu gerek makamat aliyyece gerek memleket ve vilayetçe tensib buyurulması ve....adliye nezareti tarafından tervicine mesa' gösterilmemesini müstelzim mağduriyet-i azimemiz bulunmakla beraber..."

¹²⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 30-31, 30 Kanunuevvel 1325 - 12 January 1910

"memleketin harabiyet-i umumiyete badi olacağından"

¹²⁷¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 39, 4 Kanunusani 1325 - 17 January 1910

¹²⁷² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 39, 4 Kanunusani 1325 - 17 January 1910

"Allah aşkına sadırdaki hakkımı vilayet vasıtasıyla bendenizden sorulsun da ol vakit ya derdime derman ya katlime ferman buyurulub memnun olurum"

¹²⁷³ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 38, 9 Kanunusani 1325- 22 January 1910

"Zira Millet-i Osmaniye Meşrutiyetperver sulh iken ondan muntazım daireler küşad olunabilir"

¹²⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 38, 9 Kanunusani 1325- 22 January 1910

"Ancak bizim gibi bigünah maruzanın feryadlarına acınmayub çakerlerinin yandırılmasıyla mahvları ve meşrutiyet ruhu olan tefrik-i anasıra mucib ahvale teessüf azim-i elzemdir."

side of the Constitutionalism when the time came, and they wanted to benefit from the blessings of equality and justice.

However, the trial was still not concluded and Ömeri's messages were still not ended. The fact that he had been sending recent messages only with his own name meant that he either lost the support of other prisoners or communicated with the Central Authority without their knowledge. On February 21, he sent a long message to both the Ministry of Interior and the Grand Vizirate and stated that their requests for amnesty eventually resulted in the opinion to accelerate the trial.¹²⁷⁵ However, Ömeri was very desperate since this was not a success for him and wrote that if the court could not be established yet, their non-convicted detainment would take another 20 years.¹²⁷⁶ He re-stated that their opponents have prevented the Governor from making positive comments regarding the inquiry of their amnesty.¹²⁷⁷ On top of that, he claimed that these opponents have been trying ruin them.¹²⁷⁸ He reminded that even the bandits who destroyed the realm were forgiven, but why were they trying to be destroyed as Pro-Constitutional and obedient people?¹²⁷⁹ He stated that pardoning of both parties was the most appropriate solution in terms of reconciliation, which was the spirit of the Constitutionalism, and in terms of politics, humanity and honor.¹²⁸⁰ According to Ömeri, although they were sure to be acquitted at the end of the trial; he commented that it was not possible to conclude the trial due to the abundance of details

¹²⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"İstirhamatımıza cevaben 28 Kanunusani 1325 dahiliyeden afvımız hakkında vilayetten sorulan mütala tesri-i muhakemeye tevîl olunmaktadır."

¹²⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Muhakeme şimdiye kadar teşkil ettirilemedi ise bile 20 sene de bitmez bu mesele-i mahbusedir"

¹²⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Mu'terizler afvımız için Valiye yazdırmazlar."

¹²⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Bilakis mahvımıza çalışıyorlar. Mezalim tahammülümüze kaldı"

¹²⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Alemleri mahveden eşkıyalar bile affolunuyorlar. Meşrutiyetperver muti olduğumuzdan mahvımıza kadar yürümeye sebep nedir?"

¹²⁸⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Meşrutiyet ruhu olan te'lif-i beyn noktasından siyaseten, mürüvveten, hamiiyetten her iki tarafın afvı billahi maslahaten ensebdir"

and the factionalism of the witnesses.¹²⁸¹ He added that if their case did not result in amnesty, their salvation would be impossible.¹²⁸²

While the public trial was still in progress in March 1910, another request reached the authorities by the prisoners' mothers and wives.¹²⁸³ Hatice and her friends claimed that the Kurds, who were the main motive and encouragement of Sheikh Said's murder, had fled and that their obedient and innocent sons were arrested in their stead.¹²⁸⁴ For this reason, they were completely miserable for a year and even had to sell their beds in order to make a living for their imprisoned men.¹²⁸⁵ Now the only thing they had was their honor and these 14 women requested the amnesty of their sons and husbands from the Ministry of Interior.¹²⁸⁶ The request by Hatice was also reported to the Ministry of Justice and the Governorate of Mosul, and the trial was specifically requested to be accelerated.¹²⁸⁷ In a short time, Brigadier General Muhiddin, the deputy Governor of Mosul, informed that the 'public trial' (*muhakeme-i aleniyye*) was initiated, that the judgement was continued in accordance with the judicial principles and that the prosecutor's office was asked to speed it up.¹²⁸⁸ After the court was concluded in July 1910, the results of the trial was going to be declared to these women by the Mosul Governorate.¹²⁸⁹

¹²⁸¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Muhakemede beratımız muhakkak ise de teferruatının çokluğundan şuhudun tefrikasından muhakemece hitamı mümkün olamayacağından afvımızın iradesini re'sen istihsal"

¹²⁸² BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325- 21 February 1910

"Mükerreren istirham ettiğimiz müracaatımızca meselemiz afv ile neticelenmez ise halas muhalattandır"

¹²⁸³ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1326- 20 March 1910

14 women such as Hadice, Meryem, Cemile, Adile, Azime...

¹²⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1326- 20 March 1910

"Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Said vukuatının asıl müsebbib ve muharriki olan, kanuna itaat etmeyip firarda bulunan Ekradı tevkifden bil-istisna bilhassa muti' olan evladlarımız garib olduklarından"

¹²⁸⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1326- 20 March 1910

"bir seneden beri mazlumen tevkiflerinden büsbütün perişan olduk. Yataklarımıza varıncaya kadar satıp maaşlarını verdik"

¹²⁸⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1326- 20 March 1910

"Yalnız namusumuz kaldı"

¹²⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 1, 13 Mart 1326- 26 March 1910

¹²⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 3, 16 Mart 1326- 29 March 1910

¹²⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 4, 14 Temmuz 1326- 27 July 1910

6.3.2 Sâdât's Determination to Secure Convictions

Sâdât, who was aware of these amnesty requests during the trial process, particularly insisted on securing the convictions until the last moment. As the trial came to an end, Sulaymaniyah Sâdât sent a second signed and sealed manifest to the Sheikh-ul-Islam on June 12, 1910.¹²⁹⁰ They explained how the administration in the Iraqi geography deteriorated day by day, to what extent the political degeneration reached, and how the scope of the conspiracy established against them expanded.¹²⁹¹ The ignorance that prevailed in the region during the despotic regime has devastated all patriots, this notion was also inherited by Post-Constitutional cadres, and the pursuit of personal interests by civilian administrations increased the factionalism in the region.¹²⁹² According to the manifest, as the verdict of the case was delayed, opponents of Sâdât managed the cover up their major crimes and renew their oppression, lawlessness and slander by involving the new Sub-Governor Rüşdi and Chief of Penal Chamber Ahmed Ref'et into their alliance.¹²⁹³ They had included Deputy Mayor Abdurrahman Aga and his companions to these serious accusations and claimed that their confidential correspondence with Hamawands had been exposed while he was in the Directorate of Correspondence (*Tahrirat Müdiriyeti*) and the Deputation of Sub-Governorate (*Mutasarrıflık Vekaleti*).¹²⁹⁴ According to them, the Local Government, which had no

¹²⁹⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

¹²⁹¹ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

"Hıttâ-i Irak denildiği zaman mahiyette gayet ali terakkîyat ve tekamülü tecessüm eder. Irakımızın yar ve ağyara gıpta-aver olan medeniyet ve ma'muriyetine bedel sekene cehl-i mülkde harabiyet gibi ahval -i esef ihtimali gören erbab-ı basiretesbab-ı mucibeyi taharri ile işgal edince idare-i umur edenlerin adl ve müsavaat dairesinde umuru tedvir etmedikleri ve gaiyye-i efkar ve teşebbüsleri sırf kendi menafi -i mahsusaları nokta-i nazarına ma'tuf ettiği zihine tebadür ider."

¹²⁹² BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

"Bu halde muhabbet-i vataniye ve milliyesi olan her bir erbab-ı vicdan kaser olan idare-i müstebide-i sabıkanın siyaki yüzünden artık buraları bütün bütüne istila eden cehlin beyn-ülmüzmin bir hal kesb eden na'ra-i şer ve nifakın inkılab-ı ahir-i mesudumuz siyasiyeyle zevalpezir olması me'mul etti.idareyi ele alanlar gene menaf-i mahsusalarına devam-ı memuriyetlerini temin için beyn-ül.....ilka-i münafaret ve mazarrat ettiklerinden seyyiat-ı sabıka olanca kuvvetiyleolarak teessürat-ı muzırrası herkesi dilhun eylemiştir"

¹²⁹³ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

"Bu kadar mesaib vecan harabıyla dilhun ve hükümetin adalet muntazırına müfsidin merkulmarın fitraten müsaid şer ve nifak oldukları cihetle Ceza Reisi Ahmed Ref'et ve liva mutasarrıfı Rüşdi Beyleri işgal-i daire-i ittifaklarına alıp onların muavenet ve müzaheretleriyle seyyiat-ı mühimme vakalarını setrsabıkayı tekrar ve tecdide sa'y ederek etraf ve taallukat ve akrabalarımıza ceraim icad ve tertib ve envai ilkaat, müfsid-i tekraraneye tevessül ile dahilen ve haricen ihlal-i asayiş eylemekde bulundukları meydandadır."

¹²⁹⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

preventive effect against the realization of the disaster that happened to them, on the contrary, was its accomplice and promoter.¹²⁹⁵ They remarked that, despite the documents revealing the financial preparation of the disaster and numerous witnesses, these conspirators were still not subject to criminal proceedings.¹²⁹⁶ Naturally this uncertainty encouraged their opponents, increased their activities violating the public order and endangered the lives of Sâdât.¹²⁹⁷ At the end of the message, they again emphasized that if justice is not served, they will migrate elsewhere with their entire formation consisting of 10 thousand households.¹²⁹⁸

In another message at the end of June, Maruf stated that as justice was delayed, the persecution on them increased and their patience inherited from their ancestors was now exhausted.¹²⁹⁹ According to Maruf, their opponents were still supported by the Local Administration, were persistent on removing Sâdât from Sulaymaniyah and would continue until there was no single member left.¹³⁰⁰ Finally, he warned that if the besmirched reputation of Sheikh Mahmud was not cleared and the perpetrators of the Mosul Incident were not convicted, they would leave their homeland in tears.¹³⁰¹

“ve Belediye Reisi Vekili Abdurrahman Ağayla rüfekaş liva Tahrirat Müdiriyetinde , Mutasarrıflık Vekaletinde bulunduğu sırada Hemvendlilerle gizli muhabere evrakları derdest ve el-yevm Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi Heyet-i Tahkikiyeside mevcut”

¹²⁹⁵ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

“Başımıza gelen mesaib-ive felaket eylemesinde hüsn-i tesirinden mahrum olan hükümet-i mahalliyeye müfsidin..... müttelik ve mürevviç-i efkarıdır.”

¹²⁹⁶ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

“Musul feciasını ilka’ için 1500 Lira para sarf ederek bizzat ve bil vasıta müdahaleleri Musul muhakemesindeki evrak-ı meşîyyet ve şuhud-u müteaddide ile müsbet iken şimdiye kadar haklarında takibat-ı kanuniye icra edilmemesinden cesaretlenerek efkârı gayrimizcen ve asayiş-şikenanelerinde gittikçe ibraz-ı faaliyet ediyorlar”

¹²⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

¹²⁹⁸ BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910

“mürtekeb oldukları ceraim ve kabahin cezay-yıtertib ve ...adaletin icrası ve olmadığı halde on bin haneyi teşkil eden bilumum Sâdât ve taaluâtı vatanımızı göz yaşları dökerek vedaya mecbur olduğumuzu arz”

¹²⁹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT.110/11/Lef 2, 17 Haziran 1326- 30 June 1910

“Ecdadından mevrus musaibe tahammül, hakkımızdaki mezalime karşı hükümet-i meşrutanın adaletine intizar iken Sâdâtımızdan maada , takat-ı beşer fevkinde olan yar-ı zulm gittikçe tezayid tezauf eylediğinden artık bizim de düş-u tahammülümüz mütekessir oldu.”

¹³⁰⁰ BOA, DH.MKT.110/11/Lef 2, 17 Haziran 1326- 30 June 1910

“Yezidden daha anud daha hunhar husemamız bakiyye-iolan hanedanımızdan kimseyi bırakmamak fikriyle halen ifa-yı mefsedet etmekte , hükümet-i mahalliyeden müzaharet görmektedir.”

¹³⁰¹ BOA, DH.MKT.110/11/Lef 2, 17 Haziran 1326- 30 June 1910

“Şimdiye kadar hiçbir eser-i adalet göremediğimizden vadi-i yeisle bulunan bilumum Sâdât, ekser-i kariben; bi gayri hakkın Şeyh Mahmud daileri şanuna sürülen leke, nazar-ı afv ve atıfetle izale

Before they had to make a painful decision like immigration from their homeland, they demanded justice with a final and fierce hope.¹³⁰² Sâdât's determination and persistence to secure the convictions continued until the trial was concluded.

6.4. Convictions

Although the convictions eventually relieved the Sâdât bloc, they caused even greater sadness on the Mosuli Ulema and caused objections from Mosuli notables, merchants and shopkeepers. These prominent representatives of the people of Mosul backed the convicts until the last moment and evaluated the safety of the investigation and the reliability of the verdicts as doubtful. This was the third bloc mentioned in the introduction part of the study and whose involvement in the Mosul Incident changed the whole equation considerably. It was sprouted during the involvement of the Arab Ulema in the Mosul Incident, was flourished during pre-trial detentions, and was fully consolidated and manifested itself after the verdicts. The people of Mosul literally turned into a single front against Sâdât, consolidated all the means at their disposal and put pressure both on the Chamber of Deputies and the Sublime Porte through the Mosuli deputies.

The trial which lasted for almost 5 months, started on February 28, 1910 and ended on July 14, 1910.¹³⁰³ According to the telegram sent by Deputy Governor Brigadier General Tefvik on 17 July, the sentences given to the suspects at the end of the trial were as follows¹³⁰⁴:

buyurulmaz, mezalim-i vakıanın Musul'da Süleymaniye'deki fail müsebbibleri pençe-i adaletle çarptırılmazsa göz yaşları dökerek vatani veda mecburiyetindedir”

¹³⁰² BOA, DH.MKT.110/11/Lef 2, 17 Haziran 1326- 30 June 1910

¹³⁰³ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 5, 4 Temmuz 1326 - 17 July 1910

“Musul Hadisesi muhakemesine 15 Şubat 1325’de başlanılarak 1 Temmuz 1326 tarihine kadar icra kılınan muhakemat neticesinde eşhas-ı müttahme ve maznuneden yüz elli üçünün beraatına ve seksen dördünün cinayet ve elli dördünün cünha derecesinde mücrimiyetlerine, on birine idam ve birine on beş sene, sekizine beşer, beşine dörder ve dördüne üçer buçuk ve elli beşine üçer sene kürek ve cünha erbabının on dördüne üçer sene ve on altısına altışar, yirmi üçüne üçer ve birine bir mah hapis cezası hüküm verilip dünkü gün resmi tefhimi icra olunduğu İstinaf Müdde-i Umumiliği ifadesiyle maruzdur”

¹³⁰⁴ BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 5, 4 Temmuz 1326 - 17 July 1910

Due to the need for oarsmen in the Ottoman navy in the 16th century, penal servitude in the galleys (called *kürek*, i.e oar) became a very common punishment. However, with the decline of naval

	Conviction	Number of Convicts
	Acquitment	153
84 Convictions Felony (Murder)	Death Sentence	11
	15 Years Imprisonment	1
	5 Years Imprisonment	8
	4 Years Imprisonment	5
	3,5 Years Imprisonment	4
	3 Years Kürek Penalty*	55
54 Convictions Misdemeanor	3 Years Imprisonment	14
	6 Months Imprisonment	16
	3 Months Imprisonment	23
	1 Month Imprisonment	1

Table 5: Convictions given in the Mosul Incident trial

In total, we see that 291 people were judged during the trial, 153 of them were acquitted of the charges, 84 of them were sentenced for major crimes (*cinayet*) and 54 for minor crimes (*cünha*). Especially obtaining the names of those who have been sentenced to death and heavy imprisonment would make a great contribution to this study. However, in the Ottoman state archive documents, there is no record of who received which penalties.

6.4.1. Post-Conviction Amnesty Requests by Mosuli Merchants, Shopkeepers and Ulema

The trial was over, but the requests for amnesty of the convicts were not yet over. Almost 300 Mosul craftsmen, shopkeepers and merchants (*Esnaf-ı Ahali*) written and sealed a statement, and sent to the Mosul deputies in the Chamber of Deputies on 31

warfare in the later period, prisoners of galleys were either held in land prisons like other prisoners or used as hard labor in ships and shipyards. This penalty of galley given in the Mosul Incident can be thought to be a different type of imprisonment or hard labor.

Rudolph Peters, *Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century. Themes in Islamic Law*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p.99
Sevan Öztürk, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Ceza Sisteminde Dönüşüm: Zindandan Hapishaneye Geçiş*, Master's Thesis Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, 2014, p.76,77

July and to the Mosul Governorate on 1 August.¹³⁰⁵ These Mosul residents stated that the unity and brotherhood between the Arab, Turkish and Kurdish elements in the provincial center, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah Sanjaks were shaken after the Feast Incident.¹³⁰⁶ Even if many prisoners were acquitted and released as a result of the trial; according to them, the situation of those convicted was also doubtful.¹³⁰⁷ Because the petitioners believed that some prisoners accused each other just to save themselves, and that the primary investigation, which was the trial was originated, was carried out by incompetent persons irregularly.¹³⁰⁸ They did not believe that the trial was conducted in a healthy manner due to such faults, suspicions and personal hatred; and they stated that these convictions caused great sorrow to the people of all three elements.¹³⁰⁹ According to them, there was no absolute reason for this Mosul incident other than the act of God.¹³¹⁰ And these convictions only fueled hatred and enmity between the three elements living in each corner of the province in an intertwined fashion.¹³¹¹ Ensuring the peace and security of these people depended on the rebuilding of this unity and brotherhood, and according to them, the only condition for this was the amnesty of the prisoners.¹³¹²

¹³⁰⁵ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

¹³⁰⁶ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

“Merkez vilayet ile mülhak Kerkük ve Süleymaniye sancaklarını teşkil eden Urba ve Türk ve Kürd unsurları arasına min-el kadim mevcut ve hiçbir zaman haleb-pezir olmayan ittihad ve muvahat-ı esasi bu üç unsur mensub eşhası meyanesinde vaki olan Bayram Vakasının teessürleri bit-tabi lerzenak olmuş idi.”

¹³⁰⁷ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

¹³⁰⁸ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

¹³⁰⁹ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

“Bu vakanın muhakemesi neticesinde birçok maznunların beraatları tahakkuk ve tahliyeleri icra kılınmış ise de diğerlerinin müdaafaten yekdiğere isnad-ı cürm etmeleri ve muhakemenin me’haz ve esası olan tahkikat-ı ibtidaiyye evvelce dahi makamata arz olunduğu üzere zimam-daran-ı idaratda tesir ve nüfuzlarından ve şevaiib, ağraz ve tezvirden salim kalmaması esbabıyla takrir eden, mahkumiyetleri her üç unsurun bütün efradına azim bir teessür ve meyyusiyet iras etmiştir.”

¹³¹⁰ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

¹³¹¹ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

¹³¹² DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326- 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326- 01 August 1910

“Vukuu için mukadderat-ı ileyhadan maada sebeb-i hakiki katiyyen olmayan bu vakadan dolayı hasb-el beşeriye anasır-ı mezkureye vaktiyle ilka ve bu mahkumiyetin tecdid eylediği, buğz ve adavetin bütün bütün izalesi mahkumların affından maada bir suret ile kabil olmayacağı vilayetin her bir köşesinde muhtelit ve karışık bir surette yaşayan anasır-ı mezkurenin efradı sıyanesinde istirahat-ı umumiyyeyi temine kafil olan rabita-ı ittihad ve uhuvvetin tecdidi vücubu vareste-i ifa olduğuna binaen mahkumların da afvlarına dair icab eden makamata işar-ı keyfiyet buyurulmasıyla mağduriyetten istihlasları umum namına müsterhamdır”

Mosul Deputies Mehmed Ali Fazıl and Davud Yusefani took this statement into consideration and immediately contacted the Ministry of Interior.¹³¹³ The deputies were worried by the allegations that personal hatred was involved in the primary investigation of the Mosul Incident and that the innocent people were convicted for this reason.¹³¹⁴ However, they particularly noted that the issue was outside of their jurisdiction and their responsibility was limited to raising this issue related to executive power to the Ministry.¹³¹⁵

There were other messages advocating the convicts of the Mosul Incident and based on the collaboration of Mosul residents from different categories. A group consisting of an average of 20 Ulema and merchants and such as Nakib Kaimakam Abdülğani and Şiarzade Mehmed was one of them.¹³¹⁶ They claimed that some of their fellow townsmen were victimized in court with insufficient evidence and some persuasive statements.¹³¹⁷ According to them, amnesty was absolutely necessary to prevent greater turmoil between the Kurdish and Arab elements throughout the province and to maintain their unity and brotherhood.¹³¹⁸ Although many criminals have been pardoned in terms of maintaining peace, it was very upsetting that Mosul residents' wishes were not accepted.¹³¹⁹ In another message by Şiarzade Mehmed and Devecizade Osman from Ulema, it was claimed that the convictions were based on personal hatred and that the imprisonments should not continue.¹³²⁰

¹³¹³ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 10, 31 Temmuz 1326- 13 August 1910

¹³¹⁴ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 10, 31 Temmuz 1326- 13 August 1910

“Vaktiyle Musul’da vuku bulan Bayram hadise-i malumesinin tahkikat-ı evveliyesinde bir takım ağraz sarf edildiğinden neticesinde bazı bi-günahilerin mahkum edilmiş oldukları ahalice mütevatir olmakla”

¹³¹⁵ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 10, 31 Temmuz 1326- 13 August 1910

“husus-u mezkur bir guna vazife-i acizanemize taalluk etmeyip kuvve-i icraiye ait bulunmuş olduğu hasebiyle”

¹³¹⁶ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 8, 14 Ağustos 1326 - 27 August 1910

¹³¹⁷ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 8, 14 Ağustos 1326 - 27 August 1910

“Bayram vakasından dolayı bir takım hemşehrilerimiz delail-i hafif ve ifadat-ı mukni’ üzerine muhakemede mağdur edildiğinden”

¹³¹⁸ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 8, 14 Ağustos 1326 - 27 August 1910

“vilayetin her bir köşesinde suret-i muhtelitde yaşamakta olan Kürd ile Arab unsurları arasında şuriş.....mahviyla itihad-ı.....ve idamesi için her iki cihet-i.....afları biddefaat istirham olunmuş ve”

¹³¹⁹ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 8, 14 Ağustos 1326 - 27 August 1910

“istirahat-ı umumiyeinin temini nokta-i nazarından bir çok mücrimlerin afvlarına müsaade buyurulmuş iken istirhamımızın adem-i is’afı bais-i meyussiyet-i umumiye olmakla”

¹³²⁰ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 5, 25 Eylül 1326- 08 October 1910

In the messages sent to Istanbul from the Sâdât front after the delivered convictions, there was satisfaction and consolation from justice. The telegram Hıdırzade Mahmud sent to senate member Sheikh Abdülkadir was one of them and heralded the end of the grievance felt since the Mosul Disaster.¹³²¹ After so much sorrow and patience, they were finally able to find solace in the manifestation of justice.¹³²² In addition, Mahmud stated that although there were those who nurture grudge and try to abolish the Sayyid institution, there were also Constitutional justice which eliminates such mischievous goals.¹³²³ Obviously, Sâdât bloc seemed quite pleased with the result since the perpetrators were convicted and justice was served in the end. The fact that no objections by Sâdât on the aftermath of the trial were observed in the archive records was a proof of this.

Both the Ulema and merchants of Mosul were truly clear about their objections and did not seem to believe in the justice of the convictions. The common reference they stated was that the restoration of harmony, order and peace in Mosul were completely dependent on this amnesty. According to Deputy Governor Mirliya Tevfik, the decision of amnesty would provoke the factions that had waited for the outcome of the trial and remained silent until now.¹³²⁴ Perhaps the perpetrators freed after amnesty would join religious orders and take an active role.¹³²⁵ It is not known whether the requests for amnesty after convictions have had a retrospective impact on the judicial decisions. In any case, an amnesty decision to be given after such a devastating and sensitive incident was based on many different dynamics and one step ahead was

“İki unsur beyninde vukuundan mütehaddis mukateleden dolayı mahkumiyetlerinin istilzam ettiği esbabı delaletin gazezolmasından bahisle afvları istida kılınan eşhasın devam-ı mahpusiyetleri bütün mağduriyet ve mazlumiyetleri bais olacağı”

¹³²¹ DH.MUİ.128/21/Lef 2, 15 Ağustos 1326 - 28 August 1910

“Hiçbir akvam ve.....vukuu gayri mesbuk Musul vaka-i feciasından mütehassıl mağduriyet-i felaket.....nihayet veriliyor”

¹³²² DH.MUİ.128/21/Lef 2, 15 Ağustos 1326 - 28 August 1910

“Sabr-ı teşmilgüzar ahvalin muztaribeye ihkak-ı hakk izhar-ı adaletle teselli bulabiliyoruz.”

¹³²³ DH.MUİ.128/21/Lef 2, 15 Ağustos 1326 - 28 August 1910

“Erbabı ağraz nasıl Siyadete adavet beslemekte ve müntehi olmaklığımıza çalışmakta iseler de hükümeti meşrutanın temini buyurduğu adalet bu misüllü makasid-ı faside hatime vermiş olduğundan”

¹³²⁴ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 9, 24 Ağustos 1326- 06 September 1910

“bunların afvlarıyla şimdiye kadar akıbetine muntazırın sükun etmekde bulunan hizb-ü ahirin sadayı şikayetle....bais olacağı”

¹³²⁵ DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 9, 24 Ağustos 1326- 06 September 1910

“ve belki de bu fitneyi ika edenlerden ahz-ı tarik dahi takib edileceği varid-i hatır bulunduğundan”

uncertain. Such a paradoxical amnesty could have had traumatic consequences like heroizing or emboldening the perpetrators or driving Sâdât completely out of control. Eventually, it is understood from the archive records that neither the chief instigator Ömeri nor the Mosul Ulema and the notables' requests for amnesty yielded positive results. However, it is also a fact that the detainments and convictions of the Mosul Incident connected Mosul's religious, commercial, and public classes each other like never before.

CHAPTER 7: ARAB-KURDISH DISPUTE AND CONCLUSION

7.1. The Origins of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute in the Context of the Mosul Incident

Although there are not many sources in the literature on the pre-modern history of the Arab-Kurdish conflict, instead it has found a solid ground in the literatures of Modern Iraqi and Syrian History.¹³²⁶ Considering that these two countries have gone through similar nation-state building processes and have had their share of Ba'athist regimes, it can be very stimulating to examine the situations of minorities in these two countries and their interactions with the central authorities. However, the most important thing at this point in our study is to analyze whether there was any ancient dispute between the Arab-Kurdish peoples long before the Mosul Incident, and if so, to analyze the possible impact of this dispute on the incident. Although it is not called a dispute, it is referred in different sources that in the territories they co-existed, Arabs had a dislike for Kurds and Kurds had a dislike for Arabs.

In his memoirs *Two Years in Kurdistan*, British-Indian Officer William Rupert Hay shares remarkable interpretations on the dislike between Arabs and Kurds. In addition, these insulting and humiliating expressions also offer valuable clues about how British Imperialism viewed and looked down on the people of the region:

“As may be imagined, the Kurds and Arabs have a considerable dislike for each other. The Arab is of an essentially volatile disposition, alternately energetic and lazy, inconsistent and unreliable by nature, but generally extremely cheerful and loquacious, with an immense sense of humour. As regards ideas of cleanliness or morality he is but little removed from the animals. The slow-going, industrious, and respectable Kurd regards him as a being of a lower order, a garrulous ape, or a dirty and shameless “sansculotte,” who is always trying to intrude his presence where he is not wanted. This only refers to the ordinary tribesman. An Arab chief is treated with the greatest respect on account of his ancient descent, and Shaikh Hanash of the Tai, a young man of no ability or importance, will be offered a seat above the biggest Dizai chiefs. Nearly every Kurdish agha boasts of Arab descent, and endeavours to connect himself with the Prophet or one of his early adherents. The Arab regards the Kurd as

¹³²⁶ Michael Rear's *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State* (New York: Routledge, 2008) and Harriet Allsopp's *The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East* (New York: I.B Tauris, 2014) can be referred as remarkable studies that shed light on the dialogue between Arabs and Kurds, especially in the nation-state building processes.

an incubus which weighs upon him and restricts his liberty of action. He has a proverb which runs-

*Thalatha bad-dunya fasad
Al Kurdi al jurdi wa al jarrad.*

*There are three plagues in the world,
The Kurd, the rat, and the locust”¹³²⁷*

The following statements are remarkable examples of how the British Orientalist perspective exalts and praises the Kurds compared to the Arabs, as in Gertrude Bell or Ely Bannister Soane:

“Only a few settled down and endeavored to build villages and cultivate like Kurds. But the Arabs are lazy and indolent by nature; their only wish is to make just enough to enable themselves to live in a moderate degree of comfort, and they entirely lack the Kurd’s persistent avarice and desire to accumulate wealth.”¹³²⁸

In addition to this statement emphasizing the economic ambition and entrepreneurship of the Kurds, the following statement emphasizing the class superiority of the Kurds over the Arabs is also noteworthy:

“The Kurd is a convinced aristocrat, whereas the Arabs waver between democracy and anarchy.”¹³²⁹

The expression of *“the Kurd’s dislike of the Arab is that of the patrician for the plebeian”* in the study of photographer Susan Meiselas also supports the Hay’s approach in which Kurds consider themselves superior to Arabs.¹³³⁰ Paul J. Rich, on the other hand, refers to the analogy comparing the dislike of the Kurds for Iraqis to that of the 18th-century Scottish Highlanders for the English.¹³³¹ Rich also notes that the Kurds have cherished an identity that predates Islam for many centuries, have had a rich folklore and music, and have always fought efforts to “Arabize” their culture.¹³³² The Kurds, who demonstrated a fierce resistance to the Arab-Muslim invasions,

¹³²⁷ William Rupert Hay, *Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918-1920*, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1921), p.92,93

¹³²⁸ Hay, *Ibid*, p.92

¹³²⁹ Hay, *Ibid*, p.93

¹³³⁰ Susan Meiselas, *Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History*, (New York: Random House, 1997)p.59

¹³³¹ Paul J. Rich, *Iraq and Rupert Hay’s Two Years in Kurdistan*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008),p.xvii

¹³³² Rich, *Ibid*...p.xvi

eventually converted to Islam without becoming Arabized.¹³³³ During this resistance which lasted for about a century, Kurdish tribes resisted Arab tribes for social reasons rather than religious ones.¹³³⁴ All methods, including matrimonial strategy, were used to coax and convert the Kurds to Islam.¹³³⁵

In addition to looking at the anciencey of the Arab-Kurdish dispute, zooming in Mosul's demographic and socioeconomic structure can help us understand the ethnocentric motives of the Mosul Incident. Its location as a frontier city, its historical mission as a Sunni Orthodox defender against the Shiite Safavids, and its demographic structure based on a mosaic of ethnic and sectarian communities, have been decisive in the later transformation of Mosul into a prominent center for Arab Nationalism.¹³³⁶ The north and east of the Mosul Province were largely inhabited by Kurds and rarely Assyrians and Shabaks, the west was inhabited by Yezidis, and the settlements around the Baghdad road were predominantly inhabited by Turkmen.¹³³⁷ Moreover, with its thriving trade and economy towards the end of the Ottoman period, Mosul had also turned into an important commercial town.¹³³⁸ Thus, the city itself as the provincial center, was dominated by Sunni Arabs, who played a leading role in Iraq's political and economic life, partly due to Ottoman support and partly due to their connections with Arab mercantile networks within the Levant.¹³³⁹ With a strong character of Sunni sectarianism and Arab ethnocentrism, this community was increasingly associated with Arab nationalism and reasserted that engagement when its interests were threatened.¹³⁴⁰ In the context of Mosul, Arab Nationalism became an instrument by which urban elites reasserted their dominance vis-a-vis ethnic and sectarian minorities, mostly the Kurds.¹³⁴¹ After the Young Turk revolution which widened the spectrum of reforms, the Sunni Arab elites who thought that their power was being challenged,

¹³³³ Kendal Nezan, *A brief survey of The History of the Kurds*, Fondation-Institut kurde de Paris https://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php Access Date: 07.08.2021

¹³³⁴ Nezan, *Ibid*...

¹³³⁵ Nezan, *Ibid*...

¹³³⁶ Killian Redden, *In the Shade of the Khilafa: The Rise of Jihadism in Mosul*, [Kuwait Program at Sciences Po Student Paper Award] Course 'Islam and Politics in a Changing Middle East' taught by Professor Stéphane Lacroix, Spring 2018, p.2

¹³³⁷ Redden, *Ibid*, p.2,3

¹³³⁸ Redden, *Ibid*, p.3

¹³³⁹ Redden, *Ibid*, p.3

¹³⁴⁰ Redden, *Ibid*, p.3

¹³⁴¹ Redden, *Ibid*, p.3

apparently organized a demonstration along ethnic sentiments and then this demonstration was turned into a massacre.¹³⁴²

Elie Kedouri attributes the Mosul Incident to the irritation created by the Young Turks on Mosul Muslims and the resistance of Muslim supremacy against Constitutional prospects such as liberty, fraternity, and Parliament.¹³⁴³ According to Kedouri, the emissaries sent by the CUP to indoctrinate Constitutionalism in Mosul showed disrespect for the *Sultan*, implied contempt for the *Caliph*, triggered the open opposition of the Ulema and eventually created a "*disturbed state of public feeling*" in the city.¹³⁴⁴ While Kedourie highlights that the riot was engaged against the post-constitutional authorities, he also does not disregard the ethnic argument.¹³⁴⁵ He expresses anti-Kurdish motives and sentiments behind the Mosul Incident as follows:

*"This 'disturbed state of public feeling' shortly afterwards found vent in a formidable riot in which some seventy people perished. The riot was clearly the outcome of the widespread disaffection towards the authorities which the **coup d'état** created. Its victims were Kurds and, what is more serious from the government's point of view, largely men who wore the sultan's uniform. The Kurds predominated in the **vilayet** of Mosul and were disliked by the predominantly Arab population of the city of Mosul."*¹³⁴⁶

Beyond this ancient dispute between Kurds and Arabs, it would be extremely useful to refer to Hakan Özoğlu's unique and remarkable work, analyzing the Nationalist roles of Kurdish and Arab Notables and comparing two Nationalisms each other. Discussing the role of local notables in Kurdish and Arab Nationalisms can help us to understand what ethnic sentiments and arguments might have been utilized as early as 1909, when nationalism was not even mentioned. Because, considering that Arab Nationalism sprouted during, and Kurdish Nationalism right after the First World War, it can be thought that some unnamed proto-nationalist sentiments or motives were inventive and decisive in the Mosul Incident. However, this is still an argumentative approach, as it is not known for certain whether the incident had any inter-tribal motivation.

¹³⁴² Redden, *Ibid*, p.3

¹³⁴³ Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1974), p.142

¹³⁴⁴ Kedourie, *Ibid*, p.142

¹³⁴⁵ Kedourie, *Ibid*, p.142

¹³⁴⁶ Kedourie, *Ibid*, p.142,143

Analyzing the Kurdish Notables through Hourani's Paradigm of Notables, Hakan Özoğlu brings slight modifications to this model by stating that there was no separate class of local military leaders in the Kurdish Provinces as in the Arab Provinces.¹³⁴⁷ Özoğlu argues that the leadership of the local forces was undertaken by the religious leaders and secular traditional notables in Kurdish Provinces.¹³⁴⁸ He also adds that although some forces were appointed from the center to the Governor's command, the local military forces mainly consisted of Kurdish tribesmen, outnumbered the forces under the governor's command.¹³⁴⁹ Another modification Özoğlu brings to Hourani's model is related to the categorization of Ulema.¹³⁵⁰ He states that the Ulema in the Kurdish Provinces are almost entirely Sufis, in contrast to the Hourani's categorization of Madrasa-educated religious functionaries.¹³⁵¹ Özoğlu also underlines that in some cases the distinction between traditional notables and Sufis was not very clear, and that the notable which functions as an intermediary between the state and the people, does not always come from an urban background.¹³⁵² In this respect, another important finding of Özoğlu is that although the majority of Kurdish notables engaged in nationalist activities were located in urban centers, their origins and power bases were rural.¹³⁵³

According to Özoğlu, nationalism played an inventive and decisive role in the crystallization of Arab notables' dissatisfaction with the central government.¹³⁵⁴ On the solid foundation empowered by their personal charisma and ability to mobilize large groups, these notables had a voice in the emergence of Arab Nationalism.¹³⁵⁵ In fact, the study aptly demonstrates that this situation is not unique to Arab nationalism and that Kurdish nationalism is also nourished by a similar system of common values.¹³⁵⁶ However, Özoğlu argues that, despite their inventive and decisive roles in the

¹³⁴⁷ Hakan Özoğlu, "'Nationalism' and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman–Early Republican Era." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2001, pp. 383–409
 JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/259457 Access Date: 06.08.2021

¹³⁴⁸ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.384

¹³⁴⁹ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.384

¹³⁵⁰ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.384,385

¹³⁵¹ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.385

¹³⁵² Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.385

¹³⁵³ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.385

¹³⁵⁴ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.386

¹³⁵⁵ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.386

¹³⁵⁶ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.386

appearance of Kurdish Nationalism, Kurdish notables did not form a harmonious group, Kurdish nationalism was fractured by long-term disputes between these notable families and limited by the Islamic concerns of the Naqshbandi Sheikhs.¹³⁵⁷ The Kurds, whose leaders were of tribal and Sufi origin and who were members of the Ottoman elite, would be the last group to claim nationalism among the Ottoman elements.¹³⁵⁸ Because they were not inclined to have clear distinctions and a national consciousness in the ideological sense like Christian subjects of the empire.¹³⁵⁹ According to Özoğlu, Kurdish Nationalism utilized pre-existing loyalties to mobilize the Kurdish people, rather than demanding the termination of these loyalties for the sake of a national unity.¹³⁶⁰ However, the cost of maintaining these loyalties sprouted on tribal and sectarian networks was high and made Kurdish nationalism vulnerable to pre-existing rivalries.¹³⁶¹

Özoğlu also lists the reasons why Kurdish Nationalism was belated compared to Arab Nationalism, despite going through similar cultural renaissance processes.¹³⁶² The first reason was that the Kurdish leaders, who were involved the Ottoman bureaucracy still had hopes of reviving the Ottoman state until the end of the First World War.¹³⁶³ The other reason was that while most of the Arab leaders resided in Arab lands, some prominent Kurdish leaders who were born and raised outside of their homeland had limited access to the Kurdish lands and population.¹³⁶⁴ The last reason was that Kurdish nationalism, unlike Arab Nationalism, did not receive much foreign support.¹³⁶⁵

In the context of Mosul Incident, it can be thought that the Arab-Kurdish Dispute took place on three grounds: Military, Religious and Judicial. The military phase of the dispute surfaced within the army over the notions of ethnicity and locality to which the soldiers belonged. The ancient mistrust and dislike of the soldiers of these two

¹³⁵⁷ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.403

¹³⁵⁸ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.403

¹³⁵⁹ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.404

¹³⁶⁰ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.404

¹³⁶¹ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.404

¹³⁶² Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.404

¹³⁶³ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.404

¹³⁶⁴ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.405

¹³⁶⁵ Özoğlu, *Ibid...* p.405

ethnicities and regions towards each other, the wrong tactics of the local commanders in the armed conflict, and their strategic failure to manage the crisis further deepened this division. Furthermore, the state's unreliability on the Kurdish and Arab Forces may have fueled the distrust of these two elements against each other as well. The state authority may have made a big strategic mistake by revealing its unreliability towards different ethnic groups within its own military, and these groups may have developed a reflex against each other as inconsistency breeds insecurity. The fact that the Quick Reaction Force to respond to the Kurdish-origin Kirkuk Mule Cavalry who were sheltered in the stables after the harassment incident was the Arab-origin Mosul Cavalry, fueled the conflicts in the first place. Despite serving in the same army and having official identities and authorities, the soldiers of these two ethnic elements came across to each other in a public order incident. Furthermore, the possibility of Arab civilians taking up arms and participating in the armed conflict on the side of the Mosuli Cavalry can be interpreted as a serious negligence and lack of foresight in terms of chain of command. No details were found in the archival documents as to whether these Arab and Kurdish soldiers had any tribal affiliation or whether the conflict between the two groups was a tribal rather than ethnic one. However, I believe that a clearer answer to this question can be given by conducting a further research on the sources of different countries, such as consular archives.

As a second ground, the dispute was flourished between the Kurdish Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah and the Arab Ulema of Mosul over the notion of religious leadership. Although he initiated an Islamic formation in the context of politics, it was occasionally felt in the correspondences that Ömeri neglected the discourse of Panislamism [or Ummahism], glorified Arabism and opposed the Kurdism. In fact, both the Sulaymaniyah Sâdât led by Sheikh Said and the Mosul Ulema led by Reşid el-Ömeri were based on the *Sunni* doctrine and empowered by the *Monarchist* ideology. However, ethnic discrimination and the struggle for supremacy within the religious leadership set these two blocs against each other, whose common ground was Pan-Islamism and Monarchism. One of the most important factors was the possibility that the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union was established as an organization to empower and strengthen the solidarity of the Mosul Ulama. This entity under the guidance of Reşid el-Ömeri may have deepened the polarization between the

two Sunni groups during the Mosul Incident and facilitated the Mosul Ulema's engagement with the Barzanjiyah Clan. The second most important factor might have been that Sâdât's priorities and concessions achieved in the Hamidian Regime had provoked the Mosul Ulema for a long time. Long-standing aversion to the privileged status of the Barzanjiyah Sheikhs may have allowed the Mosul Ulema to consolidate with an ethnocentric motivation, regardless of their religious orders.

The third platform where Arab-Kurdish dispute took place was the Judiciary, and the division here developed over imprisonment, trial and requests for amnesty. The ongoing grievances of the Mosuli suspects, who were detained for a long time before they convicted, and Sâdât's concern about the possibility of a general amnesty brought the dislike between the two ethnicities to the surface in the judicial platform. The first triggering factor on this ground was that although many Mosuli Arabs were arrested and imprisoned after the Mosul Incident, no Kurds from the Barzanjiyah party were arrested. This situation further provoked both the Mosuli prisoners, their families and the Mosuli notables against the Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah. Meanwhile Sâdât's concern was mostly about the trial process and amnesty debates. The conduct of the major investigation in the Mosul Judiciary and the hearing of the case in the Mosul Courthouse prevented the Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah from being involved in the process safely and comfortably. In addition, the amnesty discussions that reached Sâdât's ears also put the Sulaymaniyah front under great stress and caused the Sheikhs to increase the pressure they have been exerting on the state authority.

In any case, although it is possible that this conflict started as a tribal one between Kurdish and Arab tribes at the first phase, the ethnic emphases felt in the correspondence in the later stage suggests that the hostility may have evolved into an ethnic dimension. If there were tribal affiliations of Kirkuk Ester Cavalry, Mosul Cavalry or Mosul Ulema led by Reşid el-Ömeri, who were involved in the incident, it is necessary to reveal these affiliations and analyze the dynamics between these tribes. Tribal Courts, which are still seen in Iraq, are officially affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and are responsible for resolving inter-tribal conflicts, show us how deep inter-

tribal conflicts can get.¹³⁶⁶ Accordingly, if there were tribe-based motivations of the Mosul Incident beyond the ethnocentric division suggested by this study, this would be elaborated on a further research based on foreign archival sources beyond the Ottoman state archives. Even if this conflict may have been based entirely on tribal animosity, the possibility that it gained an ethnocentric or proto-nationalist emphasis after a point would support the argument of this study. Consequently, the religious, political and cultural codes of the Arab-Kurdish dispute, which was also inherited in today's Iraq and became prominent especially in the Saddam Regime, can be chronologically taken back by examining pre-nationalist cases such as the Mosul Incident.

¹³⁶⁶ Mustafa Saadoun, *Will Iraq's new 'tribal court' undermine rule of law?* Al-Monitor.com, April 12, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/04/iraq-tribalism-sheikhs-justice-law.html>
Access Date:28.07.2021

7.2. Conclusion

Sheikh Said, the famous leader of the Barzanjiyah clan, was transformed into a despot through the privilege, power and authority he had gained during the reign of Abdulhamid II and oppressed the people of Sulaymaniyah for many years. Sâdât-ı Barzanjiyah, who had occasional and partial conflicts with the tribes, managed to establish an alliance with the tribes against the state authority when necessary and turn the regional balance of power in its own favor. Said who had gained a permanent place under the guise of an institution of great religious prominence such as the Sayyid; had also the full support of the religious orders and tribes. It was a highly controversial phenomenon that Said, who was depicted as such a cruel tyrant by some circles in Sulaymaniyah, was so revered by some particular groups in the region. At this point, it can be thought that the unconditional obedience to Sâdât and the desire to stand with the strong albeit cruel, outweighs anything else for these groups. The tragic killing of such a respected character had devastated the religious and tribal groups in the region. The destruction that followed this incident led to a severe uprising against the state authority, caused a series of successive events that could not be prevented for years and triggered the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Northern Iraq territory.¹³⁶⁷ Said's son Mahmud, who survived the Mosul Incident and spent his mid-life in such a traumatic environment, was going to challenge the British authorities after the First World War and declare himself the king of Kurdistan.¹³⁶⁸

Sheikh Said also got his share from the Post-Constitutional political proliferation, started a formation called Society of Unionist Charity (*Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İttihadiye*) and became a major rival to the CUP entity in Sulaymaniyah. It was now the time of politics, and Sâdât had to adapt its instruments to this environment of liberty, pluralism and freedom of speech. However, we can say that the establishment of this organization drew the reaction of the CUP and accelerated the expulsion of Said from

¹³⁶⁷ For an overview of before and after the Mosul Incident please see *Chapter 5: The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Kurdish Nationalism* and *Chapter 7: The Kurds and World War I* in Wadie Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006) p.102-114; p.125-132

¹³⁶⁸ For Sheikh Mahmud revolts and his relations with the British please see *Chapter 10: Shaykh Mahmud and the Rise and Fall of the South Kurdish Confederation in Iraqi Kurdistan after World War I* and *Chapter 11: Shaykh Mahmud's Second Rebellion* in Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement...* p.160-184; p.185-202

Sulaymaniyah. Then a telegraph war broke out and both the CUP clique and the Sâdât front rained down their own claims and demands towards the superior authorities. CUP prevailed in the correspondence traffic and the way for Said's banishment from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul was paved. After Said was banished to Mosul, Sâdât's claims about the Sulaymaniyah conspiracy had a great impact in Istanbul and left the Governorship of Mosul in a difficult situation.

The perspectives and attitudes of the Governors regarding Sâdât were quite different from each other. While Zeki left an Anti-Sâdât impression in many narratives and archive documents, it was also claimed that he was negligent, anxious, and incompetent during the Mosul Incident. However, the allegations that Zeki caused the incident to grow even more, that he downplayed the incident in the eyes of higher authorities, and that he hid some facts from Istanbul, were more crucial than his inability to manage the crisis. Even Zeki was not involved in the alleged conspiracy which was masterminded in Sulaymaniyah, in some narratives he was accused of being a bystander to the incident and even of pointing Said and his son Ahmed as a target.

It is noticed that the Joint Task Force (*Kuvve-i Mürettebe* or *Müretteb Kuvvet*), which was planned to be dispatched and deployed in Mosul after the incident, occupied the correspondence for a long time. Zeki refrained from making the necessary pursuits and arrests before the Task Force arrived and constantly fought for this with the higher authorities. Zeki, who constantly insisted on deployment of the expected force, also dealt with the renewal of the judicial departments of Mosul. Considering the chaotic environment in Mosul after the incident, Zeki's concerns were not in vain. Because the forces in the provincial center of Mosul consisted of local soldiers and the judicial departments of Mosul consisted of local officials. Such 'locality' could cause major irregularities in both arrests and prosecutions, overshadow neutrality principle and even exacerbate the existing Arab-Kurdish divide. Therefore, after the 4th Army had gradually reached Mosul, the judicial cadres were also renewed and the atmosphere of trust was partially ensured before the trial.

Particularly, in the case of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, it is noticed that Sâdât could easily mobilize local elements against the state authority. Aware of the divine devotion of the villages and tribes around, the Barzanjiyah Clan had blockaded Sulaymaniyah

with the tactical support of aggressive tribes such as Hamawand. The concern that the Sulaymaniyah district was rapidly progressed into a civil war, and the allegations that army weapons were distributed even to civilians by the Local Administration, heavily troubled the central authorities. Sâdât, who could not see a swift justice from the state authority, turned to revenge and directed its anger towards Sulaymaniyah. The fact of defying the state authority in a vicious and treacherous manner was obviously demonstrated in the murderous attack on Tevfik Pasha's caravan.

The reflections of the incident in the Chamber of Deputies are also very helpful in understanding the first parliamentary atmosphere of the Constitutionalism. The parliamentary pluralism, which gave a new impulse to the Ottoman Central Authority, approached the incident from several different points. Intense debates took place, especially on the legitimacy of the executive power and the jurisdiction of the parliament over the incident. Deputies discussed the decision of Said's banishment from Sulaymaniyah and was almost divided on the legitimacy of the executive power in relation to the practice. Besides, the expectation of an almost judicial function from the parliament over the incident was met with different reactions from deputies.

The arrival of Reşid was very decisive for the next course of the Mosul Incident. The new Governor, who started to investigate the conspiracy allegations as soon as he arrived, then obtained Ali Said's letters and Tevfik's promissory note and reported them to Istanbul. The busiest period of the criminal investigation; detainments and amnesty debates coincided with the period of Reşid's Governorship. However, also Reşid was going to be accused of different aspects. In the archive, although a meeting of Reşid with Kirkuk Commander Izzet Pasha is mentioned, documents do not reveal on which subjects they had collaborated. However, it was referred in the correspondences that he allegedly provided patronage for Sâdât, cooperated with the Sheikhs in Kirkuk and allowed them to return to Sulaymaniyah. It was even claimed that he had tried to undermine the criminal investigation records of Sâdât. Even the Sub-Governor Tevfik had accused Reşid of forging documents against him and of not returning his extorted belongings. It is understood that all these allegations had drawn Istanbul's attention even they were not proven, and his dismissal took place afterwards. In the light of this information, it can be thought that Reşid turned out to be a controversial Governor after he took his office in Mosul.

Four different conspiracy claims stand out in the study. The first was made by Sâdât and alleged the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Tevfik and some certain officials of masterminding a conspiracy to banish Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul. The second claim was also made by Sâdât and accused Major Ali Said of organizing the house raid and the murder of Sheikh Said in Mosul in cooperation with some certain local ringleaders. Based on the correspondence between Tevfik and Ali Said and the sum of 1.500 liras allegedly collected in Sulaymaniyah, it was claimed that the first two conspiracies were part of the same plan. The third conspiracy claim was made by the Sub-Governor Tevfik and accused the Governor Reşid of forging a document against him. The fourth conspiracy allegation was brought forward by Reşid el-Ömeri who was the leading suspect in the Mosul Incident, and he claimed that the Governor Reşid charged him on a fabricated crime without any solid evidence. However, no official charge or prosecution against Reşid regarding to Tevfik's or Ömeri's allegation could be found in the records. Although Tevfik and some officers were prosecuted for the alleged conspiracy in Sulaymaniyah, no convictions were found in archive records. However, both Tevfik and Reşid shared the same fate and were dismissed of their duties.

Among such contrasting paradigms, Sâdât had acquired an even more eternal opponent outside of state authority. It is observed that the struggle between Sulaymaniyah Sâdât and the state authority assumed a triple character after the Mosul Incident. The gap between the people of Mosul and Sulaymaniyah was deepened, the Mosul Ulema and notables were also involved into this equation and both sides demanded justice on their behalf from the state. For Sâdât, justice was the arrest and punishment of the perpetrators of the Mosul Incident and the murderers of Sheikh Said. On the Mosul front, justice acquired a completely different meaning and meant the amnesty of the prisoners detained in prison for a long time before their convictions.

One of the most controversial characters of the incident was Reşid el-Ömeri. Ömeri, who founded the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union, was accused of collaborating with some religious power focuses for breaking the public peace and order. In some narratives, it was noticed that Ömeri was one of the leaders of the group that raided Sheikh Said's house. After his detainment, he became the spokesperson of the prisoners and led the requests for amnesty. Unable to get the support he expected

from Governor Reşid regarding the amnesty, Ömeri was going to accuse Reşid of acting despotic and partisan. However, it could not be found in the documents whether Ömeri was among the 11 people executed as a result of the trial. Either way, Ömeri was a figure who left traces in Mosul's local politics in the environment of political pluralism that emerged after the Constitutionalism.

The allegations and accusations directed against local administrators and authorities around the Mosul Incident can be regarded as a different contribution to the literature. Because around such a huge incident, many different authorities were accused, some of them were prosecuted, and the central authorities in Istanbul were constantly subjected to complaints. The fact that the administrators were obliged to carry out a policy in one way or another in a shaky and sensitive province like Mosul may have paved the way for irregularities and mismanagement in Local Governments. Because, after the Constitutionalism, local dynamics changed, ethnic and religious elements lost their privileges, and the centralization policies of the CUP began to gradually penetrate the provinces. It is also seen that the Governors, who are caught in the middle of the Arab-Kurdish divide, can make wrong decisions, tend to one side by losing impartiality or avoid participating in conflicts. It can be thought that after the incident, which broke out with a conspiracy and grew with negligence during Zeki's period, Reşid was inclined to the side of Sâdât in order to reduce the pressure and stress on the province. Analyzing the decisions, preferences or mistakes of the Governors lived in Mosul with the fear of a broke out of civil war at any moment, can be inspiring for further research of the Post-Constitutional provincial histories.

CHRONOLOGICAL COURSE OF EVENTS

Year	Month	Day	Event
1904	April	9	Armed conflict between Sâdât and Ağavat
	June	15	Re-emergence of the conflict between Sâdât and Ağavat Governor Mustafa Nuri suggested banishing Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah
1905	January	14	Sheikh Said and his affiliates were pardoned by the Sultan
	May	27	Ağavat was also pardoned by the State for avoiding further hostility
1906	February	6	Peace was established between Sâdât and Ağavat and their prosecutions were suspended
	November	23	Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Salih Vasfi Efendi resigned
1907	February	4	Tevfik Bey was appointed to Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate
	July	23	Governor Mustafa Yumni concealed and delayed the Proclamation of Constitutionalism
	August	12	Appointment of Zeki Pasha as the Governor of Mosul
1908	September	28	CUP's uncontrolled branching and interventions in Mosul
			Serious allegations filed by Ağavat against Sheikh Said and his affiliates
		16	Dispute between two different CUP branches in Mosul
	October		All Provincial Administrations were instructed to continue their duties as before, regardless of orders and directives from CUP branches.
		2	State and Party took measures against the uncontrolled branching of CUP
		11	Serious allegations against the Society of Unionist Charity of Sheikh Said
		11	The banishment of Sheikh Said was requested by Sulaymaniyah notables
	November	17	Two deputies were sent from Thessaloniki CUP headquarters to Mosul
		17	Zeki suggested that Said be banished to a province outside of Mosul
		26	Serious allegations by Sâdât against Sulaymaniyah authorities
1909	December	4	The ultimatum of the Sulaymaniyah notables on the banishment of Sheikh Said
		7	Sheikh Said and his retinue were banished from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul
		15	Tevfik's failure in administration was complained by the Ministry of War
		20	Warning that Said will flee and return to Sulaymaniyah to take revenge
		21	Newspaper article against Battalion Commander Fehmi
		23	Contact of Sheikh Said with 'KSCP' headquarters in Istanbul
	January	30	Military investigation against Sulaymaniyah military authorities
		2	Governor Zeki justified and praised Tevfik's performance
		6	CUP Sulaymaniyah Branch defended and justified Commander Fehmi
		12	Allegations on Commander Mustafa that he oppressed the Sâdât families
	February	13	Sheikh Said's allegations against the tripartite alliance of Mahmud, Tevfik and Mustafa Pashas
		28	Commander Mustafa, who was constantly complained by Sâdât, was requested to be reassigned to another location
	March		Allegations that Sheikh Said has been lobbying the state authorities in İstanbul through the KSCP
		1	The ultimatum of the CUP Sulaymaniyah Branch that the whole town will migrate to another place if the Sheikhs are returned to Sulaymaniyah
		5	Violent armed clashes after a woman was allegedly harassed in Mosul

1909	February	6	The raid of Sheikh Said's mansion by a Mosuli crowd and the murder of the Sheikh with his son and his men
		7	Governor Zeki Pasha's resignation and the Ministry's rejection
		7	4 th Army was ordered to form a Joint Task Force for suppressing the turmoil in Mosul
		9	Transfer of survived Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk was requested by Sâdât
		9	Those who killed Sheikh Said were reported to be of Mosuli and Arab origin
		19	New non-local prosecutors were requested by Governor Zeki
		20	Sheikh Said's salary from the state was allocated to his eldest son
		20	The banishment and murder of Sheikh Said was discussed at the Parliament
		21	Said's 10-year-old son was sent back to Sulaymaniyah
		23	Seyyid Taha's invitation to Kurdish Sheikhs and Tribal Chiefs to his lodge
		23	Intelligence that Kurdish tribes would attack non-Muslim communities
		24	Financial difficulties for the supply and maintenance of the JTF in Mosul
		24	Warning by Zeki that the KSCP may try to awaken Kurdish nationalism
		25	Zeki proposed a Special Judicial Delegation for Mosul
		25	Initial elements of JTF departed for Mosul from their garrisons
		26	Sulaymaniyah Mufti Abdülaziz submitted the alleged crimes of Sheikh Said to the Parliament
		28	Transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk approved by the state
		28	Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha was officially dismissed from his office
		1	Appointment of Reşid Pasha as the Governor of Mosul
		1	The 6th Army was ordered to conclude the investigation against Commander Mustafa
		3	Ziya Pasha was appointed to the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate.
		4	Mosul Gendarmerie Commander Edhem Bey was appointed to Diyarbekir
		4	Sâdât's allegations that Major Ali Said was the sole promoter and motivator of the Mosul Incident.
		6	Sheikhs of Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Khalidiyya sought justice for the Mosul Incident
		13	Talabani Tribe Chief Abdulhamid sought justice for the Mosul Incident.
		14	Governor Zeki justified Major Ali Said against Sâdât's allegations
		15	Initial elements of the JTF arrived and deployed in Mosul
		16	The appointments for the Mosul Justice Department were announced
		18	Complaints of Sâdât's wives about Tevfik Pasha's persecution and atrocities
		19	Tevfik's convoy was ambushed by irregular forces of Sâdât backed tribes
		22	The chiefs of the Begzada, Rashwand, Khizirvand, Ramawand and Hamail tribes sought justice for the Mosul Incident
		22	Zeki reported insufficiency of the initial deployment of the JTF
		23	Some Arab and Kurdish tribes attempted to cause chaos throughout the province
		23	Tevfik arbitrarily assumed his office after the caravan ambush
		23	Tevfik's performance/dedication was praised and his official reinstatement was requested by Sulaymaniyah notables

1909	March	24	Allegations of misconduct and nepotism against Tevfik
		25	The Manifest of Sâdât reached to the Ministry of Interior
		18/25	The town of Sulaymaniyah was besieged by Sâdât-backed armed tribes
		19/27	Army weapons were distributed to the civilians of Sulaymaniyah against the siege
			Notables claimed that Tevfik's dismissal was unfair and uninvestigated
			An active/capable commander was requested for Sulaymaniyah from 6th Army
		27	Kirkuk Postnîsh made advise to the Sheiks and tribal chiefs
			It was reported that some elements of the JTF departed late while others dispersed on the road due to health conditions
		28	Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said reported the gravity of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah
		?	Commander Mustafa was requested to be assigned to a farther place than Kirkuk
		1	Mosul authorities requested additional forces from the 6 th Army
			Military force deployed in Sulaymaniyah has reached the level of 800 people
			Retreat of sieging groups to Bazyan and normalization in Sulaymaniyah
		2	A public announcement to prevent ordinary people of Sulaymaniyah from joining, aiding and abetting bandits
	March		Influential Kurdish leaders were advised through the KSCP to disperse the siege
		5	Sulaymaniyah military officials were summoned to the 6th Army in Baghdad over some certain allegations
			New appointments to the top commands in Kirkuk
		6	New Governor Reşid went to Sulaymaniyah to resolve the crisis with Sâdât.
		11	Two letters proving that the Mosul Incident was planned and organized by Major Ali Said were seized.
		18	Salih Bey was appointed to Mosul Gendarmerie Command
			Sulaymaniyah authorities were alleged to be involved in a conspiracy against Sheikh Said
		20	An official investigation against the allegations of Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy.
			It was alleged that Governor Reşid formed some alliances to protect Sâdât and attempted to cover up their criminal records
		27	The Baghdad-based newspaper İrşad made serious allegations against Governor Reşid.
			Sheikhs were officially allowed to return from Kirkuk to their hometown Sulaymaniyah
		28	A 1500 lira worth promissory note sealed by Tevfik and allegedly proving his involvement in the Mosul Incident, was seized.
		30	The Sub-Governor of Zor was requested to check Tevfik's official seal and to detain him for a few days.
		31	The notables of Sulaymaniyah made serious allegations against Governor Reşid

1909	April	4	Tevfik's indictment and investigation file was submitted to the judicial authorities
		13	14 individuals including Reşid el-Ömeri, were arrested in connection with the Mosul Incident.
		17	Allegations of misconduct and financial irregularity against Commander Zühdü
	May	1	Anti-constitutional and reactionary movements in some of the 4 th Army garrisons in the Van Province
		25	Complaints by Baghdad merchants that transportation to Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah sanjaks is in grave danger
		27	Reşid el-Ömeri filed a complaint against Governor Reşid to the 3rd Action Army Command
	June		92 individuals in connection with the Mosul Incident had been arrested
		1	It was reported that the withdrawal of JTF could disrupt the investigation and lead to further violations of public order.
		2	Tevfik's accusations of document forgery and confiscation of property against Governor Reşid
			The Grand Vizirate announced that the JTF will be withdrawn from Mosul
		3	The Grand Vizirate warned that martial law would be declared in Mosul if necessary
		4	It was argued that the newspapers Baghdad and El Reşad provoked some circles of Sulaymaniyah against Sâdât.
		6	Reşid el-Ömeri filed a complaint against Governor Reşid to the parliament
		8	It was stated that Ömeri's involvement in the Mosul Incident and his disruptive actions were based on solid evidence and reliable denunciations
		22	6 th Army Commander Mehmed Fazıl Pasha was appointed as the Governor of Mosul
	July	14	A Reserve Battalion was mobilized to supplement the insufficiency of JTF in Mosul
			Tevfik strongly denied all the accusations against him and argued that he could prove the forgery of the promissory note
		15	Tevfik claimed that the investigation on him was not conducted impartially and safely in Mosul and demanded that his investigation be transferred to Istanbul
	August	25	Allegations by a former administrator that former Governor Zeki escalated the Mosul Incident and damaged the province
		13	Governor Mehmed Fazıl Pasha stated that the Mosul investigation will soon be resulted legally
		22	Governor Mehmed Fazıl Pasha sent his first comprehensive report on the Mosul Incident.
	October	6	Sâdât's request to transfer the case to another court due to security reasons
		13	Some concerns and allegations by Mosul Prosecutor Lütüfi about the public order
		17	Numerous requests for amnesty reached from detainees led by Reşid el-Ömeri

1910	December	20	Central authority became unable to withstand ongoing requests and pressures for amnesty
		22	The reluctant and non-interventionist attitude of the Minister of Justice regarding to the amnesty
		29	Ineligibility of the detainees for amnesty was declared since there was no administrative or political justification
	January	12	Ministry of Interior stated that a possible amnesty would depend on the post-judgement process
	February	28	The trial of the Mosul Incident started to be heard
	March	20	The wives and mothers of the detainees requested amnesty for their men
	June	12	The Second Manifest of Sâdât reached to the Sheikh-ul-Islam
		30	Sâdât claimed that their opponents were still supported and encouraged by the Local Government.
	July	14	The trial of the Mosul Incident ended, and the convictions announced
		31	300 Mosul craftsmen, shopkeepers and merchants requested amnesty for the convicts of Mosul Incident
	August	13	Mosul Deputies contacted the Ministry of Interior regarding to the amnesty request
		27	Mosuli Ulema claimed unreliability of convictions and requested amnesty
		28	Telegrams reached to KSCP regarding to Sâdât's satisfaction with the convictions

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
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Photographs



Appendix-1A: Former Mosul Governor Zeki Pasha. As one of the Western Army Commanders (*Garb Ordusu Kumandanlarından*) during the Balkan Wars ¹³⁶⁹

¹³⁶⁹ Source: SALT Research, *Garb Ordusu kumandanlarından Zeki Paşa*, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/19785> Access Date: 02.06.2021; For his Command of the Vardar Army during the Balkan Wars please see Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War*, (London: Routledge, 2000) p.47-51



Vertreter der Verbündeten Deutschlands im Großen Hauptquartier

Von links nach rechts: 1. v. Klepsch-Kloth, I. u. I. General. 2. Oberst Freiherr v. Bienerth, I. u. I. Militär-Attaché. 3. Zeki Pascha, 4. Oberst P. Ganzschew, bulgar. Militärbevollmächtigter.

Appendix-1B: Former Mosul Governor Zeki Pasha (3rd from the left). As the Military Representative of the Ottoman Army at the German General Headquarters during the First World War.¹³⁷⁰

¹³⁷⁰ Yusuf Ziya Altıntaş, @yusufziya_a, *Almanya'nın müttefiklerinin Alman genel karargahındaki temsilcileri*, 1916. https://twitter.com/yusufziya_a/status/1342785548746977283
Access Date:02.06.2021



Appendix-1C: Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji. The boys standing next to him could be his sons.¹³⁷¹



Appendix-1D: Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji with Kurdish notables.¹³⁷²

¹³⁷¹Source: Çandname, ŞEYH BERZENCİ, KÜRTÇE BANGA HEQ GAZETESİNİ ÇIKARDI, 17.11.2018, <https://candname.com/tr/?p=21372>, Access Date: 03.06.2021

¹³⁷² Source: Kurdistan 24, İbrahim Halil Baran, Kadiriler ve Nakşiler; yenilgiler ve arayışlar – 4, 31.03.2021, <https://www.kurdistan24.net/tr/opinion/65767-Kadiriler-ve-Nak%C5%9F%C3%AElar;-yenilgiler-ve-aray%C4%B1%C5%9Flar---4>, Access Date: 03.06.2021



Appendix-1E: Jaf Chief and Gulanbar District Governor Mahmud Pasha¹³⁷³

¹³⁷³ Source: Mikaila Ailesi, Mehmed Peşaye Caf 1846-1921, Güney Kurdistan Mikaelidir
https://m.facebook.com/mikailailesi/photos/a.924751390916845/3119718938086735/?type=3&source=57&_tn=EH-R Access Date:03.06.2021



Appendix-1F: Mosul Governor Ahmed Reşid Pasha ¹³⁷⁴

¹³⁷⁴ For a detailed presentation about Ahmed Reşid Pasha's professional career and private life: Eda Turanlı, Ahmed Reşid Paşa, prezi.com, 12.09.2018, <https://prezi.com/eatok5ww6mmf/ahmet-resit-pasa/>
Source: <https://prezi.com/eatok5ww6mmf/ahmet-resit-pasa/?frame=d706cd16b637a4d2d470b83ee3760dd3d36c7c4e> Access Date:01.06.2021



Appendix-1G: Mosul Governor Ahmed Reşid Pasha¹³⁷⁵

¹³⁷⁵ Source: Eda Turanlı, *Ahmed Reşid Paşa*, prezi.com, <https://prezi.com/eatok5ww6mmf/ahmet-resit-pasa/?frame=9f9b92ff61a6e903ca7106c428d0a72bad2aef52> Access Date:01.06.2021





Appendix-1H: Dagestani Mehmed Fazıl Paşa with Kurdish tribal leaders from Northern Iraq who visited him at his home in Baghdad.¹³⁷⁶



Appendix-1I: 1908 Ottoman Iraq Mosul Postcard to England¹³⁷⁷


¹³⁷⁶ Source: Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti 100 Yaşında!, @KKCGunlugu, *Dağıstanlı Muhammed Fazıl Paşa, Bağdat'taki evinde kendisini ziyaret eden Kuzey Iraklı Kürt aşiret liderleriyle*, <https://twitter.com/KKCGunlugu/status/967490428491661312>, Access Date: 03.06.2021

¹³⁷⁷ Source: Balkan Phila, *Ottoman Iraq: 1908 (19 December)*. Picture postcard of Mosul (ed. Sarrafian Bros #188) to Petersfield, England, <https://www.balkanphila.com/shop/1908-ottoman-iraq-mosul-postcard-to-england/>, Access Date: 03.06.2021



Appendix-1J, 1K: Mosul Deputies Mehmed Ali Fazıl and Davud Yusefani¹³⁷⁸

¹³⁷⁸ Source: SALT Research, *Mehmed Ali Fazıl Efendi-Musul - Mehmed Ali Fazıl Ef.-Moussoul* Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/19763>, Access Date: 03.06.2021
Musul Mebusu Davut Yusufani Efendi, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/23219>, Access Date: 03.06.2021



Appendix-1L, 1M: Diyarbekir Deputy Pirinççizade Arif and Zor Deputy Hızır Lütüfi¹³⁷⁹

¹³⁷⁹ Source: SALT Research, *Diyarbakır Mebusu Arif Efendi - Arif Effendi, député de Diarbékir*, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Press Cuttings and Documents, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/19194?locale=en> Access Date: 27.06.2021
Zor Mebusu Hızır Lütüfi Bey, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/17891> Access Date: 27.06.2021




Appendix-1N, 1O: Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said Efendi and the 4th Army Commander Marshall (*Müşir*) Ibrahim Pasha¹³⁸⁰

¹³⁸⁰ Source: SALT Research, *Saïd Efendi-Süleymaniye - Saïd effendi député de Suleïmanié*, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/18788> Access Date: 28.06.2021

Mirliva İbrahim Paşa. Dördüncü Ordu müşiri İbrahim Paşa - Ibrahim Pacha, Général Brigade. Ibrahim Pacha, commandant du 4me, corps d'armée Ottoman, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/23132> Access Date: 28.06.2021

Appendix 2: Archival Documents



Appendix-2A: BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326- 16 September 1908
The complaint submitted by the Ağavat (Landlords) of Sulaymaniyah to the Prosecutor's Office regarding Sheikh Said and his affiliates

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 ۱۰۰

The letter sent by First Lieutenant (*Mülazım-ı Evvel*) Mehmet Salim who was stationed in Mosul, to his friend İbrahim Edhem in the 2nd Army, including his witnessing, observations, concerns and allegations regarding the Mosul Incident. (4 pages)

نمونه ۱	متوسط مرکز	روز و شب	دقیقه	ساعت	علی تاریخی	گروه	کلمات	علی نومردی
مخرج مرکزی	کشیده ایدن مأمور	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد
اخذ ایدن مأمور	اخذ تاریخی و ساعتی	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد	مرد
اشارات مخصوصه	Voies	Matin ou Soir	Minutes	Heures	Date du dépôt	Group	Nombres des mots	N° du dépôt
Indications non taxées								

صدا القضاة

مشرطه ارايه عليه كه قباله اوزنه رسيد اليه هارث معلوم سبت و به
 سنجي هم مستطاب اوزن آبي سه دوز لوافل اهلان مقله سن قسوقه هفت
 نامي و هفت نمبر و نولفده هيا ايندي تمباور دره طولايد نوارني مختلفه ده
 مقدم بوخه زياد نام لرز هني محموله ابر عظم فاسله در كوكه انعامه مولى
 فاجعه شده بوايه دض نمبر حدوتن سبب منق اولده عظم فاسله و فاسله استجواب
 و عوامه خيبره خدمه ايه و اكي سه دوز كوكه صداقت و انقاسه خدمه صحنه
 و حقوقه خيبره و عبادل محققه شده لطف زده قدر بر فباخي اولمايه مقفه لوتوفيه
 بائنه بدياهه مشروطيه خلاف قانونه غلنه ده حلقه اهدت و انقار كونه
 انجيد بركونه خنه و ناسفه بالتسبب قصبه خود غزوه اوچي سخته صدره او صده
 بعيه صادره مائه كوزه ده فريه قوبه مولى دقوعا قفه صدره ركوكه اعلا
 قضاة شجره نمبر بائيه جبايه طوكه امدني نفاها و بركوكه قطبان
 وزيرباندي اوزنه شفا مشهور حبانلي بابا سوكه كول ستره شنج عبيه باري
 عبه القاره شرنل و ربي شنج شده سه احمد بابا رسول زاده كرم مقف زاده شنج

DH.MKT 2751/29 (5. v. k. 6. shf. 605) 3-1

DH.MKT.02751.00029.003

Appendix-2G: BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324- 23 February 1909
 Telegram sent to the Grand Vizirate by more than 100 notables from Sulaymaniyah under
 the leadership of Deputy Accountant Maruf. (5 pages)

نمونه ۱		متوسط مرکز	
سوق نومردی		خرج مرکزی	
سوق نومردی		کشیده ایدن مامور	
ارسال تاریخی		اخذ ایدن مامور	
ارسال ساعت		اخذ تاریخی و ساعت	
سوق ماموری		اشارات مخصوصه	
L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité à raison du service de la télégraphie			
عملی نومردی	کلمات	غروب	عملی تاریخی
N° du dépôt	Nombres de mots	Group	Date du dépôt
			Heures Minutes
			Matin ou Soir
			Voies
			Indications non taxées

قادر و احمد سابقه صفی زاده سید محمد نقیب زاده سید نوید زاده صباغی
تبعی علی لکونه اشغالی مشهور صحنه زواری و جیم احمد زری قومانده ارباب
ایضاً ساری و ضیاع وقت استاده شکار و خود خوار ز طافه
تحقیق آید به گونه که در حجابیه خط عرب و باره ده جلالتی در طغانه می
مالی و ساز و آزاره جمع و جب است که به گونه ساری و پیاده تقابل اید و
منازعه و محو مأموریه عربانه کلفیه قائم و کبی قول افاس عیالوهای
و وقتو ضیا طایفه معنده بزباش سید ملازم اول معوف اندرک محافظه
و اندام قتلانی دانش سوار ضابطه فکماه اغا و علی اصفیل معینه و
نزدیک افاد سکه بولنی حاله بولنی بر صوم باقده اوزر زینه دفعه بام
انده اچار رس پاشای شایرله امدانده همه و اندام افادنه اوج است
سوارده برکه صحفا به نفی ملک حدینه جوی و به اوه جودنه اندک و آب
ماوند اوج مارنه اید شاه و موی ارباب اوزر زنه کی البس به نفی نفور
و آبای زایر زنه نفی غصب و زینیه قری و فوج بولایه استخبا اوزر زینه رکنه
کوند به امدارک معادینه انچه نفی قدری قدری بلم بلمه اولد نفقه شوا حمله

DH.MKT 2751/29

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 L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité
 a raison du service de la télégraphie

نومره	متوسط مرکز	نومره	مخرج مرکز	نومره	کشیده ایدن مأمور	نومره	اخذ ایدن مأمور	نومره	اخذ تاریخی و ساعت
زورنال نومروسی		سوق نومره		ارسال تاریخی		ارسال ساعت		سوق مأموری	
علی نومروسی	کلمات	غروب	علی تاریخی	ساعت	دقیقه	روز و یا شب	طریق	اشارات مخصوصه	
N° du dépôt	Nombres des mots	Group	Date du dépôt	Heures	Minutes	Matin ou Soir	Voies	Indications non taxées	
							۲		

مؤسسه مدینه مدینه، قندهار، انجمنه انجمنه و باه نظموه و باه هدفه
 ربه قوه اوله جغه اجه و اوله یغز جغه محک و مجار لرک عا جه و نایبدر
 و صلی و قندهار صدره رکورک اداره ایدیلده منشورک اصالی مفسره و مقدره
 سول قلمعه اوزره و لایله خایه جغه برره قالدیلدی حیا و مستحبه سیه
 بدیمه یل خایه اهللک لیه خایه قندهار ایدیلدی و مقدره سارا ایلک ابقا دروام
 مأمورین صول رفه اوله رفه عدالت ناضحه اوزهم و استیلا ایدر و مدله
 عله اوله شوفا ده فده ریکر افاده لرک کجی مژ اولدیغی حله صدقت
 و انقیاد و لطفه زنده سیمیه اهللک و جفاف عیار و طبعیه نایبیه عقاب و ده معدود
 اولدیغی احاسی ایلده اوله جغه سله و جاتری ایاقداننه الیه و باجی
 و فتورله ریکر رجورک حیا و بخانه نشینه اولدیغی عله و ججه عا جانی

مانده باشنده تقفانه قندهار
 اعضا مجلس اداره اعضاء مدبرین نوید و لایله مقدره محاسبه و لایله
 قنایه عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده
 کاتبه امیه اعضا امیه عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده
 محکمته یحانی ایدیلدی و باجی اعضا عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده عیالده
 3-3 حجه

DH.MKT 2751 / 29

نمونه ۱ متوسط مرکز مخرج مرکزی کشیده ایدن مأمور اخذ ایدن مأمور اخذ تاریخی وساعت اشارات مخصوصه طریق Voies Indications non taxées		روز و یا شب دقیقه ساعت تاریخ Group کلمات عملی نومروسی		Matin ou Soir Heures Minutes Date du dépôt Nombres des mots No du dépôt	
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[illegible]

تاریخ و محل ارسال و دریافت

TELEGRAMME

L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité à raison du service de la télégraphie

نومبر	سال	روز	ساعت	دقیقه	روز و یا شب	Voies	اشارات Ind. non taxées
۰	۵۴	۷	۸	۰	۰	۰	۰

نومبر	سال	روز	ساعت	دقیقه	روز و یا شب	Voies	اشارات Ind. non taxées
۰	۵۴	۷	۸	۰	۰	۰	۰

DH.MKT.01308.00008.002

Appendix-2H: BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909

Serious accusations by the Former Head Clerk of the Sharia Court of Sulaymaniyah (*Sabık Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkatibi*) Abdülfettah against the Governor Reşid (2pages)



دفعه اولیٰ درودیه احوال نظرًا سببیه مستغفرتیہ اجابتہ بالوجوبہ مخدوہ اولیٰ اسات مائی معرفتہ
 حادثہ مخدوہ - تعلیم وارتباطہ طواری تحقیقات مرکز دولتی مستغفرتیہ اجابتی اسباب تکامل
 ماحدہ اصنافیہ معرفتہ فرمانیہ ماحدہ
 ماحدہ اولیٰ
 ماحدہ

OSMANLI ARSIVI		
DH. MKT		
2796	16	1-2

DH.MKT.02796.00016.001

نمونه ۱

زودنال نومروسی	۴۴	موصول	متوسط مرکز
سوق نومروسی	ص ۳۱	دیه	کشیده ایدن مأمور
ارسال تاریخی	ص ۳۱	ص ۳۱	اخذ ایدن مأمور
ايرسل ساعتی	ص ۳۱	ص ۳۱	اخذ تاریخی
سوق شماره	ص ۳۱	ص ۳۱	

TELEGRAMME

L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité à raison du service de la télégraphie

معلی نومروسی	کلمات	غروب	معلی تاریخی	ساعت	دقیقه	روز و یا شب	Voies	اشارات
N° du dépôt	Nombres des mots	Group	Date du dépôt	Heures	Minutes	Matin ou Soir	Ind. non taxées	
۷۴۹۰	۱۷۸		۳					۵-۷

دخیرتقا صبیح


ترتیب اول و تابعی مدتی تمام اوله یغورده مطلقاً اعتماد موقوفه بریاست
 حنیف تجاوز انجمن جمہوری کاتب سفید عفو بورلقدی حالہ مفدور و فائز
 ملیح حکمرانی عفوہ سابقہ اولہ یغورده دتریکہا قریب نف تنہا ہندہ
 تنہا فی و یغورده صورتی حالہ مفدور با قریباً تنہا تنہا ہندہ ہندہ جواب
 زریعی و یغورده بدین محضاً تنہا ہندہ مفدور اولہ یغورده عفوہ مستقیمہ اولہ یغورده
 ایستادہ اب وہ خدوہ عائدہ قریبہ نہ دلاں عیدہ عائدہ قریبہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 سائبینہ مالکوتی قریباً سائبینہ یغورده و یغورده افدور قریبہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 ذل الیہ ذل الاسلام و یغورده با سائبینہ سائبینہ سائبینہ سائبینہ
 و صاویہ و نائیفہ بی نقطہ نقطہ ہندہ اوکوردہ عیدہ قریبہ سائبینہ سائبینہ
 نامہ و ہندوہ الحفیہ ایستادہ قریبہ ہندہ و نائیفہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 زینت نائیفہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 یحییٰ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 سائبینہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 محمد ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ
 بدین ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ ہندہ

DH.MUİ 24-3/6

17

DH.MUİ.00024.3.00006.017

Appendix-2J: BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisani 1325- 07 December 1909
 Request for amnesty in which Reşid el-Ömeri emphasized Arabism



DH.MU.00117.00023.004

Appendix-2L: BOA, DH.MU.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326- 12 June 1910
The Second Manifest of Sâdât sent to the Sheikh-ul-Islam

دولت تلغراف معاملاً لندن دولای مسئولیت قبول ایتز

L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité
à raison du service de la télégraphie



دولت علیه عثمانيه تلغراف اداره سی

SERVICE DES TÉLÉGRAPHES
DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN

[موردی] ۱۸

شماره N° d'expédition	کشیده اولان transmis à	تکراراً کشیده و یا سوق Retransmission ou Expédition	مأمور امضای Employé	مورد امضای Employé	اخت Réception	واضحه مرکزی Reçu de	شماره N° d'ordre
		le ۲۲ H. M. ۱۵			le ۲۲ H. M. ۱۵		

de pour موردی مصلح

N° Mois date H. M. دقیقه ساعت تاریخ ۸۶ قیو پ

Indications éventuelles

اشارات محتمله

داخلیه نفقہ تنہ
ج. ۲۲ رجبی مصلح حادثہ میاں کمر سنہ ۱۵ طبعی رہ بنحو فیہ
اگرچہ ناخفہ خدا جہد قلنا بحاکمہ نتیجہ سندہ استخفی مضمون و نظرونہ دہد لیونہ
اوضہ برائتہ وک نہ در دینہ جنات والہ در دینہ جہد درجہ سندہ بحر بنفیر
اودہ بنیہ اعدام و برینہ اودہ بہ سنہ وکتر بنیہ بشر و بختہ درہ و در دینہ اوجہ
جمیعہ والہ بنیہ اوجہ سنہ کور و جہد ایبا بنیہ اودہ در دینہ اوجہ سنہ وادہ بنیہ
البشر بنیہ اوجہ اوجہ در دینہ بہ جہد بنیہ حکم و بریب و دینہ کونہ و بریب
اوجہ کونہ بنیہ اشفاق مدی محمد بنیہ افادہ بنیہ مصلح (۱۵) مصلح

والہ وکیل میرزا
نذوقہ

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DH-MUI 77-2/21

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DH.MUI..00077.2.00021.005

Appendix-2M: BOA, DH.MUI.77/21/Lef 5, 4 Temmuz 1326 - 17 July 1910
Telegram of the Deputy Governor Mirliva Tefvik reporting the convictions of the Mosul
Incident trial.

