



ISTANBUL MEDENİYET UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

**THE 1656 ÇINAR EVENT: THREADS OF
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL
DYNAMICS**

Master's Thesis

İBRAHİM SERT

April 2024



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Style and Reference Manual Statement

Having reviewed this thesis written under my supervision, I confirm that it has been written in accordance with Chicago Manual of Style and used its footnote reference format consistently throughout the entire text.

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that all information in this dissertation has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conducts, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Signature

İbrahim SERT

This
thesis
goes to
the loved
ones who
have
supported
me and
my
journey.

ÖZET

1656 ÇINAR VAKASI: TARİHSEL ANLATILARIN VE SİYASİ DİNAMİKLERİN İZDÜŞÜMLERİ

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Bu tez on yedinci yüzyıl Osmanlı İstanbulu'nda meydana gelen, 1656 tarihli Çınar Vakası ya da Vaka-i Vakvakiye olarak da bilinen olayı merkeze alarak Osmanlı tarihyazıcılığına ve dönemin siyasi atmosferine dair bir inceleme yapmaktadır. Çınar Vakası'nın çağdaş kaynakları ile olayın elli yıl sonrasında Mustafa Naima Efendi (ö. 1716) tarafından kaleme alınan *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fi Hulâsati Ahbâri'l-hâfikayn* adlı eser mukayeseli şekilde değerlendirilmiş ve vakanın yeni bir anlatısı önerilmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra Osmanlı toplumunun, özellikle de İstanbul'da yaşayanların imparatorluğun siyasetine ve karar alma mekanizmalarına katılmak ve ayrıcalık elde etmek ya da var olanları güvence altına almak için Osmanlı Sarayı ile müzakere etmelerine olanak tanıyan yöntemleri nasıl geliştirdikleri ve bunların neler olduğu burada tartışıldı.

Çınar Vakası'nın sıfır noktası kabul edildiği bir sayı doğrusu üzerinde sola doğru hareket edilerek 1589 ve 1656 arasında vuku bulan on dört ayaklanma incelenmiş, bunlarda yeniçerilerin rolü ve etkisi sorgulanmıştır. 1622 ve 1648 yıllarında organize edilen iki ayaklanmanın dışında kalan vakalarda yeniçerilerin kısa süreli ittifakların parçası olduğu, daha çok ikincil bir rolde, destekçi sıfatı ile ayaklanmalarda yer aldıkları tespit edilmiştir. Literatürdeki genel uzlaşının aksine dönemin isyancı figürlerinin yeniçeriler değil, altı bölük ahalisine mensup sipahiler olduğu açıkça görülmektedir.

Yapılmayan ödemeler bahane edilerek başlatılan ayaklanmaların ana figürleri sipahilerken, yeniçeriler onlardan gelen davete kendi çıkarlarına uyması halinde katılmışlardır. 1593 ve 1648 yıllarında sipahilere katılmayan yeniçeriler saray ile iş birliği yapmanın kendileri için daha avantajlı olması sebebi ile ayaklanan sipahilere saldırarak dağılmalarını sağlamışlardır. Bu şekilde hem imparatorluk başkentinde yaşayan iki elit zümre arasındaki denge sağlanmış hem de yeniçeriler kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda padişaha sadık kalmışlardır. Ancak nadiren meydana gelen bu durum ileride yeniçeri ve sipahilerin bir araya gelmesinin önünde bir engel teşkil etmemiştir. Her iki elit grup da birbirlerini desteklemenin ayrıcalıklarını korumak, yenilerini

kazanmak ya da imparatorluk yönetimine dahil olmak için hayati öneme sahip olduğunun farkındadırlar.

On yedinci yüzyılın bir yeniçeri ayaklanmaları çağı olmadığının örnekleri ile gösterilmesinin akabinde Çınar Vakası mercek altına alınmaya başlanmıştır. Öncelikle çağdaş kaynaklardan yola çıkılarak vakanın meydana geldiği dönemde nasıl kayıt altına alındığı ve hangi detaylarının vurgulandığı belirlenmiştir. Çınar Vakası'nın çağdaş anlatısı açığa çıkarıldıktan sonra vaka sırasında öne çıkan ve on yedinci yüzyılın ilk yarısı boyunca da gözlenebilen bir siyasi katılım aracı *Ayak Divanı* incelenmiş ve önemi vurgulanmıştır. Ayrıca bu pratiğin uygulayıcıları ve talep edenleri arasındaki pazarlık süreci ve bu sürecin aktörlerine de değinilmiştir. *Ayak Divanı*'nda konuşulan meseleler, talepler ana aktörlerin diyalogları dikkatle incelenerek Osmanlı siyaset düşüncesi çerçevesinde sultan-saray ve katılımcıların imparatorluğa dair fikirlerine ışık tutulmuştur.

1656 Çınar Vakası'nın çağdaş kaynakları tespit edilerek bunların vakayı nasıl anlattıkları belirlenmiş ve vakanın yeni bir anlatısı inşa edilmeye başlanmıştır. Vakanın çağdaş kaynaklardan beslenen anlatısının kurulmasının ardından Mustafa Naima Efendi'nin Çınar Vakası'nı nasıl ve hangi niyetlerle kurguladığı sorgulanmıştır. Yapılan çalışmanın neticesinde ise Naima'nın vakayı çağdaş kaynaklardan farklı olarak incelediği ve vakayı içerisinde bulunduğu patronaj ilişkisinin lehine yeniden kurguladığı ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Naima'nın vakadan elli yıl sonra yazdığı eserinde çağdaş kaynaklardakinden oldukça farklı bir anlatı ve bu anlatıyı meydana getiren çeşitli niyetler keşfedilmiştir.

Naima'nın yeniden kurguladığı 1656 Çınar Vakası içerisinde bulunduğu Köprülü patronajının bir sonucudur. Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa'nın tarih yazması şartı ile patronajına aldığı Naima, tarihini yazarken Köprülü ailesini yeni bir bağlam içerisine yerleştirmiştir. Tezde bu bağlamın çeşitli yönleri ele alınmıştır.

Çınar Vakası'nın sona ermesini takiben sadarete atanan Köprülü Mehmed Paşa'nın (1656- ö. 1661) nasıl sadrazam olduğu noktasında Naima'nın epey kafa yorduğu ve vakanın da öncesine atıfta bulunarak meşru bir zemin yarattığı açıktır. Vakanın öncesinde azledilen sadrazam Süleyman Paşa'nın (ö. 1687) merkezinde olduğu bu anlatıya göre, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa henüz Çınar Vakası meydana gelmeden önce Mimar Kasım Ağa tarafından vezir-i azamlıktan çekilmek isteyen Süleyman Paşa'ya kendi yerine atanması için önerilmiştir. Ancak, Naima'ya göre Süleyman Paşa her zaman olduğu gibi basiretsizlik göstermiş ve Mimar Kasım Ağa'nın teklifini reddetmiştir. Dolayısıyla imparatorluğun yönetimi Süleyman Paşa gibi zayıf, vasıfsız ve saray ağlarının kuklasına dönüşmüş bir yöneticinin eline kalmıştır. Bununla da sınırlı kalmayan Naima, vakanın meydana gelmesinin sebeplerinden biri olarak Süleyman Paşa'nın zzzayıflığını ve Mimar Kasım Ağa'nın önerisini reddetmesini gösterir. Naima bu şekilde Köprülü Mehmed Paşa'nın sadarete atanmasının Çınar Vakası meydana gelmeden önce

gündemde olduğunu, herhangi bir güç boşluğundan istifade etmesine gerek kalmadığını ve sadaretin Mehmed Paşa tarafından hak edilmiş bir pozisyon olduğunu öne sürer. Bunu yapmak içinse çağdaş kaynaklarda adı geçmeyen, varlığına yalnızca kendi metninde rastlanan Mimar Kasım Ağa'ya referans verir. Bununla da sınırlı kalmaz Ayrıca Süleyman Paşa'nın imajı üzerinde de oynama yaparak kendi anlatısını güçlendirir.

Köprülü Mehmed Paşa'nın ve dolayısıyla Köprülü ailesinin sadarete geliş sürecini meşrulaştıran Naima bunun yanı sıra ideal bir sadrazamın nasıl olması gerektiği konusunda yaptığı yorumlarda Süleyman Paşa ve onun gibi sadrazamların İmparatorluğu giderek zayıflattığını ve acziyet içerisinde bıraktığını ileri sürer. Süleyman Paşa gibi isimlerin zayıf yöneticilerin karşısında ise isim vermeden de olsa Köprülü Mehmed Paşa'yı ideal yönetici olarak tanımlar.

Bu şekilde Naima, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa'nın iktidara gelişini meşrulaştırmış olur. Anlatısının ilk kısmında Süleyman Paşa'nın imajını yeniden yaratan Naima ikinci kısmında ise Çınar Vakası sırasında şeyhülislam olarak atanan Hocaazade Mesud Efendi'nin (ö. 1656) üzerine giderek tıpkı Süleyman Paşa'da yaptığı gibi onun da imajını yeniden yaratır. Naima'ya göre Mesud Efendi yalnızca bir Şeyhülislam olarak değil Aynı zamanda bir siyasi yönetici gibi hareket etmeye çalışmıştır. kendi görevinin sınırlarını aşarak devlet işlerine müdahil olmaya çalışmış ve bu şekilde avantaj sağlamıştır. Saray içerisinde yapılan ya da yapılması planlanan her türlü atamaya karışmış kritik mevkilere kendisinin kontrol edebileceği isimlerin getirilmesi için uğraşmış ve bu isimler üzerinden imparatorluk yönetimine dahil olmaya çalışmıştır. Ancak Mesud Efendi'yi eleştiren Naima'nın amacı Çınar Vakası'nı kullanarak geçmişte bir referans noktası yaratmak ve asıl niyetine ulaşabilmektir. İşe Köprülüler meşrulaştırmak ve onların imparatorluğun selameti için ne kadar önemli olduğunu vurgulamakla başlayan Naima sonrasında doğrudan patronuna, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa'ya ve onun meşruiyetine yönelir.

Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa'nın sadareti (1697-ö. 1702) Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi'nin (ö. 1703) imparatorluk yönetiminde güç kazandığı ve karar alma mekanizmasına hakim olmaya çalıştığı bir döneme rastlar. Dolayısı ile Hüseyin Paşa ile doğal bir rekabet içerisindeydi. Feyzullah Efendi'nin Sultan II. Mustafa (ö. 1703) tarafından koşulsuz destekleniyor oluşu ve Köprülülerin 1683 Viyana Kuşatmasının ardından giderek zayıflamaya başlaması Hüseyin Paşa'yı bu rekabette dezavantajlı ve zayıf bırakmış, en nihayetinde ise sadareten kendi rızası ile çekilmek zorunda kalmıştır.

Patronunun haksızlık ve adaletsizlikle karşılaştığını iddia eden Naima tıpkı Mehmed Paşa örneğinde olduğu gibi Hüseyin Paşa'yı da imparatorluğun kötü gidişatını durdurabilecek ideal bir sadrazam olarak tanımlar. Feyzullah Efendi gibi kendi hırslarının peşinden koşan ve imparatorluğa zarar veren isimler sebebi ile gerçekten imparatorluğun ve ümmetin faydasına çalışan

görevlilerin hak ettikleri pozisyonlara gelemediklerini belirtir. *Tarih*'inde Feyzullah Efendi'yi eleştiren Naima, Çınar Vakası'nda kullandığı yöntemi burada da kullanır. Naima'nın, Mimar Kasım Ağa'nın diyaloguna benzer ve gerçekliği tartışmalı birkaç diyalog vasıtası ile Feyzullah Efendi taraftarlarını nasıl tek tek Feyzullah Efendi'nin hata içerisinde olduğuna ikna ettiği görülür.

1656 Çınar Vakası ile Köprülüler meşrulaştıran ve ailenin iktidara geliş anlatısını onların patronajı altında yazan Naima, 1703'e gelindiğinde patronunu ve onun icraatlarını meşrulaştırır. Burada Naima'nın geçmişteki figürlerle mevcut anlatısındaki figürler arasında korelasyon kurduğu göze çarpar. Süleyman Paşa zayıf ve başarısız sadrazam örneği iken Köprülü Mehmed Paşa ve Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa ideal sadrazam örnekleridir. Naima'nın anlatısında, Hoca Mesud Efendi haddini bilmeyen, devlet işlerine karışmaya çalışan ve kendi hırslarını imparatorluğun faydasının önünde tutan bir karakterdir aynı şekilde Feyzullah Efendi de bu vasıfları taşımaktadır ve her ikisinin de sonu aynı olmuştur.

Naima yalnızca Amcazade'nin kendisini meşrulaştırmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda onun sadaretinde aldığı kararları da meşrulaştırır. Hüseyin Paşa'nın en tartışmalı ve en çok eleştirildiği girişimlerinden biri olan Karlofça Antlaşması'na (1699) dair yazdıkları bunun kanıtı niteliğindedir. Naima, Feyzullah Efendi ve etrafında örgütlenen ulema tarafından sert şekilde eleştirilen anlaşmaya farklı bir açıdan yaklaşır. Naima Karlofça ile Hudeybiye Anlaşması (628) arasında üstü kapalı bir bağ kurar. Naima'ya göre Hz. Muhammet Hudeybiye Anlaşması'nı yaparak beraberindeki yüzlerce Müslüman'ın canını kurtarmış, onların güvenliğini sağlamıştır. Peygamberin kendisi konu ümmetinin can güvenliği olduğunda çekinmeden kafirlerle anlaşmıştır. Dolayısı ile peygamber ümmetini korumak için kafirlerle anlaşma yapıyorken Amcazade'nin yaptığını eleştirmenin manasız olduğunu vurgular.

Tezde Mustafa Naima'nın merkezinde olduğu bir tarihyazımı ağı da ortaya konulmuştur. Mustafa Naima'nın kendi tarihinde Çınar Vakası'nı kurgularken kullandığı kaynaklar konusunda seçici davrandığı gözlemlenmiş ve Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi'nin (ö. 1658) *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar*'ının Naima'nın taraflılığından kaynaklı olarak öne çıktığı tespit edilmiştir ve vakanın daha güvenilir başka çağdaş kaynakları varken Naima'nın neden Abdülaziz Efendi'yi tercih ettiği sorusu her ikisinin de mensup oldukları bir ağdan yola çıkılarak cevaplanmıştır. Her iki yazarın da biyografileri incelendiğinde Naima'nın Halep'teki yeniçeri ailesi ve Abdülaziz Efendi'nin şeyhülislam olmasında önemli payı olan İstanbul'daki yeniçeri ağaları, Bektaş Ağa ve Kara Murad Ağa, arasında bir ağ olduğu tespit edilmiştir. İkincil olarak ise her iki ismin de Köprülülerle temas halinde oldukları anlaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mustafa Naima Efendi, 1656 Çınar Vakası, Ayak Divanı, Osmanlı Siyaset Düşüncesi, Köprülüler, Tarihyazımı, On Yedinci Yüzyıl

ABSTRACT

THE 1656 ÇINAR EVENT: THREADS OF HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS

SERT, İbrahim

Master's Thesis, Department of History

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Güneş IŞIKSEL

April 2024

This thesis examines Ottoman historiography and the political atmosphere of the seventeenth century by focusing on the 1656 Çınar Event, also known as the *Vaka-i Vakvakiye*, which occurred in Ottoman Istanbul. The contemporary sources of the Çınar Event and the *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri'l-hâfikayn*, written by Mustafa Naima Efendi (d. 1716) fifty years after the event, are comparatively evaluated, and a new narrative of the event is proposed. It also discusses how Ottoman society, particularly those residing in Istanbul, developed methods such as *Ayak Divanı* that allowed them to negotiate with the Ottoman Palace in order to participate in the politics and decision-making processes of the Empire and to obtain or secure privileges.

Furthermore, this study analyzes the intentions of Mustafa Naima Efendi, a historian, and uncovers the reasons behind his work. The structure and narrative of his work were determined by Naima's patronage relationship with Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa and the Köprülü family. The thesis clearly states that Mustafa Naima re-narrated the Çınar Event in order to legitimize the Köprülü dynasty's grand vizierate period, and he also refashioned the images of important figures such as Süleyman Paşa and Hocaazade Mesud Efendi to justify his patron's actions. In addition to these aspects, the study reveals a historiographical network between Mustafa Naima's family, Janissary Aghas such as Bektaş Agha and Kara Murad Agha, and Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi.

Keywords: Mustafa Naima Efendi, 1656 Çınar Event, Ayak Divanı, Ottoman Political Thought, Köprülü, Historiography, Seventeenth Century

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This thesis serves as a testament to my devoted academic journey, one filled with both triumphs and setbacks, moments of joy and sorrow. Each page represents a distinct milestone, and every chapter is a product of a unique struggle. I not only confronted ideas and issues, but also pushed the boundaries of my own intellectual capacity. Throughout this journey, however, I was never alone. There were certain individuals and institutions that provided guidance and support from various perspectives.

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Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion,
for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.

Bertrand Russell

Madness can sometimes be the path to truth.

Star Wars-Clone Wars S6/E11

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INTRODUCTION

Ottoman Istanbul stood as a center and witnessed the early modern period's notable events, embodying the era's profound transformations. As the heart of the empire, Istanbul was focal to understanding the globalization of Ottoman socioeconomic change, despite challenges such as inflation and periodic upheavals. Its strategic importance as a hub of trade and cultural exchange underscored the interconnectedness of early modern developments within the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul's dynamism and resilience amid these complexities underscored its central role in shaping the course of early modern history.¹ It is impossible to interpret Ottoman history without understanding Istanbul's fundamental dynamics in terms of political, economic, and social movements.

The multicultural and multi-class structure of Istanbul, which expanded from century to century, made it difficult to understand Ottoman Istanbul and the empire as a whole. For sure, not only Istanbul predestined the Empire, but also Anatolia and other well-protected dominions had an impact on it in different centuries.² However, the century that was exposed to both of their effects was the seventeenth century.

¹ Jane Hathaway, "A Preliminary User's Guide to the 'Early Modern' Tool in Ottomanist Scholarship," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 7, no. 1 (2020): 41–44; Marinos Sariyannis, "Cultural and Political Synchronicity vs. Economic and Social Diversity: What Global 'Early Modernity' Does Not Explain," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 7, no. 1 (2020): 61–63.

² Güneş Işıksel, "Imperial Limits and Early Modernity: Borderland Clients of the Ottoman Empire and the 'Well-Protected Dominions,'" *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 7, no. 1 (2020): 49–51.

The Empire found itself in a state of balance race with its subjects, or, as it can be said, the sensitive but problematic balance that was guarded by the Empire throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries became unable to be hidden. One of the main components of this balance was justice, *adl*. When the Ottoman sultans became unable, or subjects acted as if, to provide and secure justice, subjects attempted to determine, provide, and secure their own justice, and these attempts shaped the seventeenth century.

Ottoman society, specifically Istanbulites developed new methods which allowed them to participate in the Empire's politics and decision-making process and to negotiate with the Ottoman Palace to secure or gain privileges. Mostly, these attempts accumulated between the late sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, which pointed out a turbulent period from Europe to China.

One of the attempts that occurred in Istanbul, the 1656 Çınar Event, was taken into account in this thesis. Before examining the event, however, it is useful to understand what the seventeenth century meant for the Ottoman Empire and its global parallels. Moreover, the Çınar Event was not a single and independent event that came out of nowhere; it was the continuation of a string of events organized under the same motivations and marked a profound effect on seventeenth-century Istanbul.

The seventeenth century has been characterized as an epoch marked by crisis, a term that has ignited extensive debates since the mid-twentieth century. The debates surrounding the notion of a general crisis during that century gained momentum with the publication of Eric Hobsbawm's seminal

work, *The General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century*, in 1954. The initial debate predominantly focused on the European economic structure, with notable contributors such as J. H. Elliot, Pierre Goubert, and H. R. Trevor-Roper. Hobsbawm's perspective posited the general crisis as synonymous with economic retrogression. According to his analysis, this period witnessed a significant shift, as the Mediterranean, for the first time in its historical trajectory, relinquished its central economic position to the Atlantic World. Furthermore, Hobsbawm contended that the crisis emanated from the wars that characterized this period, among others the Thirty Years War.³

Yet his assertions were not immune to serious criticism. In particular, H. R. Trevor-Roper challenged the notion, asserting that the crisis was not primarily rooted in economic conditions but rather in political factors. According to Trevor-Roper, the crucial period between 1640 and 1660 did not witness an economic crisis *per se* but rather a crisis in the relationships between the state and society.⁴ Besides Trevor-Roper, Niels Steensgaard, and Alexandra Lublinskaya objected to Hobsbawm from different perspectives.⁵ The strongest objection came from Helmut Koenigsberger, who argued that

³ Eric Hobsbawm, "The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century," *Past & Present*, no. 5 (1954): 33–55; J. H. Elliott, "Decline of Spain," in *Crisis in Europe 1560-1660*, ed. Trevor Aston (New York: Routledge, 2011), 167–90; Cumhur Bekar, "Dünya ve Osmanlı Tarihçiliğinde 17. Yüzyıl Krizi," in *Erken Modern Dönem Osmanlı Devleti: Kriz, Değişim ve Dönüşüm*, ed. Yavuz Kısa (İstanbul: İdeal, 2023), 81–103.

⁴ H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis in the Seventeenth Century," in *Crisis in Europe 1560-1660*, ed. Trevor Aston (New York: Routledge, 2011), 66–101.

⁵ Niels Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis," in *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1997), 32–57; A. D. Lublinskaya, *French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Bekar, "Dünya ve Osmanlı Tarihçiliğinde 17. Yüzyıl Krizi," 84–86.

modern historians were misinterpreting the seventeenth-century rebellions and revolutions. According to Koenigsberger, biases rooted in retroprojections of twentieth-century conditions onto the seventeenth century were distorting the understanding of historical events. His critique emphasized the need for scholars to approach the study of the seventeenth-century crisis with heightened historical sensitivity, avoiding anachronistic interpretations and acknowledging the distinct socio-political and economic contexts of the period.⁶

Diverging from historians who concentrated exclusively on economic or seventeenth-century perspectives, Reinhart Koselleck adopted a distinct approach, delving into the multifaceted nature of crises. In Koselleck's framework, a crisis transcends mere economic downturns or disorder; instead, it embodies a series of complex phenomena intricately interwoven with various facets of human experience and societal dynamics. He defines a crisis as a state marked by profound uncertainty and instability, often entailing the breakdown of longstanding institutions, conventions, and belief systems. He further posits that crises serve as catalysts for progress and transformation. They compel communities to reassess their objectives, values, and organizational strategies. In his view, the concept of a crisis is not a static, one-dimensional state but a dynamic force that takes on diverse shapes contingent upon contextual factors such as history and culture. Koselleck also emphasizes that a crisis is inherently associated with transition and need not always be viewed negatively. However, the apprehension and uncertainty

⁶ H.G. Koenigsberger, "The Crisis of the 17th Century: A Farewell?," in *Politicians and Virtuosi: Essays in Early Modern History* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1986), 160–62.

accompanying transformation frequently contribute to the negative connotations attached to crises due to their integration with the present moment. His comprehensive perspective encourages a nuanced understanding of crises as integral components of societal evolution rather than isolated events confined to specific periods or economic realms.⁷

In the last decade of the twentieth century, general crisis theory became a subject of both global and connected histories. Jack Goldstone published his article *East and West in the Seventeenth Century*, in 1988, and a couple of years later, in 1991, he released his book *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*.⁸ Addressing the debates stemming from Eurocentric, Marxist, and Weberian perspectives on the general crisis, Jack Goldstone introduced a comprehensive framework that synthesized economic, social, and political changes, offering a fresh perspective.

Goldstone's universal model delineates a narrative beginning in the sixteenth century when the global population exhibited steady growth. However, this demographic expansion surpassed the capacity of agricultural production, resulting in an inability to meet the escalating needs of the burgeoning populace. The consequence was a surge in inflation, compelling authorities to implement measures such as elevated prices and taxes to rectify

⁷ Reinhart Koselleck, "Crisis," trans. Michaela W. Richter, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006): 357–400; Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner (California: Stanford University Press, 2002), 236–48.

⁸ Jack Goldstone, "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, no. 1 (1988): 103–42; Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World: Population Change and State Breakdown in England, France, Turkey, and China, 1600-1850* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

the imbalance between income and expenditures. Concurrently, the expanding population prompted states to enlist a greater number of soldiers, introducing a new complication: the delayed or non-payment of soldiers' wages. Amid governments grappling with these economic challenges, the uptick in social mobility, driven by population growth, allowed individuals to ascend to elite circles through patronage connections. This social dynamic, in turn, gave rise to political factions as individuals sought to consolidate their positions, leading to conflicts among different factions or intra-elite disputes.

Goldstone's universal model thus presents a nuanced understanding of the seventeenth-century crisis by weaving together economic, social, and political factors, offering a more integrated and holistic perspective on the intricate dynamics at play during this transformative period.⁹ Tensions would surface between elite groups and the state, especially when the state encountered difficulties in fulfilling the demands of these elites and struggled to assimilate them into the administrative framework. These complex dynamics often resulted from the state's inability to accommodate the expectations of the elite, leading to a breakdown in the relationship between these influential factions and the governing authorities. The failure to effectively integrate the elite groups into the administrative apparatus would exacerbate the discord, creating a scenario where conflicts between these

⁹ Goldstone, "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China," 104–6; Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World: Population Change and State Breakdown in England, France, Turkey, and China, 1600-1850*, 1–63.

influential factions and the state became more pronounced and challenging to manage.¹⁰

Another salient characteristic of the historical epoch under consideration was the ascendancy of Puritanism. Concurrently, this era witnessed the ascendance of both Puritan and scholarly movements, intricately interwoven within the persistent dynamics of power struggles. The proliferation of popular and elite ideologies, with a common emphasis on the restoration of order, substantially propelled these socio-political movements forward. The century's dynamics were further shaped by multifaceted factors, including fiscal decay, internal conflicts within elite factions, demographic expansion, widespread mobilization, and the concurrent emergence of both popular and elite ideologies.

Jack Goldstone thus provided a comprehensive analysis of these dynamics, using the term 'state breakdown,' which refers to "any event that involves a crisis of central state authority, elite revolts, popular uprisings, widespread violence, or civil war."¹¹ Therefore, the European uprisings exhibited an apocalyptic nature, characterized by a primary objective to dismantle the existing societal framework and institute a novel order. Conversely, the Eastern rebellions, still framed somewhat Orientalistically, assumed a cyclical nature, driven by the intent to reinstate order and eradicate pervasive corruption within the prevailing systems. This dichotomy underscores the divergent ideological underpinnings that underscored the

¹⁰ Etienne Stockland, *An Analysis of Jack A. Goldstone's Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, The Macat Library (London: Routledge, 2017), 34.

¹¹ Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World: Population Change and State Breakdown in England, France, Turkey, and China, 1600-1850*, 4–12.

motivations behind the European and Eastern rebellions, shaping their respective trajectories and objectives.¹²

One of the main aims of Jack Goldstone was to indicate that “the major states of Europe, China, India, and the Ottoman Empire were all experiencing a similar course of advanced organic development.”¹³ This argument challenged the existing literature, which was primarily focused on European progression and Eastern retrogression, in other words, the ‘Great Divergence’. Furthermore, Goldstone highlighted that the economic and administrative frameworks of Eurasian states were predominantly anchored in agrarian production until the nineteenth century. As a corollary, these bureaucratic models, deeply rooted in agrarian principles, inevitably commenced their decline owing to transformative shifts in population dynamics.

Following the release of his book, Jack Goldstone encountered criticism from scholars in the fields of history and political sociology. Political sociologist Charles Tilly conducted a meticulous examination of Goldstone’s singular model for elucidating revolutions and dismissed the conditions put forth as indicative of revolutionary events. In a similar vein, historian Lawrence Stone levied harsh criticism against Goldstone, asserting the utilization of ambiguous and unreliable data while dismissing the political stress indicator (PSI) formula as a mere product of imagination. The critiques

¹² Goldstone, “East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China,” 133 In some Ottoman examples, restoring order meant turning to ancient laws (Kanun-i Kadim).

¹³ Jack Goldstone, “Capitalist Origins, the Advent of Modernity, and Coherent Explanation: A Response to Joseph M. Bryant,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, no. 33 (2008): 120.

from Tilly and Stone underscored the contested nature of Goldstone's work within the academic world, prompting a reevaluation of his methodology and empirical foundations.¹⁴

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the crisis debate began to change course under the influence of alternative perspectives. Historians criticized the simplification and limitation of the term to politics and economics. Jan de Vries emphasized that the traditional view of the crisis, which was used throughout Europe, did not apply to every European state. The generalization of the crisis perspective failed to take into account the possible outcomes of the seventeenth century because of its inclusive view rather than regional awareness.¹⁵ Peter Burke approached the crisis from a different perspective, arguing that it was not visible in every area, such as art and patronage.¹⁶ Both suggested revising the term to reflect a more global and interconnected understanding. In the second decade of the century, Sam White and Geoffrey Parker published their books on climate and its effects on the seventeenth century.¹⁷ According to them, the crisis of the seventeenth century occurred because of global climate change, which affected the world as a whole. While Sam White focused specifically on the Ottoman case,

¹⁴ Stockland, *An Analysis of Jack A. Goldstone's Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, 51.

¹⁵ Jan de Vries, "The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 40, no. 2 (2009): 151–94.

¹⁶ Peter Burke, "The Crisis in the Arts of the Seventeenth Century: A Crisis of Representation?," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 40, no. 2 (2009): 239–61.

¹⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Geoffrey Parker approached the case more globally. These two books presented different perspectives and sides of the ongoing crisis debate.

While Goldstone directed his focus towards the *Celālî* rebellions in Anatolia (and not elsewhere in the ‘Well-Protected Dominions’), Ottoman Istanbul in fact emerged as a pivotal locus experiencing the crises of the seventeenth century. The factors elucidated by Goldstone to expound upon this historical period are, in fact, notably discernible in the context of Istanbul. From the concluding years of the sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottoman capital found itself in a persistent state of turmoil. Influential elements such as population expansion, inflation, factional strife, public dissent, and military uprisings played pivotal roles in shaping the trajectory of the city. The population of Istanbul surpassed 700,000, exacerbating the challenges as agrarian production proved insufficient, hampered by inherent limitations.¹⁸ This led inevitably to an increase in inflation; and naturally, taxation increased in direct proportion to inflation.¹⁹ Taxes and inflation caused market fluctuations, which were subsequently followed by uprisings from two specific groups: cavalry soldiers and the Janissaries. Furthermore, elite groups experienced expansion. According to Baki Tezcan, individuals from various social strata, especially merchants, paid 55 gold ducats (6600 *akçes*) to join one of the elite groups, the Janissary Corps, due to the privileges associated with being a Janissary and the potential

¹⁸ Mehmet Öz, “The Population of Istanbul From the Conquest to the End of the 18th Century,” in *Antik Çağdan XXI. Yüzyıla Büyük İstanbul Tarihi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2016).

¹⁹ Şevket Pamuk, “The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 1 (2001): 69–89.

for profit through their monetary network.²⁰ Except for those military elite groups, there were other factions established around certain figures, such as Kösem Sultan, Turhan Sultan, grand viziers, and eunuchs. Moreover, in line with Goldstone's argument about Puritanisms, *Kadızedelis* gained popularity among people, particularly among the artisans, who turned out to be one of the most prominent groups in the seventeenth century, not only in the Ottoman capital but in other big cities.

Nevertheless, according to the widely accepted narrative now, the crisis started to mitigate its pivotal repercussions in 1656 with the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as the Grand Vizier. Through adept administrative strategies, the latter succeeded in mollifying the contentious factions, Puritan groups, and scholarly elements. Subsequently, he initiated the renewal of loyalty contracts with military elites, including the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers. While it may not be asserted unequivocally that the centralized authority of the Ottoman Empire experienced a surge, it is plausible to contend that the state demonstrated an enhanced capacity to manage diverse groups, effectively incorporating them into a symbiotic network during the Köprülü era.

Historical debates on uprisings during this period frequently spotlight the Janissaries, often labeling the seventeenth century as the 'Age of Janissary Rebellions.' However, a more nuanced examination of historical records provides a divergent perspective on these uprisings in as much as contrary to prevalent narratives, the soldiers of the *Kapıkulu Süvaris/Altı Bölük Ahalisi*,

²⁰ Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University, 2010), 204–6.

particularly the *sipahis* (cavalry soldiers), emerged as more frequent and formidable instigators of uprisings throughout the seventeenth century. The inaugural *Beylerbeyi* (Governor-General) uprising in 1589 marked the onset, while the pinnacle of the cavalry soldiers' uprisings occurred during the Çınar Event in 1656. Notably, the fourteen uprisings between 1589 and 1656 played a pivotal role in shaping the century's character. Furthermore, the intensity of these uprisings in the earlier part of the seventeenth century surpassed that witnessed in the latter half, emphasizing a noteworthy temporal evolution in the nature of these military upheavals.²¹

²¹ Aysel Yıldız, *Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution* (London ; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2017), 1–20.

Year	Rioter
1589	Sipahis + later → Janissaries
1593	Sipahis → Janissaries massacred Sipahis
1595	Sipahis
1600	Sipahis
1601	Sipahis
1603	Sipahis
1622	Anti-sultan faction + Janissaries
1632	Sipahis
1632	Sipahis
1648	Janissaries + Scholars + Kösem Sultan
1648	Sipahis → Janissaries massacred Sipahis
1651	Artisans → with Kadızadeli arguments
1655	Sipahis
1656	Sipahis + Janissaries → until one point
1657	Sipahis
1687	Janissaries + Sipahi + Cebeci

Table 1 The chronological order of uprisings between 1589-1687

Between 1589 and 1603, a series of six uprisings orchestrated by cavalry troops unfolded. Notably, in 1593 and 1595, palace authorities strategically employed the Janissaries to quell the insurrections staged by the cavalry soldiers. However, a perceptible shift occurred after 1603, as the Janissaries started to actively participate in nearly every uprising organized by the cavalry, with the exception of the year 1648, following Sultan

İbrahim's dethronement. In 1632, cavalry soldiers initiated three separate uprisings, and in 1648, they rebelled once again following Sultan İbrahim's removal from power, only to be swiftly suppressed by the Janissaries. Subsequently, in 1655, another uprising was orchestrated by cavalry soldiers, this time targeting the Grand Vizier, İbşir Paşa.

However, it is crucial to underscore that the most impactful among these cavalry uprisings transpired during the Çınar Event of 1656, as elucidated in the initial chapter. During this episode, the cavalry soldiers managed to establish a novel order—an oligarchy that endured for a duration of *circa* seventy days. Contrary to a common acceptance, the Janissaries typically assumed a supportive role rather than that of primary organizers in these uprisings. The intricate dynamics of collaboration and alliance between the Janissaries and the cavalry troops manifested in a complex interplay during this turbulent period.

At the outset of the 1656 Çınar Event, the Janissaries initially adhered to their customary stance. However, as the events unfolded, a significant shift occurred, leading to a change in allegiances, ultimately resulting in the termination of the established oligarchy. The Janissaries, despite their traditional positionment, transitioned to the opposing side, thereby influencing the course and resolution of the event. It is noteworthy that when the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers encountered shared challenges, they would forge alliances and collaborate until their common objectives were attained.

Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge the inherent hierarchy within the Ottoman structure. While both the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers were servants of the Sultan, the Janissaries occupied a closer and more privileged position in the Sultan's service. This hierarchical distinction added a layer of complexity to their interactions and alliances during times of crisis and upheaval. The *Kavānîn-i Yeniçeriyân* (Codes of the Janissaries) even recorded the Janissaries as the special and utmost loyal servants of the Sultan.²² As Wilkins and Yi emphasized, Janissary influence began to grow in the second half of the seventeenth century, particularly in the 1660s, a conclusion drawn from central court records in Istanbul.²³ This conclusion underscores the pivotal role played by the cavalry troops, particularly in the context of the Çınar Event, where they successfully established an oligarchy. However, it is crucial to note that the cavalry troops experienced a subsequent decline in power following the conclusion of what I term as oligarchy episode.

Let's have a closer look at the alliances between two eminent soldier groups and the modalities of their payments. In 1589, cavalry soldiers rebelled, citing debased coins as payment, and demanded the execution of Doğancı Kara Mehmed Paşa, a trusted favorite of Murad III.²⁴ Mehmed Paşa initiated the minting of a novel currency, *akçe-i cedit*, with the intention of

²² Özgül Özbek, "Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân (İnceleme-Metin-Dizin)" (Ph.D., Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, 2017), 136; Tayfun Toroser, trans., *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân: Yeniçeri Kanunları* (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2011), 71.

²³ Charles Wilkins and Eunjeong Yi, "Between Soldier and Civilian: Janissaries in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul and Aleppo," in *Crafting History: Essays on the Ottoman World and Beyond in Honor of Cemal Kafadar* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2023), 563–65.

²⁴ Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, *Künhü'l-Ahbar*, ed. Ali Çavuşoğlu (Ankara: TTK, 2019), 1094–97.

introducing it into circulation so as to compensate soldiers's losses. This currency reform, aimed at addressing inflation, sparked discontent among the struggling cavalry soldiers, prompting their rebellion. Subsequently, Janissaries, who also received payments in the new currency, aligned themselves with the cavalry soldiers in the uprising.²⁵ Scholars have examined this historical event through diverse lenses. Despite the plurality of perspectives, a notable observation emerges — the centrality of the cavalry soldiers in the uprising remains a consistent focal point across these varied analyses. However, it is noteworthy that researchers, despite acknowledging the pivotal role of cavalry soldiers, have not uniformly positioned them as the primary figures in the event. This event, serving as a precursor, marked the inaugural step in a series of subsequent uprisings orchestrated by cavalry soldiers throughout the seventeenth century.

Despite the success of the 1589 uprising and the initial support of the Janissaries for the cavalry soldiers, a significant shift occurred in 1593. This time, the situation reversed for the cavalry soldiers, as opposed to the Janissaries. While the Janissaries received their payments in precise amounts, there were not sufficient funds to meet the financial commitments owed to the cavalry soldiers. In response, Ottoman officials reassured the cavalry soldiers that their payments would be fulfilled gradually. However, this assurance failed to pacify the discontent, leading the cavalry soldiers to reject the proposal and initiate an uprising. Their demands centered around the

²⁵ Mehmet Kuru, *Osmanlı'nın Para ile İmtihani: XVI.-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun* (Ankara: Fol, 2022), 118–31; Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate Predecessors" (Ph.D., Ohio State University, 2010), 190–93.

execution of the *defterdar*, minister of finance, in response to the unexpected payment predicament. Following deliberations on the cavalry soldiers' demands, the Palace made a crucial decision to involve the Janissaries. An imperial decree was issued, commanding the mobilization of the Janissaries against the discontented cavalry soldiers. The Janissaries, in response to this decree, moved to the second courtyard in the Palace, where clashes ensued, resulting in the Janissaries killing the cavalry soldiers occupying that strategic location.²⁶

This incident exemplifies the strategic deployment of the Janissaries by Ottoman officials in managing internal dissension, particularly against the backdrop of financial disputes involving cavalry soldiers. While in 1589, the Janissaries aligned with the cavalry soldiers over a shared concern regarding debased coins, the dynamics shifted in 1593. With the Janissaries having received their payments, their motivation to support the cavalry soldiers dissipated. In the absence of compelling circumstances, the Janissaries exhibited unwavering loyalty to the Sultan. Notably, the cavalry soldiers were not driven by a desire to seize undue advantages, but the uprising in 1593 underscores their adeptness in attributing responsibility for payment failures and demanding an execution. From the perspective of the cavalry soldiers, this act was perceived as a pursuit of justice in response to perceived injustices in the financial realm.

²⁶ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 2 (Ankara: TTK, 1988), 198–99; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, trans. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 1 (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 58–60.

In 1595, a significant episode unfolded as the sons of cavalry soldiers (*veledeş*) intercepted Grand Vizier Ferhad Paşa, requesting the transfer of their payments to Istanbul's register. However, Ferhad Paşa rebuffed this appeal, alleging disobedience on the part of the soldiers. Subsequently, the *veledeş*, in collaboration with other cavalry soldiers, orchestrated an uprising against Ferhad Paşa, demanding his execution. This recurrence mirrored the events of 1593, indicating persistent tensions between the cavalry troops and the Ottoman authorities. Responding to the uprising, Ferhad Paşa once again employed the Janissaries, who carried out a lethal intervention, resulting in the deaths of numerous cavalry soldiers. Remarkably, this consecutive involvement of the Janissaries against the cavalry troops marked the final instance until 1648. Following the failed uprising, Ferhad Paşa presented a report to the Sultan, asserting that the unrest had been supported by his rivals, Koca Sinan Paşa and Cigalazade Sinan Paşa. In an effort to quell potential dissent, Ferhad Paşa sought an imperial decree to physically punish his rivals. However, cautious advisers of Murad III dissuaded him, cautioning that such measures could trigger another uprising. Consequently, Koca Sinan Paşa and Cigalazade Sinan Paşa were instead exiled from Istanbul.²⁷

The uprisings occurring towards the close of the sixteenth century have been frequently examined within the context of contemporary court politics and the prevailing financial conditions within the Ottoman Empire. While some other perspectives can as well offer valuable insights for comprehending and analyzing these incidents, two salient facts emerge

²⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 1:88–93; Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, trans. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 1 (Ankara: TTK, 1999), 15–16.

unequivocally. Firstly, the pivotal actors in these uprisings were the cavalry troops, demonstrating their inherent capability and agency in orchestrating independent revolts. Secondly, these three uprisings played a pivotal role in influencing the trajectory of uprising practices throughout the seventeenth century. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of these events necessitates an exploration of both the socio-political dynamics and economic exigencies that converged in shaping these transformative episodes during the late sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire.

The commencement of the seventeenth century was marked by a consequential event—the murder of Esperanza Malchi Kira Hatun, a woman of Jewish origin engaged in business with the Ottoman harem. In 1600, upon their return from a military campaign, the cavalry soldiers discovered a controversial deal involving Kira Hatun and the Agha of the *Darussaade*, Gazanfer Agha, pertaining to tax farms. Kira Hatun was profiting from taxes and further selling tax rights to clients for enhanced financial gain. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, the cavalry soldiers sought a fatwa from Şeyhülislam Sunullah Efendi to legitimize the murder of Kira Hatun.

Despite the soldiers' request, Sunullah Efendi, guided by his duty to uphold justice for non-Muslims under Sharia law, rejected their demand for a fatwa. Nevertheless, the rejection did not deter the cavalry soldiers, who proceeded to kill Kira Hatun and demanded, as well, the execution of Gazanfer Agha from the Palace. The execution did not materialize due to the soldiers' payment in precious coins and the Sultan's acceptance of a new tax regulation. The subsequent year saw another attempt on Gazanfer Agha's life

by the cavalry soldiers, but the intervention of Şeyhülislam Sunullah Efendi and Grand Vizier Damad İbrahim Paşa spared him from harm. However, Gazanfer Agha's fortunes took a turn for the worse in 1603 when the cavalry soldiers revolted once more. Despite previous interventions, he met his demise during this uprising, illustrating the volatile dynamics of power, financial interests, and conflicts involving the Ottoman cavalry soldiers at the outset of the seventeenth century.²⁸

Between 1589 and 1603, cavalry soldiers organized six uprisings to demand the execution of some officials and to obtain new privileges, or at least their payments, from the Sultan. All but one of these attempts ended in favor of the Cavaliers. Each time, they came before the Sultan, presented their demands, and left him no room to refuse them. The janissaries participated in their attempts as well, but sometimes they cooperated with the Palace to keep the cavalry soldiers in line. But who were these cavalry troops that, contrary to popular belief, posed a greater threat than the Janissaries?

Who were the Cavalry Troops?

The main army of the Ottoman Empire was divided into two groups: infantry and cavalry. The infantry consisted of recruits, Janissaries, armorers, gun carriage drivers, sewers, and grenadiers. The cavalry, also known as the *Altı Bölük Halkı* (soldiers of six regiments/royal cavalry regiments), was composed of *Sipahis*, *Silahdars*, sağ/sol (right/left) *Ulufecis*, and

²⁸ Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate Predecessors," 48–50; Levent Kaya Ocakaçan, "Geç 16. ve Erken 17. YY'da Osmanlı Devleti'ndeki Patronaj İlişkilerinin Gazanfer Ağa Örneği Üzerinden Venedik Belgelerine Göre İncelenmesi" (Ph.D., Marmara University, 2016), 86–94; Zeynep Aycibin, "Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin" (Ph.D., Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar University, 2007), 356–57.

sağ/sol Garibs. Some of the soldiers of six regiments were gathered from *devşirmes* and were distinct from the *Timarli Sipahis*. They were recognized as one of the elite classes of the empire, their reputation was greater than the Janissaries' until the middle of the seventeenth century.²⁹ There is a high probability that the reputation of cavalry troops stemmed from the Byzantine *pronoia* system. During the early conquests of the Ottomans, notable individuals such as Mihaloğlu and the various *tekfurs* (feudal lords) of Bithynia played significant roles. As these figures joined the Ottoman ranks, their Christian-origin military groups followed suit and became part of the Ottoman war machine. This situation facilitated the swift military conquest of Anatolia and the Balkans. The Ottomans adopted the *timar* as their fundamental military and fiscal system. The state effectively assimilated and transformed the Christian military groups and their practices into a polyglot pot.³⁰

Although there was no specific institution for raising cavalry, soldiers could be recruited from various sources. Virtually every class within the empire had the potential to be promoted to the cavalry division. This pool of potential recruits included apprentices from the palaces of the İbrahim Paşa, the Galata, the Edirne, and the Topkapı (Enderun and Birun), as well as soldiers from the Janissaries, armorers, artillery regiments, and gun carriage

²⁹ Coşkun Ünsal, "Osmanlı Askeri Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Süvarileri (XVI-XVII. Yüzyıllar)" (Ph.D., Marmara University, 2023), 57–62.

³⁰ Speros Vryonis, "The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23/24 (1969): 251–308.

drivers. Furthermore, servants of the viziers' households could also join the cavalry division.³¹

The cavalry division was divided into three degrees within the six regiments. In the first degree, there were *Sipahis* and *Silahdars*; in the second degree, also known as the middle regiment, there were right and left *Ulufecis*; and in the third degree, also known as the lower regiment, there were right and left *Garibs*. Their *mevacibs* (payments) were determined according to their degree. Their payments were made quarterly, with the quarters named *Masar*, *Recec*, *Reşen*, and *Lezez*. Soldiers had two options for receiving their payments. The first, known as *sergili*, involved a stand set up before the Grand Vizier to give soldiers their payments. The other one was *taşralı*, which allowed cavalry soldiers who could not come to Istanbul to have their payments delivered to them by their officers.³²

The cavalry division during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries typically comprised an average of fifteen to twenty thousand soldiers, with the *Sipahis* emerging as the most populous troops within this division. Organized into three hundred companies, each consisting of twenty or thirty soldiers, these companies were led by a first sergeant known as the *bölükbaşı*. The responsibilities of the *Sipahis* varied between wartime and peacetime. During conflicts, their primary tasks encompassed marking the army's route, fortifying positions, maintaining battlefield order, and ensuring the safety of key figures such as the Sultan, the treasury, and the Grand Vizier.

³¹ Özbek, "Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan (İnceleme-Metin-Dizin)," 155–56; Toroser, *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan: Yeniçeri Kanunları*, 99–102; Ünsal, "Osmanlı Askeri Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Süvarileri (XVI-XVII. Yüzyıllar)," 63–128.

³² Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 2:187–89.

Conversely, in times of peace, the *Sipahis*' duties diverged from military affairs. Without active warfare, *Sipahis* found opportunities to serve as clerks or tax collectors, thereby supplementing their income. Initially, only the three hundred *Sipahis* in Istanbul were appointed to peacetime duties for a one-year service in the *divan-ı hümayun*. However, this system underwent a transformation, expanding to include *Sipahis* from Anatolia and Rumelia, leading to a shift from annual to semi-annual assignments. This alteration had repercussions, particularly in the tax-collecting process, adversely impacting the empire's fiscal equilibrium. The introduction of the duty, known as *gulamiye* or *hizmet*, played a role in these unfavorable consequences. In 1632, Sultan Murad IV took a significant step by abolishing this duty, aiming to mitigate the negative effects on taxation and restore balance to the fiscal framework of the Ottoman Empire.³³

Sipahis lived in areas near Istanbul, with approximately 1500 *Sipahis* located within the city itself. Bachelor *Sipahis* resided in bedsitters around Süleymaniye or inns of the Sultan Ahmed, the Elçi (ambassador), the Kurşunlu, and the Yeni Mosque.³⁴ Unlike the Janissaries, cavalry troops did not have any barracks to live in due to their marriage rights. The right to marriage was equal to the right to have a residence and a family. This law was outlined in the *Kavanîn-i Yeniçeriyân* as "... a barrack was not constructed for cavalry troops. Because being a bachelor was the code of the Janissaries, and bachelors needed a place to live."³⁵

³³ Ünsal, "Osmanlı Askeri Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Süvarileri (XVI-XVII. Yüzyıllar)," 286–88; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 2:155–61.

³⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 2:185–86.

³⁵ Özbek, "Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân (İnceleme-Metin-Dizin)," 127; Toroser, *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân: Yeniçeri Kanunları*, 59.

Besides the marriage right, they also had the right to leave their military position to their sons as their legacy. This practice is called *veledeş*. When the sons of cavalry soldiers reached puberty, they were admitted into the cavalry division. If their father was alive, a specific amount of money was deducted from the father's payments and given to the son. If the father passed away before his son reached puberty, the son would be admitted to the cavalry division upon coming of age, provided he could establish his inheritance rights with witnesses.³⁶

According to Rifa'at Abou-El Haj, cavalry soldiers were permitted to participate in political affairs.³⁷ However, beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, the cavalry division lost its reputation and fighting ability. They became a burden to the empire, and after the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826; in the following years, Sultan Mahmud II disbanded the cavalry division.³⁸

The Janissaries, initially established as the Sultan's devoted and exclusive attendants, leveraged their triumph over the cavalry soldiers to secure additional privileges. However, their allegiance was not solely confined to the Sultan. There were instances, particularly when their interests aligned, where the Janissaries formed alliances with the cavalry troops, demonstrating a pragmatic approach focused on maximizing gains. Notably,

³⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 2:162–68; Ünsal, “Osmanlı Askeri Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Süvarileri (XVI-XVII. Yüzyıllar),” 121–23.

³⁷ Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 30.

³⁸ Erhan Afyoncu, “Sipahi,” in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 2009); Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Sipahi,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/sipahi>.

the Janissaries exhibited a propensity to shift alliances over time, evident in episodes such as those in 1632 and 1656. Rather than ushering in a new paradigm for the seventeenth century and beyond, the Janissaries assimilated the methods of the cavalry soldiers. In doing so, they not only adopted but also absorbed the practices gradually relinquished by the cavalry troops. This dynamic underscores the complex and adaptive nature of the Janissaries, who, rather than creating a novel reality, strategically incorporated elements of the cavalry soldiers' approach while filling the void left by their gradual decline.³⁹

Nevertheless, the historiography and narratives that emerged in the nineteenth century, particularly following the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, underwent a significant reinterpretation of the past. In this revisionist approach, the Janissaries were recast as scapegoats, bearing the blame for what was referred to as the empire's so-called decline.⁴⁰ In an alternate historical scenario, if I may, had the cavalry soldiers not experienced the loss of their legal standing in 1656 and their oligarchical prominence remained unchallenged by an alliance between the Palace and the Janissaries, it's conceivable that, in the present context, the narrative might have portrayed the cavalry troops as the scapegoats instead. Nevertheless, the political propaganda of the nineteenth century has influenced our understanding of the

³⁹ Cemal Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels Without a Cause?," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 13 (2007): 123 "Whatever its relation to one's notion of order and decency, the cumulative experience of political activism by the Janissaries and their affiliates eventually created a new political reality, which could be seen as the kernel of a [political party or even a] representative institution, including alliances and clashes with other social-political forces."

⁴⁰ Erdal Küçükyağın, *Turna'nın Kalbi: Yeniçeri Yoldaşlığı ve Bektaşilik* (İstanbul: Kapı, 2022), 11–22.

seventeenth century, making the study of this period even more complicated. The marginalization or reduction of the impact of cavalry soldiers resulted in a misinterpretation, even in an exaggeration, when examining the contemporary narratives from that century. This circumstance, particularly apparent in the analysis of the Çınar Event, caused a shift in narrative focus from the center, where the cavalry soldiers played a pivotal role, to the periphery, emphasizing the Janissaries. In 1656, the Janissaries were initially portrayed as the saviors of the Sultan by their contemporaries, but in subsequent historiography from the nineteenth century onward, paradoxically, they were simultaneously depicted as both perpetrators and victims of the same event.

With the abolition of the cavalry and the Janissary, according to modern Ottoman historiography, the two biggest problems of the Empire were solved, and all obstacles to modernization were removed. From now on, the empire could begin the process of advancement that European empires had already begun in the fifteenth century and surpassed the Ottomans in the seventeenth century. But was this narrative ever true? What happened in the seventeenth century to European empires? There are global and strange parallels between the Ottoman Empire and the European empires, as I pointed out below.

Global and Strange Parallels

The crisis unfolding in the seventeenth century, as delineated above, necessitates a closer examination through concrete examples to illuminate the shared predicaments and trajectories of monarchies across major powers, including France, England, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. Noteworthy is the recognition that the Ottoman Empire was just one among many

monarchies grappling with this crisis; it indeed manifested as a global phenomenon, reverberating across diverse regions. However, for the sake of comparability, our focus will be confined to European events, as the most analogous cases of the Ottoman Empire unfolded on the European stage.

In both France and England, the tempest of civil wars stormed through the political landscape, leaving an indelible mark on their respective histories. The conflicts were not merely regional skirmishes; rather, they reflected profound internal strife and ideological clashes that fundamentally shook the foundations of monarchical rule. Meanwhile, Spain found itself contending with popular uprisings that posed a formidable challenge to its established order. The resonance of discontent among the populace mirrored the broader crisis engulfing European monarchies, indicating a widespread undercurrent of dissatisfaction and a desire for transformative change. As we delve into the European events, it becomes evident that these crises were not isolated occurrences but rather part of a shared upheaval that transcended borders. The analysis of France, England, and Spain provides a comprehensive lens through which to discern the intricate interplay of political, social, and economic forces shaping the fate of these monarchies during this tumultuous period.

In 1642, the first minister of France, Armand du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, one of the most prominent figures in the French monarchy, died. The following year, King Louis XIII also passed away. With this, a new stage began under the regime of the young King Louis XIV, his mother Anne of Austria, and her favorite, Cardinal Jules Mazarin, who became the first

minister. Cardinal Mazarin attempted to seize power, following in the footsteps of his mentor, Cardinal Richelieu, and he wanted to continue the Thirty Years' War to gain power both within and outside of France. However, in order to continue the war, France's war machine needed money to keep the troops on the battlefield. Mazarin chased Richelieu's way of obtaining money and designed a new taxation package that raised taxes on the people. However, Mazarin's package received opposition from the Court of Paris. The judges of Paris resisted and exercised their right to remonstrate, rejecting the package. Mazarin's policies provoked unrest from the beginning of 1643, but tensions escalated, and between 1648 and 1653, France faced a civil war against the crown led by its officials, so-called the *Fronde*: aristocrats, judges, and other factions of the nobility.⁴¹

In France, the state breakdown led to a weakening of the central authority, which caused the royal family to flee Paris. This situation encouraged other provinces to join the *Frondeurs*, and a popular uprising strengthened under the motto "Long live liberty and no taxes..." In 1648, the Prince of Condé, cousin of King Louis XIV, joined the ranks of the *Fronde* because he could not fulfill his desired expectations in the royal court, and Mazarin also viewed him as a threat and tried to send him to the battlefield to remove him from Paris. As a result, Condé rebelled and entered Paris as the commander of the rebel army. However, his presence caused a disturbance in the *Fronde*. Members of a faction known as the *Old Fronde* collaborated with

⁴¹ David Parrot, 1652: *The Cardinal, the Prince, and the Crisis of the Fronde* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2020), 1–4; Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "The Fronde," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2014.

Anne of Austria and turned against Condé. Upon discovering this, he fled to the Spanish Netherlands on October 13, 1652.⁴²

Following Condé's departure, the *Fronde*'s influence waned, paving the way for the king's triumphant entry into the city, escorted by the royal army. The *Fronde*'s failure marked the demise of significant opposition against the monarchy, quashing dissenting voices and nullifying the influence of certain figures who had thrived on the opposition. In the aftermath, the repercussions were swift and decisive – rebels faced exile or imprisonment, solidifying the monarchy's grip on power. France's political landscape underwent a transformative shift as King Louis XIV ascended to an era marked by the zenith of absolute monarchical authority. The demise of the *Fronde* not only extinguished dissent but also facilitated the consolidation of the monarchy's power, rendering it more formidable than ever.

The passing of Cardinal Richelieu and the subsequent ascent of the young king had initially stirred hopes among the nobility to reclaim lost privileges and exert influence over the administration. Viewing this as an opportune moment to reestablish their former prominence, the nobility sought to navigate the shifting political dynamics. However, the trajectory took an unexpected turn, culminating in the termination of the *Fronde* and the establishment of a regime characterized by stringent absolutism. The denouement of the *Fronde*, therefore, not only extinguished nascent hopes of nobility resurgence but also marked the inception of an era wherein the

⁴² Paul Rice Doolin, *The Fronde* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935), 29–58.

absolutist authority of King Louis XIV reigned supreme, reshaping the course of the French monarchy.⁴³

During the same period that France was dealing with the *Fronde*, the Spanish monarchy faced fiscal problems while continuing the Thirty Years' War. To address these issues, the monarchy demanded additional taxes from its subjects, including those living in the Kingdom of Naples, which was ruled by a viceroy. This led to a confrontation over a new tax called *Gabella della frutta* (fruit tax). On July 7, 1647, the streets of Naples became the stage for a formidable uprising led by Tommaso Aniello d'Amalfi, known as Masaniello, and Giulio Genoino. The grievance that fueled this rebellion was the onerous Spanish taxes levied on essential commodities. The uprising primarily comprised non-professionals, ordinary citizens, and artisans, forming a formidable force against the Spanish presence and their taxation policies in Naples. The overarching objective was twofold: the abolition of burdensome taxes and the rejection of Spanish rule, which was enforced through the oligarchic governance of Naples' local elites.

This rebellion unfolded within the broader context of the Thirty Years' War, posing a direct threat to the monarchy and King Felipe IV. The viceroy of Naples, however, proved ineffectual in the face of this unprecedented popular uprising. The resolute resistance exhibited by the people compelled Felipe IV to take decisive action, leading to the issuance of an order for his son, Don Juan José de Austria, to march to Naples and quell the rebellion. The culmination of this clash occurred on April 6, 1648, when Don Juan José

⁴³ Parrot, 1652: *The Cardinal, the Prince, and the Crisis of the Fronde*, 3–5.

de Austria, at the behest of his father, entered Naples. The intervention marked a turning point, extinguishing the flames of rebellion and reinstating control over the city. The suppression of the Neapolitan uprising reflected the broader challenges faced by European monarchies during the tumultuous era of the Thirty Years' War, where the confluence of social unrest and geopolitical complexities presented profound challenges to established authority.⁴⁴

The rebellion was initiated under the leadership of Masaniello. However, his assassination after ten days led to a division among the participants. The absence of a charismatic and efficient leader resulted in a power struggle for control of the uprising. Nevertheless, the rebels managed to resolve their internal conflicts and regrouped around Henry of Lorraine, the French Duke of Guise. From July 7th, 1647, to April 6th, 1648, Naples revolted against taxation and declared itself a free republic, thereby bringing an end to the Spanish monarchy and the oligarchy of the nobles in Naples. However, the Spanish monarchy could not tolerate this situation and took decisive action. Don Juan laid siege to the city and compelled its surrender, as the loss of Naples to French control, even under the pretense of a free republic, was unacceptable.⁴⁵ The Republican era of Naples came to an end with the return of the Spanish monarchy, which established its rule in a strict

⁴⁴ Silvana D'Alessio, *Masaniello: The Life and Afterlife of a Neapolitan Revolutionary*, trans. Thomas V. Cohen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022), 11–29; Christopher R. Marshall, "'Causa Di Stravaganze': Order and Anarchy in Domenico Gargiulo's Revolt of Masaniello," *The Art Bulletin* 80, no. 3 (1998): 478–97.

⁴⁵ Rosario Villari, "Masaniello: Contemporary and Recent Interpretations," *Past & Present*, no. 108 (1985): 117–32; D'Alessio, *Masaniello: The Life and Afterlife of a Neapolitan Revolutionary*, 31.

manner, similar to France. The monarchy was once again restored, but it gained even more power.

During the same years, in 1642, a civil war broke out in England between the Royalists, who supported the absolute monarchy of King Charles I and his divine rights, and the Parliamentarians, who advocated for parliamentary supremacy within a constitutional monarchy. Subsequently, the Parliamentarians called for the complete abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords. The initial phase of the English Civil War concluded in 1648 when King Charles was captured and imprisoned at Hampton Court Palace. Oliver Cromwell, widely recognized as a key figure of the Civil War, endeavored to mediate between Parliament, the army, and the king. However, Charles I's decision to flee to the Isle of Wight to negotiate with the Scots in return for accepting their terms on the throne and restoring order thwarted Cromwell's attempts to persuade the king towards a constitutional settlement. Consequently, the second phase of the English Civil War commenced. Swiftly, this phase culminated with the execution of Charles I in 1649, making him the sole English monarch to be executed.⁴⁶

Following the execution of Charles I, the monarchy faced abolition, giving rise to the establishment of the Commonwealth of England, accompanied by an administrative Council of State. Under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell, the Parliamentary army orchestrated numerous

⁴⁶ Martyn Bennett, *Oliver Cromwell* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006), 132–57; Ronald Hutton, *The Making of Oliver Cromwell* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), 299–325; John Morrill, “Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658), Lord Protector of England, Scotland, and Ireland,” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); J. S. Morrill and Maurice Ashley, “Oliver Cromwell,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2023.

campaigns in Ireland and Scotland until the proclamation of the Commonwealth of England, Ireland, and Scotland on September 3, 1651. Cromwell's military triumphs elevated his political sway, resulting in his appointment as Lord General of the Commonwealth Army. Perceiving Parliament as fraught with self-seeking and corrupt members and incapable of implementing necessary social and economic reforms, Cromwell, leveraging his influence, called upon the army, which he had previously commanded in the Civil War, to dissolve Parliament and exile its members. Subsequently, he undertook a restructuring of the parliamentary system to align with his vision. In December 1653, following the establishment of the new Parliament, Cromwell assumed the title of Lord Protector, a position he occupied until his demise in 1658. Notably, despite being offered the title of king by Parliament before his protectorate, Cromwell declined, yet he wielded powers akin to those of a monarch. Upon Cromwell's death, his eldest son succeeded him in the protectorate. However, navigating the power vacuum left by Oliver Cromwell posed a formidable challenge for his son.⁴⁷ The royalists seized the opportunity to restore the monarchy, resulting in the coronation of Charles II in 1660.

The seventeenth century was no different for France, England, Spain, or the Ottoman Empire. However, the results of the century differ slightly between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, as emphasized in the conclusion.

⁴⁷ Bennett, *Oliver Cromwell*, 227–60; Hutton, *The Making of Oliver Cromwell*, 325–38.

Thesis Structure

The historiography of the seventeenth century received little attention. Most of the researchers generally focus on the question, “What happened?” But very few of them, like Baki Tezcan and Gabriel Piterberg, asked, “How were the events recorded by historians?”⁴⁸ While they asked this question about the deposition of Osman II in 1622, this research addressed the same question regarding the 1656 Çınar Event. This thesis delves into the Çınar Event, serving as a case study to shed light on a political shift and administrative transformation that took place in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Prior to and following the event, notable disparities in the intensity of rebellions and uprisings were observed. However, the main focus of this study lies in the historiography and narration of the event. By comparing contemporary sources with Mustafa Naima Efendi’s account in his *Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn fî hulâsati ahbâri’l-hâfikayn*, it becomes apparent that there has been a significant shift in the narrative, leading to an impact on the true nature and objectives of the event. Exploiting these discrepancies, the thesis contributes to the reconstruction of the narrative, the identification of key individuals, and the understanding of the historiographical networks and frameworks associated with Naima and other specific figures.

⁴⁸ Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*; Baki Tezcan, “The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: A Historiographical Journey,” in *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Jane Hathaway (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004), 25–45; Gabriel Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Piterberg Gabriel, “The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa: Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Jane Hathaway (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004), 13–25.

From 1589 to 1656, at least fourteen uprisings took place in Istanbul. The Janissaries organized or played a significant role in only two of them. One occurred in 1622, and the other in 1648. Both events were labeled as rebellions because, at the end of the events, sultans were either killed or dethroned. Despite this, researchers have focused on the seventeenth century as an age of Janissaries' rebellions and have shown little interest in the cavalry troops. Due to these perspectives, the *Ayak Divanı*, one of the primary methods of argument and negotiation used by cavalry troops against the empire in the seventeenth century, has never been thoroughly studied. It served as a means for participating in the government and decision-making processes of the Ottoman Empire. However, the functions and significance of the *Ayak Divanı* remain shrouded in obscurity. Most of the Ottoman historians asked: What did the janissaries do? but nobody asked what the cavalymen did. In my study, I asked this question in the context of the Çınar Event. And here, this study challenges traditional historical perspectives.

My thesis is composed of three chapters, excluding the introduction, conclusion, and appendix. Chapter one is concerned with contemporary narratives. The chapter will examine the 1656 Çınar Event through contemporary narratives, with a specific emphasis on its primary practice and key individuals' ideas. The main objective is to uncover the insights that can be gained from these narratives regarding the Çınar Event. By utilizing various contemporary sources, the process of the event was outlined, and an emphasis on one of its main praxes, the *Ayak Divanı*, was conducted for the first time in literature. The earliest implementations of the *Ayak Divanı* and its subsequent transformation over the centuries will also be analyzed.

Furthermore, the oligarchy, which was ruled by the *meydan aghas* and lasted for seventy days, will be defined here, along with how the organizers of the event, who originally came from cavalry soldiers, underwent an identity transformation.

Chapter two focuses on Mustafa Naima Efendi and his account of the Çınar Event in the *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbârî'l-hafıkayn*. This section aims to demonstrate how Naima instrumentalized and reconstructed the past, particularly the Çınar Event. This section delves into Ottoman political thought, exploring both individual and collective ideas. Naima altered the perception of certain individuals, their roles, and their thoughts in order to establish a basis for his main objective: to legitimize the Köprülü administration before the Çınar Event and the criticized activities of his patron, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, before the 1703 Event. The central question is: How does Naima manipulate historical events and figures to contribute to the legitimization of the Köprülü administration and Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa?

Further, one of the detonators of the Çınar Event, the Grand vizierate of İbşir Paşa, and the uprising that cost him his head were taken into account to portray the dynamics of intra-elite conflicts and the flexibility of factional transactions. The execution of İbşir Paşa was not only the result of the unkept promises made to the cavalry units for their support but also the result of the rivalry between two eminent Ottoman administrators, İbşir and Kara Murad Paşas. Within the scope of this chapter, a novel rendition of the 1656 Çınar Event is offered to the scholarly discourse.

The second chapter is also concerned with Mustafa Naima Efendi's narrative strategies in his *Tarih*. This chapter continues with the biography of Mustafa Naima, and I will emphasize his career as a bureaucrat-origin historian. I will then go on to an exploration of his family ties, career, and network, and determine the background of his work. Afterward, under the second title, another biography of one of the primary sources of Naima, Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, will take the stage. When constructing his *Tarih*, Naima selectively chose contemporary sources that aligned with his specific purposes, exhibiting a biased approach. He cherry-picked particular details that supported his narrative. Naima utilized individuals' conflicts of interest and thoughts from a pragmatist perspective. However, to clearly understand these facts, it is necessary to consider the main source of Naima's work. Therefore, extensive research has been conducted on Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, who played a crucial role in Naima's retelling of the Çınar Event, and his rival Hocaşade Mesud Efendi.

This research includes an examination of Abdülaziz Efendi's biography, family background, career, political affiliations, waqf activities, and his work, *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar*. Considering these aspects, a framework is established to enhance the understanding of why Naima relied on Abdülaziz Efendi as a source and why he carried his biases against certain figures, such as Hocaşade Mesud Efendi, into his chronicle. Later on, Hocaşade Mesud Efendi's biography was taken into account to illustrate the conflict and problems he had with Abdülaziz Efendi. Also, Naima's perspective on this conflict, how the conflict is reflected in Naima's *Tarih*, and how Naima utilized it are questioned to understand Naima's historiographical thought.

This title aims to analyze the interconnected narratives of Mustafa Naima and Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi to shed light on their respective historiographical methodologies, biases, and socio-political contexts around the question of: Why did Naima choose Abdülaziz Efendi as his main source instead of more reliable and event-centric contemporary sources? Moreover, this chapter elucidates two historiographical and political networks associated with Naima, Abdülaziz Efendi, various Janissary Aghas, and the Köprülüs. Through these networks, a historiographical connection between Naima and Abdülaziz Efendi is being identified and contributed to the literature for the first time.

Later on, the chapter examines Mustafa Naima Efendi's intentions to write his *Tarih*. Naima constructed his *Tarih* to legitimize his patron, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, and the Köprülü family at certain points. However, Naima employed a sophisticated method to achieve his goals as a historian who was supported by the Köprülüs. While Naima was writing his *Tarih*, his patron, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, was in a rivalry with Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, one of the three şeyhülislams—the other two, Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi and Hocaazade Mesud Efendi—who were executed due to their political involvement in Ottoman history.

Naima's narrative had two different dimensions. In the first dimension, Naima used certain individuals related to the Çınar Event (Süleyman Paşa and Hocaazade Mesud Efendi) to emphasize their cautionary tales and how their ambitions led to their downfall. To defend his patron, Naima recreated images of these individuals and fictionalized their figures through the Çınar Event.

While Süleyman Paşa, who was one of the main reasons for the Çınar Event in 1656 from Naima's perspective, symbolized a weak and incapable grand vizier, the opposite of any of the Köprülü grand viziers, Hocaade Mesud Efendi symbolized scheming and corrupt religious authority who damaged the empire, just like Feyzullah Efendi. The chapter questions how Naima created correlations between his subjects by using historiographical materials and narration tools.

In the second dimension, Naima wrote an addendum titled *Feyzullah Efendi Event* (Feyzullah Efendi Vakası) to analyze the 1703 Event against Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi and his ambitions. While writing the addendum, Naima severely criticized Feyzullah Efendi, his political intrigues, and his nepotism. Naima created or reconstructed some dialogues and scenes to provide a solid ground for his critics against the rivals of Amcaade Hüseyin Paşa. Through this addendum, Naima indicated that his patron, Amcaade Hüseyin Paşa, was qualified and suitable to govern the empire. However, Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi did not allow him to fulfill his duty. Even though he was only a religious authority, he exceeded his limits and attempted to govern the empire with his ambitions. Due to this, in Naima's perspective and narrative, Feyzullah Efendi received the punishment he deserved in real-time events.

At the end of the chapter, a reassessment of Naima's Feyzullah Efendi addition to *Tarih* has been submitted. One interesting aspect of Naima's *Tarih* is taken into account. Naima begins his introduction with the Hudaybiyah agreement signed between the Muslims of Madina and the Pagans of Mekka

in 628 under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. In Ottoman historiography, it can be observed that some historians chose to start their history with a narration of the history of Islam. However, none of them chose a specific case to start with, except Naima. He explains how the Prophet Muhammad's decision to sign the agreement with infidels saved the lives of hundreds of Muslims. His emphasis was on this, and he did not say anything more about the agreement. Naima aimed to lay the solid groundwork for his patron's most controversial diplomatic maneuver, the Treaty of Karlowitz, in response to criticism coming from Feyzullah Efendi and his supporters regarding signing an agreement with infidels.

Chapter three presents a broad review of the impact of Mustafa Naima Efendi on the narration of the 1656 Çınar Event in the literature. In this review, I demonstrated how Naima shaped the literature and historical perspective, how the historians wrote their studies about the event, and in what contexts. I identified the contexts in which the Çınar Event was placed and the current narrations of the event. I also traced historians' sources and pointed out that the majority of the sources originated from Mustafa Naima. With this effort, I have made it concrete that Naima's influence and motivations, which caused his re-narration of certain events in order to legitimize his patron, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, and his family, have shaped the majority of the studies. In addition, the analysis of the images of Süleyman Paşa and Hocaazade Mesud Efendi in the literature provided here. It is apparent that the literature cumulated under the shadow of Naima.

Based on contemporary biographical works such as *Vekâyi'u'l-Fuzalâ* and *Zeyl-i Şakâ'ik*, the beginning of the appendix section will provide a concise biography of Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi, a historian and scholar from the seventeenth century. Ahmed Efendi is widely recognized as the primary source for Naima's *Tarih*; however, he did not receive much interest in literature. Lastly, an interesting archival document and its English translations will be provided in the appendix.

CHAPTER I: THE ÇINAR EVENT AS A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL PHENOMENA

On Sunday, February 27, 1656 (1 Ca. 1066), the grand vizier Süleyman Paşa, distributed stipends to the Janissaries with the funds he managed to collect with great difficulty. In appreciation of his efforts, Sultan Mehmed IV first rewarded him with two robes of honor.⁴⁹ Yet, just two days later, he found himself replaced by Deli Hüseyin Paşa, ex-commander of the Crete Expedition⁵⁰ and Surnazen Mustafa Paşa was appointed as his deputy (*kaimmakam*).⁵¹ Meanwhile, within the city of Istanbul, a contingent of several hundred Janissaries, arriving from Crete, were claiming that they had gone without salaries for several months.⁵²

⁴⁹ Berna Mert, “IV. Mehmed Devri Bir Kaftan Defteri (H. 19 B. 1058-24 N. 1086/ 9 Ağustos 1648-12 Aralık 1675) (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)” (M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, 2022), 318–19.

⁵⁰ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, trans. Fahri Çetin Derin (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2008), 84; Ziya Akkaya, “Vecihi Devri ve Eseri: 1637-1661/1057-1071” (Ph.D., Ankara University, 1957), 132; Solakzade, *Tarih*, ed. Halit Atlı, trans. Vahid Çabuk (İstanbul: İBB Kültür Aş, 2016), 903; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, ed. Nevzat Kaya (Ankara: TTK, 2003), 234; Hande Nalan Özkasap, “Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)” (M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, 2004), 21; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Yücel Dağlı, Seyit Ali Kahraman, and İbrahim Sezgin, vol. 5 (İstanbul: YKY, 2001), 8; Ertuğrul Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani” (Ph.D., Marmara University, 2000), 43; Hrand Andreasyan and Fahri Çetin Derin, “Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre),” *İstanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 3 (1957): 58.

⁵¹ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 84; Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani,” 43; Özkasap, “Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme),” 21; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, 234.

⁵² Andreasyan and Derin, “Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre),” 58; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, 236; Ramazan Aktemur, “Anonim Osmanlı Vekayinamesi (H. 1058-1106/M.1648-1694) (Metin ve Değerlendirme)” (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul University, 2019), 99; Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani,” 43. While most of the sources concurred that the soldiers who arrived from Crete were Janissaries, Mehmed Halife claimed that the soldiers were cavalry troops.

In this petition to the Palace, Hüseyin Paşa expressed gratitude for the bestowed gifts acknowledging his recent triumphs in Crete.⁵³ However, he explicitly urged for the immediate disbursement of quarterly payments for the Janissaries under his command.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the Janissaries who managed to get paid were encountering a different challenge. The city's artisans and craftsmen, in other words *ehl-i suk*, were staunchly refusing to accept or purchase the devalued coins distributed to the Janissaries by Süleyman Paşa.⁵⁵

In response to this defiant stance from the *ehl-i suk*, the Janissaries took matters into their own hands, dismantling stalls and launching attacks on the artisans' shops.⁵⁶ The escalating tension, spanning approximately five days,

⁵³ The apparent reason for the Cretan War, or the Siege of Crete (1645-1669), was an attack on the Ottoman galleon that was carrying the former Agha of the Darüssaade, Sümbül Agha, and about 3000 pilgrims to Egypt. The Maltese pirates plundered the galleon and sold the booty in Crete, which was under the rule of Venice. The Ottoman government accused Venice of protecting the pirates and violating the treaty between them, then used this as a *casus belli* and mobilized the navy. In 1646, Hüseyin Paşa was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Crete campaign. At the beginning, his strategy and efforts enabled the Ottoman army to conquer the castle of Resmo in 1646. While Hüseyin Paşa continued the expedition, the supply of the soldiers became problematic. Venice blockaded the Ottoman ships' routes to Crete, and as a result, Istanbul was unable to send supplies. As a result, Ottoman progress in Crete slowed down. Not only the lack of food but also the non-payment of soldiers' salaries caused unrest. Hüseyin Paşa sent requests to the Sultan for a solution to the situation. However, it was not until the Grand Vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa that a permanent solution was found. Mücteba İlgürel, "Deli Hüseyin Paşa," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1999); Hasan Ali Cengiz, "Osmanlı Kaynaklarında Girit Seferi," *Trakya Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 9, no. 17 (2019): 105–33.

⁵⁴ TS.MA.e/704-39.

⁵⁵ The term *ehl-i suk* refers to a combination of Ottoman esnaf (tradesmen and artisans) who have a shop in Istanbul's markets, so-called bazaar/çarşı. Each esnaf who had a shop in çarşı could either provide a service or sell a variety of goods. *Ehl-i suk* included an extended scale of vendors and craftsmen in itself. However, the term did not mean that all of the esnaf worked in harmony and cooperation. Fundamentally, all the esnaf groups, which can be considered under the term *ehl-i suk*, had their own dynamics, hierarchy, regulations, and guilds. They had their own unique organizational capability and capacity to administer themselves internally. Eunjeong Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 62; Ahmet Kal'a, "Esnaf," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1995).

⁵⁶ Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 43.

reached a critical juncture as it triggered a massive uprising on Friday, March 3 (6 Ca.). The catalyst for this upheaval was the proposal put forth by the certain member of the *sipahis* (cavalry troops), who, having yet to receive their quarterly payments, suggested a collaboration with the discontented Janissaries.⁵⁷ According to Eremya Çelebi's eyewitness account, the union of Janissaries and cavalry troops, consummates quickly. The ensuing chaos, which disrupts the customary Friday rituals, prompts the *ehl-i suk* to take preemptive measures, such as swiftly shuttering their shops.⁵⁸

While Eremya's account paints a vivid picture of the events, his narrative is sometimes veiled in ambiguity, leaving some crucial questions unanswered. Just an example: Did the impact of the disruption extend to all mosques *intra muros* or was it confined to those in close proximity to the Palace? Albeit these uncertainties in his version of events, Eremya Çelebi draws attention to a notable absence, the *cuma selamlığı*.⁵⁹ In other words, the traditional greetings parade of the sultan before going to and coming from the Imperial Mosque, where he was to attend the Friday prayers. This

⁵⁷ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 85; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 43; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 236; Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 22.

⁵⁸ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre)," 58.

⁵⁹ *Cuma selamlığı*, a customary ritual observed by the Ottoman sultans, involved the exchange of greetings before and after the Friday prayer as they made their way between the Palace and the designated mosque. This ceremonial act served as an opportunity for the sultan to personally greet his subjects and listen to their grievances and take their petitions. Moreover, it was a means for the sultans to manifest their presence and visibility to their subjects. The significance of this practice lay in the role of the sultan fulfilling his duty to ensure justice, as he sought to reassure his subjects on a weekly basis that he would consistently uphold and safeguard justice. Mehmet İpşirli, "Cuma Selamlığı," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1993).

interruption in a routine ceremonial practice marks indeed a significant departure from the norm.⁶⁰

Before the night of March the 3rd, bridging Friday to Saturday, Janissaries and cavalry soldiers had independently expressed their concerns about payment problems in various parts of the city. However, according to Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, writing not *in situ* but building on his network of agents in the City, a significant development occurred that night: at the Janissary Barracks in the Et Meydanı.⁶¹ Janissaries and cavalry soldiers came together to discuss their shared grievances. As a result of their discussions, both parties reached an agreement about jointly requesting an immediate *ayak divanı* from the Sultan.⁶² However, the meeting's pivotal details, encompassing their main and contingency plans to achieve their goal, the specifics of their additional requests, the strategic discourse they intended to employ during the crucial meeting with the Sultan, and the allocation of responsibilities in orchestrating their demands, have faded into obscurity: The chronicles and other contemporary observers, unfortunately, provide no further insights into these critical aspects.⁶³ Nonetheless, as detailed both in

⁶⁰ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçian'a Göre)," 58.

⁶¹ Et Meydanı was a square that served various purposes for the Janissaries. Its significance grew during the reign of Süleyman I, when meat distribution to the Janissaries took place, leading to its name as Et Meydanı. However, over time, the square's functions expanded and diversified. It became a gathering place for Janissaries to train, coordinate, and organize uprisings. Furthermore, it functioned as a negotiation center where other groups aimed to persuade and engage the Janissaries in uprisings. Additionally, Et Meydanı often served as the starting point for Janissaries' movements during uprisings. Lastly, the square also functioned as a base for Janissaries to assess the situation during an uprising. Abdülkadir Özcan, "Etmeydanı," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1995); Önder Kaya, "Et Meydanı: Osmanlının Nabzının Attığı Yer," *İstanbul Mekan ve İnsan*, 2012, 46–78.

⁶² Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, 236.

⁶³ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 85; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 43–44; Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 22; Aktemur, "Anonim Osmanlı Vekayinamesi (H. 1058-1106/M.1648-1694) (Metin ve Değerlendirme)," 99; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve*

Abdülaziz Efendi's narrative, and in some other accounts, it is evident that a large number of cavalry troops spent the night at the Janissary Barracks – something not very usual. As the early hours of Saturday approached, around four o'clock, the gathered crowd started to proceed towards At Meydanı⁶⁴ to press further for the *ayak divanı*. Evliya Çelebi further recounts that prior to the assembly at At Meydanı, numerous boats journeyed from Üsküdar to Istanbul. It is conceivable that those arriving by boats were among the cavalry soldiers who, in 1655, had initially come to Istanbul with the promise of rewards from İbşir Paşa and had remained around the city following his execution.⁶⁵

In the morning, the newly established assembly managed to formally present their request to the Sultan. However, swayed by the counsel of the aghas of white and black eunuchs, Mehmed IV opted for a mediated approach

Metin) 1732, 236–37; Solakzade, *Tarih*, 903; Akkaya, “Vecihi Devri ve Eseri: 1637-1661/1057-1071,” 133; Andreasyan and Derin, “Çınar Vak’ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan’a Göre),” 59; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8.

⁶⁴ At Meydanı, also known as the Hippodrome, was the most important public space in Ottoman Istanbul from 1453 to the early republican era. It served as a center for ceremonies, meetings, uprisings, and other events. The function of the square changed after the Ottoman conquest. While it once served as a venue for horse racing and entertainment for the Byzantine emperors and their people, it took on a new role in the Ottoman era. During the Byzantine era, emperors would participate in events held in public squares like Hippodrome to increase their visibility to their subjects. However, with the Ottoman conquest, the emperors' presence faded away, and the square became the exclusive domain of the people. Due to its strategic location and features, At Meydanı became a site for gathering, protesting, threatening, and uprisings, making it a crucial part of the Ottoman uprising mechanism. At Meydanı was a location where rioters could persuade sultans to negotiate and accept their demands. It was specifically used by cavalry soldiers and the Janissaries to take the high ground against the sultan and his officials. While the location was used by soldiers to compel the sultan to accept their demands, it also restricted the Palace's movement area. Meydanı represented an opportunity and advantage for the people, but a restriction and threat for the Ottoman Palace. Doğan Kuban, “Atmeydanı,” in *Hippodrom/Atmeydanı: İstanbul'un Tarih Sahnesi*, ed. Ekrem Işın, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Pera Müzesi, 2010), 17–32.

⁶⁵ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8 Let me note that contrary to other accounts, Evliya Çelebi's narrative, enriches our comprehension of the varied and possibly interrelated factions entangled in the events preceding the unrest.

to pacify the crowd, instead of immediately endorsing their plea for an urgent meeting under his behest and in his presence. Two groups of negotiators were dispatched for this purpose. Initially, Nakib Efendi (*Nakibüleşraf**) and Koca Nişancı Paşa, the chancellor, were appointed. But, this initial negotiation team made no headway with the crowd, prompting their return to the Palace with the unwavering demand for an *ayak divanı* still in place.⁶⁶ As the day drew to a close, a portion of the Janissaries and cavalry troops chose to linger around at At Meydanı, while some opting to spend the night in various locations such as Yeni Camii, Mehterhane, and *Çingane çergeleri* (possibly not a precise site like the previous, but gypsy tents set around the eastern walls of the Palace).⁶⁷ On Sunday, March the 5th, the Sultan dispatched an imperial letter (*name-i hümayun*⁶⁸) to Vezir Tavukçu Mustafa Paşa and Bolevi Mustafa Efendi, tasking them with negotiations aimed at pacifying the discontented sipahis and janissaries.

By preparing the letter, Mehmed IV's initiative extended beyond merely winning hearts; it also involved fortifying the mediators' position against the dissenting factions. Through this letter—the exact contents of which remain unknown to us—the Sultan seems not only to acknowledge the

⁶⁶ Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 43–44.

⁶⁷ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8.

⁶⁸ The *name-i hümayun* was an imperial letter that Ottoman sultans sent to their equals, vassals, or rulers who govern a privileged territory that was granted by the sultan. The purpose of this letter varied, ranging from announcing the ascension of a new sultan, demanding an oath of loyalty, or proclaiming newly acquired territories. However, the case in 1656 highlighted an anomaly in Ottoman practice, as the sultan chose to send an imperial letter to the mob instead of a customary firman (ferman), via an envoy. Presumably, the Sultan's primary objective was to facilitate negotiations and preempt potential violence targeting his officials. This act aimed to demonstrate the Sultan's earnest consideration and handling of the mob's grievances and requests, while also seeking to contain and suppress the escalating uprising. Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, "Name-i Hümayun," in *DİA* (Ankara: TDV, 2019); Mübahat Kütükoğlu, "Ferman," in *EI (Third Edition)*, 2016.

Janissaries and cavalry troops' uprising but also to legitimize somehow the soldiers' recent demands. Typically reserved for communication with foreign or vassal states, *name-i hümayun* took on a novel role in this occasion by being addressed to the Sultan's *kuls*, aimed at quelling the uprising and de-escalating tensions. Yet, despite this imperial intervention, the crowd persisted in their demands, reiterating them to the negotiators, who were then dispatched back to the palace.⁶⁹

In addition to the mediators appointed by the palace, there appear to be individuals who have taken it upon themselves to engage in negotiation attempts. An example of such a self-designed peacemaker is Kara Abdullah, a *divan-ı hümayun mevkufatçısı* of cavalry origin, associated with Şeyhülislam Kocahüsamzade Abdurrahman Efendi. In various accounts, Kara Abdullah is depicted as making his way to At Meydanı on Monday 6th, convinced that his cavalry background would make him a credible interlocutor. Conversely, alternative sources suggest a different motivation, proposing that he sought to exploit the chaos for personal gain and rewards. Be that as it may, Kara Abdullah faced an unexpected and tragic turn of events upon his arrival. Without giving him a chance to speak, the crowd pulled him down from his horse and after slaughtering him, dismembered his body which they hung in the *Mehterhane* hall.⁷⁰ In this manner, the Janissaries and cavalry

⁶⁹ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre)," 59; Akkaya, "Vecihi Devri ve Eseri: 1637-1661/1057-1071," 133; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 85; Solakzade, *Tarih*, 903; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 236-37; Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 22; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8.

⁷⁰ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 238; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8; Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 24; Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya

troops, who had still not yet received a positive response to their *ayak divanı* request, were giving most probably a warning to the Palace by lynching Kara Abdullah and then displaying his body. A hint of what they might do if the events turn out not to be in their favor.

The terrible demise of Kara Abdullah marked a significant juncture in the escalating violence of the Çınar Event. Initially directed towards inanimate targets such as shops and stalls, the violence took a more sinister turn by claiming the life of someone who presented himself as a negotiator. In light of this mounting brutality, the Palace acknowledged the futility of pursuing a resolution through mediators. On the day Kara Abdullah met his tragic end, the Sultan, fully recognizing the gravity of the situation, summoned the discontented soldiers to gather at the *Alay Köşkü* for an *ayak divanı*, signaling a shift in the approach to addressing the unrest.⁷¹

1.1 *Ayak Divanı*s and Their Stakes

The *ayak divanı* holds a paramount importance during the events of 1656. If the traces of this peculiar form of *divan*, where diverse segments of Ottoman political society conveyed their grievances verbally to the Sultan, can be found well before 1656, there is a lack of comprehensive studies on the subject. Therefore, in the subsequent discussion, if I abstain from providing an exhaustive scholarly examination of the origins, characteristics, and dynamics of these assemblies, I nonetheless offer relevant insights which

Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre),” 59; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 88; Solakzade, *Tarih*, 903–4.

⁷¹ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 238; Akkaya, “Vecihi Devri ve Eseri: 1637-1661/1057-1071,” 133–34; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 88; Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gilmani,” 44.

would shed light on their diverse functions and implications pertaining to the Çınar Event.

The earliest documented instances of *ayak divanı*, date back to 1563 and 1565.⁷² While these references in the chronicles may suggest a connection to the later years of Süleyman the Magnificent, during the reigns of Selim II and Murad III, this practice does not seem to have a wide usage. Be that as it may, in February of 1595, Mehmed III, following his ascension to the throne and his visit to the sacred site in Eyüp where he engaged in the ceremonial act of sword girding—a moment of institutional significance in its own—organized a pivotal *ayak divanı* during his return trip from Edirnekapı to the Palace.⁷³ There, the sultan in motion actively engaged in discussions with viziers, like on military campaigns, and attentively listened the pleas voiced by the common people. It is also worth noting that, this extraordinary divan

⁷² *Tarih-i Selaniki*, 1:3–6, 67.

⁷³ Ascension ceremonies held great significance in the Ottoman Empire, as they served to announce the accession of new sultans and enabled subjects to take a loyalty oath to their sultans. Until the late sixteenth century, there was a lack of clarity regarding the nature of these ceremonies. However, by the early seventeenth century, it became evident that the ceremonies consisted of two distinct steps. During the first step, the prince would be escorted to the *hırka-i şerif* department by the agha of the *darüssaade* and the swordbearer agha. Here, the grand vizier and the *şeyhülislam* would pledge their loyalty to the sultan. Subsequently, the prince would appear before the *babüssaade*, where both palace officials and external dignitaries would declare their allegiance to the newly enthroned sultan. This marked the completion of the first stage of the ceremony. The second stage of the ascension ceremony took place at the Eyüpsultan Tomb and involved the sword-girding ceremony. After receiving loyalty oaths within the palace, it was now time for the sultan to make himself visible to his subjects. The sultan would make the journey to Eyüp either by an imperial boat or by road. Along the way, whether while en route or upon returning to the palace, the sultan would visit the tombs of previous sultans such as Mehmed II, Bayezid II, Selim I, and Süleyman I. At the Eyüpsultan Tomb, the sultan would then symbolically gird a sword, which held sacred connotations. The primary purpose of the sword-girding ceremony was to secure the recognition of the sultan by his subjects and to elicit loyalty oaths from all segments of Istanbulite society. Abdülkadir Özcan, “İstanbul’da Cülus ve Kılıç Kuşanma Törenleri,” in *Antik Çağdan XXI. Yüzyıla Büyük İstanbul Tarihi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2016); Abdülkadir Özcan, “Kılıç Alayı,” in *DİA* (Ankara: TDV, 2002).

witnessed the inclusion of a major political actor, the şeyhülislam, to the *ayak divanı*.⁷⁴

Another *ayak divanı* during the last year of Mehmed III's reign, in January 1603, requires here a particular focus insofar as it served as a kind of prototype for the subsequent ones that took place throughout the seventeenth century. This time the *divan* was not assembled at the behest of the sultan; rather, it was in response to a request from the cavalry troops.⁷⁵ The latter, utilizing this platform, circumvented the Palace's customary negotiation and concession processes and ended up with the executions of almost-omnipotent Gazanfer Agha, the chief white eunuch (*Babussaade/kapu Ağası*), and Osman Agha, the chief black eunuch (*Darüssaade Ağası*). These punishments were the first ones known to have taken place as a consequence of an *ayak divanı*.⁷⁶

Under Sultan Suleyman I, the *ayak divanı* served mainly for quick decision-making, but during Sultan Mehmed III's reign, it expanded to address grievances from the sultan's servants. This shift in the *ayak divanı*'s dynamics saw the cavalry troops actively participating in governance for the first time—instead of an outright rebellion, as was the case in 1589—leveraging this newfound influence to advocate for their political causes. Additionally, a notable turning point also occurred in that occasion when the

⁷⁴ *Tarih-i Selaniki*, 1:455–56.

⁷⁵ Ocakaçan, “Geç 16. ve Erken 17. YY’da Osmanlı Devleti’ndeki Patronaj İlişkilerinin Gazanfer Ağa Örneği Üzerinden Venedik Belgelerine Göre İncelenmesi,” 107–21.

⁷⁶ Aycibin, “Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin,” 417–18; Ocakaçan, “Geç 16. ve Erken 17. YY’da Osmanlı Devleti’ndeki Patronaj İlişkilerinin Gazanfer Ağa Örneği Üzerinden Venedik Belgelerine Göre İncelenmesi,” 123–28.

cavalry troops strategically allied themselves with the Janissaries before formally co-petitioning for an *ayak divanı*, a joint gathering at At Meydanı.

It is improbable to characterize the reigns of Ahmed I, Ibrahim I, and Osman II as epochs of political tranquility in Istanbul. Indeed, one could speculate that Sultan Osman II's reluctance to engage in councils with soldiers may have exacerbated the escalation of violence, which amounted to his ominous demise.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, it is apparent that the clamor for councils prompted by soldiers intensified during the reign of Murad IV. Three of the significant *ayak divanı* of the seventeenth century occurred during the latter's reign. Two of them were convened in response to the demands of the cavalry troops, while the third one was assembled by the order of the Sultan himself.

Indeed, an examination of the events unfolding in 1632, makes evident that their similarities to those of 1656 are not confined to a singular facet and warrants a nuanced exploration. But perhaps it is time to revisit some good-

⁷⁷ Soldiers did not demand an *ayak divanı* during this upheaval. There are a couple of reasons for this. Primarily, the soldiers obtained a *fatva* from the *şeyhülislam* to support their requests on legal grounds. With this *fatva*, the soldiers could compel the Sultan to abandon his ideas. Another reason was that instead of a formal *ayak divanı*, there were some mutual attempts at negotiation. Prior to the escalation of the unrest, the Palace sent negotiators chosen from prominent figures, such as *şeyhülislam* Esad Efendi, Nakibüleşraf Şerif Gubari Efendi, Zekeriyazade Yahya, Kafzade Faizi Efendi, Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi, Sivasi Efendi, Kadızade Efendi, the Şeyh of Monla Gürani, and other şeyhs who held prestigious positions among the Istanbulite society. The eventual *ayak divanı* became pointless since the soldiers rejected these prominent figures as peacemakers, and moreover the Sultan was not in favor of any further negotiation. Hüseyin Tugı, *Musibetname*, trans. Şevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: TTK, 2010), 36-38. In the eyes of Osman II, the soldiers were seen as a leaderless mob who would disperse at the sight of a powerful sultan and his determination. Most importantly, there was a correlation between the deposition of Osman II and the 'unwritten constitution of the Ottoman Empire'. The Sultan had to ensure privileges for certain elite groups; otherwise, the balance between the Sultan and these elite groups could be affected. If the balance, which was the reason for the Sultan's maintenance of power, began to favor the Sultan, then the unwritten constitution would come into play, and a new candidate who had promised the elite groups the continuation of their privileges upon enthronement would be put forward: Baki Tezcan, "Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1618–1622)" (Ph.D., Princeton University, 2001), 266; Burak Onaran, *Padişahı Devirmek Osmanlı Islahat Çağında Düzen ve Muhalefet: Kuleli (1859), Meslek (1867)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2018), 40.

old monographies. Mustafa Akdağ suggests that describing Celâlî activities merely as rebellion inadequately captures their moves. Therefore he introduces alternative terminology, preferring the term ‘Great Celâlî Struggle’. What forces lead large groups to forsake their allegiance to the state? In the case of the cavalry soldiers, it was the loss of privileges. Subsequently, these soldiers sought refuge in Paşa’s households, assuming roles as commanders of Celâlî groups that congregated under the paşas. Suffice to say here that some of the cavalry units operating independently in various regions, were labelled as ‘zorba’ by the Palace chroniclers.⁷⁸

If the labels *zorba* and *zorbalık* were started to be employed to denote the oppressive practices of cavalry soldiers in Anatolia, where they coerced cash and in-kind taxes from the civilian population, upon their arrival in Istanbul, these troublemakers underwent a noteworthy change and metamorphosed into *meydan ağası*, aghas of the square. This transformation not only altered the nomenclature but also reshaped the identity and strategies of the cavalry soldiers. Mustafa Akdağ challenges thus the conventional classification of events during the early years of Sultan Murad’s reign as mere ‘Celâlî Uprisings,’ asserting that these urban revolts possessed distinctive features and characterized these social movements as *zorba* incidents.

An instance of this is evident at the outset of the 1632 Istanbul uprisings, where the *zorbas* congregated in At Meydanı and initially demanded the execution of seventeen statesmen, attributing their responsibility for Hüsrev Paşa’s dismissal. It’s noteworthy that the majority

⁷⁸ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası* (İstanbul: Cem, 1995), 330–40.

on this list were members of the *Divan-ı Hümayun*. In opposition to Hafız Paşa's appointment as the Grand Vizier following Hüsrev Paşa's dismissal, the Janissaries and cavalry troops, organized most probably by Topal Recep Paşa, convened and seized control of At Meydanı in February 1632 to demand an *ayak divanı*. Responding to the soldiers' demand, the Sultan organized a council to hear the representatives of the crowd in front of the 'Port of Felicity'. Present at the council, aside from the Sultan and the crowd's representative, were viziers, scholars, and the Şeyhülislam Yahya Efendi. However, the Sultan did not accede to the crowd's requests, which included the execution or dismissal of Hafız Paşa, Yahya Efendi, and fifteen others. Sultan Murad IV, addressing the representatives, stated, "If you are not listening to my answers which make you not worth engaging with, why did you invite me to the council?" Subsequently, he departed harshly and headed to his Harem.⁷⁹ When the crowd's representatives saw the Sultan's departure, they threatened the Sultan, "My sultan, if you do not hand over these seventeen people to us; in that case, we know what to do!" This threat was evidently a reference to the Osman II's tragic fortune.⁸⁰

As tensions escalated among the assembled factions, unease permeated at At Meydan when the representatives returned empty-handed following the Sultan's rejection of their demands. In a bid to persuade the Sultan, Recep Paşa asserted, "My Sultan, appeasing these seditious men is imperative, and there is no alternative to meeting their demands. If they desire me as well,

⁷⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, trans. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 3 (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 699–701.

⁸⁰ Aycibin, "Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin," 823; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:701–4.

surrender me. A servant has always been a sacrifice for his master.” However, he proceeded to underscore historical precedents, implicitly warning the Sultan, “They have obtained what they sought from previous sultans too.” Sultan Murad IV, discerning the growing threat to his regime, realized that the uprising would persist until he acceded to the demands. Succumbing to the pressure, Hafız Pasha was handed over to the crowd and subsequently met his terrible end.⁸¹

A while later, in March, a new uprising emerged, and it knocked on the door of the Sultan again since he had executed Hüsrev Paşa, deemed responsible for the February uprising.⁸² The Janissaries and cavalry soldiers demanded again an *ayak divanı* for the second time in early 1632. The representatives came once again in front of the ‘Port of Felicity’ for the council and bluntly addressed the Sultan: “My Sultan, why did you execute a valuable vizier like Hüsrev Paşa and harm your state? Now, give us Hasan Halife, Musahib Musa Çelebi, and Defterdar Mustafa Paşa, and we will tear them apart.”⁸³ They even went further and proclaimed “If you do not give us what we want, you are not anymore our Sultan.”⁸⁴ Moreover, the crowd alluded to the presence of the princes in the Harem to remind Sultan Murad

⁸¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:703 Naima’s narrative features recurring quotes and phrasings, utilizing a familiar mise-en-scene seen in both Osman II’s deposition and the current events. By drawing parallels with past events, Naima subtly suggests continuity in soldiers’ behavior across different eras. While the characters may vary, the underlying themes persist, such as soldiers seizing what they desire. This juxtaposition implies a shift in dynamics during the Köprülü era, where soldiers may have refrained from making such audacious demands, reflecting changes in governance and societal norms. ; Aycibin, “Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin,” 824.

⁸² Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:705–7.

⁸³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:708.

⁸⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:708.

IV how they could easily dethrone him.⁸⁵ In the face of potential dethronement, the Sultan found himself compelled to once again acquiesce to the crowd's demands.

Muhyiddin, a member of the Kadiri order, underscored in his *Nasihatname* that conducting an *ayak divanı* was regarded as one of the Sultan's responsibilities.⁸⁶ The poem below is likely to be written in 1632:

O Sultan, let an ayak divanı convene
If throne and crown you aim to keep serene, ...
Your forebears oft assembled in debate
Yet you, in this, have shown a different state.
Let twice a year the council's voice be heard
Or yearly, let this ritual be conferred....
I have come to warn you with generosity,
Hold an *ayak divanı*, wake up with generosity,⁸⁷
...
In the annals of time, the divan did convene
In consultation, wisdom's gleam was seen.
Oh Shah, heed the call of history's sway
For in counsel's embrace, greatness holds sway⁸⁸

Muhyiddin not only counseled the Sultan to convene an *ayak divanı* twice a year but also advocated for its institutionalization as a ritual or law.⁸⁹ However, contrary to Muhyiddin's counsel, the authority to call an *ayak divanı* was significantly wielded by soldiers, particularly the cavalry.

⁸⁵ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:708–9.

⁸⁶ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, 24–25 As Rifaat abou el Haj emphasized in his work, *nasihatnames* were not only about “how to,” but they also served as a reflection of a voice, an opinion, and the political point of view of individuals or specific elements within the ruling class that had lost out in a struggle.

⁸⁷ Mehmet Emin Tuğluk, “17. Yüzyıl’a Dair Harekeli Bir Eser: Kadiri Muhyiddin’in Manzum Nasihat-Namesi (İnceleme-Metin-Sözlük-Özel İsimler Dizini-Tıpkı Basım)” (Ph.D., Adıyaman University, 2018), 302.

⁸⁸ Tuğluk, 914.

⁸⁹ Tuğluk, 302.

Nevertheless, the last known *ayak divanı* of Sultan Murad IV's reign in June 1632, convened at the Sinan Paşa Palace by the Sultan's directive. Representatives from diverse segments of the empire were summoned, including Grand Vizier Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha, viziers, Şeyhülislam Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi, kadıaskers Karaçelebizade Mehmed Efendi and Hocazade Abdullah Efendi, Nakibüleşraf Şeyhi Efendi, Şeyh Kadızade, commanders, and prominent figures from the Janissaries and cavalry troops.⁹⁰

After the *ayak divanı* in March, Receb Paşa was executed due to his involvement in the preceding events.⁹¹ By acting so, the Sultan annihilated the most important supporter of the Janissaries and cavalry troops. Following this, cavalry troops gathered at Ok Meydanı and demanded a pacification. Tabanıyassı Mehmed Paşa, instead of acceding to the cavalry's demands, conveyed those individuals seeking privileges beyond their entitlements had been suspended from service by an imperial decree. Following this decree, the cavalry soldiers congregated at their preferred gathering place in such situations—At Meydanı—to start their protest.⁹² Considering the other two experiences in 1632, it is not difficult to anticipate the next step of the soldiers.

Yet, the Sultan swiftly ordered an *ayak divanı* himself before the gathered cavalry soldiers could demand one.⁹³ Sultan Murad IV ordered a

⁹⁰ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:717.

⁹¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:716–17; Aycibin, “Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin,” 827.

⁹² Aycibin, “Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin,” 827; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:717.

⁹³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:717; Aycibin, “Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin,” 828.

council to be held at the Sinan Paşa Palace instead of by then traditional the Port of Felicity. Likely, the Sultan made this decision due to the potential threat of dethronement. After gathering at the Sinan Paşa Palace, the Sultan sent a message to the cavalry troops at At Meydanı, asking them to send a few prominent cavalry members to represent them at the *ayak divanı*. There, he stated: “If my cavalry servants are obedient, let them send a few prominent ones as representatives from among them. They should convey their requests to the representatives. They should also accept the arrangements approved by the prominent ones.”⁹⁴

The latter complied with. During the *ayak divanı*, Sultan Murad focused his attention first on the Janissaries, citing Holy Scriptures (such as Quran 4:59) to stress obedience. He cautioned against opposition, warning of divine repercussions in this life and the hereafter. In response, the Janissaries reaffirmed their loyalty, venerating the Sultan as their sovereign, equating him with divine authority. Recognizing their allegiance, Sultan Murad nevertheless emphasized that some actions of the Janissaries contradicted obedience to God, the Prophet's teachings, and his authority as Caliph. He urged them to withdraw support from dissenters, promising rewards for compliance. The Janissary leaders affirmed their obedience to the Sultan, disavowing any allegiance to dissenters. Upon Sultan's request, they swore oaths on the Quran, meticulously recorded by Nakibüleşraf Şeyhi Efendi, solidifying verbal commitments into a written record.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:718.

⁹⁵ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:718–19.

Upon the Janissaries' oath, the Sultan addressed cavalry leaders, who declared loyalty, echoing Janissary sentiments. Despite their proclamation, the Sultan harbored skepticism, noting discrepancies between words and actions, and expressed a sense of skepticism:

Cavalrymen! You are indeed a fanatic group, as it seems impossible to make you submit in any way. Your opposition is causing harm to the state, and your demands have become unmanageable. You claim to be my servants, yet under the guise of service, you share and destroy my subjects (*reyaya*). Because you sheltered those among you who do not believe in God, merciless outlaws multiplied among yourselves. They do not listen to the prominent among you; instead, they plunder and displace the subjects. Though your number is forty thousand, the rightful number of services owed to you is five hundred. Why do you demand payment? You have plundered and displaced the subject. Without the subjects, where can I find the money to pay you? Whatever I give you is never enough. In the world, you have gained a bad reputation as rebels.⁹⁶

When the representatives of the cavalry troops heard the Sultan, they could not but reply in the following manner: “God forbid, we are loyal to the Sultan. We do not accept the label of rebels. We are friends to the Sultan’s friends and enemies to his enemies. We do not approve of those who pressure our Sultan and behave disrespectfully. We do not have the power to control them, and we do not approve of their disgraceful behavior.”⁹⁷

Upon hearing the response from the cavalry representatives, the Sultan mandated that they, like the Janissaries, pledge an oath on the Quran. Faced with the Sultan’s insistence, prominent cavalry members reluctantly took the

⁹⁶ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:718.

⁹⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:719.

solemn oath on the Quran. When the Sultan demanded the surrender of those causing unrest, a handful of cavalymen who resisted compliance were forcefully expelled from the Palace by the Janissaries.⁹⁸ After the conclusion of the *ayak divanı*, a document was issued detailing the reasons for convening the council, and recording the decisions made. In the *iblağ* (or, *dispositio*) of the text, a kind of contract is described:

From this day forward, we will not act against the will of the Sultan, and we will not come together to make demands outside the services provided to the soldiers as per the ancient laws. We have reached an agreement on this matter. If contrary to Islamic law and the Sultan's will, an individual or group makes a collective demand, we will adhere to what Islamic law requires. The aghas of the corps and the Janissary soldiers have taken the same oath. If we do not oppose an unjust person when our benevolent Sultan commands us, may the curse of Allah, the prophets, the angels, and the ummah of Muhammad be upon our corps.⁹⁹

Sadrazam Mehmed Paşa, Şeyhülislam Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi, Vezir Bayram Paşa, Hüseyin Paşa, and Nakibüleşraf Şeyhi Efendi were recorded as witnesses to this attestation, most probably prepared in *hüccet* form.¹⁰⁰ From then on, Sultan Murad's absolutist rule had its legal tenet.

⁹⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 3:720.

⁹⁹ According to Halil İnalcık, in the *ayak divanı* of June 1632, Sultan Murad IV convened a "meşveret meclisi" to assert his authority. During this council, he extracted loyalty oaths from various segments of society, including the Janissaries and sipahis. İnalcık even claimed that this meeting was an early attempt at constitutionalism. Yet the oaths lacking mutual responsibilities, İnalcık's latter qualification does not really fit in the context. Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tegayyür ve Fesad* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2014), 212.

¹⁰⁰ Aycibin, "Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin," 829–30; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 3:722–23.

1.2 Later Occurences of *Ayak Divanı*

In 1648, the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers sought an *ayak divanı* for the execution of Hezarpare Ahmed Pasha. Nevertheless, Sultan İbrahim declined their request.¹⁰¹ Subsequently, in the same year, upon the accession of Sultan Mehmed IV, the cavalry soldiers once again initiated a demand for an *ayak divanı* during their protests. However, their appeals were rebuffed, leading to the suppression of their uprising when the Janissaries orchestrated a massacre against the assembled cavalry soldiers near the Sultan Ahmed Mosque.¹⁰²

Following the assassination of Kösem Sultan in 1651, Mehmed IV, under the counsel of his mother, Turhan Sultan, mobilized his supporters to the Palace. In response, Janissary aghas loyal to Kösem Sultan issued a call for their followers to gather at the Orta Mosque. Despite the appeal led by Bektaş Agha and other Janissary aghas, the response fell short, and their supporters dispersed. Subsequently, these aghas found themselves summoned to the *ayak divanı* by the Sultan. Anticipating the likely outcomes of the council, they opted to abstain from attending, discerning a perilous future. Attempting to elude the confines of Istanbul, their efforts proved futile which culminated in their discovery, and eventual execution. In 1655, an unsuccessful *ayak divanı* demand emerged from the Janissaries and cavalry troops to prevent the execution of İbşir Paşa, a topic we will revisit later.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, trans. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 4 (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 1152.

¹⁰² Naima Mustafa Efendi, 4:1186–95.

¹⁰³ Özkasap, “Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme),” 21.

Upon scrutinizing the series of *ayak divanı*s convened prior to the Çınar Event, it becomes evident that these assemblies played multifaceted roles in Ottoman governance. They functioned not only as forums for interrogation, accountability, and administrative discussions but also served as arenas for decision-making, the consideration of petitions, the solicitation of consent, and active participation in governance. Beyond mere procedural facets, these gatherings held a strategic role in checking the Sultan's authority, influencing his decisions, and aspiring to be integral components of the decision-making apparatus. The exploration above sheds light on the transformative dynamics that have unfolded, notably portraying the Altı Bölük *Sipahis* and Janissaries' quest for a place within the decision-making echelons. This endeavor, though modest in its outcomes, signifies a discernible shift in the power dynamics of the Ottoman political society. This is evident not only per the participation of şeyhülislam, *nakibs*, and other personalities but also per the inclusion of diverse factions within the military class which argued for their right to be heard in these councils. In this emerging paradigm, the cavalry men and Janissaries, once marginalized in official councils, seeks not only their rights but also demand acknowledgment in the broader discourse of governance.

1.3 The *Ayak Divanı* in March 1656 and its Terrible Aftermath

After delving into the intricate dynamics of *ayak divanı*s, our narrative brings us back to the climactic days of March 1656. When their request for extraordinary meeting was accepted by the sultan March the 6th, the Janissaries and cavalry troops moved towards Alay Köşkü, where the *ayak*

divanı would be held.¹⁰⁴ As the multitude in front of the Alay Köşkü swelled, Mehmed IV made his entrance, accompanied by viziers, *şeyhülislam*, *ulema*, and eunuchs. The assembly, extending from foot soldiers at the forefront to horsemen at the rear, formed a line, eagerly anticipating the Sultan's address. Positioned, the Sultan engaged with the burgeoning crowd, seeking insights into their desires. Three figures, Sipahi Hasan, Şamlı Mehmed, and Galata Voyvodası Karakaş Mehmed, emerged there as the appointed representatives of the protesters. Among them, Sipahi Hasan, with a raised hand, sought permission to articulate the collective aspirations of the assembly, elucidating the purpose and objectives behind their gathering.¹⁰⁵

Hasan, in these accounts, enters the scene for the first time. Beyond representing the assembled crowd, Hasan stands as a key figure orchestrating the uprising. Addressing the Sultan amidst the crowd, he begins with a prayer for the ruler, met with a resounding "Amin!" from those gathered. Throughout his discourse, Hasan emphatically stressed that their movement harbored no hostility toward the Sultan; rather, its intent was a deliberate endeavor to safeguard the legitimacy of the uprising soldiers. Neither Hasan nor the crowd sought to menace the Sultan, but they would not accept the label of rebels. Nevertheless, contemporary chronicles and observers utilized

¹⁰⁴ Semavi Eyice, "Alay Köşkü," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1989) Situated at the intersection of Alay Köşkü Street and Alemdar Street, to the left of Alemdar Street, the Alay Köşkü stands as a prominent landmark. This thoroughfare not only leads to At Meydanı but also seamlessly connects to Divan Road.

¹⁰⁵ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8; Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre)," 59; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmanî," 44 According to Mehmed Halife, Sipahi Hasan has become sipahi from the iç mehter (inner household) of Hezarpare Ahmed Paşa. Since servants of Paşas could join the six divisions, Hasan might have joined the Cavalry Regiment from Ahmed Paşa's household. ; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 2:141–44.

pejorative terms to characterize the crowd. Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa dubbed them bandits and ‘*rezil*’ (contemptible), while Mehmed Halife employed labels such as bandits, traitors, and *zorba* (tyrants), a term, as we’ve seen, commonly associated with the rebels of 1632. Nihadi categorized them as tyrants and troublemakers, while both Abdülaziz Efendi and Evliya Çelebi employed the label of bandits. Notably, none among them employed the term rebel to characterize the assembled crowd. After the prayer, Hasan commenced his speech in earnest:

My Sultan may Almighty God not deprive your blessed existence of worship and grant you a long life. Your servants have come kissing the ground you walk on to convey their desires and wishes. Thanks to God, our Sultan has reached the age of maturity. He is qualified and capable of governing the state. However, he fails to grasp the importance of maintaining the world’s order. Infidels attack Islamic lands day and night, disregarding the Sultan. They destroy villages and towns, and infidels are triumphant, while Muslims are being defeated day by day. You are being influenced by a group of aghas, following their words. Is what you are doing worthy of the state? Our world is in ruins. There are no subjects or people left; they have all fled to foreign lands. The provinces are vacant and plundered.¹⁰⁶

In his address, Hasan also underscored the Sultan’s attainment of puberty, now at the age of 15, qualifying him as capable of ruling the empire. While acknowledging the Sultan’s wisdom, Hasan critiqued his apparent failure to comprehend the necessity of taking essential measures to uphold the ‘world order’.¹⁰⁷ Hasan proceeded to unveil the core reason behind their

¹⁰⁶ Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gilmani,” 44–45.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Gottfried Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 55–83.

uprising, leveling accusations against the Sultan for allowing the white and black eunuchs, especially their aghas, to meddle more and more in the governance. These Aghas, as Hasan argued, not only wielded influence over government affairs but also extended their interference into the economic domain. Hasan posed a poignant question, highlighting the stark contrast: while the soldiers faced humiliation, these Aghas not only garnered respect but were also perceived as masters of the body politic. This sharp disparity in treatment and status fueled the discontent among the soldiers, prompting them to challenge the prevailing power structures that allowed such injustices to persist. In Hasan's verbal communication, the grievances were rooted in a perceived betrayal of the empire's values, where those in positions of power were exploiting their authority to the detriment of the military and, by extension, the broader societal fabric:

What is the source of the Arabs' prosperity and magnificence? In your state, where they are considered noble and respected, is it fitting for your servants to be humiliated and considered lowly?¹⁰⁸

The accounts from chronicles and contemporary observers present divergent perspectives regarding the motivations behind the uprising. Evliya Çelebi highlights Hasan's argument, contending that oppression in Anatolian lands led to insufficient revenue for the treasury, resulting in the non-payment of Janissaries' and cavalry soldiers' salaries. In contrast, Mehmed Halife

¹⁰⁸ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 45; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 239; Akkaya, "Vecihi Devri ve Eseri: 1637-1661/1057-1071," 134; Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan'a Göre)," 59–60; Solakzade, *Tarih*, 904; Let's set aside the rhetoric of hatred for the time being, which, however, mirrors increasing animosity within society. Cf. Hakan T. Karateke, H. Erdem Çıpa, and Helga Anetshofer, eds., *Disliking Others: Loathing, Hostility, and Distrust in Premodern Ottoman Lands*, Ottoman and Turkish Studies (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018).

posits a different viewpoint, suggesting that the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers exploited the longstanding influence of the Aghas over the Sultan as a pretext for their uprising.¹⁰⁹ In Hasan's powerful discourse, a significant segment captures his contemplation on the circle of justice, revealing his ideological standpoint. Hasan delineates his vision by articulating the following:

The Sultan is with the servants, and the servants are with the treasury, and the treasury is with the subjects. Without the subjects, there is no treasury, without the treasury, there are no servants, and without servants, there is no sultanate.¹¹⁰

In this framework, four fundamental elements emerge: the servant, the treasury, the subjects, and the Sultan. Hasan not only underscores the equilibrium among these entities but also presents the role of Sultan as somewhat minor without the harmonious interplay of these components. Hasan's ideological stance resonates indeed with Sultan Murad IV's discourse expressed at the Sinan Paşa Palace in 1632. There Sultan Murad had highlighted the detrimental impact of cavalry activities on the provinces' subjects and tax collections. Despite the differing contexts as well as the reverse of causes and effects, both Hasan and Murad IV share a common root in the concept of the circle of justice. If sultan focused on fiscal consequences, Hasan highlighted the issue of unpaid salaries.

Despite the uprising's explicit denial of being against the Sultan, its latent threat to the ruler was obvious. Beyond Hasan, the Janissaries and

¹⁰⁹ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 45.

¹¹⁰ Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 45.

cavalry soldiers harbored their perspectives on the subjecthood and the circle of justice. When after Hasan's speech, Mehmed IV queried the crowd with "What do you want, my servants?" a collective response resonated: "The servant belongs to God, and you are only but his trustee."¹¹¹ While the uprisings of 1622, 1632, and 1655 presented distinct claims from crowds, their articulation remained obscured in historical accounts. However, the narration of the 1656 events departs from this trend, providing rather detailed presentation of the crowd's voices and perspectives. This narrative shift seems to suggest an increasing sensitivity among the political and social elite to grassroots movements and their significance.¹¹²

On behalf of the assembled crowd, Hasan meticulously enumerated their grievances, culminating in the articulation of two crucial demands. The first entailed the prompt disbursement of quarterly payments, addressing the pressing financial concerns of the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers. Simultaneously, Hasan asserted the demand for the execution of individuals deemed responsible for the hardships endured by the military factions. Presenting a list to the Sultan, Hasan specifically identified those accountable for the perceived injustices. Finally, according to the Evliya Çelebi's rendering of events, the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers issued a stark ultimatum to the Sultan, declaring, "Either our demands are met, or consequences will befall not only you but also your close associates and even

¹¹¹ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8.

¹¹² Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Initiatives 'from the Bottom up' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire," in *Osmanistische Studien Zur Wirtschafts- Und Sozialgeschichte: Memoriam Vančo Boškov*, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 24–33.

your mother.”¹¹³ However, this move somewhat contradicts Hasan’s speech as it constitutes an explicit threat to the Sultan regarding deposition.

Upon discovering the individuals listed, the Sultan conveyed a message to Sipahi Hasan through Surnazen Mustafa Paşa in which he suggested confiscation and exile as an alternative to execution for those presumed responsible. However, the crowd vehemently rejected this proposition, even issuing threats against Surnazen Mustafa Pasha, indicating their adamant stance. Recognizing the impracticality of further negotiations, the Ottoman Palace acknowledged, for the second time, the futility of pursuing negotiations in mild manner with the agitated crowd.¹¹⁴

There were six targeted aghas whose names are commonly mentioned in the chronicles. The Palace finally complied with the pressing demand. The Agha of the Darüssaade Behram Agha, Agha of the Kapu (Babüssaade Agha) Bosnevi Ahmed Agha, Has Odabaşı Hasan Agha, Hacı Bilal Agha, Hazinekar (Musahib) Yusuf Agha, and Agha of the Valide Sultan Hacı (Cacı) İbrahim Agha. Behram Agha and Ahmed Agha were executed after the *ayak divanı*, and their corpses were handed over to the crowd.¹¹⁵ The other four

¹¹³ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:8.

¹¹⁴ Evliya Çelebi, 5:8; Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gilmani,” 45; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü’l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 239; Akkaya, “Vecihi Devri ve Eseri: 1637-1661/1057-1071,” 134; Solakzade, *Tarih*, 904; Andreasyan and Derin, “Çınar Vak’ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan’a Göre),” 60 Sources present divergent figures regarding the number of individuals slated for execution. Evliya Çelebi cites forty-seven names; Mehmed Halife indicates more than twenty; Abdülaziz Efendi suggests around thirty; and Eremya Çelebi lists thirty-one. On the other hand, Vecihi and Solakzade provide a lower count, specifying eighteen names. .

¹¹⁵ Mert, “IV. Mehmed Devri Bir Kaftan Defteri (H. 19 B. 1058-24 N. 1086/ 9 Ağustos 1648-12 Aralık 1675) (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin),” 320–21 Behram Agha, who was killed (sometimes mentioned as Bayram), was replaced by the Agha of the “Eski Saray” Dilaver Agha. In the same source, on page 319, it is stated that Has Odabaşı Hasan Agha was also executed on the same day, and Halil Agha was appointed as his replacement. As for the Agha of Kapu Ahmed, Ali Agha of Uskub was appointed to take his position. ; Hafız Hüseyin Ayyansarayı, *Mecmua-i Tevarih*, trans. Fahri Çetin Derin and Vahid Çabuk

demanded aghas could not be executed due to their escape. These aghas probably ran away at the outset of events. However, the Palace guaranteed these aghas would be found and duly handed over to the crowd. The crowd, having taken the bodies of the executed aghas, returned to the At Meydanı and hanged the corpses from their feet on plane trees. Hence, the lasting label of these events in the collective memory.

While displaying the hanged corpses marked the outcome of rather successful uprising, it also revealed the deep-seated anger. The bodies were dismembered, and their flesh and fat were distributed to the spectators who had come to witness the event.¹¹⁶ While some of the crowd behind them took two of the corpses to At Meydanı, Sipahi Hasan and his core group waited beneath the Alay Köşkü. The fact that the Sultan's instructor, Bilal Agha, was forgiven at the end of the day supports this possibility. The forgiveness of one person from the list could only be possible if Sipahi Hasan was persuaded to do so.

In a broader context, historical chronicles tend to depict the Sultan as a moderate figure supportive of compromise. However, a contrasting narrative emerges from a contemporaneous source of the same period, Eremya Çelebi. According to the latter's account, the Sultan exhibited a different demeanor

(İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1985), 107 Ayvansarayi has quoted a poem about the execution of the Agha of the Kapı Ahmed Agha. A humble servant, seeking refuge in Allah's grace / Ahmed Agha, by divine aid, found his place. As a noble agha of the Kapı, he served with might / Unjustly taken, now resting in eternal light. May Allah, in His mercy, absolve his past / Grant him virtuous companions, forever to last. On Cemaziyülevvel's ninth day, he took his leave / In 1066, his spirit did cleave. Turning to Allah, he embraced the eternal call / Recite Fatiha for his soul, let blessings fall. In the morrow, may he find solace, indeed/ Supported by Mustafa, his righteous creed.

¹¹⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:9; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 46.

during the *ayak divanı*, appearing notably emotional and passive. In this portrayal, the Sultan appeared akin to a marionette, seemingly echoing the sentiments conveyed to him by the influential aghas. Eremya Çelebi noted, “The Sultan said, “Forgive three of them for me,” but he did not know who these three people were. He was repeating what he had been told from the ‘inside’.”¹¹⁷

According to Eremya Çelebi, among the names listed was Turhan Sultan, the mother of Sultan Mehmed IV. The Sultan, deeply affected by this demand, was visibly shocked. Tearfully, he pleaded for forgiveness on behalf of his mother: “In a state of fear, the Sultan lowered his headscarf around his neck and, shedding tears, pleaded, “My servants, please forgive my mother.” The soldiers, moved by mercy and feeling embarrassed, said, “We have forgiven your mother, but hand the others over to us, alive.”¹¹⁸

This disparity underscores the considerable variation that can exist within narratives originating from the same historical period. Palace-centered chronicles often depict the Sultan as composed, assuming the role of a mediator and conflict resolver. Conversely, Eremya Çelebi, originating from outside the Palace, portrays the Sultan in a markedly different light. Such divergences in historical accounts are characteristic of the era. Notably, the Çınar Incident represents the inaugural uprising with a direct focus on Sultan Mehmed IV and his inner circle. The 1651 revolt prominently featured Kösem Sultan, while in the 1655 uprising, İbşir Pasha assumed a central role.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Andreasyan and Derin, “Çınar Vak’ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan’a Göre),” 60.

¹¹⁸ Andreasyan and Derin, 70.

¹¹⁹ Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage*, 213–33; Christopher Whitehead, “The Veledeş Conflict: A Reassessment of the Mid-Seventeenth-

Mehmed IV faced the responsibility of delivering the grand vizier who had rebelled against him just a year earlier, a duty he fulfilled. However, in 1656, the unrest reached his doorstep as crowds demanded the execution of those closest and dearest to him.

The crowd harbored concrete ambitions that extended beyond mere demands of execution; their objective was to actively participate in the decision-making process and reform the Ottoman governance. The Palace, in turn, found itself in need of a capable Grand Vizier in Istanbul to fulfill the commitments and promises made at the *ayak divanı*. But this was difficult since Grand Vizier Hüseyin Paşa was in the siege of Crete. On March 6th, the same day as the *ayak divanı*, Hüseyin Paşa was dismissed before the Grand Vizierate seal reached him. Surnazen Mustafa Paşa was appointed as the Grand Vizier.¹²⁰ The Palace made the decision to pacify the uprising. However, the crowd appeared dissatisfied with the Palace's choice and opposed the latter appointment. On the day Mustafa Paşa assumed the position, around four o'clock in the afternoon, Sipahi Hasan approached the Sultan, expressing this rejection and demanding the appointment of Siyavuş Paşa in his stead.¹²¹ Following Hasan's request, Surnazen Mustafa Paşa was dismissed from the Grand Vizierate, and Siyavuş Paşa was assigned to the

Century Rebellions of the Altı Bölük Halkı," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 8, no. 1 (2021): 291–310.

¹²⁰ Mert, "IV. Mehmed Devri Bir Kaftan Defteri (H. 19 B. 1058-24 N. 1086/ 9 Ağustos 1648-12 Aralık 1675) (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)," 319.

¹²¹ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 87; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:9; Kürd Hatib, *Risale-i Kürd Hatib: Dördüncü Mehmed Saltanatında İstanbul*, trans. Hacı Ahmet Arslantürk (İstanbul: Okur Akademi, 2014) According to *Risale-i Kürd Hatib*, one of the key figures behind the uprising was Surnazen Mustafa Paşa, who is described as the "muharrik-i fitne," meaning the instigator of the uprising. ; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 48.

position. Koca Yusuf Paşa was appointed as the latter's deputy.¹²² Hasan's actions serve as a clear indication of a discernible shift in the political power dynamics within Istanbul.

The strong involvement in decision-making and governance extended beyond the mentioned incident. Following the resignation of Şeyhülislam Hüsâmzade Abdurrahman Efendi, prompted by his opposition to the *ayak divanı*, the crowd took charge of determining the next Grand Mufti. As Abdurrahman Efendi stepped down from the şeyhülislam position, he expressed interest in assuming the role of Qadı of Jerusalem. Additionally, he recommended Memikzade Mustafa Efendi, a close associate, for the position of şeyhülislam, a recommendation that was heeded, and Mustafa Efendi assumed the role.¹²³ However, the crowd rejected him as the new Grand Mufti and expressed their disapproval, saying, "How come this deficient and ignorant man became şeyhülislam?"¹²⁴ Instead of Mustafa Efendi, the crowd wanted to see Hocaşade Mesud Efendi. We will further investigate his case in the second chapter.¹²⁵

¹²² Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 87–88.

¹²³ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçian'a Göre)," 61–62; Mert, "IV. Mehmed Devri Bir Kaftan Defteri (H. 19 B. 1058-24 N. 1086/ 9 Ağustos 1648-12 Aralık 1675) (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)," 319.

¹²⁴ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:9.

¹²⁵ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 242. Abdülaziz Efendi has quoted a poem about Abdurrahman and Melikzade Efendis. To explain things to ignorance is in vain/ Known as Memekoğlu, that lowly one/ He was Müftüoğlu, that sack of shit/ He became the heir of Hüsâmzade/ What is the reason for the moon to darken so much?/ What caused this calamity?/ How can he be worthy of the fatwa position?/ We would discuss if there were a matter/ I said, let it not happen anymore, to Hatif/ Hatif said "İla salise" is the date. Besides, the displeasure of Abdülaziz Efendi because of Mesud Efendi's appointment as the şeyhülislam can clearly reveal itself. However, the problem between Abdülaziz Efendi and Mesud Efendi will be examined in the second chapter.

1.4 Transformation of the Identities and the 70-Day Oligarchy of the Sipahis

On Thursday, March 9 (12 Ca.), the dispersal of the crowd and the reopening of shuttered shops marked an essential moment in the Çınar Event, commonly deemed its conclusion in existing literature. However, this classification is somewhat inaccurate. Contrary to the prevailing notion of a six-day duration, my thesis posits a more extended period of seventy days. This temporal extension is justified by the recognition that the incident persisted until the demise of Sipahi Hasan and his associates, emphasizing that the subsequent shift in the crowd's mobility did not signify the true conclusion of the event.

Sipahi Hasan and his associates underwent an identity transformation with the power they obtained during the Çınar Event. While in the *ayak divanı*, Hasan and his associates took a significant risk by confronting not only the Sultan but also the Turhan Sultan and her faction. This faction was mainly composed of eunuchs in the inner Palace and bureaucrats who held crucial financial positions outside of the Palace.

These figures belonging to the cavalry class acquired a new title and were from then on identified as *meydan ağası*. Among them, Hasan stood out prominently. Initially, Hasan, who brought together cavalry soldiers and the Janissaries, was an organizer. However, during the *ayak divanı*, Hasan, who met with the Sultan, became a representative. Naturally, he became a representative with the authority bestowed upon him by the crowd. Hasan, appearing before the Sultan and ordering him about appointments and dismissals, was henceforth identified as *meydan ağası* Hasan. The crowd, which was initially the subject of the uprising, had now become the object

under Hasan's representation. Hasan, in turn, was positioned as the actor/subject of the uprising. Having become a source of power, Hasan directed the objects. He was no longer the one going to the crowds to organize them; instead, crowds and individuals came to Hasan with gifts to get their matters resolved. Furthermore, Hasan and his associates opportunistically established a cavalry oligarchy, benefiting from the advantages of this oligarchy for about seventy days.

Right before the moment that *ayak divanı* had to be approved by the Sultan, Sipahi Hasan was a mere vociferous organizer among the *pares*; however, after he took a step forward and addressed the Sultan henceforth, he became superior to the mob which gathered around him. Sipahi Hasan was the first superior figure acknowledged by the mob, which gave him the right to represent them. Similar figures to Hasan, such as Çalık Ahmed, would occur in the near future. Along with Hasan, his associates Şamlı Mehmed, Karakaş Mehmed, Yamak Ali, Kara Osman, and Kürt Osman also received privileges due to Hasan's new perception. Hasan challenged a certain group that had significant influence over the Empire's politics and finances through a double-sided network that contained prominent figures both from the inside and outside of the Palace. Hasan's main intention and claim were to ensure justice, but his definition of justice was self-serving and aligned with the interests of the mob that gathered around him. For their benefit, someone needed to sacrifice to open a space for a takeover. To claim a new status, they must first establish a space in which to operate. After the takeover, Sipahi Hasan and his associates could only be referred to as *meydan aghas*.

The legal pursuit of the individuals listed continued, and those aghas sought by the mob were apprehended in their concealments and subsequently subjected to execution. Their lifeless bodies were then strung up on plane trees by their feet.¹²⁶ After the executions of Hasodabaşı Hasan Agha, Hazinekar Yusuf Agha, and Hacı İbrahim Agha, all five aghas demanded by the crowd were killed, except for Bilal Agha, who was forgiven. However, the victims extended beyond these individuals.

Historical records and contemporaneous observers provide insights into the involvement of the aghas' associates in the provinces and certain palace personnel in the unfolding incident. Among the earliest casualties were Meleki Kalfa, a servant of Turhan Sultan, and her husband, Şaban Halife. Subsequent to their apprehension, their lifeless bodies were shrouded in rugs, mounted on horses, and transported to At Meydan, where they were publicly hanged on plane trees. Evliya Çelebi's account adds a distressing detail, noting that Meleki Kalfa's body was subjected to further humiliation, including the exposure of private parts.¹²⁷ Gümrük Emni Hasan Agha, Tersane Emni Salih Agha, Deli Birader Ahmed Agha, Topkaplı Mustafa Agha, and Mimar Mustafa are some further names that were always sought for.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:10; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 242–43.

¹²⁷ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:10; Andreasyan and Derin, “Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kômürciyan'a Göre),” 63–64 “... The woman who, just yesterday, trembled her servants while sitting on magnificent seats, was today loaded onto a horse like a worthless burden and taken to be hanged.”

¹²⁸ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 243; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:10.

On March 14 (17 Ca.), amidst the ongoing persecutions, Grand Vizier Siyavuş Paşa arrived in Çatalca and initiated preparations for entering the city. During this period, Evliya Çelebi paid a visit to him. The Grand Vizier entrusted Evliya Çelebi with the responsibility of conveying directives to Melek Ahmed Paşa in Van.¹²⁹ Siyavuş Paşa entered Istanbul on Tuesday, March 16, with fifty men after a two-day delay. The Sultan honored Evliya with a robe of honor.¹³⁰ As evident from this, a majority of our sources are deeply entrenched in the events, offering diverse perspectives, whether from the Palace, from high dignitaries or from other esteemed figures with varying perspectives.

One of the most sought-after individuals, Gümrük Emini Hasan Agha, was apprehended in a residence in Galata and subsequently incarcerated. Eremya Çelebi offers intriguing insights into the capture of Hasan Agha and the ensuing developments. According to Eremya Çelebi, there existed a longstanding association between Siyavuş Paşa and Hasan Agha. Following Siyavuş Paşa's dismissal from the grand vizier position in 1651, Hasan Agha assumed a supportive role by providing significant financial backing, covering the expenses of the Pasha's residence in Istanbul. With Siyavuş Paşa's return to the Grand Vizierate, Hasan Agha harbored hopes of reciprocation; however, these hopes were dashed by Siyavuş Paşa. To preempt any disclosure of Siyavuş Paşa's order for Hasan Agha's execution,

¹²⁹ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:10.

¹³⁰ Mert, "IV. Mehmed Devri Bir Kaftan Defteri (H. 19 B. 1058-24 N. 1086/ 9 Ağustos 1648-12 Aralık 1675) (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)," 321; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:10; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 88; Solakzade, *Tarih*, 905.

a distinctive theatrical performance was devised.¹³¹ The Sultan rejected Siyavuş Paşa's plea for clemency on behalf of Hasan Agha. This strategic move aimed to shift accountability for Hasan Agha's execution away from Siyavuş Paşa and onto the Sultan himself. The scheme unfolded as planned, and on Friday, March 17 (20 Ca.), Hasan Agha met his demise at the hands of the executioners, having been incarcerated for a period leading up to the execution.¹³² His body was not hanged on a tree or dismembered like the other victims. According to Evliya Çelebi, nobody dared to touch Hasan Agha's body.¹³³ However, the absence of the crowd in the At Meydanı can be another reason for this. Another source that corroborates Eremya Çelebi's account is *Tarih-i Nihadi*. Abdullah, the youngest son of Customs Chief Hasan Agha, wrote the margins of this manuscript. In these notes, Abdullah claimed his father's execution was unjust and named the individuals he held responsible. He titled Siyavuş Paşa's death as "Peg out the evil body of the Grand Vizier, Siyavuş Paşa," further supporting the consistency of Eremya's narrative.¹³⁴

Siyavuş Paşa's first term as Grand Vizier began in 1651, a period marked by significant changes in power dynamics. Influential figures such as Kösem Sultan and Bektaş Agha were removed from their positions, making way for Turhan Sultan and the eunuchs to assume power.¹³⁵ Siyavuş Paşa could not adapt to this shift, and he had conflicts, especially with Agha of the Darüssaade Süleyman Agha, who was close to Turhan Sultan. As a result,

¹³¹ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre)," 66–67.

¹³² Andreasyan and Derin, 67.

¹³³ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 5:11.

¹³⁴ Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 26.

¹³⁵ Mahmut Ak, "Siyavuş Paşa," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 2009).

Siyavuş Paşa was dismissed and sent to Bosnia, while Gürcü Mehmed Paşa was appointed as Grand Vizier.¹³⁶ During his second term as Grand Vizier in 1656, Siyavuş Paşa made considerable efforts to secure his position by relocating many influential individuals with strong ties to the Palace away from Istanbul. Surnazen Mustafa Paşa, who was initially appointed as Grand Vizier before Siyavuş Paşa, was assigned to the governorship of Erzurum. Furthermore, Süleyman Paşa, who had been dismissed from the position of Grand Vizier before the Çınar Event, was appointed to serve in Bosnia on April 2. One of Siyavuş Paşa's most formidable rivals, Gürcü Mehmed Paşa, was assigned to Cyprus on the same day.¹³⁷

Siyavuş Paşa's decisions were evidently motivated by a strategic intent to fortify his position as Grand Vizier, drawing insights from his past experiences. This strategic foresight was likely informed by the dynamics of his prior tenure. Moreover, Siyavuş Paşa's second appointment as Grand Vizier was influenced by his previous role in the same capacity. In the context of the Çınar Event, all executions and dismissals were intricately linked to associates of Turhan Sultan. Consequently, Siyavuş Paşa emerged as the most suitable candidate for the Grand Vizier position, having been previously dismissed by the faction associated with Turhan Sultan. However, Siyavuş Paşa's life was cut short on April 26 when he passed away from a protracted illness. Boynuyaralı Mehmed Paşa, who was in Damascus at the time and was

¹³⁶ Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gilmani," 48.

¹³⁷ Oral, 49; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 249–51.

recommended by Hocazade Mesud Efendi, succeeded as the Grand Vizier. As the acting vizier, Koca Yusuf Paşa held his position.¹³⁸

In the weeks that followed the beheading of Customs Chief Hasan Agha, Tersane Emini Salih Agha and Topkaplı Mustafa Agha were apprehended and executed in Sarı Solak's residence in the Mahmut Paşa neighborhood.¹³⁹ Mimar Mustafası and Çingane Beyi Deli Birader followed them.¹⁴⁰ Unfortunately, the sources do not provide information about who else was executed after this point. While a ledger listing twenty or thirty individuals is referenced, it remains unclear whether all the named individuals faced execution or if only the more prominent names were carried out to assuage the crowd's demands.

The Çınar Event turned the tables in the favor of Sipahi Hasan and his associates. It appears that Hasan and his partners collected some of the properties of those who were executed. However, chroniclers and observers do not specify the extent of their wealth. Mehmed Halife is the sole source that mentions Sipahi Hasan enrolled six thousand cavalry apprentices in seventy days and collected six hundred purses of money.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ The Tezkireci of the Damascus, Hacı Mehmed sent his congratulations to Mehmed Paşa upon his appointment to the position of Grand Vizier. TS.MA.e/669-9; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 254; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 49; Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 29; Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan'a Göre)," 69.

¹³⁹ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 249.

¹⁴⁰ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 88; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 250; Aktemur, "Anonim Osmanlı Vekayinamesi (H. 1058-1106/M.1648-1694) (Metin ve Değerlendirme)," 101.

¹⁴¹ Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 50.

Hasan's multiple appearances before the Sultan served to enhance both his and his associates' political standing. Consequently, the heightened reputation and accumulated wealth stemming from the Çınar Event positioned them as noteworthy political figures in Istanbul. This elevation in status underscored their newfound influence within the political landscape of the time. From that point onward, Sipahi Hasan, Şamlı Mehmed, Karakaş Mehmed, Yamak Ali, Kara Osman, and Kürt Osman began to be referred to as *meydan ağaları* (meydan aghas).¹⁴² They were recognized as influential figures. *Meydan aghas* were displaying this influence in the streets of Istanbul by walking around along with their slaves and cavalry escorts.¹⁴³ Yet, the burgeoning wealth they amassed began to incite a palpable reaction from the crowd that they had assembled. A group from the crowd accused *meydan aghas* of exploiting them to collect wealth, property, and money and gain a reputation. To protest *meydan aghas*, the group stoned Şamlı Hasan's house, which was state-owned and given to Hasan during the event. Şamlı Hasan then moved to a smaller house near Eğrikapı.¹⁴⁴

In the month of May, critical developments unfolded as reports from Anatolia reached the heart of Istanbul. Seydi Ahmed Paşa, a close confidant of the late Grand Vizier Ibşir Paşa (d. 1655), took action against the cavalry troops whom he perceived as responsible for Ibşir Paşa's execution, seeking retribution through their execution. This move triggered a wave of chaos among the cavalry soldiers stationed in Istanbul. Faced with the escalating

¹⁴² Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 255; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 89–90.

¹⁴³ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre)," 70.

¹⁴⁴ Andreasyan and Derin, 67.

tension, the cavalry soldiers turned to Sipahi Hasan, urging him to persuade the Sultan to launch a campaign against Seydi Ahmed Paşa in Anatolia. On May 8 (13 b.), Sipahi Hasan presented himself before the Sultan, advocating for a military campaign against Seydi Ahmed Paşa. While the Sultan granted permission, it became apparent that the Palace officials were reluctantly accepting this request. Simultaneously, dissatisfaction simmered over the increasing dominance and influence wielded by the *meydan aghas*. As the campaign plans were ostensibly discussed, the *meydan aghas* were summoned to the Palace. However, upon their arrival and admission to the Imperial Chamber, a swift and brutal turn of events unfolded. Sipahi Hasan, Şamlı Mehmed, Yamak Ali, and Kara Osman were executed on the spot, signaling a decisive shift in the power dynamics. Furthermore, an imperial decree was issued for the execution of other associates and supporters of the *meydan aghas*, marking a consequential episode in the ongoing political tumult.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 92; Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani,” 49–50; Andreasyan and Derin, “Çınar Vak’ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan’a Göre),” 70–71; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü’l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, 255–56.

CHAPTER II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NARRATIVE STRATEGIES OF MUSTAFA NAIMA EFENDI

Mustafa Naima Efendi began to write his chronicle, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî hulâsati ahbâri'l-hâfıkayn*, approximately fifty years after the 1656 Çınar Event. While the *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn* (henceforth referred to as *Tarih-i Naima*) diligently chronicles the Event, it frequently diverges from its contemporaneous sources, albeit being often influenced by them. In this chapter, I aim to explore the factors that distinguish Naima's account from its predecessors, establishing it as the primary reference for later historians when recounting the Çınar Event and its intricate relation to Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi's *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar*. I conclude this chapter by emphasizing Naima's departure from his chronological narrative through his two seemingly unrelated sub-chapters: the discourse on the Hodaybiya peace and his depiction of Feyzullah Efendi's career. Despite their apparent peripheral nature, these sections, as I intend to demonstrate, are intricately linked to his reconfiguration of the Çınar Event, shedding light on his strategic narrative techniques and the underlying themes of his historical discourse.

Let us begin the analysis without delay. Even within the chronological narrative, Naima employs distinct techniques compared to other chroniclers. This departure from convention is evident from the outset with the account of Grand Vizier Süleyman Paşa's dismissal, which directly precedes the Çınar Event. While contemporaneous sources narrate it as a routine dismissal, Naima introduces a new perspective, constructing an entirely new

framework.¹⁴⁶ In *Tarih-i Naima*, the Grand Vizier Süleyman Paşa becomes a puppet-like figure since the government belongs, *de facto*, to Turhan, the Sultan’s mother, and a coalition of influential palace Aghas under her influence. The presence of a retinue accompanied by a network of spies paints a picture of pervasive surveillance and constrained freedom of movement, signaling a leadership under strain and lacking in autonomy. In this configuration, Süleyman Paşa’s role seems limited to mere oversight of the Palace’s financial transactions, devoid of any further administrative responsibilities.¹⁴⁷

Naima proceeds then to present a scene where Mimar Kasım Agha makes a proposition to Süleyman Paşa to surround himself with reliable associates with whom he could collaborate effectively. In response to Süleyman Paşa’s avowal that those in his proximity were conspiring against him, and he lacked trustworthy individuals, Kasım Agha proposed the inclusion of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in his circle – the latter was in Tripoli subsequent to his dismissal. Dismissing Kasım Agha’s proposal, Süleyman Paşa retorted, “Are you recommending that I place my trust in a financially insolvent man, who, incapable of acclimating to new environments, embroils himself in conflicts and faces subsequent dismissals?” Naima’s audience can readily infer the incompetence and lack of foresight in this vizier, as they

¹⁴⁶ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 84; Özkasap, “Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme),” 21; Ramazan Aktemur, “Anonim Osmanlı Vekayinâmesi (H.1058-1106/M.1648-1694) Metin ve Değerlendirme” (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul University, 2019), 99; Oral, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani,” 43.

¹⁴⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, trans. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 6 (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 1644–48.

possess the advantage of hindsight, allowing them to anticipate the unfolding events and the consequential fate of the depicted statesman.¹⁴⁸

With this enigmatic scene and dialogue, Naima hints that the Grand Vizier should possess substantial authority and autonomy, extending beyond financial duties to encompass broader governance responsibilities. He suggests a connection between Süleyman Paşa's purported deficiencies and the subsequent tumultuous events, insinuating that his perceived weakness contributed to a leadership vacuum. As such, he also implies that the effective governance witnessed under Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, and his successors was rooted in their ability to fulfill the multifaceted role he outlines for an ideal Grand Vizier. Furthermore, he intimates that Mehmed Paşa's potential candidacy for the grand vizierate predated the Çınar Incident but Süleyman Paşa's shortcomings obstructed Mehmed Paşa's involvement, implying that under the Köprülü family's influence, crises like that of 1656 could have been averted.

Moreover, *Tarih-i Naima* scrutinizes the role of palace aghas involved in the Çınar Incident, particularly emphasizing their obstruction of Süleyman Paşa's voluntary resignation in January. Their refusal, allegedly influenced by their allegiance to Kara Murad Paşa, significantly complicated Süleyman Paşa's dismissal from office. Naima elucidates the aghas' motivations for rejecting the Grand Vizier's request:

¹⁴⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1645.

He is a gentle and mild-mannered man. He lacks the power to reject our requests and appoint his men. He consults us on all matters. Let him remain like a worthless figure in his position; let us have the authority to make decisions and find solutions in state affairs. We will benefit from our share of the state. In this way, we can contribute to the Treasury, advance our beneficial jihad by serving the Sultan with loyalty, and engage in the struggle for the future with devotion and sincerity.¹⁴⁹

The source of Naima's information regarding the secret discussions among the aghas remains quite obscure. The quote, unique to *Tarih-i Naima* and absent in other historical sources, appears strategically integrated to enrich the narrative's storytelling. While ostensibly shedding light on Süleyman Paşa's dismissal, Naima introduces unverifiable subplots to bolster his storyline. Contrary to Süleyman Paşa's surface portrayal, he implies that the true architects of some fateful decisions in early 1656 were the white and black eunuchs within the Palace. Unsurprisingly, these same aghas became the focal point of the discontent led by Sipahi Hasan.

As previously noted, contemporaneous sources lack a detailed account of how the livid crowd was organized by Sipahi Hasan and his associates, and there's an unclear time gap between the payments of *mevacib* and the preparatives of the *ayak divanı*. Naima's narrative elucidates the motivation behind the convergence of cavalry soldiers and Janissaries, with Sipahi Hasan already playing a significant role. However, contrary to contemporary narratives, in Naima's account, Hasan plays a prominent role only during the *ayak divanı* and its immediate aftermath.

¹⁴⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1645 The mention of Kara Murad Paşa refers to the power struggle between İbşir Paşa and Murad Paşa in 1655. The aghas of the Palace sided with Murad Paşa in this conflict.

According to *Tarih-i Naima*, Hasan primarily focused on rallying cavalry soldiers and Janissaries for an uprising through his speech at the At Meydanı after the surge of dissatisfaction among the troops following the distribution of *mevacibs*. Hasan addressed cavalry soldiers eloquently, highlighting challenges and proposing alliances with the Janissaries:

Look, comrades, our *mevacibs* were minted worthlessly. They also gave the minted, debased currency to the Janissaries. Meanwhile, how long have we been waiting to receive payment? Indeed, we did not receive our payment. The ledger was closed before half of our pay could be received. They say, “Hopefully, we will pay in the next salary period. Be patient.” We buy our food and necessities on credit. We linger in the inns, hungry and deprived. The pay we receive is not even enough to cover our debts to the innkeeper. How long shall we endure this humiliation? The vizier and minister of finance have no concern for us. It is evident that the cause of this distress is the empire’s partners. Let us go, ally with our Janissary comrades, and find a solution to this problem.¹⁵⁰

In this speech, Hasan’s primary concern was the issue of unpaid *mevacibs* and the accumulation of the debts. The party pointed out that those responsible for this situation were indeed the illegitimate partners of the empire, which are the aghas of the Palace. After convincing his comrades to take action, Hasan headed to the Et Meydanı as his second stop. When Hasan reached Janissary Square with his fellow cavalry soldiers, *Tarih-i Naima* reports a second speech: This time, his target audience was the Janissaries, who as well received their payment in debased coins that were not accepted by artisans.

¹⁵⁰ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1649–50.

Comrades, our Sultan does not consent to the oppression directed towards you and us. The reason for this situation is the greedy, immature partners of the empire who are obsessed with accumulating wealth and a few cunning figures known as the prominent figures of the state in the provinces. Ally with us and let us strive to eliminate those lowlifes and restore the Order.¹⁵¹

By this point, in *Tarih-i Naima*, Sipahi Hasan's intentions become clear – the removal of the palace aghas and their allies, seen as the oppressors of the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers. Hasan's proposal suggested that an alliance between the military classes would address existing issues and benefit the state. The events that followed suggest implicit and immediate acceptance of Hasan's proposition by the Janissaries.

Yet, the presence of Hasan's speeches only in Naima's chronicle is, at the least, surprising even if he does not explicitly attribute sources for these word-by-word quotes. In the meanwhile, this omission is unusual because, in general, throughout his *Tarih*, Naima consistently presents acknowledged and referenced quotations, along with their sources.¹⁵² The question naturally arises: Why did Naima incorporate these two quotations without providing explicit references in his chronicle?

It appears that Naima seeks to substantiate his critique of Süleyman Paşa and the Palace aghas through Hasan's speeches. Hasan's focus on a specific group within the Palace and their associates in the provinces aligns

¹⁵¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1650.

¹⁵² Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1651 For a quote taken from Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi's history, Naima states, "Aziz Efendi says in his history," indicating that he quotes from Abdülaziz Efendi. Similar source attributions can be found throughout Naima's chronicle.

with Naima's accusations of widespread corruption originating from the Palace. Implicitly, this bolsters the argument that the empire requires a strong leader like Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. Additionally, Hasan's proposal to remove those responsible, essentially advocating for uprising as a solution, suggests that the threats highlighted by Naima were becoming inevitable. Upon careful scrutiny of the text, the glaring absence of cited sources for Naima's references seems deliberate rather than accidental. It implies a strategic maneuver, akin to his portrayal of Süleyman Paşa, where Naima artfully fabricates speeches. By integrating these cleverly devised speeches into the narrative without explicit references, Naima subtly reinforces the weight of his arguments and enhances fictively the force of his critique.

If we are to return to his depiction of the Çınar Event, Sipahi Hasan skillfully persuades his fellow cavalry soldiers to form an alliance with the Janissaries. Transitioning to a second phase, Sipahi Hasan effectively orchestrates the junction of these two crucial armed forces—the dual monopoly of violence within the empire in the Weberian sense. In the final phase, this formidable coalition of forces, united by a shared goal, proceeds to the At Meydanı, advocating for an *ayak divanı*. By uniting disparate groups eager to assert themselves, Hasan essentially establishes a new political entity and personally assumes its representation. Consequently, Hasan's position and discourse during the *ayak divanı* serve as compelling evidence of this transformative process. In examining Hasan's address to the Sultan, it's apparent that Naima's account diverges from most of the contemporaneous sources, offering a more explicit narrative with specified targets. This new narrative also reveals the motivation behind the aghas' fervent efforts to

obstruct the *ayak divanı* – it goes without saying, absent in other sources. As such, Naima’s innovative alternative clarifies the fuzzy unfolding of events, compensating for lacunae found in other sources.

During the *ayak divanı*, while addressing the assembly at the Alay Köşkü, Hasan highlights the interference of the aghas in provincial affairs. He notes their selective protection of individuals, by granting them influential positions for personal gain and tax exemptions. Hasan also mentions the dismissal of capable viziers and the manipulation of the monetary system to accumulate wealth. Advocating for the execution of the aghas and their associates in the interest of religion and the state, Hasan’s discourse undergoes a further modification in Naima’s narrative. Probably much longer and galvanizing, Hasan’s discourse is distilled by Naima into a final succinct formulation: “The Sultan exists with the servants. The servants exist with the treasury. The treasury is gathered from the subjects. The subjects are pleased with *adl* (justice).” He then continues by reversing the initial equilibrium: “Without the subjects, there is no treasury; without the treasury, there are no servants; and without servants, there is no sultanate.”¹⁵³ This powerful and radical negation must have been a serious blow to his addressees. After gathering the Palace officials and the Sultan as desired, Hasan proceeded to justify their aforementioned reasons by quoting, as he believed that both the Sultan and his officials had neglected their responsibilities. This particular situation signifies the involvement of privileged groups in the realm of politics. Furthermore, it exemplifies a complex power transition from the

¹⁵³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1653.

Palace to a group of oligarchs. Hasan's speech also alluded to a long-awaited transformation within the privileged groups, who were now seeking to assert their influence in the decision-making process. When the Sultan acquiesced to an *ayak divanı* in front of the Alay Köşkü, it signified his willingness to sacrifice his officials in order to safeguard his throne. Prior to relinquishing his officials, he attempted to negotiate. However, the nature of these negotiations differed from before. Previously, the Sultan was the lawmaker; nevertheless, during the *ayak divanı*, Hasan took on the role of lawmaking, at least the authority of the lawmaker, with the Sultan serving as a mere intermediary responsible for transmitting Hasan's messages and enforcing the law. Hasan provided instructions to the Sultan, who dutifully carried them out to protect his reign. According to his subjects, the only way for the sultan to ensure justice was to obey their demands.

But this was not all. Naima introduced as well a notable divergence from contemporaneous sources in the narrative he constructed about Surnazen Mustafa Paşa's very brief tenure as grand vizier. While it is often told that Mustafa Paşa was dismissed due to the intervention of Sipahi Hasan, Naima offers an alternative narrative. Drawing from an unidentified source referred to as 'Mesudzade,' Naima asserts that Surnazen Mustafa Paşa was one of the instigators (*muharrik-i fitne*) of the Çınar Event. However, he did not provide details explaining how and why Mustafa Paşa came to be identified as one of the organizers of the event.¹⁵⁴ However, eventually, the incident organized by Mustafa Paşa turns against him, leading to his dismissal

¹⁵⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1654.

from the grand vizierate at the request of Sipahi Hasan. He is not only dismissed, but also he finds himself exiled from Istanbul and relocated to Erzurum. Naima neither condemns nor delves into Mustafa Paşa's alleged role, merely acknowledging the existence of such claims before swiftly shifting focus. It's plausible that Naima sought to underscore the potential involvement of high-ranking officials in conspiratorial schemes against their counterparts, although his exact motive remains elusive due to the absence of further evidence. This narrative tactic, however, could be interpreted as a means to underscore the necessity of virtuous viziers such as the Köprülüs.

Before delving into that matter *in extenso*, let's focus on Naima's detailed account of how the *meydan aghas* were executed. While contemporary sources state that the aghas were executed to fulfill their sentences, Naima asserts that their dissatisfaction prompted Palace authorities to devise a scheme. Hasan, opposing the meddling of palace aghas in provincial matters, began to intervene from the provinces into palace affairs with his newfound influence. As per the grievances articulated by both the Reisülküttap and Defterdar Sarı Ali Efendi, which are only relayed by Naima, it can be inferred that Kaimmakam Yusuf Paşa organized a meeting with Şeyhülislam Mesud Efendi to address the situation of the *meydan aghas*. Allegedly, during this meeting, Mesud Efendi suggested that forging an alliance with the Janissaries is the only viable solution for removing the *meydan aghas* from their positions.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1666 As Sipahi Hasan and his associate meydan aghas consolidated their power, the Janissaries' presence became less pronounced—or perhaps this was an intentional omission by Ottoman chroniclers—until they resurged, ultimately playing a decisive role in concluding the Çınar Event.

Before moving against the *meydan aghas*, Valide Turhan Sultan's full support was secured. Following this, Kara Hasanoğlu Hüseyin, an influential figure among the Janissaries, was summoned to the Palace by Mesud Efendi and Yusuf Paşa. At this meeting, great importance was placed on seeking Hüseyin's opinions and advice. He expressed that the uprising had effectively removed individuals detrimental to the state, creating a favorable situation. Yet for his opponents, eliminating those who had gained undue power during the uprising was seen as manageable. Forming an alliance with the Janissaries was deemed crucial. To ensure the alignment of Janissaries with the Palace's political stance, a respected and feared figure within the Janissary Corps needed to be appointed as their superintendent. Hüseyin Agha proposed Keçecioğlu Mehmed Agha for this role, a suggestion that gained swift acceptance. Mehmed Agha was subsequently appointed as the Janissary Agha and rapidly recalled from exile. All this wealth of crucial yet in some instances somewhat unverifiable information is, again, only found in Naima.¹⁵⁶

Amidst preparations within the palace, an opportune moment for executing the plan emerges in the provinces. Concurrently, historical accounts detail Seydi Ahmed Paşa's rebellion in retaliation for İbşir Paşa's execution, leading to a massacre of cavalry soldiers in Anatolia. In response, cavalry soldiers in Istanbul decide for action against Ahmed Paşa, and this decision is duly conveyed by Sipahi Hasan to the Sultan, who responded affirmatively. However, Naima's narrative diverges again from the rest,

¹⁵⁶ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1667.

detailing the assembled cavalry soldiers' insistence so that the Sultan lead the campaign when the imperial standard was raised. When Janissary superintendent Mehmed Agha intervenes, and opposing to this demand, Kara Hasanoğlu asks for a fetva from Şeyhülislam Mesud Efendi:

My Sultan, what is the rightful punishment in Islamic law for those who exerce pressure on the Sultan, causing disorder in state affairs and chaos among the servants of God?" In reply to his informal request for a fatwa, he received the following response: "They must be executed (per the *seyf-i siyaset*).” The response from Mesud Efendi resulted with the inevitable execution of the *meydan aghas*. Following Mesud Efendi's words, Sipahi Hasan, Şamlı Mehmed, Yamak Ali, and Kara Osman were immediately executed. To find other suspects collaborating with the *meydan aghas*, the gates of Istanbul were closed for two days.¹⁵⁷

Naima recounts the unfolding of the plan that quelled the seventy-day-long uprising in Istanbul, detailing the stages and attributing its conception to specific individuals. This plan is again mentioned only, and therefore, strangely, in Naima's chronicle – contemporary sources being totally silent. Although all sources discussing the event provide the names of those executed, there is a lack of information regarding the criteria used for their selection. Consequently, the circumstances surrounding the sudden execution of the *meydan aghas*, who were at the height of their influence, remain unclear if we set apart Naima's narrative. It is noteworthy that many of the individuals mentioned in connection to the event had ties to the execution of İbşir Paşa in the year 1655. That's why a flashback is in order here.

¹⁵⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1668–69.

2.1 Revisiting İbşir Paşa's Grand Vizierate: Ambitions, Finances, and Fractured Alliances

The appointment of İbşir Paşa, the ex-governor of Aleppo, as the grand vizier in replacement of Derviş Mehmed Paşa had caused unease among many officials, both in the palace and the provinces. According to Naima, those most disturbed by İbşir Paşa's appointment as the Grand Vizier were Defterdar Moralı Mustafa Paşa, Reisülküttab Şamizade Mehmed Efendi, Şaban Halife, Çavuşbaşı Sarı Mahmud, Gümrük Emni Hasan Ağa, Deli Birader Ahmed Ağa, Tersane Emni Salih Efendi, and Topkapılı Mustafa Ağa.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, while İbşir Paşa was waiting in İzmit to enter Istanbul, the palace aghas went to Sultan's presence and requested the revocation of İbşir Paşa, proposing the appointment of the current *defterdar* as the grand vizier. However, the aghas' request remained unsuccessful due to the intervention of Kara Murad Paşa.¹⁵⁹

İbşir Paşa, gathering twenty thousand cavalry soldiers from Anatolia by promising the registration of *veledeş* and the restoration of services (*hizmet*), left them in Üsküdar and proceeded to İstanbul to appear before the Sultan.¹⁶⁰ Upon assuming his duties, İbşir Paşa's initial actions were aimed at neutralizing or eliminating those who opposed him. His first target was Moralı Mustafa Paşa. He asked him to bring the five hundred purses (*kese*) he had offered to the Sultan on condition of appointing him as the grand

¹⁵⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1573.

¹⁵⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1575.

¹⁶⁰ Mert, "IV. Mehmed Devri Bir Kaftan Defteri (H. 19 B. 1058-24 N. 1086/ 9 Ağustos 1648-12 Aralık 1675) (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)," 300; Whitehead, "The Veledeş Conflict: A Reassessment of the Mid-Seventeenth-Century Rebellions of the Altı Bölük Halkı," 305–7.

vizier. When Mustafa Paşa claimed not to have that amount, İbşir Paşa imprisoned him, and later, despite the opposition of Turhan Sultan, sultan's mother, he was executed. Kaimmakam Melek Ahmed Paşa, who supported the idea of İbşir Paşa's dismissal, was as well sent to Van and removed from İstanbul. Due to having 180 purses taken from him and all his wealth confiscated, Şamizade was, however, not executed.¹⁶¹

İbşir Paşa went beyond these measures to secure his position. While eliminating the opposition within the Palace, he also made similar efforts in the provinces. Topkapılı Mustafa Agha secured his life by pledging to give two hundred purses. Deli Birader Ahmed Agha and his son-in-law, Ak Ali Agha (the Jizya collector from Copts), were imprisoned. With the intervention of Kara Murad Paşa, Ahmed Agha, and his son-in-law were pardoned. One of the individuals most harmed by İbşir Paşa was Hasan Agha, the Customs Superintendent. While İbşir Paşa was waiting in Üsküdar, he ordered Hasan Agha, who visited him, to prepare five hundred purses.¹⁶²

Even Kara Murad Paşa, arguably his staunchest ally, found himself targeted by İbşir Paşa. Murad Paşa had in fact realized that the Grand Vizier intended to eliminate him as well and began consolidating the opposition against İbşir Paşa. Murad Paşa summoned Deli Birader Ahmed Agha, Ak Ali Agha, former Dockmaster Mimar Mustafa, Dockmaster Salih Agha, and Customs Superintendent Hasan Agha to his side and reached an agreement with them against the Grand Vizier. Later, he summoned Şaban Halife to his

¹⁶¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1585–95.

¹⁶² Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1578–88.

mansion, and through his wife Meleki Kalfa, he sent a message to Turhan Sultan asking for her support. Murad Paşa, who organized the opposition, also tried to draw in the closest associates of İbşir Paşa to his side. One of the associates, Kürd Mehmed Agha, who arrived in Üsküdar with the forces of İbşir Paşa, consisting of cavalry troops, sided with Murad Paşa. The inability of İbşir Paşa to fulfill the promises led Kürd Mehmed and his accompanying cavalry soldiers to switch sides. Indeed, Murad Paşa not only succeeded in persuading cavalry soldiers but also forged an alliance with Kara Hasanoğlu Hüseyin Agha. This strategic move effectively garnered the support of the Janissaries in favor of Murad Paşa against İbşir Paşa.¹⁶³

The factions opposed to İbşir Paşa congregated at At Meydanı and demanded the removal and execution of the grand vizier. The official seal of the grand vizierate was transferred to Kara Murad Paşa, assumed the position of grand vizier. Şeyhülislam Ebu Said Efendi, who refrained from issuing a fatwa for İbşir Paşa's execution, was dismissed and banished to Gallipoli. In his stead, Hüsamzade Abdurrahman Efendi became the mufti of Istanbul, having provided the fatwa for İbşir Paşa's execution.¹⁶⁴ All those mentioned in the dismissal and execution of İbşir Paşa were killed during the Çınar Event: Şaban Halife, Meleki Kalfa, Çavuşbaşı Sarı Mahmud, Hasan Agha, Deli Birader Ahmed Agha, Salih Efendi, Mimar Mustafası, and Topkapılı Mustafa Agha.

¹⁶³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1603–7.

¹⁶⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1609–18.

As per Naima, the event unfolded through a plan orchestrated by Murad Paşa. Notably, this plan is not corroborated by other contemporary sources, which attribute İbşir Paşa's execution to his inability to fulfill promises made to the cavalry soldiers regarding *gulamiyes* (hizmet) and *veledes*.¹⁶⁵ However, in none of the reasons revealed by Naima, Murad Paşa is not accused directly. In contrast, Murad Paşa is depicted as a victim, attempting to safeguard himself. This portrayal is intricately linked to the relationship between Naima, his father, and Murad Paşa, as explored in the following section.

2.2 Investigating Mustafa Naima Efendi and His Tarih: A Detailed Review

Mustafa Naima was not only a historian but also held bureaucratic positions like scribe of *Divan*, chief of the registry office, and Accountant of Anatolia. Born into a Janissary family in Aleppo, he received an education in the *Teberdaran-ı Saray-ı Atık* (Halberdiers Corps of the old Palace) in Istanbul and pursued a career as a bureaucrat. The following biographical note will, however, mostly focus on Naima's role as a historian, exploring the circles around his historical writing, determining the background of *Tarih-i Naima*, and unraveling connections with figures like Bektaş Agha, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, and Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi.

2.2.1 The Family of Mustafa Naima and his Career Path

Mustafa Naima was born into a Janissary family in Aleppo in the year 1655.¹⁶⁶ His grandfather, Küçük Ali Agha, served as a Janissary of *devşirme*

¹⁶⁵ Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmani," 40.

¹⁶⁶ Lewis Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. Norman Itzkowitz (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 5 According to Thomas Naima was born in 1665. ; Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1972), 100; Gül Şen, *Making Sense of History: Narrativity and Literariness in the Ottoman*

origin in Aleppo.¹⁶⁷ Naima's father, Mehmed Agha, likely married a local resident during his assignment in Aleppo. Although details about Naima's grandfather and father are limited, Naima's chronicle states that they served as Janissary commanders (*Yeniçeri Serdarı*) in Aleppo.¹⁶⁸ In the beginning of 1650s, a critical event involving local power holder Emir Assaf highlighted the intricate power dynamics in the city, which followed Governor İbrahim Paşa's failed assassination attempt. Agha of the Janissaries Bektaş, of whom we had some information previously and one of the key members of the Kösem Sultan faction, intervened, in that junction empowering Küçük Ali Agha and Mehmed Agha to negotiate¹⁶⁹ As evident from Naima's chronicle, conflicting parties reached an agreement through negotiations conducted on behalf of Bektaş Agha by the parents of the historian.¹⁷⁰

Naima highlights his grandfather's ties in Istanbul, particularly with dignitaries associated with Kösem Sultan, including Bektaş Agha and Kara Murad Agha.¹⁷¹ He also delves into details about his father's connections with

Chronicle of Na'ima (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2022), 38; Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi 'ul-Fuzala*, trans. Ramazan Ekinci, vol. 4 (İstanbul: Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2018), 2903; Mehmed Cemaleddin, *Ayine-i Zurefa: Osmanlı Tarih ve Müverrihleri*, trans. Mehmet Arslan (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2003), 53; Hafız Hüseyin Ayvansarayı, *Vefayat-ı Ayvansarayı*, trans. Ramazan Ekinci (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2017), 245; Tayyazade Ata, *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi: Tarih-i Enderun*, trans. Mehmet Arslan, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2010), 52; Christine Woodhead, "Naima," in *EI (Second Edition)* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 917; Cavid Baysun, "Naima," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: MEB, 1964), 44; Mehmet İpşirli, "Naima," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 2006).

¹⁶⁷ Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 14.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas, 15; Şen, *Making Sense of History: Narrativity and Literariness in the Ottoman Chronicle of Na'ima*, 39.

¹⁶⁹ The mentioned Bektaş Agha is the one who played a significant role in Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi's appointment as the şeyhülislam. Additionally, he is also an important supporter and associate of Kösem Sultan. Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, trans. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 5 (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 1296.

¹⁷⁰ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1020–23; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 5–12.

¹⁷¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1146; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 12.

Kara Murad Agha.¹⁷² By leveraging these connections in Istanbul, or at least what remained of those connections, Mustafa Naima, came to Istanbul in the 1680s where he entered to the Halberdiers Corps, which was dominated by the Janissaries at the time.¹⁷³ According to Atazade, Naima took lessons from Bayezid Madrasa during his apprenticeship at the Halberdiers Corps.¹⁷⁴ He then entered into the Palace when Kalaylıkoz Ahmed Paşa, who also originated from the Halberdiers Corps, became vizier.¹⁷⁵ In 1686, Naima took his first step into the bureaucratic career by being appointed as a divan scribe.¹⁷⁶ In his career which covers nearly thirty years of his life, Naima served as chief of protocol, treasurer of galleys, chief of the imperial registry office, and scribe of the sword-bearer corps. In addition to these, he held the position of Anatolia accountant three times.¹⁷⁷

In addition to his role as an imperial bureaucrat, the more significant aspect of Mustafa Naima's career was his position as the official historian. According to the records of Raşid Mehmed Efendi, who served as a court historian between 1714 and 1723, Mustafa Naima "was appointed to record the events of the Sublime State" at the turn of the 18th century.¹⁷⁸ Rami

¹⁷² Kara Murad Agha (Paşa), with whom Mehmed Agha was associated, gathered a faction that dismissed and executed Grand Vizier İbşir Mustafa Paşa in 1655, and he assumed the grand vizierate for himself.

¹⁷³ Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 16; Şen, *Making Sense of History: Narrativity and Literariness in the Ottoman Chronicle of Na'ima*, 40–41.

¹⁷⁴ *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi: Tarih-i Enderun*, 2010, 3:52.

¹⁷⁵ Tayyazade Ata, *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi: Tarih-i Enderun*, trans. Mehmet Arslan, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2010), 169.

¹⁷⁶ Erhan Afyoncu, "Osmanlı Müverrihlerine Dair Tevihat Kayıtları I," *Belleten* 20, no. 24 (1999): 84.

¹⁷⁷ İpşirli, "Naima," 316–18.

¹⁷⁸ Raşid Mehmed Efendi and Çelebizade İsmail Asım Efendi, *Tarih-i Raşid ve Zeyli (1071-1114/1660-1703)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan et al., vol. 1 (İstanbul: Klasik, 2013), 610; Afyoncu, "Osmanlı Müverrihlerine Dair Tevihat Kayıtları I," 84–85.

Mehmed Agha introduced Mustafa Naima to Köprülü Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa who commanded him to complete the history written by Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi and to compose a contemporary history, which had been left unfinished – to which I will return momentarily.¹⁷⁹ In return for this task, he was granted a salary from the Istanbul Customs Office.¹⁸⁰ His task was not about writing the history of the past but keeping a record of the present, as Thomas aptly puts it.¹⁸¹ Naima dedicated his work to two individuals. The first one was Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, the *raison d'être* de *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî hulâsati ahhâri'l-hâfîkayn* to which I will focus on later.¹⁸² The second high dignitary to whom Naima dedicated his history was Moralı Damad Hasan Paşa, who, after Amcazade's death, urged Naima to continue writing his *opus*.¹⁸³

Following this brief overview of Mustafa Naima's life, I will delve into the biographies of Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi and Hocaazade Mesud Efendi. The examination of their lives, as well as the rivalry between these individuals, offers insights into how Naima reshaped the portrayals of certain figures to reinterpret specific events which were closely linked to Naima's patron, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, and his family, the Köprülüs.

¹⁷⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 1:8; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 35–39.

¹⁸⁰ Şen, *Making Sense of History: Narrativity and Literariness in the Ottoman Chronicle of Na'ima*, 60–61.

¹⁸¹ Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 38.

¹⁸² Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 1:1–11.

¹⁸³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1857–60; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 43–45.

2.2.2 Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi and His Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar

Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi (henceforth, KÇZ), who served in various administrative positions such as professorship (müderrislik), judgeship (kadılık), chief judgeship (kadıasker), and last but certainly not least Grand Mufti of Istanbul, has a forty-year career in the *ilmiye*. from (1612/1021 AH) until his exile in 1651 (1061/AH). Abdülaziz Efendi, hailing from the esteemed KÇZ family with a rich tradition within the Ottoman *ilmiye*, represents the fourth generation of this renowned lineage. Beyond merely inheriting the family's legacy, KÇZ's alignment with the *ilmiye* reflects not only an association with scholarly pursuits but also a deliberate navigation toward political prominence.

KÇZ was born in 1591 (h. 1000) and married the daughter of Şeyhülislam Hoca Mehmed Efendi, who was the son of Şeyhülislam Sadeddin Efendi. KÇZ has produced works in various genres such as fiqh, translation of the biography of the Prophet Muhammed, poetry – he had a *divan* –, and as we will focus on momentarily history. His influence and role in the Fatih Mosque events of 1623, the deposition of Sultan İbrahim in 1648, and the assassination of Kösem Sultan in 1651 underscore the breadth of his political maneuvering. KÇZ's extensive career unfolded against the backdrop of three instances of exile. Following the Fatih Mosque Event, he faced exile to Bursa, and subsequently, while occupying the position of Kadı of Istanbul, he found himself exiled to Cyprus. The culmination of his career, marked by the assassination of Kösem Sultan, led to his final exile to Chios.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ Müstakimzade Süleyman Sadeddin Efendi, “Devhatü'l Meşayih,” fol. 23a, YEK, Esad Efendi 2265; Emrah Bilgin, “Devhatü'l-Meşayih ve Zeyilleri (İnceleme-Tenkitli Metin-

KÇZ's career's third phase, from the mid-1640s on, was marked by increased political involvement. Unlike previous periods, this phase, though relatively short, saw him hold significant positions like Chief Judge of Rumelia and Şeyhülislam. He actively engaged in competition with influential figures such as Kösem Sultan, Turhan Sultan, and Şeyhülislam Bahayî Efendi and engaged in critical political actions.¹⁸⁵ His role in the dethronement of Sultan İbrahim in 1648 was important.¹⁸⁶

During the ascension of Mehmed IV to the throne, KÇZ personally seated the Sultan by holding his arm. His pivotal role in Mehmed IV's ascension demonstrates his emergence as a political figure and kingmaker which immediately led to his appointment as the Chief Judge of Rumelia after the Sultan's enthronement.¹⁸⁷ With enhanced relations with the new Sultan and the Palace, he personally presented his treaty on *fiqh*, titled *el-Kafi* to the

Dizin)" (Ph.D., Atatürk University, 2016), 177; Ali İhsan Karataş, *Şeyhülislam Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi (Hayatı-Eserleri-Vakıfları)* (Bursa: Bursa Kültür A.Ş., 2015), 22; Şerafettin Turan, "Hoca Sadedin Efendi," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1998); Mehmet İpşirli, "Hocazade Mehmed Efendi," in *DİA* (Ankara: TDV, 2003).

¹⁸⁵ During Sultan İbrahim's reign, sable fur began to serve a kind of tax function. Feridun Emecen, "İbrahim," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 2000); Sultan İbrahim and Grand Vizier Ahmed Paşa, anticipating resistance to a cash tax, sought alternative resources by requesting sable fur for the palace. However, this strategy backfired, leading to a gathering of soldiers, bureaucrats, and ilmiye members demanding the Grand Vizier's dismissal. Initially rejected, their demand was eventually accepted under mounting pressure. Unsatisfied with the Grand Vizier's removal, the crowd escalated its demands, pressing for the dethronement of Sultan İbrahim. Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke: [Osmanlı Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)]*, ed. Zeynep Aycibin, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2016), 984–90; Zeynep Aycibin, "Katib Çelebi, Fezleke, Tahlil ve Metin" (Ph.D., Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar University, 2007), 1036–40. In this event, where Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi stood out, Kösem Sultan was persuaded to dethrone Sultan İbrahim and replace him with Prince Mehmed (Mehmed IV). ; Burak Onaran, *Padişahı Devirmek Osmanlı Islahat Çağında Düzen ve Muhalefet: Kuleli (1859), Meslek (1867)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2018), 42–47; Mücteba İlgürel, "Kösem Sultan," in *DİA* (Ankara: TDV, 2002); Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Bu Mülkün Sultanları* (İstanbul: Alfa, 2015), 250–53.

¹⁸⁶ During the events, he even dared to respond firmly to İbrahim I, who reminded him he was still the Sultan, remarking that he was no longer the Sultan. Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1798–99.

¹⁸⁷ Abdülkadir Özcan, "IV. Mehmed," in *DİA* (Ankara: TDV, 2003), 414–18.

Sultan in the year 1649 (h. 1049).¹⁸⁸ Following the positive reception from the Sultan, KÇZ initiated an unprecedented departure from Ottoman political traditions. In September 1649 (h. 1059 Ramadan), while Bahayi Mehmed Efendi held the title of Şeyhülislam, Mehmed IV also conferred honorary rank upon KÇZ¹⁸⁹, causing confusion in the Ottoman bureaucracy and sparking debates on the ceremonial and protocol.¹⁹⁰

The mentioned ceremonial crisis only ceased four years later. While this resolution may appear to somewhat sidetrack us from our main subject, it will prove advantageous to scrutinize it closely as it implicates individuals closely tied to the events of 1656. In 1651, an English merchant lodged a complaint with İzmir's judge, Haşimizade, alleging that the British Consul owed him money. The Consul contested, claiming that Ottoman courts had jurisdiction only for cases up to two loads of akçe. Following the Consul's objection, Haşimizade transferred the case to Şeyhülislam Bahayi Efendi. Seeking a resolution, Bahayi Efendi appealed to Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa for assistance.¹⁹¹ After the latter's refusal to solve the case, Bahayi Efendi appealed to the British Ambassador, Sir Thomas Bendysh, seeking the dismissal of the British Consul. However, the Ambassador rejected this

¹⁸⁸ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 36.

¹⁸⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1244–45 The title of şeyhülislam received by Abdülaziz Efendi has also found a place in the poems of the contemporary poet Cevri Çelebi. "May the title of fatwa be blessed upon glorious Aziz.," Mehmet İpşirli and Mustafa İsmet Uzun, "Bahai Mehmed Efendi," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1991); Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, trans. Ramazan Ekinci, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2018), 2336–37 The second person to receive the fatwa title in a similar manner after Abdülaziz Efendi was Fethullah Efendi, the son of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, who was executed in the 1703 Edirne incident. He also received the fatwa title, while his father was the Şeyhülislam.

¹⁹⁰ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1246 The chapter titled "Vaka-i Garibe," "Awkward Situation," by Naima is an example of the problem and debate over protocol.

¹⁹¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 5:1297.

request, citing his lack of authority to dismiss someone appointed by the King of England and emphasizing that such interference violated the Capitulations between the Ottoman Empire and England.¹⁹² Bahayi Efendi considered the Ambassador's response as an insult to the empire and himself, and he had the Ambassador brought to his own house and imprisoned him there.¹⁹³

Bahayi Efendi's sudden decision faced backlash from the Janissary aghas, led by Bektaş Agha, who gathered at İbrahim Paşa Palace. They demanded the immediate release of the Ambassador and the dismissal of Şeyhülislam from his post. Amidst the ongoing conflict with Venice, the Ottoman authorities aimed to prevent tensions with England and consequently removed Bahayi Efendi from his position.¹⁹⁴ Following his dismissal, little debate ensued over his successor. The Janissary aghas, backing KÇZ, changed his honorary rank to the officially entitled *şeyhülislam* in May 1651.¹⁹⁵

This connection gains importance in understanding KÇZ's association with Naima, as discussed later, given that Naima's grandfather and father had close ties with Bektaş Agha.¹⁹⁶ Abdülaziz Efendi, in contrast to Bahayi Mehmed Efendi, maintained favorable ties with the Janissary aghas, aligning himself politically and issuing fatwas in accordance with their opinions.

¹⁹² Mark Charles Fissel and Daniel Goffman, "Viewing the Scaffold from Istanbul: The Bendysh-Hyde Affair, 1647–1651," *Albion* 22, no. 3 (1990): 445.

¹⁹³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 5:1298; Daniel Goffman, *Britons in the Ottoman Empire 1642-1660* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 181–84.

¹⁹⁴ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, 53–54.

¹⁹⁵ Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, trans. Ramazan Ekinci (İstanbul: Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2017), 913; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin) 1732*, 55.

¹⁹⁶ Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 6–12.

Notably, he supported the prohibition of smoking tobacco, complying with the aghas' request, which differed from Bahayî Efendi's stance that smoking was not forbidden.¹⁹⁷ KÇZ was opposing to Bahayî Efendi from the outset.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, in *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar*, he writes "Assigning the title of Şeyhülislam to Bahayî Çelebi while he was our eighth successor in Istanbul goes against the ancient law..."¹⁹⁹

However KÇZ's brief tenure as Şeyhülislam faced disruptions in August and September 1651 (h. 1061 Ramadan). Uprising of the *Esnaf* during Ramadan, protesting newly imposed taxes, prompted demands for tax removal and accountability for those responsible.²⁰⁰ Artisans dissatisfied with newly imposed taxes sought redress from the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa via a petition, which was rejected. Seeking a resolution, KÇZ tried to delay and downplayed his influence. However, artisans surrounded his house, forcing him to join them on their way to the palace. Despite his reluctance, KÇZ eventually yielded to the pressure and proceeded towards the Palace with the artisans.²⁰¹ His arrival at the palace stirred tensions with Kösem Sultan, reigniting their ongoing conflict that began during Mehmed IV's

¹⁹⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 5:1296.

¹⁹⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1234.

¹⁹⁹ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 31.

²⁰⁰ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Yücel Dağlı and Seyit Ali Kahraman, vol. 3 (İstanbul: YKY, 1999), 153–56; Oral, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gılmanî," 31–32; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 868–69.

²⁰¹ Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage*, 213–33; Aktemur, "Anonim Osmanlı Vekayinâmesi (H.1058-1106/M.1648-1694) Metin ve Değerlendirme," 94.

enthronement.²⁰² Following the uprising, the taxes opposed by the artisans were canceled, and Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa was dismissed.²⁰³

Marinos Sariyannis argues that KÇZ intentionally sided with the artisans' uprising due to his sympathy towards the Kadızadelis' ideology. In 1651, the artisans' primary concern was not taxes but the growing influence of aghas and Janissaries in the market. Consequently, they adopted Kadızadelis' principles to legitimize their opposition to the Janissaries. Recognizing this alignment, KÇZ supported the artisans for this specific reason.²⁰⁴ The idea of KÇZ aligning with the Kadızadelis encounters challenges, particularly considering his dependence on the support of Janissary aghas. His visit to the aghas after Kösem Sultan's assassination implies a different affiliation. Instead, his connection to the artisans' protests likely stems from events preceding his exile in 1634 when his policies, particularly during an oil shortage in Istanbul, adversely impacted artisans. Understanding this historical context elucidates KÇZ's cautious approach towards artisans.

During Mehmed IV's reign, KÇZ became embroiled in the power struggle between Kösem Sultan and Turhan Sultan. Despite his attempts to

²⁰² Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage*, 228.

²⁰³ TS.MA.e/434-44; Robert Dankoff, *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Paşa (1588–1662) as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's Book of Travels (Seyahat-Name)* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 77; Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, "Melek Ahmed Paşa," in *DİA* (Ankara: TDV, 2004), 42–44.

²⁰⁴ Marinos Sariyannis, "The Kadızadelis as a Social and Political Phenomenon: The Rise of a 'Mercantile Ethic'?", in *Political Initiatives from the Bottom-Up in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. A. Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2012), 276–78. Marinos Sariyannis, "Unseen Rebels: The 'Mob' of Istanbul as a Constituent of Ottoman Revolt, Seventeenth to Early Nineteenth Centuries," *Turkish Historical Review*, no. 10 (2019): 155–88; Marinos Sariyannis, "'Mob', 'Scamps' and Rebels in 17th Century İstanbul : Some Remarks on Ottoman Social Vocabulary," *IJTS* 11, no. 1/2 (2005): 1–15.

sway Kösem Sultan's influence in the Palace, Turhan Sultan's alliance with the Darüssaade aghas altered the power dynamics. The complex political environment of the Ottoman court greatly influenced Abdülaziz Efendi's trajectory during this period insofar as the rivalry between the two powerful factions led to concerted efforts to undermine each other's and their dependents' authority.²⁰⁵ With the assassination of Kösem Sultan, Turhan Sultan's dominance in the palace became absolute.²⁰⁶

Following Kösem Sultan's assassination, alliances among various factions underwent a significant shift. Aghas, finding themselves disconnected from Palace influence, gathered at At Meydanı, while supporters of Mehmed IV and Turhan Sultan rallied within the palace walls. Both sides sought the backing of scholars, bureaucrats, and the military to strengthen their positions. Amidst this volatile situation, KÇZ navigated cautiously. Initially aligning with the aghas at At Meydanı as the Şeyhülislam, his subsequent inadvertent attempt to visit the palace resulted in his swift removal from office and exile to Chios Island.²⁰⁷

However his exile in Chios was brief. Due to the island's occupation by Venice, he was permitted to go to Bursa. Abdülaziz Efendi arrived in Bursa in 1652 and lived there until his death in 1658.²⁰⁸ Although Abdülaziz

²⁰⁵ Leslie P. Peirce, *Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257–58; Derviş Abdullah, *Risale-i Teberdariye Fi Ahval-i Darüssaade: Darüssaade Ağalarının Durumu Hakkında Baltacı'nın Raporu*, trans. Pınar Saka (İstanbul: İnkılap, 2011); Baki Tezcan, "The Debut of Kösem Sultan's Political Career," *Turcica*, no. 40 (2008): 347–59.

²⁰⁶ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 242–44; Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 127.

²⁰⁷ Karataş, *Şeyhülislam Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi (Hayatı-Eserleri-Vakıfları)*, 68–75.

²⁰⁸ Karataş, 68–75.

Efendi's relationship with the Palace was strained, he still had connections with the aghas. Moreover, he had a distinct advantage as well.

The Person Who Received <i>Mülazemet</i>	Date
Hacezade Lütfullah Efendi (Lutfi) ²⁰⁹	1643
Velizade Ahmed Efendi ²¹⁰	1644
Maalizade Seyyid İbrahim Efendi ²¹¹	1651
Çivizade Ataullah Efendi ²¹²	1651
Burusevi Şeyh Abdalbaki Efendi ²¹³	
Eş-Şeyh Abdullah Efendi ²¹⁴	
Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed ²¹⁵	

Table 2 The list of candidates who received their *mülazemet* from Abdülaziz Efendi

Notably, among those granted *mülazemet* by KÇZ was Fazıl Ahmed, destined to become a renowned Paşa from the Köprülü family. The forthcoming section will delve deeper into the examination of Naima's motivations for chronicling history. However, the intriguing connection between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa receiving *mülazemet* from Abdülaziz Efendi and Naima's patronage by another Köprülü, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, alongside a shared network between Naima's family and Abdülaziz Efendi, raises

²⁰⁹ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 3:2177.

²¹⁰ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, trans. Ramazan Ekinci, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2018), 1052.

²¹¹ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 4:2927.

²¹² Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, 4:3139.

²¹³ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 3:2721.

²¹⁴ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 2:1408.

²¹⁵ Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 910; Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 2:1452.

compelling questions about Ottoman historiography in the seventeenth century.

2.2.2.1 Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar

KÇZ holds a significant place in seventeenth-century Ottoman historiography. His grandson, İsazade Mehmed Efendi, indicates his importance by stating, “He shaped the *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman* into a new form...”²¹⁶ He authored four historical works, with two focusing on specific topics. The first, *Süleymanname*, covers the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, while the second, *Zafername*, details the campaigns of Sultan Murad IV in Baghdad and Revan.²¹⁷ The other two works, *Ravzatül Ebrar* and *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar* (Addendum to *Ravzatül Ebrar*) form an interconnected and consecutive narrative.²¹⁸ *Ravzatül Ebrar* spans from Prophet Adam to the year 1649 and was presented by himself personally to Sultan Mehmed IV.²¹⁹ Abdülaziz Efendi commenced writing *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar* while in exile on Chios Island, as a sequel to *Ravzatül Ebrar*, which he considered the first volume (*cild-i evvel*).²²⁰

The manuscript commences with Sultan Mehmed IV’s accession, its distinctive feature being the division into eleven sections corresponding to the

²¹⁶ İsazade Mehmed Efendi, *İsa-Zade Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil)*, ed. Ziya Yılmaz (İstanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1996), 51.

²¹⁷ Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, “Süleymanname” (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi Eki Koleksiyonu, 34 Atf Ek 462.); Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, “Zafer-Name” (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane, Adnan Ötügen İl Halk Kütüphanesi, 06 HK 4330.).

²¹⁸ Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, “Ravzatül Ebrar” (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya, 3206.); Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, “Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar” (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, 2163.).

²¹⁹ İbrahim Özgül, “Kara Çelebi-Zâde Abdülaziz Efendi’nin Ravzatü’l-Ebrâr Adlı Eseri (1299?1648) Tahlil ve Metin” (Ph.D., Atatürk University, 2010), XXX.

²²⁰ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü’l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 2.

years from 1648 to 1658, the year of KÇZ's death. What sets it apart is the author's active participation in the unfolding events, particularly those intertwined with his own life, offering nuanced insights into the intricate tapestry of historical occurrences. Notably, his poignant reflections on Bahayî Efendi's appointment in 1649, superseding his own expectations, reveal a deeply personal perspective.²²¹ Similarly, his eloquent defence upon being relieved of his duties as şeyhülislam in 1651 constitutes a sort of apology. The manuscript seamlessly melds historical accounts with elements of memoir and diary entries, elucidating intricate details, especially in matters close to the author's heart. Especially the period after his exile is characterized by introspective musings intertwined with diary-like annotations, imparts a profound sense of realism to the work. Notably, the sections detailing conflicts with Hocazade Mesud Efendi during the tumultuous 1656 Çınar Event epitomize this genre fusion, offering meticulous day-by-day chronicles that epitomize the manuscript's unique blend of historical narrative and intimate self-reflection.²²²

The *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar* served as a vital tool for Abdülaziz Efendi to stay informed about events in Istanbul and maintain his network of connections, even during his exile. Despite facing exile for the third time, Abdülaziz Efendi remained optimistic about the possibility of returning to Istanbul. In the upcoming discussion, we will explore how Naima utilized this work and its significance in shaping his own historical narrative. Before

²²¹ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, 30–33.

²²² Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, 250–55.

proceeding, let's focus on his ultimate dispute with Hocaşade Mesud Efendi, who, as previously discussed, played a pivotal role in the Çınar Event.

2.2.3 An Extraordinary Şeyhülislam: Hocaşade Mesud Efendi

Known as Hocaşade for being the son of Aydınlı Mustafa Efendi, who served as the mentor to Sultan Ahmed I, Mesud Efendi is one of the three Şeyhülislams of the Ottoman Empire who faced execution. Alongside Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi, executed in 1634, and Feyzullah Efendi, executed in 1703, Mesud Efendi met his fate in 1656. Acquiring his mülazemet in 1619, Mesud Efendi remained active within scholarly circles for thirty-seven years until his execution. In historical accounts, Mesud Efendi is often portrayed as a şeyhülislam who interfered in state matters and was considered negligent in his duties.²²³ The unfavorable depiction of Mesud Efendi in *Tarih-i Naima* appears to stem directly from the negative portrayal presented in the narrative. The negative portrayal of Mesud Efendi in *Tarih-i Naima* seems to be the explicit reason for this image.²²⁴

After Sultan İbrahim's assassination, Mesud Efendi formed alliances with influential figures such as Ebu Said Efendi, Balizade, and Mahmud Efendi, aligning himself with the cavalry troops.²²⁵ Despite his powerful backing, he faced opposition from supporters of Kösem Sultan, including the Janissaries and scholars, as he sought to exert political influence. His rise to prominence followed the events of Ramadan in 1651, which saw the demise

²²³ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin İlmiye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 231–34; Mehmet İpşirli, “Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi,” in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1988), 548–49; Mehmet Serhan Tayşi, “Feyzullah Efendi,” in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1995).

²²⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1716–17.

²²⁵ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1188.

of Kösem Sultan and Bektaş Agha, as well as KÇZ's exile. Subsequently, Mesud Efendi played a significant role in political deliberations, particularly in discussions regarding key appointments such as the grand vizierate. He actively engaged in debates, contributing to the dismissal of Gürcü Mehmed Paşa and the appointment of Tarhuncu Ahmed Paşa as the Grand Vizier.²²⁶

Mesud Efendi's intricate political maneuvers within the palace garnered him rivals who sought to eliminate him by bribing the cavalry soldiers aligned with him. However, Mesud Efendi uncovered the plot and effectively countered any attempts against him. Despite encountering obstacles in attaining his desired position during the reigns of İbşir Paşa and the Janissary-affiliated Kara Murad Paşa, Mesud Efendi remained steadfast in his meddling in Istanbul politics.²²⁷ During the 1656 Çınar Event, he became the Şeyhülislam; however, he could not hold the position for long.²²⁸ In Ramadan 1066 (1656), Mesud Efendi's falling out with Boynueğri Mehmed Paşa, whom he had initially backed for the position of Grand Vizier, resulted in his dismissal. Despite his appeal to Turhan Sultan for the removal of Mehmed Paşa, Mesud Efendi was instead ousted and sent to Diyarbakır to distance him from Istanbul. As he prepared for his journey, another complaint was made public, accusing him of assembling *Zorbas* and *Meydan Aghas* to overthrow the Sultan. He was executed shortly after.²²⁹

²²⁶ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 4:1397; Erol Özvar, "Tarhuncu Ahmed Paşa," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 2011), 20–22.

²²⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 4:1400; & 6:1656.

²²⁸ Özkasap, "Tarih-i Nihadi (152b-233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)," 25; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1565; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 242.

²²⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1683–89; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 80.

2.2.4 Mesud Efendi's Rivalry with Karaelebizade Abdlaziz Efendi

While Mesud Efendi was continuing to climb the ladder of *ilmiye*, criticism arose about his education and inadequate qualifications.²³⁰ Naima asserts that Mesud Efendi and his brother Hocasade Ali Efendi exploited the title “Hocasade” to their advantage for personal gain. The Aghas of the Imperial Harem backed the two brothers in their appointments, enabling them to remain active in scholarly circles.²³¹ However, this support also sparked various criticisms. Zekerıyyazade Yahya Efendi (d. 1644) voiced his discontent with the Hocasade brothers in this manner:

May Allah bestow His mercy upon Hoca Efendi, for he did not educate these *elebis*. In their current state, they have rendered us incapable. If only they had received proper education and learning, who would have answered to them?²³²

In 1651, Mesud Efendi faced another challenge about his qualifications. After being appointed as the Chief Judge of Anatolia, complaints arose from judges in Anatolia and the Chief Judge of Rumelia. The Chief Judge of Rumelia accused Mesud Efendi of meddling in their affairs, impeding their ability to carry out their duties, although Anatolian judges saw the situation differently. They collectively conveyed to the Grand Vizier and the Şeyhlislam their belief that Mesud Efendi was unfit to oversee them, arguing that he lacked the necessary qualifications for the role: “He is not capable of examining us; he even does not know how to read. We are examined in the

²³⁰ Kara elebizade Abdlaziz Efendi, *Ravzat'ı-l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 85.

²³¹ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, trans. Ramazan Ekinci, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2018), 653.

²³² Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1716–17.

presence of the imperial court and the scholars, and he has exceeded the limits of pride and arrogance. He appears very late in the council, causing disturbance to us.”²³³

The primary recipient of these grievances was KÇZ, who held the highest position within the ilmiye hierarchy as the Şeyhülislam. It remains unclear how he responded to the complaints against Mesud Efendi or whether any disciplinary actions were taken against him. KÇZ’s tenure, which ended in Ramadan 1651, was relatively short-lived to address the complaints regarding Mesud Efendi, who was appointed as the Chief Judge of Anatolia in the same month. However, an examination of the *arpalık* dispute between KÇZ and Mesud Efendi, as recounted in *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar*, suggests a notable conflict between the two figures.

In his account of the 1656 Çınar Event, KÇZ provides a significant aspect of his conflict with Mesud Efendi during the latter’s appointment as şeyhülislam. According to KÇZ, Mesud Efendi, with the backing of cavalry soldiers in 1656, unjustly seized the Chios arpalık* originally assigned to Abdülaziz Efendi during his exile. Although the Chios arpalık* was initially designated for Memekzade and the Mudanya arpalık* for Abdülaziz Efendi, KÇZ claimed that Mesud Efendi’s true intention was not to secure this arpalık. Instead, Mesud Efendi allegedly anticipated that KÇZ would object to being deprived of the arpalık, providing him with a pretext to either exile or execute KÇZ. However, KÇZ thwarted Mesud Efendi’s plan with the

²³³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1412.

following ironical statement: “The benefice of Mudanya is a few degrees higher than Chios; we are pleased with your generosity...”²³⁴

A negative portrayal of Mesud Efendi, largely shaped by Abdülaziz Efendi, prevails in the available details about Hocaşade Mesud Efendi in subsequent historiography. In the sections written by KÇZ about Mesud Efendi in *Zeyl-i Ravzatül Ebrar*, labels such as *burnaz* (hooked nose), *sefiş* (ignorant, sybarite), and *musibet* (calamity) were used to characterize his opponent. In response to Mesud Efendi’s appointment as şeyhülislam, Abdülaziz Efendi notes, “...with the help of the cavalry soldiers, the title of Şeyhülislam was bestowed upon Hocaşade Mesud Çelebi from among the ordinary scholars, and the *ilmiye* dared to show even this calamity to me.”²³⁵ KÇZ’s unfavorable portrayal of Mesud Efendi extended to labeling him as *müfti-i fitne*. According to KÇZ, Mesud Efendi’s role as şeyhülislam during the 1656 turmoil and his issuance of subsequent fatwas earned him the title of the instigator of the turmoil. KÇZ suggested that Mesud Efendi was implicated in the unrest from its inception. Interestingly, this curious label, *müfti-i fitne*, was derived from the sum of the numbers 1065 and 1, via its numeric ebced re-composition, which equals the year h. 1066 when the Çınar Event took place.²³⁶

²³⁴ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü’l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 253; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1662.

²³⁵ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü’l-Ebrar Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)* 1732, 242.

²³⁶ Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, 275; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1656.

2.3 Establishing a Correlation Between Mesud Efendi and Feyzullah Efendi in Naima's Narrative

How does a seemingly insignificant conflict from half a century earlier take center stage in *Tarih-i Naima*? Examining Naima's portrayal of the 1656 Çınar Event reveals a notable focus on KÇZ's viewpoint, featuring extensive quotations and a faithful adherence to his perspectives. Naima retains the original descriptors used by KÇZ to depict Mesud Efendi and maintains the narrative of Mesud Efendi's collaboration with the cavalry soldiers that ignited the 1656 unrest. Without altering KÇZ's portrayal, Naima highlights Mesud Efendi's perceived injustices, notably his seizure of KÇZ's *arpalık*, reflecting a meticulous preservation of historical perspectives within political historiography.²³⁷ Mesud Efendi in mind, he formulated the following remark: "In short, those who were indifferent to the current state of worldly affairs and excessively pursued their interests, disregarding the rights of a few oppressed individuals, ultimately faced their own destruction as a result of their vengeful actions, as dictated by the law of retaliation."²³⁸

Mustafa Naima's approach was intricate, characterized by a meticulous selection of examples. He functioned not merely as a passive recorder but rather as an annotator, injecting depth into his narrative. Despite this, he refrained from offering personal opinions, instead employing fictional or real individuals to narrate events, such as the 1656 Çınar Event and the 1703 Incident. When critiquing or providing evidence, Naima often invoked (even

²³⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1662.

²³⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1716 Be that as it may, a more impartial narrative emerges when considering the accounts of Naima's contemporaries, such as Zeyl-i Şakaik and Vekayi'ul Fuzala; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 437; Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:742.

re-invented) characters like Mimar Kasım Agha. This section explores Naima's correlation between two executed *şeyhülislams*, illustrating how he crafted a narrative link between independent figures and events, offering insight into his narrative technique.

After Sultan Mustafa II's coronation in 1695, Feyzullah Efendi became Şeyhülislam until his execution in 1703. He was removed due to accusations of favoritism and undue interference in state affairs. Rıfaat Abou-el-Haj posits that the 1703 incident arose from a power struggle between two factions: one supported by the reigning sultan, enjoying privileges, and the other comprising officials formerly favored by previous sultans, vying for positions in the new administration.²³⁹ The rebellion began with the Cebecis' grievances over unpaid mevacibs. However, it quickly escalated as the Janissaries, supported by segments of the ulema, artisans, and aspirants for positions in the imperial administration, rallied together, ultimately leading to the Sultan's overthrow. Feyzullah Efendi's favoritism in appointments within the *ilmiye*, particularly towards his relatives, created discontent among other ulema members who were also anticipating positions.²⁴⁰ The Sultan's relocation from Istanbul to Edirne caused a bureaucratic upheaval, affecting the livelihoods of merchants and artisans. A group from Istanbul marched to Edirne, presenting their grievances en route. Despite assurances of a return to Istanbul and the removal of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, appointed

²³⁹ Rıfaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984), 10–16.

²⁴⁰ Abou-El-Haj, 18–19; Annemarike Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703” (Ph.D., Leiden, Leiden University, 2007), 24; Umut Deniz Kırca, “‘The Furious Dogs of Hell’: Rebellion, Janissaries and Religion in Sultanic Legitimation in the Ottoman Empire” (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul Bilgi University, 2010), 25.

officials remained, sparking fears of recurrence. Moreover, privileged factions sought to safeguard their advantages by deposing Sultan Mustafa II. Thus, the dethronement of Mustafa II and the rise of Ahmed III were intertwined with these motivations.²⁴¹

Feyzullah Efendi's unorthodox actions, resembling those of a grand vizier rather than a şeyhülislam, drew considerable attention. Continuing his narrative until 1660, Naima dedicated a special section titled "Feyzullah Efendi Incident," providing a thorough exploration of the events in 1703. Within this section, Naima recounts a spirited debate he had with a supporter of Feyzullah Efendi during a gathering where he expressed his criticisms against Feyzullah Efendi. The supporter countered by referencing historical instances of scholars involved in state affairs. Undeterred, Naima delved into a historical discourse, citing the example of Caliph Osman, ultimately persuading Feyzullah Efendi's supporter to his viewpoint. Following his critique of Feyzullah Efendi, Naima seamlessly transitioned into narrating the pivotal 1703 Event, thereby concluding the additional section of his History, which normally ends fifty years earlier.²⁴²

Commencing with an exposition of Feyzullah Efendi's trajectory, Naima proceeds to address criticisms and counterarguments from Feyzullah Efendi's supporters. Central to Naima's critique is Feyzullah Efendi's purported nepotism, particularly in securing positions for his son, Fethullah, as his successor. Moreover, Naima accentuates Feyzullah Efendi's

²⁴¹ Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*, 87; Kırca, "'The Furious Dogs of Hell': Rebellion, Janissaries and Religion in Sultanlic Legitimation in the Ottoman Empire," 35–37.

²⁴² Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1857.

involvement across bureaucratic and scholarly domains. An objection raised against Naima cites instances of familial advancement under other Şeyhülislams, to which Naima retorts by underscoring the intelligence and moderation of those individuals. Naima's standpoint about KÇZs appointment is unequivocal, asserting his rightful eligibility for the position. Despite deserving recognition, Naima laments the disrespect shown towards KÇZ. Through his analysis, Naima not only offers a multifaceted exploration of Feyzullah Efendi's tenure, illuminating broader themes of nepotism and scholarly integrity within Ottoman bureaucracy but also in a curious twist, Naima reintroduces KÇZ into the narrative. This move subtly implies circularity in historical patterns, despite the fifty-year gap. It is through such techniques that Naima demonstrates his continuity with Ibn Khaldun, portraying historical cycles and interconnectedness across time.²⁴³

In fact, the criticisms of Naima towards Feyzullah Efendi were rooted in the conflict between Feyzullah Efendi and Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa. Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, who was the patron of Naima, was the nephew of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa.²⁴⁴ The Köprülü era, which began with the appointment of Mehmed Paşa as grand vizier in 1656, ended with Amcazade's resignation from the grand vizierate in 1702. The grand vizierate of Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa was characterized by conflict and competition

²⁴³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1861–62 On Naima's Khaldunism; Marinos Sariyannis, "Ottoman Ibn Khaldunism Revisited: The Pre-Tanzimat Reception of the Muqaddima, from Kınalızade to Şanizade," in *Political Thought and Practice in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marinos Sariyannis (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2019), 251–86.

²⁴⁴ Mehmed İzzet Bey, *Harita-i Kapudan-ı Derya*, trans. Cemil Sağlam (İstanbul: Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2021), 124–25; Osmanzade Ahmed Taib, *Hadikatü'l-Vüzerâ* (İstanbul, 1271), 124–26.

with Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi.²⁴⁵ Hüseyin Paşa's disadvantaged position in this conflict was a hidden leitmotif in *Tarih-i Naima*.

In the opening of this chapter, I explored Naima's perspective on the 1656 Çınar Event, focusing on his portrayal image of Süleyman Paşa. By subtly contrasting Süleyman Paşa's perceived deficiencies with Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, Naima underscored the pivotal role of a strong and decisive grand vizier. Later on, in the account of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's appointment as grand vizier, Naima depicts Mehmed Paşa making requests from Turhan Sultan and Sultan Mehmed IV. These requests primarily sought to secure Mehmed Paşa's independence and autonomy in his actions. It's worth noting that, apart from Naima, there is no other historical record documenting Mehmed Paşa making such demands.²⁴⁶ According to Metin Kunt, Naima's effort in this regard was an innocent attempt by someone under Köprülü patronage to dramatize events.²⁴⁷

Kunt may qualify Naima's narrative as benign, but in a broader context, it reveals a profound influence of the Köprülüs, starting with Süleyman Paşa's dismissal. Naima strategically reshaped Süleyman Paşa's image to legitimize Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's ascent to the grand vizier position, marking a significant move in Ottoman political narratives. This appointment wasn't ordinary; it carried distinct implications. Under the Köprülüs, the pursuit of

²⁴⁵ Cumhur Bekar, "The Rise of the Köprülü Family: The Reconfiguration of Vizierial Power in the Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D., Leiden University, 2019), 11; Münir Aktepe, "Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1991); Tayşi, "Feyzullah Efendi."

²⁴⁶ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1700–1701.

²⁴⁷ Metin Kunt, "Naima, Köprülü and the Grand Vezirate," *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, no. 1 (1973): 57–64; Bekar, "The Rise of the Köprülü Family: The Reconfiguration of Vizierial Power in the Seventeenth Century," 77; Metin Kunt, "The Köprülü Years: 1656–1661" (Ph.D., Princeton University, 1971), 50–61.

exclusive and autonomous authority, epitomized by the grand vizier, saw a resurgence. However, after the setback at Vienna in 1683, the Köprülü family's influence began to decline. The weakening of the Köprülüs, highlighted by Sultan Mehmed IV's deposition in 1687, led to governance vacuums exploited by figures like Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi.

Yet, despite Naima's recurrent legitimization of the Köprülü family, his underlying motive was to champion Hüseyin Paşa. Naima accentuated Hüseyin Paşa as a potent and self-reliant grand vizier figure in his narrative.²⁴⁸ After mentioning at the beginning of his chronicle that *Tarih-i Naima* was dedicated to Hüseyin Paşa, there was a relatively long section narrating the Hdaybiyyah Treaty.²⁴⁹ The inclusion of the Hdaybiyyah Treaty at the outset of Naima's Ottoman chronicle might appear peculiar to those unfamiliar with his connection to Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa. Naima explores the motivations behind Prophet Muhammad's treaty with the Meccan polytheists, emphasizing its significance for Muslims and the advantages it conferred upon them. The question arises: why did Naima choose to commence an Ottoman chronicle with the narrative of the Hdaybiyyah Treaty?

The Ottoman Empire's defeat in Vienna initiated a sixteen-year-long war, compelling them to contend with the Holy League comprising Habsburg,

²⁴⁸ Şen, *Making Sense of History: Narrativity and Literariness in the Ottoman Chronicle of Na'ima*, 291. Gül Şen argues, in her narratological analysis of Naima's text, that Naima aimed to secure the legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty. However, when the relationship between Naima and Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa is examined, it becomes clear that this is not totally accurate. Seemingly, Naima rather intended to preserve and defend the legitimacy of the Köprülü family, especially Hüseyin Paşa, through historiography.

²⁴⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 1:11–21; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 69–70.

Russia, and Venice on multiple fronts. In 1697, when Hüseyin Paşa assumed the grand vizierate, he adopted a peace-oriented approach to mitigate the war's impact on the Ottoman Empire. This policy culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz. The path to Karlowitz posed significant challenges for Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa.²⁵⁰ Bringing an advantageous alliance to the peace table was already difficult, and Hüseyin Paşa, while doing so, also made efforts to convince the opposition led by Feyzullah Efendi.²⁵¹ Despite the strong opposition, including that of Feyzullah Efendi, the Treaty of Karlowitz, once accomplished, turned Grand Vizier Hüseyin Paşa into the focal point of harsh criticism. Particularly, the scholars had been against Karlowitz from the very beginning.²⁵² Naima, cognizant of the criticisms surrounding Hüseyin Paşa's role in the Treaty of Karlowitz, strategically employed the narrative of the Hudaybiyyah Treaty to vindicate his patron. Drawing parallels between Prophet Muhammad's peace agreement with the infidels and Hüseyin Paşa's diplomatic efforts, Naima underscored the legitimacy of the treaty and Hüseyin Paşa's commitment to safeguarding Muslim interests and lives.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ Rıfaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 87, no. 4 (1967): 498; Rıfaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Reisülküttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz" (Ph.D., Princeton University, 1963).

²⁵¹ Selim Hilmi Özkan, "Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri (1644-1702)" (Ph.D., Süleyman Demirel University, 2006), 43.

²⁵² Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*, 17; Rıfaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94, no. 4 (1974): 438-47.

²⁵³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 1:11-21; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 69-70; Marinos Sariyannis, *A History of Ottoman Political Thought Up to the Early Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 308-18; See as well: Muhammed Hamidullah, "Hudeybiye Antlaşması," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1998).

Naima's propagandistic efforts on behalf of Amcazade extended beyond the Prophet Muhammad-Hudaybiyyah analogy to encompass another strategic equation involving KÇZ, Mesud, and Feyzullah. Through historical examples, Naima selectively crafted his discourse, emphasizing lessons for corrupt şeyhülislams entangled in politics. The inclusion of the conflict between KÇZ and Mesud Efendi served as a revisitation of Abdülaziz Efendi's critique, illustrating a shared fate as a cautionary tale for ambitious figures meddling in political affairs. Mesud Efendi, akin to Feyzullah Efendi from half a century ago, faced execution, echoing the fate of Hüseyin Paşa's corrupt adversary. Naima strategically selected KÇZ as a central figure in shaping the narrative around Mesud Efendi for several interconnected reasons. Firstly, the historical rivalry between KÇZ and Mesud Efendi provided Naima with ample negative material to draw parallels with the narrative surrounding Feyzullah Efendi. Secondly, KÇZ's close ties with the influential Köprülü family, coupled with his position in the ulema, particularly his role in educating Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, highlighted his multifaceted influence. Lastly, indirect personal connections between KÇZ and Naima further solidified Naima's choice. Naima's family engaged in political and commercial dealings with Janissary agha Bektaş Agha, who facilitated KÇZ's appointment as Şeyhülislam and offered support in various matters. Additionally, Naima's father was present in Istanbul during Sultan İbrahim's dethronement, orchestrated by KÇZ in 1648. These factors collectively allowed Naima to seamlessly integrate KÇZ into the broader narrative he was constructing.

CHAPTER III: IN THE SHADOW OF NAIMA: SHAPING LITERATURE AND PERSPECTIVE

Mustafa Naima Efendi's reinterpretation of the Çınar Event, through the lens of the Köprülü family, has established a narrative that still holds influence in modern literature. Naima's portrayal elevates the significance of Süleyman Paşa's dismissal, transforming it from a routine administrative change into a pivotal moment that exposes leadership shortcomings. His narrative emphasizes the missed opportunity that came with rejecting Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, highlighting the consequences of weak leadership on financial stability and administrative functionality. Centuries later, Naima's account continues to shape contemporary understanding of the Çınar Event and influences modern literature's interpretation of this historical episode.

In crafting his *Tarih*, Naima orchestrated a dual narrative, shifting from a retrospective examination of Süleyman Paşa to a forward-looking perspective centered around Hocaşade Mesud Efendi. The focal point transitioned from questioning the legitimacy of the Köprülüs to spotlighting the rivalry between Naima's patron, Amcaşade Hüseyin Paşa, and Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. To lay the groundwork for his critiques of Feyzullah Efendi, Naima strategically employed Hocaşade Mesud Efendi. Within the narratives of Mesud and Feyzullah, Naima highlighted the tragic and instructive fate that befell Şeyhülislams intervening in state affairs and seeking to shape imperial policies.

Naima skillfully constructed a bridge between Feyzullah and Mesud Efendis, leveraging the Çınar Event. This bridge also served as a conduit for

Naima's criticisms of the 1703 Edirne Event and Feyzullah Efendi. While *Tarih-i Naima* delved into Mesud Efendi's character in various sections, the common thread across these segments was the portrayal of Mesud Efendi as a negative exemplar, subject to scrutiny. The rise of the Köprülüs, the reconstructed legitimacies, and the underlying competition between Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa and Feyzullah Efendi unfolded in the concealed facets of the political drama. Naima, utilizing the denouement of the Çınar Incident as a touchstone, crafted a distinct narrative spanning fifty years until 1703. History and historiography, in Naima's adept hands, metamorphosed into a pliable material molded according to his narrative will.

Mustafa Naima's profound influence in Ottoman historiography, particularly in political history, is enduring. His impact resonates through works spanning the nineteenth to the twenty-first century, shaping narratives of the Çınar Event. Naima's perspectives, notably on figures like Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi (see *infra*) serve as a cornerstone for subsequent historians. The pervasive nature of Naima's imprint underscores his status as a historiographical luminary. Analyzing works that delve into the Çınar Event reveals a consistent reliance on Naima's insights, reflecting his enduring sway over Ottoman historical narratives. The nuanced portrayal of key figures by Naima continues to shape interpretations, highlighting the timeless influence he holds in Ottoman historiography.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁴ Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, ed. Mümin Çevik and Erol Kılıç, trans. Mehmet Ata, vol. 10, 18 vols. (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983); Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l- Vuku'at*, ed. Yılmaz Kurt, vol. 2, 4 vols. (Ankara: TTK, 2014); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: II. Selim'in Tahta Çıkışından 1699 Karlofça Antlaşmasına Kadar*, vol. 3/1, 4 vols. (Ankara: TTK, 2011); İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, vol. 3, 5 vols. (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972); Reşad Ekrem Koçu, "Çınar Vakası," in *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Neşriyat Kollektif Şirketi, 1965);

Three stages will be followed during the evaluation of the literature: Firstly, how many different contexts the Çınar Event has examined in the literature will be identified. Then, the transmission chains in the literature will be illuminated, showcasing how Naima's narrative has endured into modern times. Lastly, a comparative analysis will be undertaken to assess how various sources portray Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi.

3.1 Identifying Contexts About 1656 Çınar Event

3.1.1 Identifying Contexts

To carefully examine the literature, it is necessary to first determine how the selected studies discussed the Çınar Event. As a result of the context analysis conducted on these studies, five different contexts were identified: financial/administrative crisis, decline, tegayyür (deterioration), factional struggle, and the rise of the *Köprülüs*. The financial and administrative crisis finds a place in seven different sources. The context derived from *Tarih-i Naima*, focusing on the financial and administrative crisis, has become a mainstream perspective due to its frequent usage. However, a key issue related to this context is that Naima exclusively applied the financial and administrative crisis to the first half of the seventeenth century. According to Naima, the empire remained in a state of financial and administrative crisis

Mustafa Cezar, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4, 6 vols. (İstanbul: Baba Matbaası, 1960); Münir Aktepe, "Çınar Vakası," in *DİA* (İstanbul: TDV, 1993); Necdet Sakaoğlu, "Çınar Olayı," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1993); İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tegayyür ve Fesad*; Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*; Fikret Yılmaz, "İstanbul'da Siyasal Olaylar Kronolojisi (1453-1826)," in *Antik Çağdan XXI. Yüzyıla Büyük İstanbul Tarihi* (İstanbul: İBB Kültür Aş, 2016); Fikret Yılmaz, "Siyaset, İsyan ve İstanbul (1453-1808)," in *Antik Çağdan XXI. Yüzyıla Büyük İstanbul Tarihi* (İstanbul: İBB Kültür Aş, 2016).

until the appointment of the first Köprülü to the grand vizierate. Naima attributes this situation to unsuccessful administrators like Süleyman Paşa and arrogant figures like Mesud Efendi. The incompetence of individuals like them has led the empire into a crisis. However, during the Köprülü era, none of these issues were apparent because the empire had begun to be well-governed.

If the contexts were categorized, it would be seen that Joseph von Hammer, Nuri Paşa, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hami Danişmend, Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Mustafa Cezar, and Münir Aktepe have employed the financial and administrative crisis as the primary context.²⁵⁵ Stanford Shaw, on the other hand, examined the event within the framework of the decline of the empire.²⁵⁶ While sharing similarities with the decline, the context of tegayyür (deterioration), emerging as a different context, has been employed by Halil İnalcık to evaluate the event.²⁵⁷ The three contexts listed have been used by individuals who chose Naima as the main source for narrating the event, and therefore, they serve as carriers of Naima's narrative. When looking at the remaining two contexts, it is observed that they deviate from Naima's narrative. Necdet Sakaoğlu and Fikret Yılmaz's ideas that inter-factional struggle was the main factor of the event set them apart from the

²⁵⁵ von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:255–59; Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l- Vuku'at*, 2:66–67; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: II. Selim'in Tahta Çıkışından 1699 Karlofça Antlaşmasına Kadar*, 3/1:290–95; Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 3:420–22; Koçu, “Çınar Vakası”; Cezar, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, 4:2033–44; Aktepe, “Çınar Vakası.”

²⁵⁶ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*, 1:206.

²⁵⁷ İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tegayyür ve Fesad*, 315–20.

main narrative.²⁵⁸ When examining the last context, it is understood that Caroline Finkel evaluates the event through the rise of the Köprülüs and the establishment of a long-lasting grand vizierate dynasty. Although Finkel's perspective aligns with Naima, what distinguishes her is the use of Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan as her primary source instead of Naima.²⁵⁹

3.1.2 Different Narrations of the Çınar Event

The Çınar Event is generally narrated based on *Tarih-i Naima*. However, the narrative derived from the *Tarih-i Naima* is devoid of criticism. Naima's ideas and thoughts are not filtered; instead, the event is copied verbatim from Naima. This state brings about some fundamental historiographical problems. In this section, the similarities and differences with Naima in the narration of the Çınar Event by the examined researchers will be emphasized. The identification of similarities aims to indicate Naima's existing hegemony in the literature. On the other hand, the detection of divergences will reveal how the authors filled the gaps left by Naima or differentiated themselves from Naima in what aspects and in what ways.

While making this observation each context group will be evaluated separately, but to avoid repetition, the focus will not be on the narrative constructed by all the authors within the groups. Joseph von Hammer, Mustafa Nuri Paşa, and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı will be examined in detail, as they are the authors who most extensively analyze the Çınar Event within the context of a financial/administrative crisis. Those in the same group,

²⁵⁸ Sakaoğlu, "Çınar Olayı"; Yılmaz, "İstanbul'da Siyasal Olaylar Kronolojisi (1453-1826)"; Yılmaz, "Siyaset, İsyan ve İstanbul (1453-1808)."

²⁵⁹ Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*, 249–52.

including İsmail Hami Danişmend, Mustafa Cezar, Reşat Ekrem Koçu, and Münir Aktepe, will not be subjected to a separate evaluation. The authors in this context mostly repeat Naima. Their repetition of Naima increases the number of intertextual similarities, making it difficult to compare. From İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı onwards, it is notable that the authors narrate the event using the same arguments and methods. Texts of Stanford Shaw and Necdet Sakaoğlu will not be discussed in this section due to their shortness. Although Fikret Yılmaz seems different in some aspects from the narrative, especially due to his use of sources directly influenced by Naima and his adherence to Naima in terms of Mesud Efendi's image, he will not be evaluated in this section.

Joseph von Hammer is among the prominent writers who stick to Naima's narrative in the description of the event. Notably, Hammer highlights Naima's emphases. Hammer follows Naima's chronology and begins narrating the event with a group of Janissaries from Crete demanding unpaid mevacibs and threatened by an Ottoman officer. He then describes the gathering of the cavalry soldiers and the Janissaries. However, perhaps to avoid a complete similarity to Naima, he notes early in the narrative that Surnazen Mustafa Paşa was one of those who organized the uprising.²⁶⁰ While describing the dialogue based on Naima's text between the Palace and the rebels, a slight deviation occurs in Hammer's narration of the speech of Rum Hasan Agha, one of the leaders of the uprising. In *Tarih-i Naima*, the main topics of Rum Hasan's speech were the undervaluation of payments, the

²⁶⁰ von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:255.

inability of viziers and treasurers to collect money, their failure to inform the Sultan about the current situation, the wealth accumulated by aghas and tax collectors, the exemption of taxes from those close to the aghas, the dismissal of those who do not act in line with the aghas' interests, and the acquisition of higher profits by taking *mukataas* at lower prices.²⁶¹ Hammer, on the other hand, narrows down these topics by listing instances of administrative abuses, the sale of offices, premature tax collection, payment delays, interference of eunuchs in state affairs, and the debasement of the currency.²⁶² The existence of such a speech by Rum Hasan is uncertain. This speech was not present in the contemporary accounts of the event; it is only found in Naima. It is unclear where Naima's detailed quotation comes from. However, Naima likely created this speech by using Rum Hasan Agha to criticize the pre-Köprülü period. The speech, beginning with prayers to the Sultan, continues with a few pieces of advice that seem to be quoted from a book of government and ends with a plea for forgiveness for their insolent behavior towards the Sultan.²⁶³ Lastly, the list of names for which they demanded execution to restore the order was read to the Sultan. The speech appears carefully crafted and organized afterward by Naima. It is observed that Hammer misinterpreted a reaction from the crowd after this speech. The Sultan's proposal to spare the lives of those whose deaths were sought and to seize their property was rejected by the crowd. The crowd, refusing the proposal, threatens the Sultan in Hammer's narrative by saying, "We no longer want you either." The

²⁶¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1653–54.

²⁶² von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:256.

²⁶³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1653.

Sultan, whose life was threatened, was frightened, and he ordered the execution of the two aghas whose names were on the list.²⁶⁴ However, the crowd's reaction was not against the Sultan; according to Naima, it was against Surnazen Mustafa Paşa.²⁶⁵ Throughout almost the entire text, Hammer follows Naima and aligns with him, but he makes some additions to Naima at some points. For instance, the information that Gümrük Emni Hasan Agha, among those executed, had debased the coin in Bursa was an addition made by Hammer to Naima.²⁶⁶ However, when these minor divergences are set aside, Naima's influence is strongly felt in the text.

Mustafa Nuri Paşa is also one of those who follow Naima's narrative. Similar to Hammer, he chronologically stuck to Naima, but, notably, he did not include all the details of the event in his narrative. Except for the details Naima emphasized and wanted to highlight, other details did not find a place in Nuri Paşa's account. Special attention was given to the speech made by Sipahi Hasan, and thereafter, a stance was adopted that justified Sipahi Hasan. The punishment of those responsible for plunging the empire into crisis was not only the desire of the assembled crowd but also the consensus among the prominent figures of the state.²⁶⁷ Nuri Paşa appears to differentiate from Naima in this part. Naima did not make any implication or suggestion about the consensus of the prominent officials with Rum Hasan Agha. However, despite this, Nuri Paşa behaves as if there were some consensuses. Although

²⁶⁴ von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:256.

²⁶⁵ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1654.

²⁶⁶ von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:257.

²⁶⁷ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l- Vuku'at*, 2:67.

Nuri Paşa's attitude may indicate a divergence from Naima, it was a contribution to Naima's narrative, whether intentional or unintentional. As mentioned above, it is uncertain whether this speech in Naima truly belongs to Rum Hasan. Nuri Paşa's approach to the speech was an example of the reconstruction of Naima's narrative and took it a step further. The usage of this speech in the literature and additions to it strengthens the text and prevents questioning about it. Another important point was the conditions claimed to be presented by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to Turhan Sultan upon assuming the Grand Vizierate. Similar to Rum Hasan Agha's speech, Mustafa Nuri Paşa incorporates the conditions of Köprülü Mehmed, which is mentioned only in Naima, into his narrative.²⁶⁸ According to Naima, Mehmed Paşa presented four conditions before his appointment. According to these conditions, whatever Mehmed Paşa offers to the Sultan will be accepted without opposition, there will be no pressure on Mehmed Paşa regarding appointments and state affairs, no one will share power with him, and the statements of anyone with malicious intentions towards him will not be taken into consideration.²⁶⁹ In Naima, it was also crucial that the recipient of these conditions was Valide Turhan Sultan. Turhan Sultan, who approved Mehmed Paşa's grand vizierate, accepted the conditions, thus marking the beginning of the Köprülü era, during which the empire could reach its former glory. However, some questions arise as to why Turhan Sultan, who competed with Kösem Sultan to reach her current power, willingly handed over power to Mehmed Paşa. By introducing these conditions, Naima created a legitimate

²⁶⁸ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, 2:68–69.

²⁶⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1700.

ground for Köprülü Mehmed Paşa and confirmed this ground with a contract that he established. In his narrative, Nuri Paşa also follows this path. It is observed that Hammer, like Nuri Paşa, lists these conditions. Both Nuri Paşa and Hammer accepted and repeated Naima's narrative without criticizing its construction. Naima's reliability or the consistency of the details provided by him have not been criticized.

When İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's narrative of the Çınar Event is examined, it becomes apparent that it resembles Naima's narrative. This resemblance is both chronological and narrative. The connection of the event with the financial/administrative crises in the empire, incompetent administrators, and the process from the beginning of the cavalry soldier's uprising to the execution of the prominent figures in the uprising was conveyed by following Naima without any changes. Therefore, what is said about Hammer and Nuri Paşa is also valid for Uzunçarşılı. Uzunçarşılı also did not criticize *Tarih-i Naima*. However, it is interesting that Uzunçarşılı rarely referenced Eremya Çelebi. Even if he states that Eremya Çelebi was a witness to the period and recorded the event day by day, Uzunçarşılı did not use Eremya Çelebi except in several points. The first place where Uzunçarşılı mentioned the name Eremya Çelebi was a footnote.²⁷⁰ The second instance where Eremya was used is related to the demanded names for execution mentioned in the list presented to the Sultan. One of the names on the list in Eremya's narrative was Valide Turhan Sultan. Uzunçarşılı did not include

²⁷⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: II. Selim'in Tahta Çıkışından 1699 Karlofça Antlaşmasına Kadar*, 3/1:290.

this in his narrative and only presented it as information in a footnote.²⁷¹ The only instance in the main text where Eremya was used as a source was the dismissal of Surnazen Mustafa Paşa in response to the reactions to his appointment as grand vizier.²⁷² It is unclear why the dismissal, as narrated by Naima, was quoted in Eremya. Eremya did not say anything different from Naima on this matter. Probably, Uzunçarşılı wanted to show that he was aware of the source here. He did not compare the two sources; he only narrated the Çınar Event through Naima's account.

Halil İnalçık entirely adheres to Naima in the narrative of the Çınar Event and prefers a narrative style of historiography. There is only a narrative of the event, and no information beyond what Naima wrote is provided, nor is there any criticism. An attempt is made to go beyond Naima only at one point. İnalçık established a connection between the 1656 Çınar Event and the 1651 Esnaf Uprising, highlighting the role the artisans played. One of the reasons for the emergence of the event was the refusal of the artisans to accept the money given to the Janissaries as a form of exchange while selling their products. İnalçık stated that the reaction from the market was what led to the Çınar Event.²⁷³ This situation did not apply to the unpaid cavalry soldiers but to the Janissaries. The market's refusal to accept money paid to the Janissaries has nullified the function of the money the Janissaries receive. Although İnalçık claimed that the majority of the *esnâf* were also Janissaries, he did not explain or discuss this assertion. Throughout the narrative, İnalçık was

²⁷¹ Uzunçarşılı, 3/1:292.

²⁷² Uzunçarşılı, 3/1:293.

²⁷³ İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tegayyür ve Fesad*, 318.

revealed to follow Şarühülmenarzade instead of Naima at some points when the footnotes examined. In various places, he claims to have taken what Naima wrote about the Çınar Event from Şarihülmenarzade. For example, in Rum Hasan Agha's speech, he concluded:

The contemporary chronicler, probably Şarihülmenarzade, explains the situation in a way that would justify the rebels. He is in close relations with the rulers.²⁷⁴

However, Naima wrote the Çınar Event in 1656 himself. Even though Şarühülmenarzade was one of the main sources of his *Tarih*, Şarihülmenarzade's history did not cover the year 1656; it ended with the year 1655. Therefore, Şarühülmenarzade would have no connection with the Çınar Event. Rum Hasan's speech was also not taken from Şarihülmenarzade. It is likely a speech created or recreated by Naima. There is a need for reassessment of İnalçık's statement. Based on this information, it can be said: "Naima explained the situation in a way that justifies the figures who uprose because the terrible state before the Köprülü period must be conveyed to the reader by a key figure at the center of the event. Additionally, Naima had close relations with the administrators of the Köprülü period. From the beginning, he benefited from the Köprülü patronage." Also, İnalçık mentions some Şarühülmenarzade Aşki Hasan Efendi.²⁷⁵ The historian known as the main source of Naima was not Aşki Hasan Efendi; it was Şarühülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi.

²⁷⁴ İnalçık, 330. 386th endnote on the related page.

²⁷⁵ İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tegayyür ve Fesad*. 377th endnote on the related page.

Caroline Finkel is the most taciturn historian among all the historians examined. The reason for this is her choice not to use Naima in the narration of the Çınar Event. While she was using the Naima throughout her book, she chose to use Eremya Çelebi over Naima in the narration of the Çınar Event. Preferring the contemporary Eremya Çelebi and his narrative, Finkel set herself apart from all other authors. On the other hand, she had neither checked other contemporaneous narratives. Be that as it may, Finkel brought different emphases. The narratological standpoints of Eremya Çelebi and Mustafa Naima were different from each other. Eremya Çelebi was a member of an Ottoman Armenian artisan family living in Istanbul, which contrasts Naima an imperial bureaucrat who recorded the event fifty years after it. Consequently, their emphases were different in many instances. This dissimilarity transpires in Finkel's narrative of the Çınar Event where the socio-political views of Eremya gain significance. One of the most important features that sets Eremya apart from his contemporaries as well as from Naima was his depiction of the emotional state of the Sultan during Rum Hasan Agha's speech at the council meeting. The narrative produced by Ottoman historians and bureaucrats depicted the Sultan as having faced the situation calmly and made practical decisions to appease the crowd. However, in Eremya Çelebi's account, there was a teenage sultan in a state of uncertainty and shock about what to do amid the turbulent events. Upon learning that his mother, Turhan Sultan, was also threatened with execution, he demanded her forgiveness with tears. Understanding the emotional state of Mehmed IV was nearly impossible, but Eremya's attention to this was

easily discernible.²⁷⁶ Eremya Çelebi narrated the events he observed after the *ayak divanı* and provided a chronological account of the Çınar Event. Another point that Finkel emphasizes by referencing Eremya Çelebi was the Turks' efforts to avoid conscription into the army when orders were given for military preparations. They disguised themselves as Armenians to escape conscription. Although this situation was not directly related to the Çınar Event, it was important for Eremya, but it cannot be said that he was very pleased with it.²⁷⁷ The reason for Finkel's usage of Eremya Çelebi and her emphasis on his observations was her desire to delve into the social structure of Ottoman Istanbul. The reaction of the Sultans in the face of uprisings and the reflexes exhibited by those obliged to be soldiers before a campaign can be examined through Eremya.

3.2 Source Tracking in the Literature

Naima's narrative, focused on the Köprülüs, posits that administrative and financial crises arose as a result of ineffective grand viziers, ultimately leading to the Çınar Event. This particular conclusion, originating from Naima himself, gained widespread acceptance primarily due to his popularity among historians. When compared to contemporaneous sources, it becomes evident that Naima's narrative enjoyed widespread accessibility, owing to its early publication by İbrahim Müteferrika. As one of the sources on the seventeenth century, Naima's work not only served as a practical resource but also ensured the perpetuation of his narrative within the literary realm. Also,

²⁷⁶ Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*, 249.

²⁷⁷ Finkel, 250.

it should be noted that even studies differentiating or diverging from the mainstream narrative are directly or indirectly connected with Naima.

Primarily, when those who use Naima as a source are considered, a distinction can be made between direct and indirect users. Direct users are those who directly benefited from Naima without including any other source, while indirect users are those who accessed Naima's narrative through another source and benefited from it. There are nine historians in the direct usage category: Hammer, Nuri Paşa, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hami Danişmend, Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Mustafa Cezar, Münir Aktepe, Halil İnalcık, and Necdet Sakaoğlu. Except for Necdet Sakaoğlu among the researchers, the others have used only Naima in the narration of the event. They did not criticize Naima's narrative. Only Necdet Sakaoğlu has diverged from the mainstream narrative. The use of different historians, such as Eremya Çelebi and Silahdar Mehmed, could make this possible.²⁷⁸

Those who are using Naima indirectly are Stanford Shaw and Fikret Yılmaz. Stanford Shaw accessed Naima's narrative through İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı and re-evaluates the Event within the decline context. On the other hand, Fikret Yılmaz assessed the Çınar Event through Mustafa Cezar and Necdet Sakaoğlu but, to some extent, did not make blind use of Naima's narrative and differentiated himself from his precursors by constructing a different context. Yılmaz's perspective not only centers on the Çınar Event, but also conducts a comprehensive analysis of political movements in

²⁷⁸ Andreasyan and Derin, "Çınar Vak'ası (Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan'a Göre)," 57–83; Silahdar Fındıklı Mehmed Ağa, *Nusretname*, trans. Mehmet Topal (Ankara: TÜBA, 2018); Nazire Karaçay Türkal, "Silahdar Fındıklı Mehmed Ağa: Zeyl-i Fezleke" (Ph.D., Marmara University, 2012).

Istanbul. Nevertheless, he asserts that the society in Istanbul lacked mechanisms for political participation and decision-making. According to Yılmaz, while no avenues for public engagement in politics existed, there were institutions established by the Palace's monopoly that served as conduits for communication with the government. Through these institutions and upheavals, he tries to identify the communication between the government and the people that unfolded in Istanbul. Furthermore, he delves into intra-factional conflicts that are intertwined with the Ottoman Palace and specific individuals. Although he used Naima to a limited extent in the part where he narrated the Çınar Event, especially in his account about Hocazade Mesud Efendi, he followed Naima.

Caroline Finkel, who stays apart from those who use Naima, narrated the event through Eremya Çelebi, thus distancing herself from Naima's narrative. However, it should be noted that, although Caroline Finkel did not rely on Naima when discussing the Çınar Event in her work, she frequently benefited from Naima in portraying the events before and after the Çınar Event. Caroline Finkel includes bureaucratic and political developments in her examination of the empire's social structure, daily life, and cultural practices. Her historiographical approach is based on narratives instead of archival documents, which facilitates a broader and more diverse perspective for Finkel on the empire. According to Finkel, above all, the Çınar Event was an act of violence. The reason for the emergence of this act was the factions that governed the empire from the late sixteenth century until 1656. With the 1656 Çınar Event, this situation changed, and the paşas once again took control. The Çınar Event holds a pivotal position in this transition.

3.3 Analysis of the Images of Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi in the Literature

In Naima's constructed narrative of the 1656 Çınar Event, Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi have distinct roles. Süleyman Paşa is utilized within the legitimate ground created for the rise of the Köprülüs to the grand vizierate. On the other hand, Mesud Efendi is employed to strengthen the arguments of Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa's side in his struggle against Feyzullah Efendi. Naima's inclusion of these two figures in his narrative for different purposes has also influenced the positions of Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi in literature. Both are subject to a negative perspective, and the adjectives used to describe them are affected by this negativity. This section of the study will not delve into further distinctions. It will simply outline how Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi are discussed, and relevant parts will be quoted.

3.3.1 Grand Vizier Süleyman Paşa's Image in the Literature

Münir Aktepe, Necdet Sakaoğlu, Stanford Shaw, and Caroline Finkel did not make any comments about Süleyman Paşa in their works. Therefore, it is difficult to determine their opinions on Süleyman Paşa. However, considering the proximity of the sources to Naima, Aktepe is likely to have a negative stance towards Süleyman Paşa's grand vizierate. On the one hand, Fikret Yılmaz did not criticize Süleyman Paşa through Naima. Instead, he describes the situation, stating that Süleyman Paşa could not control the events, and does not mention Süleyman Paşa again.²⁷⁹ On the other hand, in the works of Hammer, Nuri Paşa, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hami Danişmend,

²⁷⁹ Yılmaz, "İstanbul'da Siyasal Olaylar Kronolojisi (1453-1826)," 80.

Reşad Ekrem Koçu, Mustafa Cezar, and Halil İnalçık, the narrative about Süleyman Paşa, constructed by Naima, is evident.

Joseph von Hammer used the part that Mimar (Architect) Kasım Agha proposed Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to Süleyman Paşa as a nominee to the Grand Vizierate, which is only included in Naima and indicated in the related section. It is unclear whether the dialogue exists because Naima claimed to have heard this information from an individual and added it to his history. The section begins with the debasement of the coin and the reactions of the artisans and soldiers to it, and the section continues until the dismissal of Süleyman Paşa from the Grand Vizierate. Here, Hammer briefly summarized Süleyman Paşa's response to Mimar Kasım Agha: "How can a man like Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, who is without wealth, rule the sublime state?" after this quote Hammer criticizes Süleyman Paşa as saying, "The Grand Vizier was proving that he believed money was more useful than steadiness and honesty."²⁸⁰ In Hammer's text, Süleyman Paşa is portrayed as an administrator who only generated short-term solutions and acted without any forward-looking expectations. He believed that he could resolve the financial and administrative problems of the empire by finding more money. Hammer fully aligned with Naima's ideas about the grand vizierate through his criticism of Süleyman Paşa. According to Naima, the duty of the grand vizier was not only to manage income and expenses.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:254–55.

²⁸¹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1644–48.

Nuri Paşa emphasized the weaknesses of Süleyman Paşa in his work titled *Netayic ü'l-Vukuat*, which examined the events and institutions that occurred in the Ottoman Empire from its foundation until 1841. Although Nuri Paşa did not directly quote Naima, the adjectives he used for Süleyman Paşa have similarities to those used by Naima. Regarding Süleyman Paşa's appointment to the grand vizierate after the dismissal of Kara Murad Paşa, Nuri Paşa recorded: "...the grand vizierate was given to a feeble elder named Ermeni (Armenian) Süleyman Paşa..." He emphasized Süleyman Paşa's origin and employed such terms as feeble and elder.²⁸² Besides for the dismissal of the Süleyman Paşa, Nuri Paşa said:

Because of the sorrow and pressure that the other partners of the state and plunderers caused, the desperate old man who owned the government seal of the empire for ninety-nine days requested his dismissal from higher authority...²⁸³

The record of Nuri Paşa reminds the Mustafa Naima's examination:

...Grand Vizier Süleyman Paşa, who, having no other competence than fulfilling the demands of the governing group, witnessed the problems caused by the lack of income, the abundance of waiting payments, and expenses, remained incapable and confused under the heavy burden of the esteemed position of grand vizierate...²⁸⁴

The influence of Naima on İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı is more intense. From Uzunçarşılı's perspective, Süleyman Paşa, who is accused of being involved in the murder of Tarhuncu Ahmed Paşa, was a feeble and coward

²⁸² Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l- Vuku'at*, 2:66.

²⁸³ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, 2:66.

²⁸⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1644.

grand vizier.²⁸⁵ Uzunçarşılı's criticisms are made based on the dialogue presented by Naima involving Mimar Kasım Ağa's advice to Süleyman Paşa. After quoting the conversation between the two, Uzunçarşılı also includes Kasım Ağa's opinion about Süleyman Paşa: "I pitied him when I realized that he could not be of use due to his obsession with personal gain from everyone; he had become so preoccupied with his concerns that he was useless for any task." Kasım Ağa's words highlight Süleyman Paşa's failure and insufficiency.

While expressing pity for Süleyman Paşa, Kasım Ağa also indicated that he lost hope in him. Based on these words, Uzunçarşılı made the following observation about Süleyman Paşa's situation: "This statement by the head of government proves how much he is in a state of unbleness and cowardice, especially under the influence and fear of the black eunuch aghas."²⁸⁶ This observation of İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı was two-dimensional. In the first dimension, it was emphasized that Süleyman Paşa was an unsuccessful grand vizier. In the second dimension, it was indicated that the intimidating influence of the black eunuchs in governance and Süleyman Paşa's lack of independence. Although Uzunçarşılı's approach to the 1656 Çınar Event marked it as a result of a financial and administrative crisis, the influence of the black eunuchs was also emphasized.

İsmail Hami Danişmend was one of the followers of the negative image of Süleyman Paşa. Danişmend presented the financial crisis created by

²⁸⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: II. Selim'in Tahta Çıkışından 1699 Karlofça Antlaşmasına Kadar*, 3/1:287.

²⁸⁶ Uzunçarşılı, 3/1:287–90.

Süleyman Paşa and his predecessors as the cause of the Çınar Event. Danişmend emphasized that Süleyman Paşa was a converted Armenian and also stated, “This feeble man’s lack of consciousness is told!” According to Danişmend, Süleyman Paşa was not only feeble but also unconscious and unaware of what he was doing. The reason for Süleyman Paşa’s dismissal is his incompetence.²⁸⁷

Reşad Ekrem Koçu did not directly criticize Süleyman Paşa or use terms like feeble and old. However, in his article on the Çınar Event, one of the individuals blamed was Süleyman Paşa. Koçu stated that the ulufe distributed by Süleyman Paşa caused unrest among the soldiers and led to the Çınar Event. Süleyman Paşa’s preferences played a role in this event.

Half of the payment disturbed by Süleyman Paşa to soldiers contained debased coins. The other half was exchanged by officers with debased coins too. Because of that, the soldiers received entirely debased coins as their payment.²⁸⁸

In his work on Ottoman history, Mustafa Cezar criticized the situation of Grand Vizier Süleyman Paşa in governance. He highlighted that Süleyman Paşa, whom he suggested take the place of Kara Murad Paşa after his resignation, was a converted Armenian. Mustafa Cezar mentioned that Süleyman Paşa was a sweet-natured and favorable man, but he was feeble. For the cause of the feebleness of Süleyman Paşa, Cezar pointed out the financial disorder and the hegemony of Harem aghas. In his narrative, Cezar

²⁸⁷ Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 3:420.

²⁸⁸ Koçu, “Çınar Vakası”. The same words can be traced in Naima’s narrative as: “Süleyman Paşa’nın verdiği mevacibin nısfı mikdarı zuyuf ve kem ayar olup sağ olan nukudun ekserin dahi zabitan-ı asker züyuf akçeye bozup nakıs ü kasid her ne ise tevzi etmişler idi.” Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 6:1648.

also included the advice of Mimar Kasım Agha to Süleyman Paşa. According to Cezar, Süleyman Paşa rejected all advice and eventually demanded from Kasım Agha the names of people who had wealth to share with him. In response, Mimar Kasım Agha reminded Süleyman Paşa of the necessity of bringing order to affairs in the sublime state and concluded his words. Cezar described Süleyman Paşa as a feeble occupier of the office of the grand vizierate. Even though Süleyman Paşa could not effectively join the administration of the empire because of the Harem aghas and financial problems, it could not help Süleyman Paşa dodge Cezar's critics. Even though Süleyman Paşa could not effectively join the administration of the empire because of the Harem aghas and financial problems, these reasons could not help Süleyman Paşa dodge Cezar's criticism.²⁸⁹

Halil İnalçık shared similar criticisms with those mentioned above while approaching the 1656 Çınar Event from Naima's perspective. Attention was drawn not only to Süleyman Paşa's old age and weakness but also to his lack of capacity to act as grand vizier. However, İnalçık's criticisms should not be only interpreted through Süleyman Paşa. Even though Süleyman Paşa was old and feeble, the influence of the financial problems created by his predecessor and the strong presence of those surrounding him in the administration contributed to his failed government. Nevertheless, İnalçık also utilized the narrative of Mimar Kasım Agha. The offers rejected by Süleyman Paşa were highlighted in İnalçık's narrative to reinforce the

²⁸⁹ Cezar, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, 4:2031–32.

criticisms.²⁹⁰ In addition, there was a point that requires clarification for İnalçık. After the section in which İnalçık explained the Çınar Event, in the endnotes, he wrote the following regarding the speech given by the uprising leader Sipahi Hasan to the Sultan:

A contemporary chronicler, probably Şarihülmenarzade, explained the situation to justify the rebels. He has close ties with some officials: Naima, VI, p. 151-153, quoted narrative from him.²⁹¹

It is seen that İnalçık assumed Naima's one of the sources was Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi while narrating the event. However, Şarihülmenarzade's history did not cover the year 1656, and therefore, he did not record the event. Naima states in the introduction to *Tarih-i Naima* that he recorded the events that occurred from 1656 onwards himself.

3.3.2 Şeyhülislam Hocaşade Mesud Efendi's Image in the Literature

Hocaşade Mesud Efendi, known as the second Şeyhülislam executed in the Ottoman Empire, also played a crucial part in Naima's narrative of the Çınar Event. Because of his importance, his name is frequently encountered in literature. However, there is a negative image of Mesud Efendi in the literature because the sources generally follow Naima's account. İsmail Hami Danişmend, Reşad Ekrem Koçu, Halil İnalçık, Stanford Shaw, Münir Aktepe and Necdet Sakaoğlu did not mention Hocaşade Mesud Efendi. However, remaining researchers Hammer, Nuri Paşa, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı,

²⁹⁰ İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tegyayür ve Fesad*, 314–15.

²⁹¹ İnalçık, 489.

Mustafa Cezar, Caroline Finkel, and Fikret Yılmaz follow the image created by Mustafa Naima.

Joseph von Hammer began to describe Mesud Efendi from his first council, which he joined as the Şeyhülislam. Instead of wearing clothes (kisve) that belonged to the rank of Şeyhülislam, Mesud Efendi wore clothes that belonged to the rank of viziers, and Hammer indicated this attitude was not welcomed by the members of the council.²⁹² Hammer's main intention was to mark the political side of the Mesud Efendi through the inclusion of this story in his narrative. Another subject that was mentioned was the rivalry between Mesud Efendi and Abdülaziz Efendi. Hammer described Mesud Efendi's act as unjust, as Naima described. Furthermore, Abdülaziz Efendi's calm reaction to this unjust situation is praised. According to Hammer, Mesud Efendi was trying to take control of the decision-making mechanism of the Palace. He targeted having a right to every appointment, and he also wanted to be the monopoly in the administration of the empire.²⁹³

Şeyhülislam Mesud Efendi found it reasonable to appoint Boynuyaralı Mehmed Paşa, the governor (protector) of Damascus, to the office of grand vizierate during the conference that was held in the Sultan's presence.²⁹⁴

The purpose of the Mesud Efendi, while suggesting the Mehmed Paşa to the grand vizierate, was to take advantage of his old age and control the

²⁹² von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10:258.

²⁹³ von Hammer-Purgstall, 10:258–59.

²⁹⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1664.

decision-making process. However, Mesud Efendi's attempt failed due to Mehmed Paşa's resistance to him.²⁹⁵

The Governor of Damascus, Boynuyaralı Mehmed Paşa, is a humble Turkmen who is an individual with strong character, and he spent time in service of the state. However, things did not go as planned for Mesud Efendi, who acted on the assumption that it would be easy to bring him under control.²⁹⁶

Mesud Efendi's ambition for political power, his bureaucratic maneuvers to achieve power, and his interventions in appointments were acts that were subjected to Naima's criticism.

Primarily, Mustafa Nuri Paşa emphasized how Mesud Efendi became the Şeyhülislam. According to Nuri Paşa, Mesud Efendi obtained the position due to some hidden dealings, and the support from prominent figures in the event played a role in his appointment as the Şeyhülislam. Mesud was getting support because of his reputation for honesty during his tenure as the Anatolian Chief Judge. However, the paradox arises when Mesud Efendi's honesty is combined with his arrogance and harsh temperament. Mesud Efendi dared to criticize everyone, began to attract negative attention, and, ultimately, was executed. In Nuri Paşa's work, Mesud Efendi's image is obvious. Mesud Efendi aspired to take control of all state affairs and become the only authority to consult. However, this desire cost him both his position and his life.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:265.

²⁹⁶ Naima Mustafa Efendi, 6:1673.

²⁹⁷ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l- Vuku'at*, 2:67.

One of the researchers who made Mesud Efendi a part of his narrative was İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı. According to Uzunçarşılı, Mesud Efendi lacked scholarly knowledge, was not well-educated, and had dangerous and harmful behavior. The reason for his appointment to the Şeyhülislam was that a few individuals supported him and made propaganda for him during the Çınar Event. Naima describes this situation as follows:

A troublemaker and a few others look like him, wearing a robe and turban. They infiltrated among the Janissaries and cavalry soldiers, and they planted the seeds of discord. 'It is not suitable for Memikzade, a simple bribe-taker addicted to wine and drugs, deprived of knowledge, to become the Şeyhülislam. It should be someone like Hocaşade, truthful and brave, to be the Şeyhülislam for us to benefit.' After this, the soldiers sent a message to the palace and mocked Memikzade's appointment, saying, 'We do not want Memikzade. Instead, it would be more reasonable for a janissary cook to become the Şeyhülislam.'²⁹⁸

As a result of this propaganda, the *meydan aghas*, who were responsible for the Çınar Event, guaranteed the appointment of Mesud Efendi to the position of Şeyhülislam.²⁹⁹ However, Mesud Efendi's reckless behavior, which had been going on for a long time, and his habit of criticizing everyone also brought about dissatisfaction with him. Mesud Efendi was as ambitious in action as he was in words. To take control of the administration, he engaged in various activities. One of these is recommending Boynuyaralı Mehmed Paşa to the grand vizierate and attempting to seize power by taking advantage

²⁹⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1657.

²⁹⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: II. Selim'in Tahta Çıkışından 1699 Karlofça Antlaşmasına Kadar*, 3/1:300.

of his old age. However, Mesud Efendi's efforts and ambition eventually resulted in the accusation that he planned to dethrone the Sultan. Following this accusation, he was executed.³⁰⁰ Abdülaziz Efendi, Mesud Efendi's rival, stated that this accusation was unjust. He wrote that despite Mesud Efendi's ambition, he would not go so far as to commit a crime against the sultan.

Mustafa Cezar's thoughts about the appointment of Mesud Efendi as the şeyhülislam were similar to İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's perspective. Mesud Efendi's supporters accused Memikzade of being addicted to opium, which tarnished his reputation. With Memikzade's reputation damaged, Mesud Efendi was suggested as his replacement and thus became the Şeyhülislam.³⁰¹ Mesud Efendi was portrayed as an orator, scheming Şeyhülislam with a political identity, striving to satisfy his ambitions with every move. The reason why Mesud Efendi recommended Mehmed Paşa to the grand vizierate was because he attempted to take advantage of Mehmed Paşa's old age. The Palace had prejudices against Mesud Efendi, who was appointed as Şeyhülislam with the support of the cavalry troops. To overcome this prejudice, Mesud Efendi collaborated with the palace against the organizers of the Çınar Event, cavalry soldiers. The underlying reason for Mesud Efendi's decision was his effort to secure his position and future. Based on Naima's account, Cezar criticizes the execution of Defterdarzade Mehmed Paşa. This execution was carried out unjustly due to the personal ambitions of Mesud Efendi and the Grand Vizier, Siyavuş Paşa.³⁰² Naima

³⁰⁰ Uzunçarşılı, 3/1:301–2.

³⁰¹ Cezar, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, 4:2036.

³⁰² Cezar, 4:2036–37.

implied the hostility between Defterdarzade Mehmed Paşa and Mesud Efendi by stating, “...due to Mesud Efendi’s grudge, Defterdarzade could not establish a good relationship with him, and an enmity had arisen between Şeyhülislam Mesud Efendi and Defterdarzade.”³⁰³ According to Naima, Mehmed Paşa was wrongly accused and executed.

Caroline Finkel and Fikret Yılmaz should be evaluated separately from other researchers regarding the image of Mesud Efendi. As mentioned above, Finkel prefers to examine the Çınar Event through Eremya Çelebi. However, it is observed that both Naima’s and Eremya’s accounts are used for the Mesud Efendi. In Finkel’s text, the image of Mesud is analyzed based on two different events. The first event is the role Mesud Efendi played in Tarhuncu Ahmed Paşa’s appointment to the grand vizierate, and the second is Mesud’s position in the Çınar Event. In the first case, Mesud Efendi was an actor, while in the second, he turned out to be a victim. Finkel’s examination of Mesud Efendi as one of the victims of the Çınar Event separated her. Fikret Yılmaz diverges from the mainstream narrative, which is based on Naima, by approaching the Çınar Event from a different perspective, but the same does not apply to Mesud Efendi. Yılmaz examines Mesud Efendi in the context of being the second şeyhülislam to be executed by following the image created by Naima.

Finkel’s narrative on Mesud Efendi began with the grand vizierate of Tarhuncu Ahmed Paşa. Mesud’s influence in this context is quite concrete. Mesud Efendi was the person who recommended Ahmed Paşa and ensured

³⁰³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1663.

his appointment as the grand vizier. According to Finkel's perspective, this critical initiative by Mesud Efendi transformed him into a powerful figure involved in state affairs.³⁰⁴ In the text, it is mentioned that Mesud Efendi was a victim of violence. This discourse was different from the image of Mesud Efendi, who lost his life as a result of the injustices he committed. Mesud Efendi's appointment was not related to his suitability or qualification for the position. The conditions of the period led him to the position of Şeyhülislam. He was appointed in a chaotic era, which put pressure on the Sultan. However, this did not prevent him from engaging in controversial actions. Mesud Efendi had a self-serving and politicized perspective. His involvement in the destruction of the Armenian Church in Bursa, as narrated by Eremya Çelebi, also points to this perspective. However, according to Finkel, what placed Mesud Efendi in a victim position was not his politicization but the violence that emerged in the Çınar Event.³⁰⁵

While examining Mesud Efendi, Fikret Yılmaz indicates similar aspects with Naima. Mesud Efendi's being the second şeyhülislam, which was executed in the history of the empire, emphasizes and questions. Mesud Efendi, a şeyhülislam with strong political tendencies, is portrayed as hard-tempered. Yılmaz mentions that his ambition to rule became evident, and he faced criticism for intervening in state affairs. Mesud Efendi paved the way to his downfall because he did not care if he was a şeyhülislam or a grand vizier. As in the general literature, Yılmaz also addresses Mesud Efendi's role and purpose in the appointment of Boynuyaralı as the Grand Vizier. Mesud

³⁰⁴ Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*, 244–45.

³⁰⁵ Finkel, 250–51.

Efendi tried to abuse Boynuyaralı Mehmed Paşa's old age for his interests, but he failed at it. As a result of political processes and imbalances, he was executed. Yılmaz argued, citing Naima, that Mesud Efendi attempted to take control of the government.³⁰⁶

Mesud Efendi's apparent target was to set state affairs in order and establish order in the world. However, due to his internal ambition for worldly affairs and governance, he had the desire to control everything, saying, "Let the last decision be mine, let me take care of state affairs, and let appointments be made according to my suggestions." He did not hesitate to punish arrogantly and ruthlessly anyone who opposed him and even go as far as having them execute if possible.³⁰⁷

The limited sources about Mesud Efendi have led Fikret Yılmaz to use Naima's narrative. Consequently, the image of Mesud Efendi as an interventionist, ambitious, politicized, and ruthless figure in state affairs is evident here.

In Naima's discourse, Süleyman Paşa and Mesud Efendi served as cautionary examples. While Süleyman Paşa represented failure and incompetence, Mesud Efendi symbolized ambition and the thirst for power. As evident in the literature, Naima's *Tarih-i Naima* and narrative have been predominantly utilized. This situation has brought about a historiography cast in the shadow of Naima and carried judgments from centuries ago. The Çınar Event has been reconstructed and narrated in Naima's world. However, being in the shadow of Naima is not only about the enchantment created by Naima's narration. Ignoring different sources in the literature or using these sources

³⁰⁶ Yılmaz, "Siyaset, İsyan ve İstanbul (1453-1808)," 154–57.

³⁰⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, 2014, 6:1683.

only to fill in the gaps left by Naima has led to the writing of the Çınar Event centered around Naima.

CONCLUSION

Within the framework of this M.A. thesis, a critical reevaluation has been undertaken concerning the 1656 Çınar Event, a pivotal episode in seventeenth-century Ottoman Istanbul, traditionally characterized in historiography as a Janissary rebellion. Despite its historical significance, the Çınar Event has long remained on the periphery of scholarly exploration, with only a handful of exceptions. This study took a new approach by delving into a comparative analysis of various contemporary accounts of the Çınar Event, with particular emphasis on the *Tarih-i Naima*, a widely cited Ottoman history book and a hitherto primary reference for comprehending the intricacies of the event. While the contemporaries of the Çınar Event documented concise, straightforward narratives capturing crucial details during the unfolding events, Mustafa Naima Efendi, in a departure from convention, engaged in a meticulous reconstruction of the narrative. He reorganized structural elements and crafted a more comprehensive and layered account. Prior to this study, however, little was known about the specific characteristics of Naima's narration of the Çınar Event, leaving his intentions and priorities unexplored.

This study has not only aimed to deepen our understanding of the Çınar Event but has also unveiled the underlying motives guiding Naima's narrative choices. It becomes evident that Naima's recounting of the events serves a larger purpose—that of justifying the superiority and continued presence of the Köprülü household within the intricate political life of the Ottoman Empire. The commissioning of Naima by Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa to

undertake this historical endeavor goes beyond a mere coincidence or a conventional patronage relationship. His timing aligns significantly with a crucial period marked by the diminishing influence of the Köprülüs against their ulema-origin adversaries, such as Feyzullah Efendi. The Köprülüs, once celebrated, became implicated as a cause for the Empire's precarious situation, especially after the signing of the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699—hence the long reinterpretation of the peace of Hudaybiyyah at the introduction of Naima's *Tarih*. In response to this turning tide, Hüseyin Paşa sought to secure not only the historical legacy of the Köprülü household but also to safeguard his own standing in the political arena.

When entrusted with the task of crafting a historical narrative, Naima seems to possess a keen awareness of the pivotal role he was to play in shaping the historical discourse to align with his patron's aspirations. His meticulous narrative was carefully designed to cater to the desires of his patron, Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa, with the 1656 Çınar Event emerging as a focal point in the reconstruction of the past. This event held particular significance as it coincided with the first year Naima took up the responsibility of independent authorship after incorporating, and perhaps even copying, verbatim, Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi's text up until 1655. The year 1656, in addition to being a critical juncture for Naima's own historical narrative, held especially profound implications for the Köprülüs as well. It marked the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to the grand vizierate. This strange synchronicity underscores the intertwined destinies of Naima and the Köprülüs, with the 1656 Çınar Event becoming a significant locus for both cases. As Köprülü Mehmed Paşa assumed the grand vizierate

in 1656, the dynamics of Ottoman politics were undergoing a profound transformation, and Naima's narrative choices became instrumental in framing this critical juncture in a manner conducive to the preservation of the Köprülü legacy.

In fact, Naima's examination of the 1656 Çınar Event surpasses a mere chronological account, delving into a narrative framework predating the event itself. Based on an anonymous source, he crafts a nuanced dialogue between Süleyman Paşa and his confidant, Mimar Kasım Ağa—an exchange conspicuously absent from other historical records but only present in Naima's *Tarih*. This dialogue revolves around Mimar Kasım Ağa proposing Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as a formidable candidate for the grand vizier position, urging the aging Süleyman Paşa to relinquish his responsibilities without scruple. Süleyman Paşa, however, dismisses this proposition with disdain. Naima strategically deploys this unique dialogue to posit that the root cause of the Çınar Event lies in the perceived narrowness of Süleyman Paşa and his associates. This multifaceted narrative serves Naima's objectives on three fronts: firstly, it reconfigures actual events to legitimize and justify his patron's ancestors; secondly, it manipulates the causative factors behind the Çınar Event; and thirdly, by reinterpreting the sequence of events, Naima establishes a foundational reference point for subsequent entries, such as the incident involving Feyzullah Efendi.

However, Naima did not solely employ the Çınar Event and its re-narration to bolster his viewpoints and arguments. He also criticized Ottoman political thought and practice. In Sipahi Hasan's speech, Naima once again condemned the current state of the Empire and its governors. He depicted the

Ottoman Empire as corrupted by officials and their factions. In line with Naima's perspective and the reorganized speech of Sipahi Hasan, certain individuals were accused of exploiting the Empire's resources for personal interests, causing chaos in both the Empire and its ecosystem. The Sultan was further accused of neglecting his responsibility toward his subjects, putting the Empire's existence in jeopardy. Sipahi Hasan, in emphasizing Sultan Mehmed IV's dependence on justice, a central tenet in the Ottoman circle of justice, secured a legitimate and justified foundation for his accusations and uprising. Naima and Hasan indirectly reminded the Sultan and his officials of their responsibilities. However, Naima's primary objective was not centered on the overall state of the Empire. His main aim was to establish a legitimate basis for the Köpürülü household, and he seized every opportunity, whether connected or unrelated, to accomplish this goal.

The 'institution' of *Ayak Divanı*, a hitherto overlooked and unexplored facet of negotiation and political participation, played a pivotal role in facilitating Sipahi Hasan's address to the Sultan, where he ardently sought justice on behalf of the Janissaries and cavalry troops under his representation. The practice evolved into a tool wielded by the subjects themselves to hold the sultans accountable and secure justice whenever possible. Whether through a conscious transfer by the sultans or an understanding among the subjects of the practice's importance in ensuring justice, *Ayak Divanı* slowly emerged as a mechanism for subjects to participate in governance. In other words, rather than resorting to brutal and illegitimate rebellions, subjects and servants of the sultans leveraged *Ayak Divanı* and its privileges to engage in the political process. This practice enabled groups, particularly military elites like the *Sipahis* and Janissaries,

who were previously excluded, to partake in the decision-making processes of the Ottoman Empire.

In instances necessitating the convening of *Ayak Divanı*, sultans and palace officials found themselves ensnared in a dilemma. The first option involved acquiescing to the demands articulated during *Ayak Divanı*, thereby ensuring the continuation of the sultan's rule, albeit at the expense of sacrificing certain officials. Alternatively, the sultan could opt to withhold approval for *Ayak Divanı*, resulting in the forfeiture of his throne and, at times, his life. Paradoxically, this decision was made in defense of officials who, despite the sultan's decision, would still face execution following the ascension of the new ruler. This intricate interplay between the sultans and the representatives of the populace in *Ayak Divanı* encapsulated the delicate equilibrium of power, justice, and political survival within the Ottoman political framework. The binary choices mirrored the complex dynamics inherent in maintaining control, navigating justice, and safeguarding political legitimacy. Nevertheless, all these decisions and processes demonstrated how the military elite groups in Istanbul participated in the decision-making process of the Empire and changed the sultans' priorities.

Sipahi Hasan's articulation of ideas was facilitated by the institutional platform of the *Ayak Divanı*. The critical analysis of the aforementioned *Ayak Divanı* underscores its indispensable role in reconstructing this historical attempt. However, in contrast to earlier instances of the *Ayak Divanı*, Hasan's demeanor and demands displayed strategic sophistication and maturity. As the spokesperson for the assembled crowd, Hasan refrained from directing accusations or threats toward the Sultan; instead, he consistently pinpointed

specific individuals. In adherence to its fundamental function, the *Ayak Divanı* served as a means to articulate demands for justice. During the seventy days of the cavalry troops' quasi-rule, the synergy between the crowd's demands and Hasan's discourse on the concept of justice created a formidable force. This period persisted until an agreement was reached between the Janissaries and the Palace, leading to the demise of the *meydan aghas*. This development sheds light on the intricate dynamic between the Janissaries and the cavalry troops. While the latter sought to assert influence in governance and decision-making, the Janissaries assumed the role of the Ottoman Empire's regulatory mechanism. When the cavalry troops overstepped their bounds, the Janissaries intervened, serving as a check on their authority.

This thesis presents an alternative view of seventeenth-century Istanbul and the crisis that it went through, along with other global precedents. The seventeenth century came with the aforementioned population growth and complications that followed. Nevertheless, these complications, such as the increment in the number of military elite groups, young, single, and unemployed males, city populations, etc., also made it possible to emerge a political society that avidly attempted to participate in the Ottoman political sphere to secure their interests, or so-called justice. But of course, this attempt was aimed at securing a share of the cake that previously belonged to the Sultan and his inner circle, nothing less. No matter what, due to this improvement, it can be mentioned that a political society took form and began to develop certain methods for maintaining its interests. In one of her excogitative and insightful studies, *Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence*

for Their Existence, Suraiya Faroqhi demonstrated that the subjects of sultans could defend their interests through a complaint mechanism and also participate in politics with the same apparatus in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Faroqhi indicated that there was a bottom-up process in the Ottoman Empire's political structure; people learned how to address and deal with issues such as those originating from officials, *zorb*as, or the state itself and wrote petitions to demand solutions.³⁰⁸ The bottom-up process was a global fundamental praxis of the seventeenth-century crisis; however, its materialization was not the same for every example.

In the context of the Ottoman Empire, the reason behind political participation was the intention to secure justice; however, justice did not have a certain meaning. On the one hand, for villagers who settled in Anatolia and struggled against the combination of *zorb*as and Ottoman officials, justice meant protection. On the other hand, for elite groups, it meant preserving their incomes and privileges in the Empire's economic and political structure. In this way, the *Celâli* movements can also be studied as a method of political participation due to their nature, as Akdağ has analyzed. Otherwise, their efforts were heavily focused on bringing the state to the table to negotiate.³⁰⁹ In addition, the empire itself showed a willingness to negotiate in order to

³⁰⁸ Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence," in *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1720* (Gorgias Press+The Isis Press, 2010), 25–36; Antonis Anastasopoulos, "Introduction," in *Political Initiatives "from the Bottom Up" in the Ottoman Empire: Halcyon Days in Crete VII/Rethymno 9-11 January 2009*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2012), 5.

³⁰⁹ Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 189–95; Aslıhan Gürbüz, *Taming the Messiah: The Formation of an Ottoman Political Public Sphere, 1600–1700* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2023), 40.

avoid unnecessary campaigns and costs. As Barkey explained, Ottoman governors based in Istanbul did not hesitate to make deals with bandits, and these deals were usually in favor of the bandits.³¹⁰ Nevertheless, it took a long time for the empire to be persuaded to negotiate rather than fight with *Celālîs*. All these facts provide the answer to a question: why were the demands for justice and the practice of it so obvious in the seventeenth century? Perhaps the question can be formulated differently: was the concept of justice (*adl*) about securing literal justice, which the mobs always used as a legitimate excuse or the privileges of the constituent elements (elite groups)? Obviously, the existence and mobility of young, single, and unemployed men were misused and exploited by elite groups in Anatolia to secure their own privileges and incomes that the sultans could no longer provide.

Another perspective this thesis brings along is about the monarchies, which collapsed and were restored in the seventeenth century. As indicated in the introduction, there were strange parallels between European monarchies (France, England, and Spain) and the Ottoman Empire. The seventeenth century was a turbulent period for all of them. Monarchs and monarchies were threatened by their subjects, and some were temporarily abolished. While Spain was challenged in Naples and lost its power for a few months, France and England fought the challenger from the mainland. The rebellion started by the *Fronde* of France ended with the birth of Louis XIV, the Sun King, *le Roi Soleil*. However, initiated in 1642 by a turbulent civil war culminating in the execution of King Charles I, this era culminated in the

³¹⁰ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 195–229.

reinstatement of the monarchy and the subsequent posthumous vilification of Oliver Cromwell. Despite a brief interlude of abolition, mirroring the trajectories of their French and Spanish counterparts, the English monarchy eventually experienced a resurgence, solidifying its dominance. The paramount European monarchies, confronting formidable challenges in the seventeenth century, momentarily grappled with a diminishing of authority and ceded control to opposing factions. However, they ultimately reclaimed and fortified their positions. While monarchs implemented more stringent measures to exert control over subjects, an intriguing departure unfolded in the Ottoman monarchy, where instead of an absolutist sultan, a distinguished and austere grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, and his progeny assumed prominence.

The thesis focused on the Çınar Event and its historiography. It was not unique to the seventeenth century; it was marked by the continuum of the period and contained more than just the characteristics of an upheaval. Mustafa Naima Efendi's narrative, which was based on the defense and legitimization of his patron and the Köprülü Family, made an examination of the event possible. Moreover, Naima Efendi's narrative makes it appear that there was an ideological shift in the Ottoman Empire's political sphere and thought.³¹¹ With this thesis, I indicated the importance of working on Ottoman historiography from different perspectives and the possible outcomes of this method. Instances similar to this case study are abundant throughout the centuries and historical records. This thesis aims to shed light

³¹¹ Gürbüz, *Taming the Messiah: The Formation of an Ottoman Political Public Sphere, 1600–1700*, 30.

on the diverse dimensions and unique aspects of Ottoman historiography while underscoring the significance for modern historians to possess an awareness of its nuances and expansions.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I: A Brief Biography of Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi

Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi, known as the main source of Mustafa Naima, was the son of Abdülhalim Efendi, who served as a professor (müderris) and judge (kadı).³¹² Although Mehmed Tahir stated that his grandfather was Amasyalı Bayram Efendi and he was born in Amasya, there is no definitive information regarding this.³¹³ After receiving his mülazemet from Şeyhülislam Muid Ahmed Efendi, he started as a müderris in Perviz Efendi Madrasa in 1649. After serving as a professor for about eight years, Ahmed Efendi died in June 1657 at Davud Paşa Madrasa. His historical writings, initiated around 1655 from Prophet Adam, remained unfinished at his death. Associated with Şeyhülislam Bahayî Efendi, he was accused by Naima of favoring Bahayî Efendi against figures like Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, reflecting the historical conflict between them. Naima reconstructed Menarzade's texts according to his own position and affiliation, as noted by Lewis Thomas.³¹⁴

³¹² Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, ed. M. A. Yekta Saraç (Ankara: TÜBA, 2016), 947; Christine Woodhead, "Sharih Ül-Menar-Zade," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 348; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 297, 462; Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:758.

³¹³ Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 947.

³¹⁴ Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 146–47.

Date	Appointment Madrasa/Judgeship/Position	Predecessor	Successor
September 1649	Perviz Efendi Madrasa	Kerastecizade	Sadrüddinzade Fethullah Efendi
August 1650- 1651	Ahmed Paşa Madrasa in Topkapı	Mütevelli Ali Efendi	Allamezade Seyyid Abdullah Efendi
August 1652	Same madrasa		
February 1655	Sinan Paşa Madrasa (Beşiktaş)	Uşşaki Hasan Efendi	Müezzinzade Şeyh Mehemmed Efendi
August 1655	Musıla-ı Sahn		
September 1655	Davud Paşa Madrasa	Uzun Abdullah	
June 1657	Deceased		Börekçizade Hasan Efendi

Table 3 The career of the Şarihülmenarzade Ahmed Efendi³¹⁵

³¹⁵ Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 462; Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:750, 758, 821, 865, 916.

APPENDIX II: Tables

Mustafa Naima Efendi's Career

Year	Assignment
1680s	Teberdaran-ı Saray-ı Atik
1686 (h. RA 1097)	Katib-i Divan (Divan Scribe) (Scribe of Kalaylıkoz Ahmed Paşa's divan) (rank of hâce)
1702	Vakanüvis (Historian) (Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa)
1704	Anadolu Muhasebecisi (Accountant of the Anatolia) (Kalaylıkoz Ahmed Paşa)
1706 ³¹⁶	Exile to Chania (Çorlulu Ali Paşa)
1709	Chief of Protocol/ treasurer of galleys
1712	Accountant of the Anatolia (Damad Ali Ağa)
1713	Chief of the Imperial Registry Office
1713	Chief Accountant (Başmuhasibecilik-i Evvel)
1715	Scribe of the Sword-bearer Corps
1715 ³¹⁷	Accountant of the Anatolia /Defter Emaneti Vekaleti
1715 (h. 1127)	Chief of the Registry (Defter Emini)/Scribe of the Divan-ı Hümayun (cemaati katıban-ı divan-ı hümayun) (Morea)

Table 4 The career of the Naima³¹⁸

³¹⁶ Ahmed Refik, "Menfada Naima Efendi," *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası*, no. 5 (1931): 52–55; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 50 Instead of Chania, Thomas used Gallipoli. However, this was not correct.

³¹⁷ AE.SAMD.III/177-17216.

³¹⁸ Afyoncu, "Osmanlı Müverrihlerine Dair Tevihat Kayıtları I," 84–84; Şen, *Making Sense of History: Narrativity and Literariness in the Ottoman Chronicle of Na'ima*, 41–52; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 22, 36–51; Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 4:2903; *Ayine-i Zurefa: Osmanlı Tarih ve Müverrihleri*, 53; *Vefayat-ı Ayvansarayı*, 245; Mirzazade Mehmed Salim Efendi, *Tezkiretü's-Şuara*, trans. Adnan İnce (Ankara: AYK, 2005), 675.

Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi's Career

Date	Appointment Madrasa/Judgeship/Position	Predecessor	Successor
1612	Hayrüddin Paşa	Sıdkı Mehmed Efendi	
1611			
1615	Ali Paşa'yı Cedid	Tevfikizade Ahmed	
1616	Piri Paşa Madrasa	Fenarizade Şeyhi Efendi	
1617	Kalenderhane Darülfadesi	Benli Abdülgani Efendi	
1620	One of the Sahn-ı Semaniyye	Arab İmamzade Mustafa Efendi	Sarı Abdullah
1621 Rebiülevvel	Bursa (Bursa) Sultaniyye	Hüsamzade Mustafa Efendi	Niksarizade Abdulhey Efendi
	Hankah Madrasa	Ahmed Efendi	
1621 Zilhicce	Edirne Selimiyyesi	Sıdkı Efendi	
1622	Eyyub Madrasa	Seyfizade	
1623 Receb	Hakaniyye-i Vefa	Amasi Abdullah Efendi	
1623 Şaban	Bursa Monla Hüsrev	Exiled because of the Fatih Mosque Event	
	Bursa Orhan Madrasa ³¹⁹		
1624	One of the Medaris-ü Süleymaniyye	Bakizade Abdurrahman Efendi	

Table 5 The professorship appointments of Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi (1st Period)³²⁰

³¹⁹ Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 233.

³²⁰ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:768–69; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 486.

Scholars	New Assignment
Bahşı Efendi	Isparta
Şerif Efendi	Bursa (Bursa)
Hasan Efendi	Bursa
Ali Efendizade Abdullah Efendi	Amasiyye
Abdülaziz Efendi	Bursa/Orhan Madrasa
Seyyid Mehmed Efendi	Sire/Monla Arab Madrasa
Aziz Efendi	Karahisar Madrasa
Esad Efendi	Ankara/one of the madrasas in Ankara
Velizade Abdurrahman Efendi	Germiyanoglu Madrasa

Table 6 The list of those exiled in the Fatih Mosque Event.³²¹

³²¹ Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 233.

Date	Appointment Madrassa/Judgeship/Position	Predecessor	Successor
1624	Yenişehir Township	Seyfizade Abdurrahman Efendi	Dismissed in h. 1034, and Motoni Ahmed Efendi was appointed to his position
1625	Mazul		Mütevellizade
1627	Mekke-i Muazzama Township	Allame Şeyhi Efendi	Dismissed in h.1037 Rebiülahir and Fenarizade Efendi was appointed to his position
1631	Edirne Payesi/ Rank of the Edirne Judgeship		
January 1634	Judge of Konstantiniyye (Istanbul)	Ahizade Seyyid Mehmed Efendi	Karaçelebizade Mahmud Efendi
1634	Exiled to Cyprus		
July 27, 1634			
1636 Ramazan (Receb)	Returned from exile		

Table 7 The judgeship appointment of Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi (2nd Period) ³²²

³²² Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:768–69; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 486–87; Bilgin, “Devhatü'l-Meşayih ve Zeyilleri (İnceleme-Tenkitli Metin-Dizin),” 192; “Devhatü'l Meşayih,” fol. 23a.

Date	Appointment Madrasa/Judgeship/Position	Predecessor	Successor
1648	Sadaret-i Rum (Chief Judge of the Rumelia)	Mülakkab Mustafa Efendi	Dismissed in 1059 and Memekzade Mustafa Efendi was appointed his position
September 1649	Şeyhülislam Payesi/Rank of the şeyhülislam	Presented his fiqh work <i>el-Kafi</i> to Mehmed IV	
November 1649	Dismissed from Chief Judge of the Rumelia		Memekzade Mustafa Efendi
May 1651	Şeyhülislam	Bahayi Mehmed Efendi	
August 1651	Dismissed and exiled to Chios		Ebu Said Efendi

Table 8 The Rumelia Judgeship of Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi and its aftermath (3rd Period)³²³

³²³ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:769–70; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 488.

Hocazade Mesud Efendi's Career

Date	Appointment Madrasa/Judgeship/Position	Predecessor	Successor
1619	Received his <i>mülazemet</i> from Esad Efendi		
1621	Şah Sultan Madrasa	Sarı Abdullah Efendi	Baba Halilzade Mehmed Efendi
1624	Aişe Sultan Madrasa	Balizde Mustafa Efendi	Acem İshak Efendi
1626	Sahn-ı Seman	Fazlı Efendi	
1626	Transferred to another sahn	Ser-mahfilzade Mehmed Efendi	Sadizade Efendi (Seyfullah)
1628	Edirne Bayezidiyyesi	Fazlı Efendi	Gul Mustafa Efendi
1629	Eyyüb Madrasa	Velizade Efendi	
1631	One of the Süleymaniye Madrasas	Ali Şah Efendi (Kardeşi)	
1632	Judge of Aleppo	Uşşakizade Abdülaziz Efendi	
1633	Dismissed		Bahayi Mehmed Efendi
1641	Judge of the Galata/Rejected the assignment	Zeyni Efendi/Reis'ül-etibba Zeynü'l-abidin Efendi	Yavuzzade Seyyid Mustafa Efendi
1642	Judge of the Bursa	Yavuzzade Seyyid Mustafa Efendi	
1642	Dismissed		Bustanzade Abdülkerim Efendi
1645	Chief Judge of Rumelia		
1645	Judge of the Eyyüb/ Rejected the assignment	Zeyni Efendi/Acem Mehmed Efendi	
1650	Judge of the Istanbul	Sunizade Mehmed Efendi	
1651	Chief Judge of Anatolia	Bosnevi Şaban Efendi	
1652	Resigned		Balizade Mustafa Efendi
1655	Judge of the Galata		Bakizade Esad Efendi
1656	Şeyhülislam	Memekzade Mustafa Efendi	Hanefi Mehmed Efendi
1656	Exiled to Bursa		
1656	Sent to Diyarbakır/executed		

Table 9 The Career of Hocazade Mesud Efendi³²⁴

³²⁴ Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ul-Fuzala*, 2018, 1:742–45; Uşşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i Şakaik*, 329, 335, 348, 454, 437–40, 527–29, 869.

APPENDIX III: The Response Sent by Kaimmakam Yusuf Paşa to the Sultan About Devaluated Akçes

Hüsn-i cihan ve teali saadetli ve marifetlü ve merhametlü ve kerametlü padişahımın vücud-u şeriflerin hatalarından masun ve mahfuz idüb serir-i saltanat ve taht-ı saadetlerinin safayı hatırlarıyla ber devam yir karar eyleye emin-i mücerred seyyidül murselin arz-ı bende-i bi mikdar budur ki hala haseki kulları ile mübarek hattı hümayun saadet makrunları varid olub mazmun-u hüccet ... asitane-i saadetlerinden zuyuf akçe cari olurmuş çün mukayyed olub zuyuf akçe harc idenleri ele götürmezse müsamaha iderse deyü tenbih-i hümayunları sadr olub benim marifetlü ve merhametlü padişahım kac başım vardır ki saadetlü ve kerametlü padişahımın mübarek hatt-ı hümayunlarına muhalif-i asitane-i saadetlerinden çarşu ve bazarda zuyuf akçe cari ola benim merhametlü ve şefkatlü padişahım akça hususunda mukaddema varid olan hatt-ı hümayun-u saadet makrunları üzre cari olub asla tecavüz eyleyüb ziyade cari olmamışdır ve hafıyyeten zuyuf harc idub bu ana dek ele girenlere asla aman ve zaman verilmeyüb haklarından gelinüb bir ferde müshade olunmamışdır fimabad benim marufetlü ve merhametlü padişahım can ve başımla habs olunub ele girenlerin haklarından gelinmek mukarrerdir benim şefkatlü ve kerametlü padişahım haşa ki bu ana dek mehabetlü padişahımın tayyi hümayunlarına ve rıza-i şeriflerine muhalif vaz olunub hidmet-i hümayunları edasında taksiratım olmamışdır heman her halde saadetlü ve marufetlü ve kerametlü padişahımın hayır duaları ricasındayım ol babıyla emr ve ferman saadetlü ve merhametlü ve şevketlü padişahımındır

Yusuf

The beauty of the universe, the noble presence of my fortunate, knowledgeable, compassionate, and generous Sultan, is innocent and protected from the faults of governance. It constantly cherishes the splendor of the throne of happiness and desires nothing but pious servitude in the eyes of the blessed Prophet. It is the wish of humble servants that the execution of decisions regarding the distribution of devalued coins from the treasuries of palaces and coins from the government's palace have been carried out. I have been warned by our fortunate Sultan not to tolerate or show any leniency to those who have debased devalued coins. How many heads do I have to pardon those who defy the blessed orders of my fortunate and generous Sultan, who allows the circulation of debased coins in markets and shops? Based on the existing orders in the presence of our merciful and generous Sultan, no concessions have been made and their rights have been upheld. Our merciful and generous Sultan, without ever opposing the orders of our respectful Sultan and his holy consent, and without any faults in my services, I humbly request the benevolent prayers of my knowledgeable and merciful Sultan, and the orders and decrees are those of our happy, merciful, and great Sultan.

Yusuf³²⁵

³²⁵ TS.MA.e/884-32.

هو

9149

پادشاهک
 خوشبختانه و تعالی سعادتلو و مروتلو و مخلصو و کرامتو و جود و شرفیاب
 خطا لذن مصون و محفوظ ایدوب سیر سلطنت و تحسین سعادت لذن صفای خاطر لرایله
 برد و ام برقرار ایلده آمین بخیرمه سید المرسلین عرض بنیمقدار بود که حال خاصه کونلری
 مبارک خط هاینون سعادت مروتلری وارد اولوب مصنون بخت نموند اسانه سعادت لذن زیوف
 لبقه جاری اولوش چون میقدار اولوب زیوف لبقه خرج ایدلری اله کتور مناسحه ایدر
 تنیه هاینونلری صادر اولوب بنم مروتلو و مخلصو پادشاه قاج باشم وارد که سعادت لو
 و کرامتو پادشاهک مبارک خط هاینونلری نه مخالف اسانه سعادت لذن چار شرو بار آورده
 زیوف لبقه جاری اولو بنم مخلصو و شفقتمو پادشاه لبقه خصوصند معده ما وارد اولان
 خط هاینون سعادت مروتلری اوزده جاری اولوب اصله تجاوز ایلوب زیاده جاری اولماشد
 و خیفه زیوف خرج ایدوب بوانه دك اله کیرنلو اصله امان و زمان و برلیون حق لذن کلنوب برده
 مناسحه اولماشد فیما بعد بنم مروتلو و مخلصو پادشاه جان و یاغله بخش اولوب اله کیرنلو
 حق لذن کلنوب مقرر بنم شفقتمو و کرامتو پادشاه حاشا که بوانه دك مایلوی پادشاهک
 طبع هاینونلری نه و رضای شریف لری نه مخالف وضع اولوب خدمات هاینونلری داستند نقصی
 اولماشد همان هر حال سعادت لو و مروتلو و کرامتو پادشاهک خیرد غالی رجاستدیم
 اولیابد امرو زمان سعادت لو و مخلصو و شوقلو پادشاهک

توسعه

TSMA-E 884/32

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APPENDIX IV: The Network of Mustafa Naima




Figure 1 The Network of Mustafa Naima

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