



ISTANBUL MEDENİYET UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

**Foucault and Agamben in the Context of Biopolitics
and Sovereignty: The Problem of Self-
Biopoliticisation**

Master's Thesis

Hakan Önal

October 2023



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Supervisor

Dr. Didem Geylani

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THESIS JURY APPROVAL

This master's thesis titled "Foucault and Agamben in the Context of Biopolitics and Sovereignty: The Problem of Self-Biopoliticisation" written by Hakan Önal at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration was accepted by our jury.

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STATEMENTS

Style and Reference Manual Statement

Having reviewed this thesis written under my supervision, I confirm that it has been written in accordance with APA Manual of Style and used its in-text reference format consistently throughout the entire text.



Dr. Didem Geylani

Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that all information in this dissertation has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conducts, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Hakan Önal

ÖZET

BİYOPOLİTİKA VE EGEMENLİK BAĞLAMINDA FOUCAULT VE AGAMBEN: SELF-BİYOPOLİTİZASYON PROBLEMİ

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Özellikle 1970'li yıllardan itibaren edebiyattan mimariye, psikolojiden siyaset felsefesine değin geniş bir alanda çalışılan biyopolitika kavramı Fransız düşünce tarihçisi ve filozof Michel Foucault'nun çalışmaları sonrasında yoğun bir şekilde popülerlik kazanmıştır. Biyopolitika kavramı söz konusu olduğunda hemen her metin karşımıza çıkan Foucault'nun çalışmaları İtalyan filozof Giorgio Agamben tarafından esaslı bir eleştiriye tabi tutulmuştur. Agamben'e göre Foucault, hukuki-kurumsal modeller (egemenlik ve devlet kavramları) temeline dayanan iktidar sorununu ele alan geleneksel yaklaşımı ihmal eder. Bu nedenle Foucault'nun ilgili biyopolitik çalışmalarının tamamlanması gerektiğini veya en azından düzeltilmesi gerektiğini savunur. Foucault, Cinselliğin Tarihi'nde siyaset teorisinin ağırlık merkezini egemenlikten uzaklaştırmayı amaçlar gibi görünse de ardından College de France'da verdiği derslerde bu niyetini tashih eder. Buna göre Foucault, İtalyan filozofun iddiasının aksine egemenlik kavramından vazgeçmez; ancak aynı zamanda egemenlik ile biyopolitika arasında bir bağ da kurmaz. Bu anlamda, Foucault'nun biyopolitika düşüncesi eksik kalmıştır. İnsanın biyolojik varlığının siyasi ve ekonomik hesaplamalara dahil edilmesinin başlangıcını açık bir şekilde gösterebilen Agamben, Foucault'nun temel amacının uzun ömürlülüğü sürdürmek, imkanları güçlendirmek, kazaları önlemek ve eksiklikleri telafi etmek olduğunu düşündüğü biyoiktidarın

nasıl öldürebileceği, böylesi bir politik sistemde ölümün gücünün ve işlevinin nasıl kullanılabileceği sorularına cevap verir. Agamben, bunu "çıplak hayat", "homo sacer", "istisna hali" ve "kamp" kavramlarıyla yapar. Ancak, bu tür sorulara yanıt verebilirken iktidarın üretken, pozitif ve disipliner boyutlarını göz ardı eder. Bu nedenle, Agamben'in 'Foucault projesi' kısmen başarılı olmaktadır: Agamben'in biyopolitik çalışmaları tamamlanmalı veya en azından düzeltilmeli. Çünkü Agamben'in düşüncesine göre kamplar sadece güç/dayatma/cebir odaklıdır. Ancak, aynı zamanda, öznenin çıplak hayatı kendi kendine ürettiği, yani kendini zoe'sine gönüllü olarak indirgeyerek oluşturduğu kamp benzeri yerler ve süreçler de vardır ki buna "self-biyopolitizasyon" adını veriyorum. Bu kavramsallaştırma ile Foucault ve Agamben'in modern biyopolitika ve egemenlik bağlamında birlikte ele alınması gerektiği sonucuna varıyorum.

Bu çalışmayı karşılaştırmalı metin analizi metodu ile anlamlı karşılaştırmalar ve tezatlıkları belirleyerek anahtar temalar, kavramlar, argümanlar ve nihayetinde benzerlikler ya da farklılıkları ortaya koyarak gerçekleştirdim. Bu araştırma tasarımı metinleri derinlemesine araştırmasına imkân verdi. Bu da nüansları fark etmemi sağladı. Araştırma sorularıma uygun Foucault ve Agamben metinleri, kitapları ve makalelerini taradım. Gerekli pasajlara tezde yer verdim ve ikincil kaynaklara, konuyla ilgili diğer yorumculara başvurdum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Biyopolitika, Egemenlik, Self-Biyopolitizasyon

ABSTRACT

FOUCAULT AND AGAMBEN IN THE CONTEXT OF BIOPOLITICS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE PROBLEM OF SELF- BIOPOLITICISATION

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According to Agamben, Foucault disregards the conventional method of addressing the issue of power that is founded on juridico-institutional models (the concepts of sovereignty and the State). He specifically argues that Foucault's relevant biopolitical works have to be completed, or at least, corrected. Even though Foucault seems to have once intended to move the centre of gravity of the political theory away from sovereignty in his book *The History of Sexuality* (1978), he then corrects himself at the lectures that he gave in College de France. According to this, Foucault, in opposition to the Italian philosopher's claim, does not renounce the concept of sovereignty; however, he does not, at the same time, establish a connection between sovereignty and biopolitics. In this sense, his account of biopolitics is incomplete. As to Agamben's attempt to complete, or at least, correct Foucauldian biopolitical works, he puts forth some theoretical notions on which he builds his "Foucault project". Being able to properly show the beginning of the entry of the biological being of humans into the political and economic calculations, Agamben answers Foucault's questions such as "How can power such as this kill [...] How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower?" as the fundamental purpose of biopower is regarded to enhance existence, extend its longevity, bolster its

opportunities, prevent mishaps, and offset deficiencies. Agamben does that with the help of his notions of “bare life”, “homo sacer”, “state of exception”, and “the camp”. However, while he is able to respond to such questions, he overlooks the productive, positive and disciplinary dimensions of power. So, Agamben’s attempt, I argue, is partially successful: The Agambenian biopolitical works have to be completed, or at least, corrected because the camps, in Agamben’s thought, are just force-based. However, there are also places and processes that look like camp, where the subject produces bare life by itself, namely, by voluntarily reducing itself to zoe, which I call “self-biopoliticisation”. With this conceptualisation, I conclude that Foucault and Agamben must be considered together in the context of modern biopolitics and sovereignty.

Key Words: Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Biopolitics, Sovereignty, Self-Biopoliticisation

PREFACE

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of biopolitics has begun to occupy an important place for the last 30 years in the academic world. French philosopher Michel Foucault is one of the most frequently referred names within the context of biopolitical literature or studies. His concept of regulatory power as the biopolitics of the population constitutes one pole of the biopower which, he claims, replaced the juridico-discursive model of sovereignty (the other pole is the disciplinary power). Stating the fact that with the emergence of biopower, it was passed from a negative, prohibitory, oppressive type of old sovereign power to a positive, productive, efficient type of power, Foucault puts his account of biopolitics in this positive frame. Giorgio Agamben –Italian philosopher inspired by Foucault’s thesis and highly influential in the field of social and political theory with his book *Homo Sacer*– expresses that the concentration camps are not analysed by Foucault whereas his analysis of disciplinary practices contains the existence of the places such as prisons, schools and hospitals. According to him, a point of intersection must be looked for between biopolitics and processes of sovereignty.

In this dissertation, I argue that contrary to Agamben’s claim that Foucault’s biopolitical theories require adjustment or, at the very least, further elaboration, it is, in fact, Agamben’s own biopolitical work needs rectification or, at the very least, additional development. Foucault, contrary to Agamben’s claim, has not neglected the traditional approach in the investigation of power. The notion of biopower, which, Foucault asserts, appeared after the second half of the seventeenth century, does not require a compulsory periodisation in his analyses of power such as sovereignty period, disciplinary period and biopolitical period. The emergence of biopower, for Foucault, refers only to a shift of emphasis in the change of power mechanisms; It is not a direct change in the mechanisms of power. At the same time, I believe, however, the question how the biopolitics, which he evaluates as the regulatory power, relates to the processes of sovereignty remains unanswered in the analysis of Foucault saying that there is no change from sovereignty to government. To be more precise, Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics is incomplete. I claim that there are some blind spots in the effort of Agamben, who expresses that he uses this incompleteness problem as base, to

complete or correct it with the notions of homo sacer, bare life, bios-zoe distinction and the camp. Accordingly, being able to influentially theorise sovereign power's capacity to kill in the context of biopolitics, Agamben, in the aforementioned context, overlooks productivity, efficiency mentality and the disciplinary dimension of power. Agamben, in asserting that the advancement of capitalism relies on the discipline of physical bodies, does not incorporate the concept of 'discipline' into his theory. Moreover, it is Agamben's another aporia that he thinks the concept of the camp, which, according to him, replaced the city, is only 'force' based. In other words, he does not detect the 'voluntary' camps developed in today's cities. According to this, I argue that today biopolitics cannot be analysed merely through the processes of sovereignty. There is a biopolitical mechanism that I conceptualise as "self-biopoliticisation" with the social arrangements and processes in which the subjects voluntarily reduce themselves to zoe. I put forward that this phenomenon cannot be understood with Carl Schmitt's account of sovereignty that Agamben uses as a theoretical tool but with Schmitt's friend and enemy distinction and Foucault's theory of technologies of the self.

The first chapter will include a short historiographic overview of biopolitics. I will touch on how the concept of biopolitics developed over time and present how opinions regarding the concept can be viewed in a historical perspective and refer to the works of pioneering scholars on the subject. There is a marked difference between the period from 1911 when the concept was first invented by G. W. Harris until Foucault's works and the period starting after Foucault's works. I will briefly show the peculiar feature of that difference, dwell on Foucault's account of biopolitics and, finally, demonstrate how Agamben, who criticises the Foucauldian biopolitics, evaluates the concept.

In the subsequent chapter, I will scrutinise Agamben's argument, which questions Foucault's disregard for the conventional perspective that examines power through juridico-institutional models. In doing so, I will firstly follow the classical examination form of Foucault's conception of power as in the periodisation from sovereignty to government. Periodisation of authors' works provides a convenient way for entering the author's world; nonetheless, there is a danger of breaking the link among the author's works: just as dividing Foucault's works, from the methodological viewpoint, into archaeological and genealogical periods. Foucault corrects the perception with

regard to the fact that biopower emerges as a rupture from the sovereignty which is a classical model of the power at his lectures in College de France. To elucidate this, I aim to examine his concepts of sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics in depth. In this manner, I will explain that Foucault does not abandon the traditional approach at the conceptual level contrary to Agamben's claim. Also, he does not either consider the concept of sovereignty within the framework of biopolitics.

In the third chapter, I will examine the theoretical pillars of the Agambenian Foucault project. Agamben puts forth the zoe and bios distinction, stating that Foucault ignored the traditional approach and, in this context, he did not analyse the exemplary places of the major totalitarian regimes of the 20th century when exploring the concept of biopolitics, for instance, the concentration camps. With the advantage of that, he puts forward that the human biological existence becoming the object of the political calculations did not begin with modernity in contrast to Foucault's claim; it had been already included as zoe since Ancient Greece. Thereafter I will show that Agamben, starting out on this basis, deals with an archaic figure of Roman law, Homo Sacer, as a unique example in which biopolitical models of power and sovereignty processes (the capacity to kill) intersect. The fact that Agamben, predicating the processes of sovereignty on Schmitt's concept of the state of exception, puts the notion of the camp where the exception transforms into a permanent condition in the centre of his theory indicates that he has, in the Foucauldian sense, a rather negative conception of power. I will complete this chapter by concluding Agamben neglects the disciplinary mechanisms because he has a negative biopolitical perspective against the Foucauldian positive biopolitics and by indicating that the foundation of Agambenian sovereignty is fragile due to his use of the notion of the camp in an excessive sense.

In the last chapter, I will attempt to conceptualise some processes and practices as "self-biopoliticisation" with the advantage of which, I claim, the Agambenian biopolitical works can be corrected, or at least, completed. I have already mentioned that while Foucault does not leave the notion of sovereignty, he does not establish a relationship between biopolitics and sovereignty. Additionally, I have also stated that Agamben's biopolitical conception grounded with the capacity to kill does not comprise the disciplinary mechanisms and makes the foundation of sovereignty fragile. From this point of view, in parallel with the claims of Bülent Diken and Carsten

Laustsen –who got inspired by Agamben and modified his concept– state that the camp logic can also be mentioned in the gated communities as in the refugee camps; however, here the camp phenomenon is not ‘forced’ but rather ‘voluntarily’ and I will describe how the ‘subjects’ voluntarily reduces themselves to zoe by giving examples regarding living space arrangements in today’s cities. Then, I will underline the main reason behind the subjects’ efforts, for the securitisation and hygienisation of their lives and bodies in respect to practices such as pilates, regular check-up, yoga, morning sports etc and the processes which give form to the places such as gated communities, beauty and therapy centres and weight loss resorts, is to try to suspend or delay death. Finally, I will show how this alternative form of generating bare life could be understood through friend-enemy theory of Schmitt and Foucault's concept of the technologies of the self.

CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF BIOPOLITICS

Biopolitics has always been both a controversial and a functional concept that has been developed and discussed within the realm of political and social sciences particularly after the translation of Michel Foucault's works into English. Thomas Lemke, the author of the book "Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction" originally published in German in 2007, states that the concept of biopolitics has become popular over the past few years. He asserts that until recently, only a limited group of individuals were familiar with this concept (2011: 1). However, many topics are problematised and analysed with the advantages of the concept in broad ranges of academic areas such as architecture (e.g. *Biopolitics and the Emergence of Modern Architecture* by Sven-Olov Wallenstein – 2008) and psychoanalysis (e.g. *Illusions of a Future: Psychoanalysis and the Biopolitics of Desire* by Kate Schechter – 2014).

The term biopolitics consists of two words: "bio" and "politics". Although bio means life, biopolitics does not mean "politics of life", yet, a political perspective focused on population, conceived as a collective of living entities (Fassin, 2009: 45). It is more commonly evaluated by means of an approach that focuses on a connection between life and power practises in particular: the point of intersection between biology and politics in general. G. W. Harris employed the phrase to characterise two aspects of the nation: the growth of population and rivalry, as well as the personal qualities of the individuals qualified to take on roles of authority within the State. According to that view, population growth should be paid special attention: otherwise, for example, the excess of the female over the male population might result in hysteria in women (Harris, 1911: 197).

The term biopolitics was first used by Harris in 1911 contrary to Esposito and Lemke's claims. Both Esposito and Lemke assert that the phrase was originally introduced by Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish political scholar, who also invented the phrase 'geopolitics', in his 1916 book titled "Staten som Lifsform (The State as a Form of Life)" (Esposito, 2008: 16; Lemke, 2011: 9). Nonetheless, in accordance with both chronological order of the employment of it and Bikindo's detection,

the phrase biopolitics was coined by Harris in the paper entitled 'Bio-Politics' published in *The New Age*, a London weekly journal in 1911 (Bikindo, 2016: 166, note 51).

Kjellen, whom writers generally ignore according to Esposito's claim, is one of the first thinkers in the studies of biopolitics. In Kjellen's view, biopolitics is described on the basis of the state's logic of self-preservation (Esposito, 2008: 16). The state must remove parts suffering from disease and eradicate parasites. All these actions must be done in order to ensure people's and its own health. As a form of life, state is, in Kjellen's view, not a subject of law derived from contract theories but a "living organism" or a "living creature" (Lemke, 2011: 10).

Other important but neglected texts in the pre-Foucault history of the term are Karl Binding and Eberhard Dennert's papers published in 1920 and 1926, respectively. These texts can be characterised in terms of organismic, anthropological and naturalistic approaches. The notion of biopolitics has taken on diverse definitions as a result of these perspectives that establish connections between natural occurrences in the realm of biology and the political actions of human beings. Yet another example of that is Canadian novelist and biologist Morley Roberts's book *Bio-politics: An Essay in the Physiology, Pathology and Politics of Social and Somatic Organism* (1938). Roberts here offers a biopolitical state model that resembles a lightly connected group of cell and protozoan parasites (as cited in Liesen and Walsh, 2012: 3).

By the 1970s, the concept of biopolitics had been examined in terms of organismic, anthropological and naturalistic approaches. When it comes to Michel Foucault's works on biopolitics, his studies constitute a sort of rupture or breaking point just as in his archaeological method that promotes determining conditions of possibilities of what is expressed in the past, in contrast to conventional history understanding, by centring on the concepts of rupture, threshold, limits, and series (Foucault, 1972: 21). At this time, Foucault himself becomes an example of that archaeological view. His studies mark a new period of biopolitics. He analyses the historical process through 'life' emerging as the centre of political strategies in contrast to former naturalist interpretations of biopolitics. In this sense, the notion

of biopolitics in Foucault's point of view reflects "a particular modern approach to exercising power" (Lemke, 2011: 33).

Foucault first employed the phrase biopolitics while delivering a presentation titled "The Birth of Social Medicine" in 1974. Defining the term in the context of capitalism and body, Foucault underlines that following its emergence in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, capitalism diverted its attention to the body as a contributor to productivity and workforce capabilities. Dominance on people extended beyond their thoughts and beliefs to include their physical bodies. He then claimed that the primary focus, in the context of capitalist society, was on the body as a fundamental biopolitical element (Foucault, 2002: 136-7).

After his first use of the term biopolitics which he explained as capitalism's socialising the body, Foucault employed it in the meaning of a new form of power that is "directed not to the human as a physical existence but to the living individual, acknowledging them as a living entity and a member of human species" (Foucault, 2003: 242). These two citations may give the impression that he didn't define his account of biopolitics in a clear way or his usage is not consistent. The problem stems from the fact that Foucault applies the notion of biopolitics interchangeably with the term 'biopower'. Biopower, replacing the classical-juridical model of sovereign power, refers to the wide array of methods by which the fundamental biological attributes of the human species turned into the focus of the strategic political calculation (Foucault, 2007: 16). Considering its emergence as the threshold of modernity, he also claims that, due to this transformation in power dynamics, man has, without any prior instance, begun to be perceived as a 'species' or 'living-being' (Foucault, 1978: 143).

Giorgio Agamben, in opposition to Foucault, argues that biopolitics does not originate from modern power technologies. It should not be considered as the threshold of modernity (Agamben, 1998: 4) but as the concealed reality behind all Western political and legal systems (Blencowe, 2010: 115). Agamben points out that in Ancient Greek, there are two terms for life: "zoe", which represents the basic state of existence shared by all living entities, and "bios" referring to the particular mode or lifestyle associated with an individual or a community

(Agamben, 1998: 1). By doing so, he underscores that Foucault's concept of "man as species or living-being" has, for a considerable time, been incorporated into Western politics 'bare life' that is generated by sovereign power, a practice that has been in place since Ancient Greece, where man is reduced to his zoe dimension (1998: 6). Accordingly, Agamben establishes a link between biopolitics and sovereignty and even states that the generation of a biopolitical physique is the foundational operation of sovereignty (ibid.). He differs, in this respect, from Foucauldian biopolitics. Whereas Foucault sees the biopolitical paradigm within the framework of a non-coercive power model, Agamben draws attention to its inseparable link with the sovereignty codes.



CHAPTER TWO: FOUCAULT, BIOPOLITICS AND SOVEREIGNTY

Agamben, in his magnum opus, *Homo Sacer*, claims that Foucault neglects the conventional approach, which discusses power in the context of juridical and institutional frameworks that encompass the sovereignty's definition and the State theory, instead, he focuses on analysis of how power infiltrates the bodies and lifestyles of individuals (Agamben, 1998: 5). In parallel with this claim, Agamben indicates that Foucault has initiated his examination of biopolitics without making any mention of Hannah Arendt, who scrutinises the mechanism that places biological existence in the heart of modernity's political stage (Ibid.: 3). Furthermore, he points out that Foucault, contrary to what is expected in consequence of the inquiry starting by means of rebuilding of the great confinement within healthcare facilities and jails, does not analyse the foremost biopolitical sites, such as camps (Ibid.: 4 and 119).

The problem of inconsistency related to how Foucault employed the notion of biopolitics has been mentioned earlier. Yet, the problem is not actually about its missing relation with sovereignty as Agamben argues. The real problem rather originates in the way Foucault employs the term biopolitics interchangeably with the concept of biopower. However, it is possible to say that the term biopolitics has a certain position in his theory. This certainty, for Foucault, distinguishes itself in determining the conditions of possibilities of biopolitics as a pole of biopower with anatomo-politics as another one (Foucault, 2003: 243). As to sovereignty, Foucault analyses biopolitical power mechanisms by drawing attention to the classical juridico-discursive model of sovereignty first. This modality of power during the classical era held the authority to decide on the destiny of life, either to preserve or terminate it and symbolised itself with a sword (Foucault, 1978: 136), namely, with the capacity to kill. However, during the classical period, the former modality of power associated with death, which represented the core of the sovereignty, was later replaced by the strategic oversight and control of body and life (Ibid: 139-40). While saying sovereign power has been replaced by biopower since the latter half of the 1600s, Foucault, on the other hand, indicates that he

does not offer a historical break among power mechanisms. So, he does not suggest a complete historical discontinuity, which means sovereignty, for him, still stays relevant while the art of government transforms into a political science. As a matter of fact, he even asserts that the question of sovereignty has never been more distinctly raised. Instead of picturing a straight line from a historical era centred on sovereignty to a society of disciplinary power and then to a government-centred one, Foucault proposes a triangular relationship encompassing "sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management" (2007: 142).

When we consider the two quotations on sovereignty together, it gets complicated to understand his theory of biopolitics' relation with sovereignty. So, to be able to investigate Agamben's claims on Foucault's theory, taking a closer look at Foucault's thoughts on biopolitics in detail is essential. Whether Foucault has neglected the traditional approach in his study of biopolitics or not can only be determined by probing his texts.

2.1. FROM SOVEREIGN POWER TO BIOPOWER

The opening scene of Foucault's work titled "Discipline and Punish" features intricate details of the 1757 punishment of Damians after his bid to assassinate the king. According to the court decision, the sentence imposed on Damians envisaged extremely severe torture methods on his body. After this elaborately planned method of extreme punishment, his body was completely dismembered (Foucault, 1995: 3). The death of Damians is a sign of forming part of a ritual. Moreover, torture is a component of the liturgy of punishment and has two dimensions: first one is its ceremonial dimension which aims giving a clear message to those watching the open demonstration and grief; secondly, within the framework of legal principles which enforces it, the excessive level of violence of torture in the public sphere must be realised and perceived as a victory by every single individual (Ibid: 34).

The paradigm of sovereignty, which separates the realm of power from the social realm, and operates with prohibition and terrifying punishment, corresponds to the political science's traditional approach (Gambetti, 2009: 151). This is what Foucault ignores according to Agamben's claim. It is built by means of the State's use of power as enforcement and its ability of making people obey the law. The main enforcement strategy is to codify the criminal activities and associated penalties. The logic of sovereignty is circular and its purpose is to perform the processes of sovereignty (Ibid: 153). As it is described in Damians' death scene, the old sovereign power, for Foucault, is a type of power that exerts repression and coercion via legal restrictions. (Oksala, 2011: Note 25). The old sovereign power has the negative, repressive and inhibitory role (Foucault: 1980: 139; Nash, 2010: 21). Contrary to the old sovereign power, Foucault will describe the characteristics of the new techniques of power –he calls it biopower, emerging since the latter half of the 1600s, as positive and productive (Gordon: 1980: 245). Foucault, in *Discipline and Punish*, portrays what has changed within 80 years after Damians' scene. Torture, in this process, gets lost and instead, the aim of punishment becomes the reform of the prisoners. Moreover, some surveillance mechanisms are implemented in military barracks, hospitals, prisons and schools (Sarup, 1993: 67).

According to Foucault, with the appearance of biopower towards the close of the 18. century, being taken account of processes pertaining to life expectancy, mortality rate and productivity in human life by means of a series of administrative techniques and statistical knowledge made the political existence of the human body naked. To put it another way, humans have, for the first time in history, begun to be considered as 'species' or 'living beings' rather than a subject of law. The development of this new power modality, holding the authority to decide on preserving or terminating individuals' lives, marked, in Foucault's view, a significant political metamorphosis of the former classical form of power that had authority to end life or allow it to continue (Foucault, 2003: 240-1).

The new technology of power has two poles: disciplinary power as anatomo-politics of human body and regulatory power as biopolitics of human race (Ibid.:

243). With the advantage of the conception of these new technologies of power, Foucault had the opportunity to create room for a non-repressive form of power in political thought and undermine the approaches that mainly focused on the processes of sovereignty. However, he believes that the traditional approach in political theory still occupies an important place by emphasising that the problem of sovereignty remains relevant precisely due to the reason for the significance attached to "the problem of state and sovereignty" (Foucault, 1978: 88-89). Foucault, despite the significance of the traditional approach as he stresses, tries to chart the new power technologies' operational codes.

2.2. DISCIPLINARY POWER AS ANATOMO-POLITICS OF BODY

Disciplinary mechanisms, Foucault ascertained while probing the birth of the prison, reveal power practises different from the paradigm of sovereignty. The opportunity to make the individual bodies harmonised to certain norms were created by means of techniques of surveillance, monitoring, spatial arrangement, calculation, classification and rationalisation (Nash, 2010: 22), which had been developed during the period of the 17th century. Whereas the paradigm of sovereignty is based upon the capacity to kill and spread fear, disciplinary power sets forth modern principles for "regularising, refining, and universalising the art of punishing" (Foucault, 1995: 89). Compared to the paradigm of sovereignty, it is observed that disciplines have altered "the extent, target and mode of control: concentrating on individual bodies instead of masses, prioritising the supervision of the body instead of signifiers, and continuous monitoring of processes rather than their outcomes" (Shein, 2004: 4).

The emergence of the new punishment and surveillance needs should be considered together with the radical changes in the economy. Urban settlements that make up the roots of today's crowded metropolitan cities begin to rise with the disintegration of feudalism. This period witnessed a sharp increase in urban population. While some people migrating to cities from rural areas began to work in the developing industrial sectors, many remained unemployed. As the number

of people who live in cities increased, alienation took the place of the recognition and awareness positions brought about by the transparency experienced in the past. It is never predictable where and whom the danger will come from. People have found the opportunity to observe each other at many moments of life and have established a sincere environment for socialising in the relatively small settlements and community-type social structures of the early periods. Life was surrounded by transparency peculiar to small settlements (Bauman, 1989: 38-39).

After huge population growth, such associations began to show great changes with living spaces. While the "mutual watching activity", which can be characterised by the expression "I am watching you, you are watching me," has lost its effectiveness, another position to carry out this process in a more general frame and more powerful form was needed (Bauman, 1989: 39-40).

Michel Foucault thinks that the growth of capitalism is closely intertwined with the establishment of the prison, the institution that will systematically carry out this surveillance. The source of wealth was mainly concentrated in the hands of landowners during the period of the 1500s and 1600s. The bourgeoisie started off to invest its fortune entirely in stocks, raw materials and machines. In the final decades of the 1700s. While wealth gained a new material form and appearance, the bourgeoisie had to leave all they had in the working class' hands. There were a number of longstanding illegal acts that people acquired in this period. As Foucault puts it, the bourgeoisie, in some cases, tolerated this illegality because they could turn it into its favour. However, the formation of a direct contact of the population, consisting of the poor and the unemployed, with wealth made the bourgeoisie even more intolerant in the newly established order. In the given circumstances, a search for a new justice system that can penetrate the whole of society has emerged (Foucault, 2002: 67).

The goal of the disciplinary power which "concentrated on the concept of body as a mechanical device" is to discipline the human body, to develop its capabilities, to make it more efficient, obedient, and to blend it with mechanisms of effective and financially prudent management, in brief, to correct and to normalise individuals (Ventura, Miller & Deflem, 2005: 62). Foucault calls it the "anatomo-

politics of the human body” (1978: 139). The disciplinary power aims to create "docile bodies" in modern life. Foucault points out that discipline must have a “corrective” nature to achieve this goal by stating that punishments are the frequently reiterated activities with the help of diversified training techniques within the realm of discipline (1995: 179).

Disciplinary power, which “operates systemically within a society and not from above” (Keenan, 2001: 212), creates "docile bodies" in three different ways: hierarchical observation (surveillance), normalising judgement, and the examination (Foucault, 1995: 170). Hierarchical observation renders visible the observed via a "gaze", constituting a section of the whole process of disciplinary power (Keenan, *ibid.*). The modern architectural system builds structures that both meet the functional needs of people and make those who are inside visible. For example, building well-lit and large-windowed classrooms with wide aisles allows the teacher to be observed, in doing so, the teacher was taken under control and tried to get the highest efficiency from him. Similar examples have been put into practice in prisons, factories, hospital rooms, and military barracks (Foucault, 1995: 171; Gutting, 2005: 82). Daily life has begun to be controlled by means of mass media, camera systems, etc. depending on technological developments.

The disciplinary power, secondly, uses the "normalising judgement" to provide control. It is not based on the rightness or wrongness of the acts of the individuals, but on comparing the actions of the individual with the actions of others.

Foucault indicates extremely small penalties serve as the foundation of the systems within the realm of discipline. Such penalties can be related to time (being late, absent, or interrupting tasks), to actions (distraction, carelessness), to manners (rudeness, rebelliousness), to communication (babbling, impertinence), and to bodily conduct (inappropriate behaviour, poor physical hygiene) (Foucault, 1995: 178). Due to this reason, actions and results are assessed using two opposing criteria – one positive and one negative (St-Pierre & Holmes, 2008: 356). Normalising judgement is a common form of supervision. In addition to this, there is no escape from it because the criterion for each level of success demonstrates a higher target is possible. For instance, a student's ability should be judged, not

only in a general test, to be successful, but also should be judged according to the degree of the most successful fifty candidates.

Foucault, finally, sees the ‘examination’, placing the individuals into a ‘writing network’, as a disciplinary mechanism. He views the examination as a ‘normalising gaze’ creating visibility that enables persons to be differentiated and evaluated. Every examination eventually collects information about those exposed to it (student, patients, etc.) and begins to control them with the norms that it generates (Gutting: 2005: 86).

As Smart states, disciplinary systems operate as a power modality by infiltrating the essence of an individual's physicality and inner thoughts (1983: 113). Emblematic of such a mechanism is Jeremy Bentham's ‘panopticon’ (West, 2010: 194) that Foucault defines as an ‘architectural figure’ of disciplinary power (1995: 200). The term panopticon finds its origins in Greek, combining "panoptos" (indicating 'visible to all') and "panoptes" (meaning 'all-seeing'). It originally denoted a device that integrated both a telescope and microscope (Macey, 2004: 114-116).

Foucault, influenced by Bentham's panopticon prison architecture, attempts to explain how the techniques that enable gaze and monitoring are transformed into instruments of control. Panopticon is one of the best examples of transition to the disciplinary society. According to Foucault, who adapts the panopticon model – which he uses as a metaphor– to modern surveillance technology, the power control and discipline individuals and their bodies with a visual technique they develop. Bentham's panopticon architecture was based on the following principles:

[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which

each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions - to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide - it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected (Foucault, 1995: 200).

Defining the panopticon in this way can create an image that it is an architectural form. This is true but incomplete. Panopticon is not just an architectural form; it is also a manifestation of the exercise of power over the thoughts of individuals. Another point that is important is that the power is visible; however, its existence is not provable. Those, who can never be sure whether the supervisor is looking at, sleeping resting, or doing something else, feel that they must always behave as if they were under surveillance. Panopticon is therefore the internalization of discipline by prisoners. With the application of panopticon technology by other institutions, power disciplines the society in an economical, efficient, and effective manner (Keskin, 2000: 18). To create a purposeful and continuous visibility that guarantees the self-regulated operation of power is the most important effect of panopticon (Foucault, 1995: 201) because it automatises and deindividualises the power. It is not important who exercises the power. Here, subjection arises mechanically from an imaginary relationship. In this sense, the application of force is not essential to regulate the behaviour of the convict, soothe the madman, motivate the worker, guide the schoolboy in his studies, or ensure the patient follows regulations (Foucault, 1995: 202) Thus, the bodies are deeply surrounded and the individual is meticulously produced in this order.

2.3. REGULATORY POWER AS BIOPOLITICS OF POPULATION

Foucault, in the lectures he gave in 1975-76, mentions a new technology of power – regulatory power, which is, for Foucault, another name for ‘biopolitics’ (Oliwniak, 2011: 56)– emerging under the influence of industrialization, which accelerated at the end of the eighteenth century:

Now I think we see something new emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century; a new technology of power, but this time it is not disciplinary. This technology of power does not exclude the former, does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques... Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man as body but to the living man, to man as living-being, ultimately... to man as species (2003: 242).

According to this, he distinguishes biopolitics, the object of which is population, from disciplinary power, which is based on body politics. Although themes developed in *The Birth of Biopolitics* –name of the lectures he delivered in 1978-79 and in which he broadens the conceptual framework– provide intensive data, it does not go beyond ‘making a land survey’. Foucault, in the same lectures of 1975-76, speaks much more clearly about the nature of biopolitics:

After the anatomo-politics of the human body established in the course of the eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but what I would call a biopolitics of the human race. What does this new technology of power, this biopolitics, this biopower that is beginning to establish itself, involve? I told you very briefly a moment ago; a set of process such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on. It is these processes –the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, and so on– together with a whole series of related economic and political problems... which, in the second half of the eighteenth century, become biopolitics’ first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control (Foucault, 2003: 243).

Under the light of this concept, Foucault investigates the conditions of possibility of how life has become the object of political and economic calculations (Campbell, 2011: 120). According to him, along with the rise of biopolitics, the human biological existence, in this period, has been politicised within the framework of principles which are pointed out in the above quote: "the longevity and productivity of life", "the level of health" and "life

expectancy" (Gudmand-Høyer & Hjorth, 2009: 110). As seen here, the object of biopolitics is basically "life". Foucault, as demonstrated earlier, defines this political transformation as a shift from old sovereign "right to take life or let live" to this new technology of power "to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" (Foucault, 1978: 138). This is a situation which is required to go beyond the traditional approaches.

The biopolitical power is established with a 'perspective of population' (Davies, 2006: 251) due to the increasing importance of the management of population in the 17. and 18. centuries (Oksala, 2010: 36). Thus, this new form of power approaches the population as political, scientific, and biological problem (Foucault, 2003: 245) and also tries to normalise it (Newswander, 2011: 541). In this context, the population has emerged as the first theme of biopolitics. Lemke claims that Foucault considers the population as an "independent biological corpus", namely, a social body rather than a legal or political entity (Lemke, 2011: 36). This social body begins to appear as the final end of 'government' –which enables Foucault to integrate his micro-physical analyses of power with a macro-political understanding of governmental practises (Mitchell, 2006: 179) and by which he replies to those who assert that he neglects the significance of the traditional approaches (Lemke, 2002: 51) (e.g. the definition of sovereignty and the theory of the State)– instead of representing the old sovereign.

The end of government is not merely to govern, but also to develop the situation of the population, to enhance its level of wealth, longevity and health. In addition to the fact that the population starts to appear as the final end of government, "it is the subject of needs and aspirations" and at the same time, "the object of government manipulation" (Foucault, 2007: 141). Here, the main target and instrument of the government of population is the 'interest' as the consciousness of each of the individuals making up the population, and interest as the interest of the population (Ibid.). Therefore, all the processes touching the population must be controlled in order to make success –the criteria of the governmental action (2008: 16), permanent and to maximise the interest. In this respect, when interfering in the economic life,

state puts forward it as the interference for the interest of the population. For instance, it is not surprising that Turkey's president, Tayyip Erdoğan, based on a study conducted by the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University, emphasized that "having at least three children" is in the interest of the population: "one or two children mean bankruptcy. Three children mean we are not improving but not declining either. So, I repeat, at least three children are necessary in each family, because our population risks aging. We are still on the good side, as we still own a young and dynamic population. But we are slowly aging. Presently, the whole western world is trying to cope with this problem. Please do not take our vulnerability lightly, this is a very serious issue" (quoted in Soy, 2015: 11).

Technology of security is, apart from the population, another theme of biopolitics. The goal of this technology is, for Foucault, the entirety of the concrete processes of life in a population (2003: 249). All kinds of factors entering the population area such as the birth and death rate, quality of life, and longevity are tried to be taken into the security circle. Security targets the population's conditions of change so as to prevent or compensate for the dangers and risks arising from the existence of a population as a biological entity (Lemke, 2011: 37). Biopolitical apparatuses of security do not confine or restrict. On the contrary, it creates an area of action that is ever expanding. It does not interfere with life from outside as sovereignty does. It aims to minimise the use of law and force. In other words, it does not manage the 'life' from outside; it shapes it from the inside (Calkivik, 2011: 26).

Foucault exemplifies the emergence of the necessity of security mechanisms with urban planning. Alexandre Le Maître, who wrote a city planning project entitled *La Métropolitée* in the second half of the seventeenth century, is eager to organize relations and circulation between the capital and cities, cities and provinces. According to Foucault, the main problematic of Le Maistre is primarily sovereignty (Wallenstein, 2013: 18), namely, determining the main place of the government. However, disciplinary features also arise because the spatial arrangements proposed by Le Maistre involve repositioning the population in terms of certain schedules. According to this understanding, the

form that the space takes must correspond to its function one to one. Likewise, panopticon contains such an imagination (Foucault, 2007: 94). However, over time, due to the increasing population and circulation, it becomes clear that the problem-free and clear spatiality on which the disciplinary mechanism is based is impossible. The order of the city is faced with the danger of deterioration because of beggars, travellers, murderers and thieves who flocked in and crowded into the city. This is precisely what requires the security mechanisms. Security, contrary to discipline, cannot be achieved by building artificial spaces and repositioning the population according to the needs of the government. It has to get the existing as data. The aim is not to eradicate the risk because it is impossible. The aim, then, is to regulate the circulation, to separate the good circulation from the bad and to work on the possibilities. A strategy that takes the uncertainty of the future into consideration is determined, numerous dynamic elements cluster and the numerous events which these can cause are tried to be predicted. Foucault writes: "I think the management of these series that, because they are open series can only be controlled by an estimate of probabilities, is pretty much the essential characteristic of the mechanism of security" (Ibid.: 35).

Foucault indicates that the disciplinary techniques or the analysis of sovereignty, after his conceptualisation of biopolitics, remain present. He does not give up his previous works; however, he says biopolitics creates "a different level and a different scale" and has "a different bearing area" (2003: 242). Lazzarato, with regard to this, makes the following observation: "Foucault does not neglect the analysis of sovereignty; he merely asserts that the grounding force will not be found on the side of power, since power is" blind and weak, "but on the side of the Forces that constitute the "social body" or "society" (Lazzarato, 2002: 118). As seen in this passage, Foucault did not put the analysis of power aside, instead updated and strengthened his theory, taking into account the varying balances and centres of gravity in the power mechanisms. Foucault's analysis of biopolitics, in this sense, does not weaken his analysis of power but improves it. Prozorov, in support of this, states that sovereignty, in Foucault's thought, is not just a transitory historical modality

of power relations but one of present elements in any diagram of governmentality (Prozorov, 2007: 114). Lemke, in parallel with this, says that the tools implemented in biopolitics are regulation and supervision rather than discipline and observation (2011: 37) and he mentions of two different series in Foucault's thought: "the body–organism–discipline–institution series, and the population–biological processes–regulatory mechanisms–State". These series correspond to different places in terms of control and intervention means, as well as being interrelated.

In accordance with the diagram drawn here, Foucault, who once have spoken of the need to cut off the King's head in political theory (1980: 121), now argues that there is no change from sovereign power to government, but a change in the emphasis: "a shift of emphasis and the appearance of new objectives, and so of new problems and new techniques" (2007: 471). Instead of cutting off the King's head, he demonstrates, in one sense, the necessity to understand the importance of the sovereign power, capacity of which has retreated when compared to disciplinary or regulatory power. Likewise, Joseph states that what Foucault, in this case, is concerned about is how the modern developments shaped by discipline and governmentality affect sovereignty (Joseph, 2012: 30). However, the question that needs to be asked here arises differently: How can the function of murder that is the primary dimension of sovereignty be possible for a technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its objective (Foucault, 2003:254)? Foucault tries to answer this question with the problem of "the war among races" which he associates with racism. Although he probes the phenomenon of death in *Society Must Be Defended* and *The History of Sexuality*, sovereign power's capacity to kill in the context of biopolitical technologies remains undervalued in Foucault's thought. Besides, there is no legal basis for biopolitical power to legitimize the act of claiming lives because its purpose of existence is to improve life and to prolong its duration (Ojakangas, 2005: 18).

It is precisely here that Agamben makes his criticism regarding the Foucault's conceptualization of biopolitics. Foucault merely focused on the analysis of

the process of subjectivisation that causes the objectivisation of individuals in the process of transition from the ancient world to the modern world. Contrary to what is expected from him, Foucault has never linked his insights with what can be emerged as the exemplary spaces of modern biopolitics, namely the politics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century. For instance, concentration camps were not analysed after the investigations that started with the grasp of the "great confinement" in the hospitals and prisons (Agamben, 1998. 119). As a result, in Agamben's argument for Foucault, the claim that he has not examined biopolitics in the context of sovereignty becomes valid. However, Agamben makes a mistake in asserting that Foucault leaves out the concept of sovereignty or state. Foucault, stating that the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat in his lectures of 1975-76, makes a correction in this matter with the seminars he gave in 1977-78: He argues that the regulatory power does not replace sovereignty; conversely, the problem of sovereignty has never been more sharply posed than at this moment (2007: 106).

After his lectures of 1977-78, Foucault once again expressed his intention to devote the lectures of that year to biopolitics in the opening seminar of the academic year 1978-79 (*The Birth of Biopolitics*). However, he says that biopolitics cannot be understood without grasping the governmental mentality called liberalism (2008: 22) and undertakes a detailed analysis of German liberalism. In his seminar on January 31, 1979, Foucault states that he plans to tackle the problem of biopolitics. On the other hand, he also signals that he can change his mind (*Ibid.*: 78). Consequently, he could not mention the problem of biopolitics that he promised to speak about due to the fact that he discussed German and American neo-liberalism until the end of the academic year.

Foucault points out in summary in the last week of the academic year that the theme of the lectures of the year must have been biopolitics, but the seminars have been entirely devoted to the liberalism which had been planned as an introductory discussion (*Ibid.* 317). There is no return to the biopolitics in the seminars of the next three academic years at the College de France or in the

last two volumes of *History of Sexuality* published when Foucault died (1984). It is understood by means of an answer that Foucault gave in an interview conducted on 21 April 1983 at Berkeley, the problem of biopolitics or biopower is a project which Foucault left incomplete: “Q. Isn't it logical, given these concerns, that you should be writing a genealogy of bio-power? M.F. I have no time for that now, but it could be done. In fact, I have to do it” (Foucault, 1983: 232).

CHAPTER THREE: THE AGAMBENIAN THESIS: CORRECTING OR COMPLETING THE FOUCAULDIAN BIOPOLITICS

Putting questions such as “How can power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?” and “How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower? (2003: 254)”, Foucault was intensely influenced by modernity’s biopolitical characteristic which situates death at the margins of culture (Bleakley & Bligh: 2009: 379). As expressed before, sovereign power’s capacity to kill in the context of biopolitical technologies remains undervalued in Foucault’s thought, even though he probes the phenomena of death in *Society Must Be Defended* and *The History of Sexuality*. Agamben, based on Foucault’s position on political power’s capacity to kill, presents an obscure figure of archaic Roman law: “homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (Agamben, 1998: 8). Whereas Foucault’s biopolitical work sweeps aside prohibitory, coercive, and repressive juridico-discursive model of sovereign power, Agamben puts forwards an idea that suggests finding a “point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power”

(Ibid.: 6) and detects such a point in the life of homo sacer: bare life (Prozorov, 2014: 95). In parallel with this, Crumbaugh argues that sovereignty and biopolitics are both “compatible” and “mutually constitutive” in Agamben’s theory (Crumbaugh, 2011: 427).

Agamben, with the advantage of zoe and bios distinction which symbolises a key role at the root of Western politics (Villamizar, 2014: 91), asserts that Foucault incorrectly conceptualises biopolitics as an invention of modernity. In other words, Foucault, according to him, misinterprets the threshold of modernity as the entrance of the bare biological existence of human life into political calculations, namely, “the entry of zoe into the sphere of the polis (Agamben, 1998: 4; Tagma, 2009: 413). For Agamben, its role in political calculations had always been included in Western politics as bare life. The inclusion of bare life, according to him, in the political sphere forms “the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power” and he even cites that “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (Ibid.: 6). In this context, Agamben states that the Foucauldian biopolitical works “have to be corrected or, at least, completed” (Ibid.: 9). According to Agamben, throughout the process of inclusion in the form of exclusion, bare life had been captured by the sovereign power. Furthermore, Agamben claims that the decisive point here is that along with the process that the exception begins to be the rule, the realm of bare life starts to overlap with the political sphere step by step, and therefore, “exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction” (Ibid.).

Agamben concentrates on the “state of exception”, in which legal norms are suspended by the sovereign power, and the “zone of indistinction”, in which bare life is produced (Lemke, 2011: 60), while Foucault examines the production of “norm” in the context of the concept of the biopolitics. For this reason, Agamben is not concerned with “life” itself as much as he is concerned with its “bareness”. The problem of biopower does not take centre stage in his theory (Genel, 2006: 44); what he focuses on is exactly the body’s capacity to be killed (Agamben, 1998: 125). Therefore, as Frost emphasised (2015: 4), some commentators evaluate Agamben’s works on biopolitics within the frame of a category “being reduced to a form of thanatopolitics”.

In this context, it is necessary to probe the pillars of Agamben's theoretical project to be able to understand whether Agamben succeeds in correcting or completing the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics.

3.1. ZOE-BIOS DISTINCTION AND HOMO SACER

Agamben argues that human life is two-dimensional: a life that is a simple life form, and a life that describes the lifestyle of an individual or a group, and names the first as "zoe" and the second as "bios" with the concepts derived from Ancient Greek (Ibid.: 1-2). This distinction seems to be the adaptation of the distinction between "private life" and "public life" in Arendt's works (Arendt, 1998: 28) to Agamben's theory. For both thinkers, life beyond its naturality refers to an existence that describes man's political capacity.

Agamben brings up the zoe-bios distinction for discussion based on Aristotle's basic proposition that places the polis in the opposition between life and the good life (Ibid.: 8). In ancient Greece, what is meant by the word of life is expressed with these two semantically and morphologically different terms. Whereas "zoe" was used to refer to the simple fact of living that is common to all living beings (animal, men, or gods), "bios" was used to point out the way of life, which is peculiar to an individual or group. However, this difference has become almost invisible in modern languages (Agamben, 2000: 3; 1998: 1). Yet, according to Agamben's assessment, though a life can never be separated from its form, political power always establishes itself "on the separation of a sphere of naked life from the context of the forms of life" (Agamben, 1996: 151-2). In other words; zoe (simple natural life), in the classical world, was imprisoned in the field of oikos by being excluded from polis. In contrast, the city (polis) occupied in a position between "the simple fact of living and a politically qualified life". In this sense, according to Agamben, Aristotle's definition regarding the end of perfect community is crucial: "born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life" (1998: 2). Here, while bios represents the political sphere, zoe implies an area left out of politics.

The zoe-bios distinction provides Agamben with an opportunity to examine the actual living conditions of homo sacer because the distinction between the two reveals the relation between bare life and politics. With the actual living conditions of homo sacer, Agamben demonstrates how human life is included by being excluded (Ibid.: 8) or, to put it another way, how Western politics starts achieving a politically qualified life through excluding bare life (Jackson, 2006: 87). What is significant here is that a figure is called as sacred. Agamben first dwells on the ambivalence of the concept of the sacred. He shows the contradictory meanings of the term sacer which is the Latin root of the equivalent words in almost all Western languages meaning "sacred". Sacer is used to convey the meanings that may be contradicted in different contexts, to describe both sublime and supreme beings and vulgar and accursed beings in Latin. The linguistically contradictory nature of sanctity is confirmed by anthropological, sociological and psychological findings. Findings from various surveys indicate the word of sacer "designates the person or the thing that one cannot touch without dirtying oneself or without dirtying" (Agamben, 1998: 79). This proves that it is possible to show the double meaning of "sacred".

For Agamben, what characterises homo sacer is not the ambivalence of the sacred. He uses it to show the one-sidedness of the divine sense of sacredness in which sacred is conceived as an absolute sublimity and to present it as "primordial political exercise" (Ek, 2006: 366). Agamben tries to establish a link between earthly power and sacredness by showing how the concept of sacred is assigned an extreme meaning. As a figure that combines the life and sacredness, homo sacer, "who may be killed and yet not sacrificed" (Agamben, 1998: 8), appears precisely here: "The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law in fact, it is noted that if someone kills the one who is sacred according to plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide. This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred" (Agamben, 1998: 71).

Life of homo sacer is located at the intersection of the status of being killed and yet not being sacrificed and outside both divine and human law (Ibid.: 73; Wheatley, 2010: 215). In other words, it is a life that is subjected to double exception or double exclusion because "homo sacer belongs to God in the form of unsacrificeability and is

included in the community in the form of being able to be killed” (Agamben, 1998: 82). As an exceptional figure, the life of homo sacer creates a very complicated exclusion and ban relationship by being subjected to double exception. This complicated relationship emerges as a result of setting up boundaries of life, which is an object of the sovereign decision, between “bare and sacred” and “political and non-political”. It also emerges as the first political activity with the exclusion-ban decision made by sovereign over the life.

According to Lemke, homo sacer in Agamben’s thought is the “hidden foundation of sovereignty” (2005: 5). Homo sacer is produced by the sovereign power by means of biopolitics. Biopolitics is thus located at the core of the sovereignty. Therefore, in this biopolitical context, homo sacer as both the object and the target of the sovereign power’s calculations cannot utilise the advantages of the juridical order as the subject of the law does. However, there is another crucial point here. According to Agamben’s determination, it is not only the homo sacer that cannot take advantage of the normal rules and rights. Since the target of modern politics is the life itself, it has a characteristic that can reduce all human subjects to the status of homo sacer at any time. This is precisely the point where the peculiar structure of modern politics is revealed (Datta, 2006: 171).

3.2. THE STATE OF EXCEPTION AND THE CAMP AS THE PERMANENT SPACE OF BARE LIFE

Agamben, trying to analyse the source of the biopolitical structure of the sovereignty, conducts its examination by questioning the position of the sovereign against the law. The point that opens the debate on the position of the sovereign against the law is the process of exception. The state of exception refers to a process involving many interrelated issues in politics and law. Therefore, making an analysis of the process of the state of exception has great importance in uncovering where the power of the sovereign’s legal entity comes from.

Agamben’s conceptualisation of the state of exception is mainly based on Carl Schmitt’s theory. Schmitt defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the

exception” (2005: 5). He asserts that each political order potentially contains a state of exception due to the fact that general norm is not able to cover a total exception (Ibid.: 6). Hence, the concept of exception seems to be an “ontological surplus” (Seymour, 2013: 99), which can never be included by the general norm. Although Agamben utilises Schmitt’s theory, their conceptualisations are actually quite dissimilar from each other. Whereas Agamben’s account of the “exception-as-the-rule combines the collapse of the dialectic between norm and exception”, in Schmitt’s approach to the concept, “the dialectic between norm and exception is a central element of political dynamics” (Huysmans, 2008: 171). In fact, Agamben’s conception of the state of exception rests upon the separation between political and juridical, public and private, life and norm. In this sense, Agamben (2005: 33) argues that the state of exception is both outside and inside of the juridical order, therefore, its definition is related to “a threshold, or a zone of indifference” where the internal and external dimensions of the juridical order get blurred.

What does the exception, which appears as a limit figure, mean? Agamben defines this figure that reveals the ontology of a biopolitical sovereign power as follows: “The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included” (Agamben, 1988: 25 – emphasis in original). This figure, according to Agamben, gives rise to a radical crisis. The radical crisis emerges in making a distinction “between membership and inclusion and between exception and rule” (Ibid.). In addition to that radical crisis, the state of exception refers to a paradox which threatens both the legitimate existence of the sovereign and the current law: in the state of exception, the sovereign “finds himself at the same time outside and inside the juridical order” (Agamben 1999: 161). In this case, it is necessary to explain the paradox that shows where the source, which constitutes the legal basis of the “legitimate” position that allows the sovereign to be involved both inside and outside the law (Hudson, 2011: 1663), draws its strength from. Otherwise, it will be necessary to quietly meet the process of sovereignty in the centre of law and politics. The demonstration of the relation of the state of exception with the present law will be possible by understanding the structure of the sovereign

decision. The sovereign decision produces and occasionally rebuilds a zone of indifference between outside and inside, between exclusion and inclusion, between norm and exception (McLoughlin, 2011: 190; Mills, 2008: 61). Here, Agamben stresses that sovereign decision is the location of an “undecidable” (1998: 27).

The sovereign threshold of politics –since Ancient Greek and Roman Law– between bare life and political life, exception and rule, public sphere and non-public sphere is placed in the modern politico-juridical order by Agamben. In this framework, modern law and politics exist within the process of creating a sovereign exception (Eisenhammer, 2014: 102) just as in the pre-modern period. The relationship between exception and rule, in this sense, reveals a deep link between modernity and pre-modern forms of politics:

together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested (Agamben, 1998: 9).

In this context, the sovereign power exposes bare life to a “biopolitical intervention” by both excluding it from and at the same time including it within the political and juridical order (Dines & Ruggiero, 2015: 434-5). What the state of exception genuinely elucidates is that the sovereign finds himself in space where homo sacer is scattered. As stated before, homo sacer is both excluded from and captured within the political and juridical order, but “in a reversed way” when compared with the sovereign’s position (Rigi, 2012: 79).

Sovereign, by perambulating over the threshold of indistinction, can decide that individuals –with the suspension of their citizenship rights, namely, ignoring their political existence (bios)– can be driven out of the political and juridical order and reduced to the status of homo sacer. Additionally, Agamben makes a determination that surpasses Schmitt’s political thought. According to him (Ibid.: 8), the fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend and enemy as Schmitt argues (Schmitt, 2007: 26) “but that of bare life and political existence, zoe and bios, exclusion and inclusion”.

This expression refers to an aporia which emerged as a consequence of modern democracy's determination of the bare life as the space of men's freedom and happiness (Ibid.: 9-10; Jackson, 2006: 87). On the one hand, while the highest point of democracy is reached, on the other hand, human body simultaneously experiences unprecedented disasters. This situation reflects the most important historical view of the aporia (Ziarek, 2008: 91). Indeed, the twentieth century is full of these aporias and the Nazi catastrophe, which is still considered as a mystery, constitutes one of the most significant turning points of these aporias. As Agamben puts it: "this aporia ... marks the beginning of modern democracy and forces it into complicity with its most implacable enemy. Today politics knows no value (and, consequently, no nonvalue) other than life, and until the contradictions that this fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and fascism – which transformed the decision on bare life into the supreme political principle – will remain stubbornly with us" (Ibid.: 10).

There are several points Agamben argues about the complex relationship between bare life and political life, exception, and rule both through *homo sacer* and modern politico-juridical process, and one of them is exemplified by the camp analysis.

For Foucault, the Panopticon is not just an architectural structure but a metaphor for the transformation of types of power. Similarly, For Agamben, the camp is a metaphor for 'exemplary places' of modern biopolitics which point to the great totalitarian states of the 20th century (Blencowe, 2010: 116). Contrary to Foucault's definition of the threshold of modernity as human being's biological existence becoming the object of politics, Agamben sets forth the notion of the camp as "nomos of modernity". The camp is a place where life cannot be distinguished from law. In other words, law is suspended in the camps and human life, in the Agambenian sense, turns to be a bare life (Minca, 2006: 391). Contrary to the theses put forward by Foucault, who examines prisons in the context of the Panopticon model, the camp is a place where the exceptions are more applicable than the area where the norms are valid. In this sense, the camp, for Agamben, is a place in which man is defined only by biological existence.

Agamben, examining the development process of the concentration camps, indicates that the camp phenomenon has begun to take shape at a time before being considered equal to the catastrophic practices of Nazis. He argues that the main discussion point among the historians about whether the first camp was the "campos de concentraciones" established in 1896 by the Spaniards in Cuba to suppress the popular uprising in the colony, or the "concentration camps" to which the British pushed the Boers at the end of the century (1899-1902) is not right. Accordingly, in both cases, the state of emergency has been expanded to include the entire civilian population. For this reason, the camps result from exception; not from ordinary law (Agamben: 1998: 166). The camp is basically a place where bare life and law enter a threshold of indistinction, and the exception becomes concrete in both Nazi and Spanish and British examples. In this sense, the camp exists wherever a zone of indistinction emerges. Agamben formulates this as follows: "The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule" (1998:168-9). According to Agamben, it is possible to make mention of an emergence of a camp whenever bios is reduced to zoe and several rights are suspended in the state of exception (Bourke, 2014: 443). For instance, the areas where immigrants are kept in airports (zones d' attentes) and even the refugee camps and the internment camps (Agamben, 1998: 174, Genel, 2006: 57, Ek, 2006: 374) can also be read as the examples of the camp.

In the camp process as the space where sovereign power and biopolitics intersect, political is biopolitics and homo sacer is in the citizen role. The only thing that has changed since the first period in the camp process, according to Agamben, is the expansion of the camp. So, Agamben states that today the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West is not the city but the camp (1998: 181).

To sum up, according to Agamben, the camp is the biopolitical paradigm of modernity. In other words, he claims that we can understand modern society by analysing the camp, but especially by analysing the juridico-political ground that makes the camp possible to establish (Leshem, 2016: 148). According to this, the camp is a space where men's political status (i.e. citizenship rights, bios) is reduced to bare life (that is, only physical existence, zoe) under the exceptional circumstances and a space where exception becomes rule. When bios is reduced

to zoe, those in the camp have no political meaning, therefore, the application of various biopolitical practices on this non-citizen and even unreal community does not constitute a crime. The fact that Agamben's notion of the camp does not include the disciplinary dimension of the bodies and embeds the biopolitics in a process of sovereignty constitutes a point of departure with Foucault. In this sense, the discipline and normalization processes mentioned by Foucault do not find a response in Agamben.

3.3. AGAMBEN'S FOUCAULT PROJECT

Agamben, who asserts that Foucault neglects the traditional approach, says that the Foucauldian biopolitical works “have to be corrected or, at least, completed” (Ibid.: 9) and puts forth some theoretical notions such as zoe-bios distinction, homo sacer, bare life, state of exception and the camp. With these theoretical pillars, Agamben was able to analyse the politics of the great totalitarian states of the 20th century through the notion of camp, which is understood as the permanent space of bare life. In particular, he attempted to answer Foucault's questions such as “How can power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings? [...] How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower? (Foucault, 2003: 254). Agamben, who seeks “point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power” (Ibid.: 6), detects such a point in the life of homo sacer: bare life (Prozorov, 2014: 95).

Agamben, explaining the concept of biopolitics that he borrowed from Foucault through the process of sovereignty, completes his theoretical project with the concept of the camp, which, according to him, has taken the city's place and in which ordinary citizens turn out to become the homo sacer. However, Agamben does not see the productive and positive sides of the biopolitical power. The Foucauldian biopolitics, which emerges in the process of transition from the negative power to the positive power, takes a negative character in Agamben's

theory. So much so that Foucault showed that the process leading from the sovereignty to biopolitics was a positive and productive power transition from the negative and prohibitive power in another sense. In this sense, the 'Agambenian negative biopolitics' can be mentioned against the 'Foucauldian positive biopolitics'. Why does Agamben's biopolitics have a negative character? It is because his conceptualization is based on bare life: Bare life is also closer to the capacity to kill and is based on the Schmittian exception theory. His Schmittian sovereignty-centered perspective in the analysis of biopolitics prevents taking account of non-state organizations and individual roles in the context of modern biopolitics. Since the sovereignty processes point to the capacity to kill, Agamben misses modernity's biopolitical discourse. For this reason, the disciplinary process cannot be mentioned in Agamben's thought. Although he states that the development of capitalism would not have been possible without the disciplinary mechanisms of the biopower that could create docile bodies (1998: 3), this emphasis of discipline disappears later. He does not explain how biopolitics is possible without the discipline of the bodies. Explaining how biopolitical power can kill, Agamben has these kinds of aporias for this reason, we need to consider both thinkers together.

Foucault overcomes this problem by proposing a triple power mechanism: "sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management" (Foucault, 2007: 142). However, the problem here is that he never explained the relationship between these three. For example, titles such as "sovereignty and biopolitics" or "governmentality and biopolitics" do not exist in Foucault's analysis. Nevertheless, as indicated above, contrary to Agamben's claim, there is a notion of sovereignty in Foucault's thought.

Agamben, combining Arendt and Schmitt's theories with Foucault's analyses, claims that there are some blind spots in Foucault's thoughts. Similarly, there are a number of blind spots in Agamben's allegations of city's becoming the camp and the exception becoming the rule. For example, Agamben's thesis that the camp has replaced the city as the biopolitical paradigm of the West can lead to consequences such as the fragility of the sovereign power and the meaninglessness of the notion of camp. Foucault's and Eagleton's determinations regarding power

and the excessive use of a term have the characteristics of bringing Agamben's interpretation into question. Foucault states that "power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression" (Foucault, 1980: 59). In this context, since Agamben puts the state of exception in the center of his theory, that might end up with the fragility of the foundation of the sovereignty as Foucault argues. On the other hand, Agamben's conception of the camp seems excessive. If the camp replaced the city, Agamben should explain the ordinary daily life in today's cities. Byung-Chul Han asserts that today, the state of exception is not a danger of becoming a rule as Agamben claims. On the contrary, we live in a society full of extreme affirmation, where no state of exception is possible anymore. The state of exception is a state of negativity. The affirming force, which characterises the society of success and performance, cannot be explained by the paradigm of immunological negativity by which Agamben entirely abides (Byung-Chul Han, 2016: 129-132). According to this, he actually confuses the sovereign's capacity to produce bare life with the potential and imaginary camps. That the sovereign power has such a capacity does not mean people continuously face the camp danger. The problem here is that Agamben's use of the concept of the camp is not limited just as in Eagleton's emphasis for a term to have meaning. Eagleton states that "for a term to have meaning, it must be possible to specify what, in particular circumstances, would count as the other of it - which doesn't necessarily mean specifying something which would be always and everywhere the other of it." (Eagleton, 1991: 7).

As a result, did Agamben succeed in his completion or correction project of Foucault? The answer would be 'partially'. Indeed, he shows the production of bare life and how biopolitical power can kill, but on the other hand, the question of how biopolitics is possible without disciplinary processes is still unanswered. Besides, in Agamben's thought, there are no possible theoretical precautions regarding the fragility risk of sovereignty.

CHAPTER FOUR: SELF-BIOPOLITICISATION: CORRECTING OR COMPLETING THE AGAMBENIAN BIOPOLITICS

As shown above, Agamben opposes Foucault's positioning the threshold of modernity as the human biological existence's entrance into the political calculations. In this direction, he points out that Foucault's concept of "man as species or living-being" has already been included by the Western politics as 'bare life', which is produced by sovereign power by reducing man to only his zoe dimension since Ancient Greece (1998: 6). According to this, Agamben defines the production of bare life as precisely the reduction of bios to zoe by the sovereign in the state of exception. Moreover, he explains the places where these processes of sovereignty are realized by the notion of the camp. Finally, he builds this theoretical context on his proposal that the Foucauldian biopolitical works "have to be corrected, or at least, completed" (Ibid: 9).

There are some blind spots in Agamben's attempt to correct, or, at least, to complete the Foucauldian biopolitical works. Apart from the blind spots shown in the third chapter, there is another a blind spot in Agamben's thought as follows: he thinks that the places, which subject to the functioning principles of the camp, are loaded with only negative attributes. However, as Diken and Laustsen –who got inspired from Agamben's thesis– argue, the gated communities in cities can also be considered in the same framework just as the refugee camps. All these places, whether in different forms, repeat the principles of implementation without being implemented and interrelation without interrelating or the state of suspension: the refugee camps leave those inside; the gated communities leave those outside. So, these two places allow those to remain naked in the face of biopolitical strategies that are increasingly expanding its boundaries of intervention in life. Weight loss resorts and therapy centres that transform health into a privilege with a capacity to directly intervene with body and with the efforts to increase life span and to affirm the 'healthy life' can be evaluated in this context, The plaza complexes, which are now encountered almost everywhere in the city, repeat the camp logic for the white-collar workers. These places, in which

security, information, lighting and air conditioning technologies suspend the street's air and time as much as its chaos, are both inside and outside the city (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, 93, 94, 96),

Agamben could analyse the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century through the camp notion but there is no 'voluntary' biopolitical spaces such as gated communities, therapy and beauty centres in his theory as Diken and Laustsen put forward. Hence, the Agambenian biopolitical works have to be corrected, or at least, completed.

4.1. THE BARE LIFE AS A VOLUNTARILY PRODUCED CATEGORY: SELF-BIOPOLITICISATION

Agamben, who looks for a point of intersection between sovereignty and biopolitics and detects it in homo sacer's life, namely, in bare life, explains his theory via Schmitt's theory of exception. He was uninterested in Schmitt's other theories. For example, he did not evaluate 'the concept of political' in the context of modern biopolitics. Besides, he states that (Ibid: 8), the fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend and enemy as Schmitt argues (Schmitt, 2007: 26) "but that of bare life and political existence, zoe and bios, exclusion and inclusion". Having ignored the theoretical possibilities of Schmitt's friend and enemy distinction that is the basis of the concept of the political (Schmitt, 2007: 26), Agamben could not see the notion of 'the voluntary camp' (gated communities, therapy centres and weight loss resorts) alongside the notion of 'the forced camp' which he reads through the processes of sovereignty, namely, state of exception.

A mind oriented towards Carl Schmitt's theoretical world can easily get stuck in sovereignty processes. As Kalyvas puts it, the liberals exaggerate the normative dimension of the law; Schmitt exaggerates the sovereignty dimension of it (Kalyvas, 2008: 86). However, according to Balakrishnan, Schmitt has a hegemonic dimension (Balakrishnan, 2000: 37). For example, he regards the public consent as necessary for the realisation of the law. The main reason for this

hegemony emphasis not being strong is probably the political instability of the Weimar Republic. When Schmitt wrote his book, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (1922), in which he tackled the problem of sovereignty, the Weimar Republic was experiencing hyperinflation (Lee, 2005: 49), starting at the end of 1922 and should be considered as a result of the sudden occurrence of war in 1914 (Kolb, 2005: 180). In this period, the Weimar Republic was feeling itself under ever increasing pressure of foreign relations -culminating in the invasion of the Ruhr, an industrial area of the Republic, by French troops in 1923, which triggered a passive resistance by the population (Lee, 2005: 49)- and suffering internal political instability. The Republic's economic, social and administrative structure was not strong enough to encounter an extreme danger (Kolb, 2005: 68). Due to these developments, the Weimar Republic was described, in the history books, as an 'improvised democracy', an 'emergency solution', a 'makeshift' republic so as to emphasize its frailty and unsteadiness (Henig, 2002: 78). As a result, starting out from a theory built in such a shadow of intense instability leads, of course, to an over-explanation of the political sphere with the process of sovereignty.

Since the enemy of biopolitical power is people who use drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, etc., society is organized against death. Health centres and gated communities are the results of this. But there is an important difference here: the organisation is not being imposed by the power, instead, people are volunteers for it. For this reason, there is one more face of the camps as the places Agamben describes by their capacity for prohibition, repression and killing in the process of sovereignty. This face is the voluntary character of the camp. Here, 'bare life' is not produced because of a force. That the subject, which Foucault explicates his or her subjectivation processes in the frame of neo-liberalism, tries to secure and hygienise his or her life and body can be understood in this context: people continuously endeavour to suspend 'death' in most living space in the city as a camp. Ögüt states that, "the main reason behind the fact that the narcissistic "neo-subject" possessed by death drive worships its body – through yoga, morning sports, Pilates, make-up, diet, regular check-up, solarium, striptease (as gymnastic exercise), body building, organic food consumption, plastic surgery, piercing and

tattoo, etc. – is to establish its own body as a fetish which masks death (Öğüt, 2016: 183). In this sense, contrary to Agamben's assertion, the modern biopolitical power mechanism is not only shaped by the process of sovereignty; but also, the processes and practices that this thesis conceptualises as self-biopoliticisation, which is not imposed upon subject and is regarded as value (healthy life, long life, security etc.), also accompany. The claim of this thesis, which previously expressed the need for Foucault and Agamben to be considered together, is complemented by a biopolitical analysis that will include these voluntary processes and practices. What is particularly to be considered here is how people can act in accordance with the governmental structure in which they are, without any coercion of the sovereign power with the capacity to kill. Foucault's critical concept here is the “technologies of the self”.

4.2. FOUCAULT'S ACCOUNT OF THE TECHNOLOGIES OF SELF AND SELF-BIOPOLITICISATION

According to Foucault, since a new model of power was put into practice, together with the changes occurring in the governmental reason, by using the new information systems, the existence of more detailed tactics and technologies on the subject became necessary (Kelly, 2009: 63). Thus, the techniques of singular or collective shaping, correction and orientation over the subject began to come to the forefront. Along with these techniques, technologies of self that operate on the mental and physical integrity of the subject have emerged.

In the direction of the general sense of the notion of governmentality, Foucault, since 1980, says that technologies of self (the means of operations that individuals carried out for the purpose of transforming themselves over their own bodies, souls, thoughts, and behaviours) must be examined more often than ever. Foucault, in *On the Government of Living* – the name of the lectures he gave in 1979-80, defines the government as “... mechanisms and procedures intended to conduct men, to direct their conduct, to conduct their conduct.” (Foucault, 2014: 12); so to speak, “conduct of conduct (Dean, 2010: 17). According to this

definition, government is specified as the government of children or consciences, a house, a state, or man himself.

Foucault can be shown as a thinker who first perceived the fact that the self is started to be seized from a previously unattainable depth level. The concept of "technologies of self" now shows us that it is the work of techniques to handle selfhood. It points to the automation of the control. Individuals participate in the control process by exhibiting their own behaviours. Modern technologies of self convince people to become healthy, successful, or desirable through happiness, perfection, wisdom, or practices that promise to ultimately rise to immortality (Coors, 2003: 284). The development of technologies of the self should not be thought separate from the processes of sovereignty created in economy and politics: it depends on the framework of the implications, roles, identities and analyses that are determined by the economic and political situation and develops together with them.

To sum up, these processes, in which bios is voluntarily reduced to zoe, do not find a response in Agamben's theory. When Schmitt's concept of political is taken into consideration instead of his theory of sovereignty, it will be seen that death is categorised as the enemy and life as the friend in the self-biopolitical period of time. At the same time, death is declared as de facto exception by the biopolitical power. The processes, Foucault explains through the concept of technology of the self, such as body building, organic food consumption, plastic surgery, yoga, morning sports, Pilates, make-up, diet and regular check-up etc. become popular in gated communities, therapy, and beauty centres. Accordingly, Agamben, in the context of the modern biopolitics, explains specifically the sovereignty processes of Foucault's triple mechanism of sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. When this included the Foucauldian discipline of the bodies and the governmental management that covers the technology of the self, a biopolitical analysis, which involves both the analysis of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century and the processes that this thesis conceptualises as 'self-biopoliticisation', was obtained.

CONCLUSION

The concept of biopolitics, which is being extensively explored in a broad range of fields from literature to architecture, from psychoanalysis to philosophy, has especially gained popularity since the 1970s. In political and social theory, the works of the French historian of ideas and philosopher Michel Foucault have shaped the main axis of the concept of biopolitics after him. According to Foucault, biopolitics symbolizes a departure from the classical form of sovereign power, symbolized by the sword, in political theory. Biopolitical power emerges with industrialization as a positive, productive, and efficient form of power, replacing the negative, prohibitive, and repressive form that retreated. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues that while Foucault's biopolitical studies encompass spaces such as prisons, schools, and hospitals, he particularly criticizes Foucault for neglecting the concentration camps of the 20th century. Agamben suggests that Foucault's theory needs to be completed or corrected to account for the significance of these spaces in the biopolitical context.

This brief context naturally leads to the following research questions:

- Is Foucault's analysis of biopolitics incomplete?
- Has Agamben been able to complement or correct it?
- Has Foucault not established a connection between biopolitics and sovereignty?
- Are there disciplinary processes in Agamben's theory?

To address these questions, this dissertation has initially examined a brief history of the concept of biopolitics. Subsequently, themes of biopolitics and sovereignty in Foucault's works were investigated, followed by an exploration of Agamben's claim to correct or complete Foucauldian biopolitics. Finally, the concept of self-biopoliticisation is introduced, emphasizing the need to correct or complete Agambenian biopolitics.

Within the structure of this thesis, I attempted to identify meaningful comparisons and contrasts using the method of comparative textual analysis. In doing so, I aimed to bring out key themes, concepts, arguments, and ultimately similarities or

differences in the texts of both Foucault and Agamben. This research design allowed me to conduct a thorough examination of the texts, enabling me to notice nuances. I included relevant passages in the thesis and consulted secondary sources and other commentators on the subject.

As a result of all these research questions and the research design, I initially clarified that the conceptual framework, from the conception of G. W. Harris who first coined the term biopolitics till Foucault's use of it which means a rupture in the history of the concept, is organismic, anthropological and naturalistic.

Harris refers to the characteristics of individuals who can take on public responsibilities with the increase in population and competition. According to this, balanced population growth is important; otherwise, an imbalance between the male and female population may occur.

Lemke and Esposito claim that the concept is first coined by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen. However, Harris had used it before. Kjellen explains biopolitics based on the logic of the state's self-preservation. The state is considered more as a living organism than a legal entity.

The relevant texts of Karl Binding and Eberhard Dennert adopt organismic, anthropological, and naturalistic approaches. Marley Roberts proposes a model of the biopolitical state, reminiscent of loose connections between parasite colonies and cells.

Foucault, on the other hand, first considers the concept in 1974, associating it directly with the body as a productive force in the development of capitalism. Later, he defines it as a new technology of power emerging in the second half of the 18th century: not the man as a body but the man as a species! During this period, he uses the terms biopolitics and bio-power interchangeably.

Biopower replacing the classical-judicial model is a set of mechanisms in which the fundamental biological feature of the human species becomes the object of political strategy.

Foucault considers the emergence of biopower as the threshold of modernity. Agamben disagrees, stating that the logic of biopolitics has already been included

since Ancient Greece by reducing human life into zoe and creating bare life by the sovereign power.

Agamben establishes a connection between biopolitics and sovereignty, claiming that the fundamental activity of sovereign power is to produce biopolitical body. He criticizes Foucault in his biopolitical theory for overlooking sovereignty, alleging that Foucault only focused on how power infiltrates the body and lifestyle. He asserts that Foucault did not analyse the concentration camps.

Foucault begins his exploration of biopolitical power mechanisms by initially addressing the sovereignty processes. In the classical period, sovereign power symbolizes itself with the sword, representing its capacity to kill. Starting from the second half of the 18th century, the management of bodies and the calculated governance of life begin to accompany this capacity. However, Foucault doesn't assert a replacement of sovereign power with biopower. He introduces the idea of the triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and government.

When examining the emergence of the prison, he discovers a different power practice than the paradigm of sovereignty. He states that individual bodies are harmonized with certain norms through techniques such as surveillance, monitoring, spatial arrangement, calculation, classification, and rationalization. All of these arise from an explosion in urban population due to industrialization. Bodies imagined as machines are expected to be efficient, obedient, and productive from the disciplinary power perspective. The Panopticon prison model represents the disciplinary society. In addition to disciplinary power, a new power technology is born: regulatory power (another name for biopolitics).

This does not exclude disciplinary power and is applied to humans as living beings instead of their bodies: the biopolitics of the human species! The fundamental focus is on birth-death rates, reproduction rates, population fertility, birth rates, death rates, and life expectancy.

The subject of biopolitics is simply "life." This new situation required to go beyond the traditional approach. In Foucault's thought, the population is not a legal or political entity but an independent biological structure. Management is now primarily the management of the population. There is no change from sovereign

power to government; there is just a shift in emphasis. Indeed, there is a new target, a new problem, and new techniques emerging.

The capacity to kill retreats but does not disappear. In this case, how will sovereign power kill? Foucault's answer to this is not clear. Agamben criticizes precisely at this point, stating that Foucault focuses on objectifying subjectivation processes and ignores the concentration camps.

Foucault does not examine biopolitics in the context of sovereignty, but he is not entirely turning away from sovereignty. While he initially claims that sovereignty is withdrawing, he later indicates that sovereignty is manifesting itself more sharply. He admits that his analysis of biopower is incomplete.

Agamben discovers an intersection in the life of the "homo sacer" between the biopolitical model of power and the traditional approach. He criticizes Foucault's interpretation of biopolitics as the threshold of modernity with the zoe - bios distinction, asserting that the zoe has been included as bare life in the domain of the polis/city since Ancient Greece. He states that the production of biopolitical bodies is the fundamental activity of sovereign power. Bare life has been captured by sovereign power through an inclusion in the form of exclusion. He explains this capture through the concepts of the state of exception and the zone of indistinction. In Agamben's theory, the focus is not on biopower but on body's capacity to be killed.

Zoe corresponds to bare life whereas bios corresponds to politically qualified life and while the politically qualified life, namely, way of life is included in the legal or normative sphere, bare life is exposed to be excluded. The figure of homo sacer exemplifies this exact nexus in ancient Roman law, representing an individual who has been excluded from the normal legal and political protections granted to citizens. That is to say that homo sacer is the symbol of pure practice of bare life. The sovereign power here decides on what is bare life or sacred, political or non-political. This decision shows that the foundation of sovereignty is biopolitical because it is a decision of exclusion regarding life itself.

Homo sacer is not the subject of law, but all the citizens to whom the normal legal and political protections are granted can be reduced to the position of homo sacer.

That is achieved with decision of exception. In fact, Carl Schmitt states that the sovereign is he who decides on the exception.

Agamben indicates that the exception becomes the rule, however, in Schmitt, the dialectic between norm and exception persists. The Agambenian state of exception is based on the distinction between the political and legal, the public and private, life and norm. The state of exception is both within and outside the law.

Sovereign power intervenes in bare life through a biopolitical intervention, simultaneously including and excluding it in the political and legal order. The most illustrative site of this logic of inclusion and exclusion is the concentration camps. The camp is not so much an architectural structure like Foucault's panopticon but rather a metaphor for the transformation of types of power and is the modern biopolitical space of 20. century totalitarian states. It is a place where life is reduced to bare life. In the camp, bare life and law enter a zone of indistinction, and the exception becomes concrete. In this sense, the camp is where the state of exception has become the rule. It is a place where rights are suspended, such as detention areas at airports or refugee camps where immigrants are held.

Disciplinary processes do not find a place in Agamben's logic of the camp. While Agamben establishes a connection between biopolitics and sovereignty, he imparts a negative connotation to this biopolitical perspective. In contrast, Foucault's perspective is more positively charged. Therefore, they should be considered together. Foucault speaks of the triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and government, but he does not explain the mechanism of their interrelation. Additionally, Agamben's assertion that the camp replaces the city may lead to the fragility of sovereign power and to the meaninglessness due to the exaggeration of the scope of the camp. Therefore, Agamben is partially successful in establishing the connection between biopolitics and sovereignty, especially in explaining how the capacity to kill operates in biopolitical processes, but he does not touch upon disciplinary processes.

Agamben thinks that the spaces where camp practices operate are filled only with negative characteristics. However, Diken and Laustsen argue that gated

communities can be considered within the same framework as refugee camps. Weight loss centres and therapy centres, where the health turns into a privilege with their capacity for a direct intervention in the body, and efforts to prolong life and affirm a healthy lifestyle can be thought of in this context. Corporate buildings, catering to white-collar workers, replicate the logic of the camp. Security, information, and climate control technologies suspend the air, time, and chaos of the street. These spaces exist both inside and outside the city.

Agamben's theory does not include voluntary biopolitical processes and spaces where an external coercion is not visible. With the help of Schmitt's friend and enemy distinction, the notion of voluntary camp can be theorised. Since the enemy of biopolitical power is those who consume drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, society organizes itself against death. Health centres and gated communities are the results of this. The critical point here is that these types of structures are not imposed. The prohibitive camp has its counterpart in the voluntary camp. Even hunger strikes can be considered a voluntary camp. In cities, a practice of suspension operates, much like in a camp, where death is constantly sought to be suspended. Through practices such as yoga, morning exercises, Pilates, makeup, dieting, regular check-ups, tanning beds, bodybuilding, organic nutrition, and plastic surgeries, the death of the fetishized body is masked, attempting to reconstruct itself.

Modern biopolitical power mechanisms cannot be solely sovereignty-based; self-biopoliticisation is also at play. It involves processes and practices considered as values, not imposed on the subject.

This situation can be explained by another theoretical tool proposed by Foucault. Foucault, who believes that more detailed techniques and technologies arise over the subject, argues that new technologies targeting the integrity of mental and physical subjects have emerged. He talks about the concept of technologies of the self, referring to the tools that aim to transform individuals through their bodies, minds, thoughts, and behaviours. He also draws attention to the concept of governmentality which he summarizes as "the conduct of conduct," emphasizing the automatization of the control of the self.

Modern technologies persuade individuals to be healthy, successful, or desirable. They achieve this through tools leading to happiness, virtue, excellence, or immortality. Agamben's theory does not explain the processes and spaces that voluntarily reduce bios to zoe through the governmentality and technologies of the self. With a Schmittian perspective, if death is positioned as the enemy and life as the friend, self-biopolitical processes become clearer.

Agamben associates sovereignty with biopolitics. If Foucault's discipline of bodies and governmental regulation is included, a biopolitical analysis that combines concentration camps and self-biopolitical processes is obtained.



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